Opinion Library

Property Division

Ofelia Rincon, Brigida Guzman, Hilario S. Dominguez, and Andrew Dominguez, Sr. v. Nellie Ramirez

COA03

In Rincon v. Ramirez, a title dispute turned on whether Travis County property acquired through a 1968 contract for deed was community property or the surviving wife’s separate property after legal title was conveyed to her alone in 2001. The Austin Court of Appeals applied Texas’s inception-of-title doctrine and held that characterization is fixed when the spouses first acquire the claim of right under the executory contract, not when a later deed transfers legal title. Because Cruz and Manuela Dominguez entered the contract for deed during marriage, the appellee could not conclusively prove as a matter of law that the property was Manuela’s separate property. The court reversed the summary judgment on the trespass-to-try-title and quiet-title claims and remanded the case.

Litigation Takeaway

"Do not let the deed date drive characterization. In Texas family and probate-related property disputes, a contract for deed or other executory real-estate agreement signed during marriage can fix community-property character long before legal title issues, and a party moving for summary judgment must conclusively address inception of title—not just later deed delivery."

Bernardo Diaz v. Delia Cavazos-Gamez

COA13

In this original proceeding, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule 202 cannot be used as broad presuit discovery to identify actors and obtain documents without strict compliance with Rule 202.4. The petitioner sought presuit depositions and six categories of documents relating to a campaign mailer, and the trial court granted the request while also denying a motion to dismiss. The appellate court emphasized that Rule 202 is a narrow, ancillary remedy requiring an evidentiary basis and express findings that either the deposition may prevent a failure or delay of justice in an anticipated suit or that the likely benefit outweighs the burden and expense when investigating a potential claim. Because the order rested on insufficient evidentiary support and formulaic recitations rather than the required substantive showing, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief vacating the Rule 202 order and dismissed the related appeal as moot.

Litigation Takeaway

"Rule 202 is not a presuit fishing license. In family-law-adjacent disputes involving sensitive financial, medical, school, mental-health, or business records, a party seeking presuit discovery must offer actual evidence supporting the specific Rule 202.4 findings; bare suspicion and broad document requests are not enough. If a trial court orders Rule 202 discovery without that strict showing, mandamus should be considered immediately because the disclosure cannot be undone."

Bernardo Diaz v. Delia Cavazos-Gamez

COA13

In this crossover case, the court held that a trial court cannot grant Texas Rule 202 presuit discovery based only on allegations in a verified petition. The petitioner sought depositions and documents to investigate who created and distributed a political campaign mailer that allegedly used confidential records. Although the trial court signed an order reciting the Rule 202.4 findings, the appellate court emphasized that Rule 202 is an extraordinary remedy requiring actual evidence and express findings that either the discovery may prevent a failure or delay of justice in an anticipated suit or that its likely benefit outweighs its burden or expense. Because the petitioner did not supply the necessary evidentiary support, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief and dismissed the appeal as moot.

Litigation Takeaway

"Rule 202 is not a presuit fishing license. If you want records or testimony before filing suit—especially sensitive financial, medical, business, or child-related information—you need evidence, narrow tailoring, and express Rule 202.4 findings, or the order is vulnerable to mandamus."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Christopher Garcia v. The State of Texas

COA13

In Garcia v. State, the defendant challenged the admission of the complainant’s prior statements after she failed to appear at trial in a family-violence prosecution. The court analyzed Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.49 and the Confrontation Clause, applying the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine. Looking at the full circumstantial record—death threats during the assault, repeated prohibited contact despite a no-contact bond condition, a jail call urging the complainant to help get him released, testimony that he had obtained a gun and watched places associated with her, and officers’ unsuccessful efforts to locate her despite her knowledge of trial—the court held the trial judge could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that Garcia intended to, and did, procure her unavailability. The court therefore upheld admission of her prior statements and ruled that Garcia forfeited his Confrontation Clause objection.

Litigation Takeaway

"When a key witness disappears after threats, intimidation, or no-contact violations, courts may infer procurement and intent from the surrounding circumstances without direct testimony explaining the witness’s absence. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a detailed record of threats, prohibited contact, judicial orders, communications, and search efforts—or, if opposing the evidence, attack those links with specificity."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Jonathan Fourie v. Kirsten Fourie

COA09

In Fourie v. Fourie, a husband filed a Montgomery County protective-order application against his wife while their divorce and custody case was pending elsewhere, even though a Harris County court had already denied a prior protective-order application based on the same family-violence allegations. The wife responded with a Rule 13 sanctions motion and introduced the prior application and denial order to show the second filing was barred by res judicata. The trial court examined whether the new filing was based on any materially new post-denial conduct, but the applicant and counsel failed to clearly distinguish the second case from the first. The court held the repeat application was groundless because it was precluded by the earlier ruling, and that the circumstances supported an inference of bad faith or harassment. It therefore denied the protective-order request and affirmed $5,000 in Rule 13 sanctions against both the applicant and his attorney.

Litigation Takeaway

"A party cannot relitigate a denied protective-order request in a new court using the same allegations and evidence. In family-law cases, lawyers must confirm there is a genuinely new factual basis before refiling; otherwise, res judicata and Rule 13 can turn a repeat emergency filing into a sanctionable tactic, with fee exposure for both client and counsel."

Lincoln Lee Lankford v. Gregory Kevin Cline

COA09

In Lankford v. Cline, the plaintiff’s live petition alleged a stand-alone assault and battery claim, along with conspiracy-related and other derivative theories. The defendant filed a no-evidence summary-judgment motion under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i), but the motion challenged only conspiracy, aiding-and-abetting, theft, attorney’s fees, and exemplary-damages predicates. The Beaumont Court of Appeals compared the live pleading to the motion and held that a no-evidence motion must expressly identify the elements of the specific claim being attacked. Because the motion never challenged the elements of direct assault, the trial court could not grant summary judgment on that claim. The court reversed and remanded as to assault, while affirming the judgment on the claims actually addressed in the motion.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family cases that include tort-style claims, do not assume a no-evidence motion aimed at one theory will dispose of every related claim. Match the motion to the live pleading claim by claim and element by element. If a stand-alone claim like assault, conversion, or fraud is not expressly challenged, summary judgment on that claim is vulnerable on appeal."

In re Ellis Farley

COA06

In In re Ellis Farley, a pro se relator in a child-custody matter sought mandamus relief against the trial judge and the official court reporter to force production of transcripts, bench remarks, and alleged recordings of in-chambers child interviews without cost. The Texarkana Court of Appeals first analyzed its mandamus jurisdiction under Texas Government Code section 22.221 and held that, unlike trial judges, court reporters are not proper mandamus targets unless relief against them is necessary to enforce the court of appeals’ own jurisdiction, which Farley did not show. The court also held the petition was independently defective under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7 because it omitted required petition components, relied on unsupported factual assertions, and lacked a certified or sworn mandamus record. The court therefore denied mandamus relief without reaching the underlying merits of the record-access complaints.

Litigation Takeaway

"Mandamus in family-law cases is won or lost on jurisdiction and record-building. If a transcript or reporter problem threatens appellate relief, aim the petition at a proper target, explain why any relief against a non-judicial officer is necessary to protect appellate jurisdiction, and file a Rule 52-compliant petition with a certified or sworn record—because urgency and detailed accusations will not substitute for proof."

Child Support

In the Interest of M.D.M., a Child

COA12

In In re M.D.M., the father tried to set aside a long-standing SAPCR child-support order by arguing the trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over him because service in the original case was defective. The Tyler Court of Appeals separated subject-matter jurisdiction from personal jurisdiction and held the county court at law plainly had jurisdiction over the SAPCR and continuing authority to enforce support. On personal jurisdiction, the court relied on Rule 120a and general-appearance law, emphasizing that the father appeared at the original hearing, agreed to and signed the 2002 order, later participated in enforcement proceedings, and never filed a compliant special appearance. Because personal-jurisdiction objections are waivable and Rule 120a is the exclusive method to preserve them, his later service, due-process, and voidness arguments failed. The court also rejected his misidentification and HVAC-license complaints as inadequately briefed or unpreserved, and affirmed the order denying his motions and dismissing his pleadings.

Litigation Takeaway

"You cannot undo an old family-court order years later by relabeling a waived service complaint as a jurisdictional or due-process defect. If a party appeared, agreed to an order, signed it, participated later, or sought affirmative relief without first filing a proper Rule 120a special appearance, a collateral personal-jurisdiction attack is likely waived and dead on arrival."

In re Institute in Basic Life Principles, Inc.

COA06

In this original mandamus proceeding, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by compelling responses to facially overbroad discovery requests in a civil sexual-abuse suit against IBLP. The requests swept across broad subjects—including religious publications, political-campaign policies, and organization-wide financial records—over expansive time periods untethered to the pleaded claims. Applying settled Texas discovery law, the court emphasized that discovery must be reasonably tailored to the claims and defenses and that mandamus is appropriate because disclosure of sensitive information cannot be undone on appeal. The court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its blanket order compelling discovery, resolving the case on overbreadth grounds without reaching the relator’s constitutional objections.

Litigation Takeaway

"Even in hard-fought cases, discovery is not limitless. If a trial court compels broad requests that are not narrowly tied to the live issues by time, subject matter, or scope—especially for sensitive records—mandamus may be the best remedy because the harm from disclosure often cannot be fixed later."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Michael A. Allen v. The State of Texas

COA01

In this criminal appeal with strong family-law crossover value, the First Court of Appeals upheld Michael Allen’s aggravated-assault conviction for causing his wife’s catastrophic head injury. The court treated the evidence as a cumulative mosaic: the wife’s near-contemporaneous outcry to her mother that Allen kicked her and sent her through a doorway, her distressed demeanor on the call, Allen’s own shifting admissions that he pushed, grabbed, shoved, or kicked her during the altercation, medical testimony that the subdural hematoma required major blunt-force trauma and was not consistent with a routine seizure or minor fall, and scene evidence showing a violent mechanism. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and deferring to the jury’s resolution of competing inferences, the court held the evidence was legally sufficient and also left intact the trial court’s admission of the mother’s testimony and trauma-causation expert testimony.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-violence protective-order, SAPCR, and custody cases, you do not need an eyewitness or perfect direct proof if you can build a coherent circumstantial record. Prompt outcry evidence, observable distress, qualified medical testimony ruling out accidental causes, party admissions, and scene corroboration can together persuade the court that an injury was inflicted rather than accidental."