Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
723 opinions found
Daniel Matthew Bible v. The State of Texas
COA03
In this criminal appeal with family-law crossover implications, the defendant challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting an indecency-with-a-child-by-contact conviction as to alleged “breast” touching. Although the complainant initially answered “No” when asked directly whether her breast was touched and described the contact as stopping at the “bra line,” the court reviewed the entire record under the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and deferred to the jury’s role as factfinder. The jury saw the complainant demonstrate the hand movement across her chest and reviewed an admitted body diagram she highlighted to show the area touched. A forensic interviewer testified that the complainant’s “bra line” demonstration included the breast, and a forensic nurse explained that young children have breast tissue and that the highlighted area encompassed the breasts. Considering the demonstrations, diagram, and corroborating contextual evidence, the Third Court of Appeals held a rational juror could find breast contact beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Don’t assume a witness’s damaging sound-bite answer (e.g., “No, he didn’t touch my breast”) defeats an abuse allegation when the testimony includes location descriptors (“bra line”), in-court demonstrations, and marked diagrams. Courts can treat demonstrative evidence—especially when supported by CAC/forensic interviewer and medical testimony—as enough to prove anatomically specific contact, and factfinders may credit that totality over semantic inconsistencies. In custody/protective-order litigation, build (or attack) the foundation and clarity of diagrams/gestures and the “translator” testimony that links imprecise language to legally significant anatomy."
In the Matter of X.M., a Juvenile
COA12
In a Texas juvenile determinate-sentence case, X.M. attempted to appeal a December 2, 2019 adjudication and disposition order committing the juvenile to TJJD by filing a pro se notice of appeal on February 24, 2026—more than six years late. The Twelfth Court of Appeals analyzed the mandatory appellate timetables under TRAP 26.1 (deadline to file notice of appeal) and TRAP 26.3 (15-day grace period requiring both a notice of appeal and a timely motion for extension). Because neither a timely notice nor a timely extension request was filed within the rule-based windows, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction. The court also rejected any request to “fix” the problem by suspending the rules, holding TRAP 2 cannot be used to alter the time to perfect an appeal in a civil case. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction under TRAP 42.3(a) and overruled pending motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appellate deadlines are jurisdictional: if you miss the TRAP 26.1 notice-of-appeal deadline (and the narrow TRAP 26.3 grace period), the court of appeals cannot reach the merits—no matter how compelling the circumstances. In family-law cases with accelerated timetables, calendar the signing date immediately, file the notice early when in doubt, and do a “jurisdiction audit” before evaluating appellate issues."
Jose Guevara-Molina v. The State of Texas
COA04
In this Texas criminal appeal, the defendant challenged six convictions for knowing possession of child pornography found on his cell phone, arguing the State failed to prove he knowingly possessed the images and separately complaining about admission of message screenshots. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and Texas Penal Code § 43.26’s “care, custody, control, or management + knowledge” concept, the Fourth Court of Appeals treated the proof as a combined-force, circumstantial-evidence case: (1) the phone was seized from the defendant’s person and he admitted it was his (including the number and length of ownership), supporting control of the device; (2) a forensic extraction located the images in multiple locations on the phone, including a user-restricted “private folder,” supporting an inference of knowing retention rather than accidental presence; and (3) the defendant’s admissions (including identifying the child depicted) and related message traffic supported knowledge of the images’ existence and character. The court rejected the argument that the State had to prove he created, saved, moved, or viewed the files. On the evidentiary issue, the court held the complaint was waived because trial counsel objected on hearsay grounds, but on appeal argued lack of authentication; the appellate theory did not comport with the trial objection under Texas preservation rules. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any case turning on “digital possession” (including SAPCR and protective-order hearings), you can prove control and knowledge without a smoking-gun admission by stacking: device nexus (seized from person/owned), forensic artifacts in multiple locations (especially secure/private folders), and contextual admissions/messages. And if you want appellate leverage, object on the right ground—mislabeling an authentication problem as “hearsay” can waive your best issue."
In the Interest of A.I.M.H., S.R.V. Jr., and F.K.V., Children
COA04
In a Department-initiated termination suit, both parents challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination. The Fourth Court of Appeals reviewed the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and termination sufficiency frameworks (legal sufficiency: view evidence favorably to the finding and defer to credibility determinations; factual sufficiency: consider the whole record and whether disputed evidence is so significant that a firm belief could not be formed). The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support predicate grounds—especially endangerment and continued controlled-substance use coupled with refusal/failure to complete treatment—based on Mother’s admissions of frequent methamphetamine and marijuana use, physical evidence of methamphetamine, and an extensive drug-test history (33 positives out of 36 requests, including shortly before trial), along with service-plan noncompliance and untreated mental-health concerns. As to Father, the court affirmed termination and rejected his best-interest challenge, emphasizing his refusal to drug test and meaningfully engage in services, unmanaged mental-health issues (including self-medicating with street-obtained pills), unstable housing/employment, and the children’s trauma responses tied to domestic-violence risk factors. Weighing the chronic, unresolved risk factors against the children’s stability and progress in the maternal grandmother’s home and her intent to adopt, the court upheld the trial court’s best-interest finding and affirmed termination of both parents’ rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination (and high-stakes custody) cases are won on patterns, not episodes: repeated positive/missed drug tests, refusal or discharge from treatment, unmanaged mental health, and ongoing domestic-violence risk factors can establish endangerment and drive the best-interest analysis. Document the services offered and the parent’s noncompliance, and contrast ongoing instability with the child’s progress and permanency in a stable placement—late, last-minute re-engagement is often too little, too late."
In the Interest of M.Z. and M.C.Z., Children
COA05
In a Dallas County divorce after a 23-year marriage, the community estate included the husband’s executive deferred-compensation “performance units,” which would pay only upon future contingent events (e.g., IPO, dividend, sale) and could be forfeited. The only valuation evidence was uncontroverted expert CPA testimony that the units had no presently ascertainable fair market value as of trial, but were not worthless and could be divided in kind. The trial court nevertheless treated the units as 100% community property, awarded 100% of them to the husband, and assigned a $0 value in the just-and-right division. Applying the abuse-of-discretion framework with embedded legal-sufficiency review under Texas Family Code § 7.001, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that evidence showing “no current calculable FMV” does not support a finding of “no value,” and the record contained no affirmative evidence that the units were worthless. Because the performance units were a material portion of the community estate, the erroneous $0 valuation tainted the overall division. The court reversed the property division and remanded for a new, proper division of the community estate (affirming the divorce otherwise).
Litigation Takeaway
"Contingent does not mean worthless. If an asset can’t be reliably valued today (executive compensation, earnouts, carried interests, options), a court cannot simply assign $0 without evidence of actual worthlessness—especially if it awards the entire asset to one spouse. Build a record that either (1) proves worthlessness, or (2) supports a division-in-kind or other non-speculative mechanism, and tie any valuation error to overall “just and right” harm when the asset is material."
In re E.R.F.
COA04
In a parentage action, the alleged father nonsuited his petition and the trial court signed an order granting the nonsuit. Because the mother had not filed any counterclaim or other pleading seeking affirmative relief at the time of the nonsuit, the nonsuit extinguished the case. Under Rule 329b, the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction expired 30 days after the signed nonsuit order. The mother later filed a motion for temporary orders and the trial court held a hearing and orally announced temporary possession-and-access rulings, later reducing them to a written temporary order. The Fourth Court of Appeals held the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue any substantive temporary possession/access orders after plenary power expired; both the oral pronouncements and the later written temporary orders were void. The court granted mandamus relief and ordered the void temporary orders set aside.
Litigation Takeaway
"A nonsuit is a hard jurisdictional stop: if the opposing party has not already filed a live claim for affirmative relief, the case is over and the court cannot issue post-dismissal temporary custody/possession orders once plenary power runs. To preserve (or obtain) temporary relief, get an affirmative counterclaim on file before the nonsuit—or file a new SAPCR/parentage case. Void post-plenary orders are immediately mandamusable without proving an inadequate appellate remedy."
In re Miranda Fredenberg
COA12
In a SAPCR modification case, the mother sought mandamus/prohibition arguing a retired visiting judge lost authority to act once the trial court’s plenary power expired because the assignment order carried forward only “until plenary power has expired.” After the modification order was signed, the visiting judge signed an income withholding order (IWO) after plenary power expired and scheduled/reset hearings on other post‑judgment motions. The Tyler Court of Appeals applied the mandamus standard (clear abuse of discretion and no adequate appellate remedy) and analyzed (1) the distinction between plenary power over the merits and the court’s continuing enforcement jurisdiction, and (2) the scope of the visiting judge’s assignment. The court held the post‑plenary IWO was not void because it functioned as an enforcement tool contemplated by the modification order and authorized by Texas Family Code § 158.102, which allows withholding to issue until support/arrearages are paid. As to other post‑judgment matters, the record did not show the visiting judge ruled on them outside his authority before the presiding administrative judge issued an amended assignment expressly granting authority to handle post‑judgment proceedings going forward. Mandamus and prohibition were denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"Plenary power expiring does not necessarily end a court’s ability to issue support-enforcement instruments like an income withholding order—especially when the final SAPCR order anticipates withholding and the Family Code authorizes it. If you plan to attack a visiting judge’s post‑judgment authority, you must build a precise record of what was signed and when, and move quickly because an amended assignment can prospectively cure assignment-scope problems."
In the Interest of C.R., a Child
COA04
In a Guadalupe County divorce, the mother alleged a history or pattern of family violence/abuse/neglect and sought to be appointed sole managing conservator with the father denied possession and access (or, alternatively, supervised access). A jury trial on conservatorship resulted in findings (under a preponderance standard in the charge) that the mother should be sole managing conservator and that the father should not be appointed a possessory conservator. At the charge conference, the father affirmatively stated he had “no objections.” The trial court then rendered a decree appointing the mother sole managing conservator and denying the father any possession or access, with findings that access would endanger the child and was not in the child’s best interest. On appeal, the father argued the preponderance instruction was unconstitutional because a no-access decree is “tantamount to termination” and should require clear-and-convincing evidence, and also contended the submission improperly asked the jury to decide an impermissible “term or condition” of possession/access under Tex. Fam. Code § 105.002(c)(2)(B). The Fourth Court treated both arguments as unpreserved jury-charge complaints: by stating “no objections,” the father waived charge error, and the court declined to apply fundamental-error review, noting that even in actual termination cases the Supreme Court requires preservation and that conservatorship orders—unlike termination—remain modifiable (distinguishing cases like *Stary* tied to protective orders). The court further concluded the jury was asked to decide conservatorship status (permissible), and because the jury refused to place the father in any conservatorship role, the trial court properly denied possession and access as a consequence of that status determination. The decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a conservatorship submission sets up a potential “no access” outcome, you must preserve error at the charge conference—object to the burden of proof and the form of the questions and obtain rulings. Saying “no objections” will almost certainly waive appellate review, and courts will not rescue the issue by rebranding it as fundamental error or “de facto termination.”"
Andy Jerome Williams v. The State of Texas
COA09
In a drug-trafficking prosecution arising from cocaine found in a concealed “trap” in a truck the defendant was driving, the defendant sought to shift blame to a third party (the truck’s insured) by offering evidence that the third party was arrested about ten months later for a similar, high-quantity cocaine offense with sophisticated concealment. The trial court excluded the third party’s later arrest under Texas Rule of Evidence 403, finding the time gap and attenuated connection created only marginal probative value while inviting juror confusion and a distracting “mini-trial” about the unrelated arrest. The Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding alternative-perpetrator evidence must have a sufficiently direct nexus to the charged event; thematic similarity and a loose association to the vehicle were not enough. The court further held the exclusion did not violate the constitutional right to present a complete defense because standard evidentiary limits, applied neutrally, may bar speculative third-party culpability theories.
Litigation Takeaway
"“Someone else did it” evidence is admissible only if you can show a concrete, case-specific connection to the incident at issue. Remote-in-time arrests or similar bad acts of a third person—without direct nexus (access, control, presence, digital/financial connectors, etc.)—are prime candidates for exclusion under Rule 403 as confusing, time-consuming, and minimally probative, and their exclusion generally will not amount to a constitutional denial of a defense."
Melvin Orlando Guevara Jr. v. The State of Texas
COA12
In this capital murder appeal, the Twelfth Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant's self-serving statements during a police interview were admissible under hearsay exceptions. The defendant, who killed a man after breaking into a home to confront an ex-girlfriend, attempted to introduce his own custodial statements—claiming he was intoxicated, remorseful, and didn't mean to hurt anyone—under the 'excited utterance' and 'mental state' exceptions. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that these statements were inadmissible hearsay. The court also ruled that defense counsel’s decision not to cross-examine a key witness could be a valid trial strategy and that a lesser-included offense instruction was not required because there was no evidence the defendant was guilty only of murder rather than capital murder.
Litigation Takeaway
"You generally cannot use your own out-of-court statements (like police interviews or body-cam footage) to prove your innocence or 'state of mind' in court; to get your side of the story into evidence, you must typically testify live and face cross-examination."