Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Lincoln Lee Lankford v. Gregory Kevin Cline
COA09
In Lankford v. Cline, the plaintiff’s live petition alleged a stand-alone assault and battery claim, along with conspiracy-related and other derivative theories. The defendant filed a no-evidence summary-judgment motion under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i), but the motion challenged only conspiracy, aiding-and-abetting, theft, attorney’s fees, and exemplary-damages predicates. The Beaumont Court of Appeals compared the live pleading to the motion and held that a no-evidence motion must expressly identify the elements of the specific claim being attacked. Because the motion never challenged the elements of direct assault, the trial court could not grant summary judgment on that claim. The court reversed and remanded as to assault, while affirming the judgment on the claims actually addressed in the motion.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family cases that include tort-style claims, do not assume a no-evidence motion aimed at one theory will dispose of every related claim. Match the motion to the live pleading claim by claim and element by element. If a stand-alone claim like assault, conversion, or fraud is not expressly challenged, summary judgment on that claim is vulnerable on appeal."
Bernard v. State
COA02
In Bernard v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed child-sexual-assault convictions and rejected the defendant’s evidentiary and procedural complaints. The main dispute was whether certain testimony from the investigating officer amounted to inadmissible backdoor hearsay—specifically, testimony explaining why no SANE exam occurred and testimony that no suspect other than the defendant had been identified. The court held the first statement could reasonably serve a nonhearsay purpose by explaining an investigative omission rather than proving the truth of the out-of-court statement, and it emphasized that backdoor-hearsay analysis turns on whether the sole intent was to place the substance of the statement before the factfinder. As to both challenged statements, the court also relied heavily on harmless-error principles because materially similar evidence came in elsewhere without objection. The court likewise found no reversible Confrontation Clause, leading-question, jury-readback, or cumulative-error issue, largely because preservation, deference to trial-court discretion, and lack of harm defeated the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Not every indirect reference to what a child or witness said is hearsay. If testimony genuinely explains why an investigator, CPS worker, counselor, or other professional took—or did not take—a particular step, a court may treat it as nonhearsay context rather than an improper backdoor outcry. But the bigger lesson for family-law litigators is preservation and consistency: make targeted hearsay objections, force the proponent to state the nonhearsay purpose, and object every time similar evidence is offered, because once the same point comes in elsewhere without objection, any appellate complaint is likely dead on harm."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Sherry Ann Kreiling and Derrie James Kreiling
COA07
In Kreiling, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the trial court rendered judgment at the end of the divorce trial when it orally announced a full, final, present disposition of all remaining issues after the parties placed most settlement terms on the record. Because rendition occurred then, the wife could not later revoke her consent before the written decree was signed. The court also rejected her Rule 301 challenge, concluding the decree conformed to the parties’ agreement and the court’s oral rendition, and it would not revisit conservatorship based on post-hearing events raised only in objections to entry. The final divorce decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a Texas divorce judge clearly disposes of every issue from the bench, treat that oral pronouncement as the judgment. After oral rendition, a party generally cannot undo an in-court settlement by withdrawing consent, and new facts arising later usually require a different procedural remedy—not opposition to signing a decree that matches the rendition."
In the Matter of J.C.
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed orders waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring J.C. to criminal district court after three alleged aggravated sexual assaults. Applying Texas Family Code § 54.02, the court held the evidence was factually sufficient to support the finding that the welfare of the community required criminal proceedings. The court emphasized the violent, repeated nature of the assaults, J.C.’s removal of his ankle monitor, prior misconduct, threats, detention violence, and expert testimony that he posed above-average danger and had below-average amenability to treatment. Although J.C. had an extremely low IQ and some potential to benefit from treatment, the court concluded those facts did not outweigh the evidence of dangerousness, escalation, and weak rehabilitation prospects.
Litigation Takeaway
"Low IQ, youth, or diagnosable impairment will not by themselves defeat a protection-forward ruling when the record shows repeated violence, escalation, supervision failures, and poor treatment prospects. In family-law cases, lawyers should build or rebut restriction requests with concrete evidence of pattern conduct, risk, compliance history, and whether available services can realistically protect others."
Alper Uzmezler v. Ekim Stevens
COA03
In Uzmezler v. Stevens, the husband challenged a divorce property division that valued Anka Labs, a closely held technology business with significant intellectual-property assets, at $1.5 million based on the wife’s expert testimony. The Austin Court of Appeals held that the trial court acted within its broad discretion because both sides presented competent valuation evidence using recognized methodologies, and the trial judge was entitled to resolve the conflict by crediting the wife’s expert’s IP-focused analysis over the husband’s lower valuation. Because the adopted value was within the range of the evidence and supported by substantive and probative testimony, the valuation and resulting just-and-right division were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Business-valuation fights in divorce are usually won at trial, not on appeal. When both sides offer facially valid expert opinions, the trial court can choose either one, especially if the selected value falls within the evidentiary range. To have a real appellate issue, counsel must build and preserve specific challenges to methodology, reliability, assumptions, and findings—not just argue that the other side’s number was too high."
In the Matter of J.C.
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed orders transferring J.C. from juvenile court to criminal district court for three aggravated sexual assault cases. J.C. argued that his extremely low IQ and below-grade-level functioning weighed against transfer, but the court held the evidence was factually sufficient under Texas Family Code § 54.02 because the record showed repeated violent offenses against persons, strong DNA and identification evidence, absconding from supervision, detention misconduct, substance abuse, and expert testimony that he posed an above-average danger and was below-average in amenability to treatment. The court concluded that J.C.’s intellectual limitations were relevant but did not outweigh the seriousness of the offenses, his background, and the community-safety concerns supporting waiver of juvenile jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"When safety is the core issue, courts may give greater weight to concrete conduct, failed supervision, and expert risk testimony than to mitigation evidence like low IQ or developmental limitations. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a record around specific dangerous acts, compliance history, escalation, and realistic treatment prospects rather than relying on diagnoses alone."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Mary Brennan and John Jefferey Ralston
COA13
In Brennan v. Ralston, the wife tried to set aside a divorce mediated settlement agreement before entry of the final decree, arguing she agreed without full disclosure of marital assets tied to the husband’s LLC interests. The court held the trial court properly denied that request because the wife offered no admissible evidence to prove concealment, fraud, or any other recognized basis to avoid enforcement. Her expert affidavit was excluded as hearsay when the expert did not testify, and attorney argument alone was not evidence. With the husband presenting testimony that discovery had been made available and no assets were hidden, the trial court acted within its discretion in enforcing the MSA and signing the final decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to undo a Texas divorce MSA, treat the hearing like a trial: bring live witnesses, admit exhibits, and prove a recognized ground such as fraud or concealment. Suspicion, discovery frustration, and excluded affidavits will not defeat an otherwise compliant MSA."
Rice v. State
COA05
In Rice v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support a misdemeanor assault bodily-injury conviction arising from a custody exchange. The complainant testified Rice struck her arm while she was holding her phone, that the contact hurt immediately, and that she had soreness and tenderness for about a day to a day and a half. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court deferred to the jury’s role in resolving credibility disputes and weighing conflicting evidence, including video, photographs, and testimony suggesting Rice may have swatted only the phone. The court reiterated that bodily injury under Texas law includes any physical pain, however minor, and does not require bruising, bleeding, or medical treatment. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law-related violence allegations, minimal evidence of pain can be enough to support a bodily-injury finding, especially when paired with video, photos, or contemporaneous reporting. Lawyers should treat exchange incidents seriously: absent bruising or medical care is not dispositive, and credibility, corroboration, and careful record-building often decide the case."
In the Interest of Y.N.P., a Child
COA13
In *In re Y.N.P.*, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed appointment of foster parents as permanent managing conservators over Father, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to overcome the parental presumption in Texas Family Code § 153.131. Although Father completed services and had agency support, the court focused on unresolved severe injuries to a sibling in the same household, Father’s lack of candor with investigators, his continued cohabitation and alignment with Mother, and the weakness of his proposed safety plan. The court emphasized that a nonparent cannot defeat the parental presumption merely by offering a better placement, but here the record supported a finding that appointing Father would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development. The court also rejected Father’s constitutional complaint and standing challenge, and affirmed the judgment in full.
Litigation Takeaway
"The key lesson is that nonparents must prove impairment, not just superiority. Evidence of stability, bonding, and better services helps only after the statutory threshold is met; the real battleground is whether placing the child with the parent would create a significant risk of physical or emotional harm. For parents, service-plan completion alone may not carry the day if they remain aligned with the person tied to the danger or cannot present a credible safety plan."
In the Matter of J.C.
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed orders waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring J.C. to criminal district court after holding the evidence was factually sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that the welfare of the community required criminal proceedings under Texas Family Code § 54.02. The court weighed the statutory transfer factors and emphasized that the alleged offenses were multiple violent aggravated sexual assaults against persons, supported by surveillance and strong DNA evidence. Although J.C. presented evidence of very low intellectual functioning and treatment needs, the court concluded those facts did not outweigh evidence of escalating misconduct, detention violence, runaway behavior, threats, substance abuse, and expert testimony that J.C. posed a high risk of violent reoffending and had below-average amenability to treatment. Because the transfer finding was not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, the court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Serious safety findings usually survive appeal when the record combines objective corroboration, a pattern of escalating misconduct, and expert testimony linking past behavior to future danger. Cognitive limitations or diagnoses alone will not defeat a transfer, custody, or protective-risk finding without a concrete treatment and supervision plan showing the person can be managed safely."