Opinion Library

In the Interest of C.S. Jr. and Z.S., Children

SCOTX

The Texas Supreme Court held that Family Code § 263.401(a) is strictly jurisdictional: if trial does not begin by the dismissal date and no extension is actually granted before that date, the case is automatically dismissed by operation of law. In this termination case, the trial judge said she was 'going to have to grant' an extension and asked counsel to submit an extension order before the deadline, but no order was signed and no other operative ruling granting an extension was made before the dismissal date. The Court analyzed the judge’s statements as expressing future intent rather than a present judicial act, concluded jurisdiction expired on the statutory deadline, and vacated the trial court’s termination judgment and the court of appeals’ judgment as void for want of jurisdiction.

Litigation Takeaway

"Do not rely on a judge’s anticipated ruling when a jurisdictional deadline is approaching. If continued jurisdiction depends on an extension or other time-sensitive ruling, make sure the record shows the court actually granted it before the deadline through a clear oral ruling, docket entry, and preferably a signed written order."

In the Interest of K.N., K.L., K.L., and K.L., Children

SCOTX

The Texas Supreme Court held that termination for endangerment under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) must be proven separately as to each parent by clear-and-convincing, legally and factually sufficient evidence. The Court rejected an approach that treated the family’s overall dysfunction as enough to terminate both parents’ rights. It upheld termination as to one parent because the record showed direct abuse allegations, visible injuries, threats against a reporter, obstruction of the investigation, refusal of services, and failure to address known safety risks. But it reversed as to the other parent because the evidence was too generalized and relied too heavily on association with the abusive household rather than parent-specific proof of knowing placement, knowing allowance, or endangering conduct.

Litigation Takeaway

"Serious parental restrictions and termination findings require parent-specific proof. If you want relief against a particular parent, build a record showing exactly what that parent did, knew, allowed, or refused to do—not just that the household was chaotic or another parent was abusive."

In re S.H.

SCOTX

In In re S.H., the Supreme Court of Texas held that an indigent parent in a Department-filed termination of parental rights case is not restricted to representation only by court-appointed counsel under Family Code § 107.013(a)(1). After the trial court appointed counsel for S.H., a lawyer from the Harris County Public Defender’s Office appeared as S.H.’s chosen counsel and sought substitution. The trial court denied substitution and sua sponte removed the public defender, reasoning that the office lacked authority to appear in the civil termination case and had usurped the court’s appointment power. The Supreme Court rejected that view, explaining that the statute guarantees appointed counsel for indigent parents but does not make appointed counsel exclusive. The Court further held that free representation by outside counsel does not amount to a judicial appointment and does not interfere with the trial court’s indigence determination or appointment authority. Because the trial court’s removal order functioned as a disqualification of chosen counsel, mandamus was the proper remedy. The Court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the removal order.

Litigation Takeaway

"A Texas family court cannot use its power to appoint counsel as a reason to block a parent’s qualified counsel of choice. In TPR and other family cases, if outside counsel—such as a public defender, nonprofit lawyer, or pro bono attorney—appears for a party, the key question is whether that lawyer is appearing as chosen counsel rather than claiming a court appointment. If a trial court effectively removes that lawyer without a valid disqualification basis, mandamus may be the fastest and strongest remedy."

In the Interest of P.A., Jr., L.L.-A., and S.A., Children

COA06

The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and on best interest. The court relied on evidence of repeated methamphetamine use, multiple refused or missed drug tests, failure to complete treatment and court-ordered services, instability, and unsafe parental decision-making, including Mother’s association with a dangerous individual. The court held that this pattern supported findings that the children were exposed to endangering conditions and that the parents engaged in a continuing course of endangering conduct. The children’s success in a safe kinship placement supported the best-interest finding. As to Mother, the court also noted that unchallenged predicate findings under Section 161.001(b)(1)(I) and (P) independently supported affirmance.

Litigation Takeaway

"In Texas child-related cases, courts can infer endangerment from a pattern of drug use, test avoidance, service-plan noncompliance, and unsafe associates even without one dramatic harmful event. For trial lawyers, small facts build a powerful endangerment record; for appellate lawyers, failing to challenge every predicate ground can forfeit the appeal."

In the Interest of H.S., B.S., and M.S., Children

SCOTX

In In re H.S., the Supreme Court of Texas held the evidence was legally insufficient to support termination of Mother’s parental rights because the Department proved troubling circumstances, but not by clear and convincing evidence that termination itself was in the children’s best interest. The record showed Mother’s trauma history, delayed service-plan compliance, drug use, and ongoing connection to an abusive Father, but it also showed a strong parent-child bond, Mother’s reporting of Father’s violence, and evidence that the children deteriorated after removal and suspension of visitation. The Court emphasized that best interest is an independent requirement under Family Code section 161.001, that preserving the parent-child relationship is strongly presumed to be in the child’s best interest, and that termination is a last resort rather than a default response to family dysfunction. The Court affirmed termination as to Father, but reversed and rendered judgment denying termination as to Mother.

Litigation Takeaway

"Evidence that justifies intervention, restrictions, or supervised contact does not automatically justify termination. In any case involving abuse, trauma, drug use, or poor parental choices, lawyers must build a record explaining why the requested remedy is proportionate; if the goal is termination, the proof must show by clear and convincing evidence why lesser alternatives are inadequate and why permanent severance truly serves the child’s best interest."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Porter v. State

COA08

In Porter v. State, the El Paso Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to a criminal defendant’s jury-trial waiver because the appellant failed to provide the reporter’s record from the hearing where the waiver occurred. The court held that under article 1.13 and ordinary appellate principles, the appellant bears the burden to present a record affirmatively showing error; when the record is silent or incomplete, a signed written waiver and judgment recitations support the presumption of regularity and defeat the complaint. The opinion also approved admission of an eyewitness’s near-immediate description of a violent assault as an excited utterance, offering a useful evidentiary framework for admitting prompt family-violence statements in civil family-law cases.

Litigation Takeaway

"Two practical lessons: first, appeals attacking a waiver, stipulation, or procedure usually fail without a complete record of the operative hearing, so preserve and order every relevant transcript. Second, in family-violence cases, early stress-driven statements to officers or other witnesses can often come in as excited utterances if timing, stress, and connection to the event are well developed."

Child Custody

Headrick v. State

COA05

In Headrick v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed an order adjudicating guilt after the State alleged the defendant violated a no-contact supervision condition by emailing his daughter from her own account. The court held that any complaint that the petition to adjudicate was too vague was not preserved because Headrick did not file a motion to quash. On the merits, the court applied the revocation standard requiring proof by only a preponderance of the evidence and concluded circumstantial evidence was enough to identify Headrick as the sender: the email referenced a shared Wordle routine, he had previously used the daughter’s account in that way, he had access to a logged-in device, and the trial court was entitled to credit the daughter’s testimony and reject his alternative explanation. The court also rejected his disproportionality challenge and affirmed the judgments.

Litigation Takeaway

"In Texas family cases involving protective orders, custody restrictions, or no-contact provisions, judges can infer digital contact from circumstantial evidence without direct forensic proof. Build the record around device access, account history, message patterns, timing, and credibility—and if an enforcement or revocation pleading is vague, object early or the complaint may be waived."

Appeal and Mandamus

Kai Nonamé v. Nicholas Denbrock

COA03

In this SAPCR-related appeal, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay certain court costs after she filed a Rule 145 statement of inability to afford costs, even though the scheduled contest hearing was effectively cancelled when she did not appear and no reporter’s record was made. The Austin Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f) requires more than notice and a conclusory order: before requiring payment, the trial court must conduct an oral evidentiary hearing on the record and enter detailed findings showing the litigant can afford the costs without sacrificing basic necessities. Because the record showed no preserved evidentiary hearing and the findings were not sufficiently detailed, the court abated the appeal and remanded for a compliant hearing and findings.

Litigation Takeaway

"Rule 145 shortcuts will not hold up on appeal. If a family-law court is going to require payment of filing, record, or other court costs, counsel must ensure there is an on-the-record evidentiary hearing and detailed affordability findings—even if the declarant fails to appear. For practitioners, the lesson is simple: make the Rule 145 record, prove or challenge actual affordability, and do not rely on bare docket entries or conclusory orders."

Child Custody

In the Interest of L.E.-N.N., C.J.W. and C.R.W., Children

COA05

In this Dallas SAPCR appeal, Mother argued the trial court erred by trying the case to the bench after she had requested a jury. The court held that filing a jury demand perfects the right to a jury but does not, by itself, preserve appellate error. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and prior Dallas precedent, the court focused on the trial record: when the case was called, Mother did not appear, her counsel appeared and participated, and neither Mother nor counsel objected to proceeding without a jury. Because no timely, specific objection was made when the court conducted the non-jury trial, any complaint about denial of a jury trial was waived. The court therefore affirmed the final SAPCR order appointing conservators and restricting Mother’s access.

Litigation Takeaway

"A jury demand is not self-executing error preservation. In Texas family cases, if the court proceeds without a jury, counsel must object on the record then and there—even if the client is absent, difficult, or claiming to proceed pro se—or the jury-trial complaint is likely waived on appeal."

Appeal and Mandamus

Headrick v. State

COA05

In Headrick v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defendant waived any complaint that the State’s motion to adjudicate was too vague because he never filed a motion to quash in the trial court. The State alleged only that Headrick had made contact with his daughter in violation of a no-contact condition of deferred adjudication, and on appeal he argued that the pleading lacked enough detail to give adequate notice. The court did not reach the merits of that notice argument, instead applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and longstanding revocation precedent requiring a timely motion to quash to preserve pleading-specificity complaints. The court also upheld the adjudication on the merits, concluding the daughter’s testimony and surrounding circumstances were sufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Headrick made the prohibited contact, and it rejected the disproportionality challenge to the within-range sentences.

Litigation Takeaway

"If an enforcement, contempt, modification, or other family-law pleading is too vague to let your client prepare a defense, do not save that complaint for appeal. File a specific motion to quash, special exception, or other targeted objection in the trial court and get a ruling, because notice defects that could have been cured will usually be treated as waived."