Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
Lowell Williams v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Williams v. State, the defendant challenged the admission of underwear and related DNA testing in a sexual-assault prosecution involving his stepdaughter, arguing the State failed to properly authenticate the clothing and establish an adequate chain of custody. The court held that Texas Rule of Evidence 901 sets only a low, prima facie threshold: the complainant’s testimony identifying the clothing she pulled out for police, supported by body-camera footage and the surrounding collection-and-testing evidence, was sufficient to support a finding that the items were what the State claimed. Because there was no affirmative evidence of tampering, substitution, or alteration, any gaps in handling went to the weight of the evidence rather than admissibility. The court therefore affirmed the trial court’s admission of the clothing and DNA evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family litigation, a witness with personal knowledge can often authenticate physical evidence without a perfect chain of custody. If you can identify the item and tell a coherent story connecting it to collection or testing, Rule 901 is usually satisfied; absent real evidence of tampering, chain-of-custody complaints generally attack weight, not admissibility."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Latricia Mundorf and Dillon Dan Mundorf
COA13
In Mundorf v. Mundorf, the court of appeals considered whether a divorce decree improperly awarded one spouse’s separate property to the other as part of the community estate. The husband proved, and the wife conceded on appeal, that several horses and one tract acquired before marriage were his separate property. Applying the community-property presumption, the clear-and-convincing standard for rebuttal, and Eggemeyer’s rule against divestiture of separate property, the court held the trial court had no authority to award those proven separate-property horses to Wife, making reversal automatic as a matter of law. The court declined to recharacterize other disputed assets where Husband’s briefing lacked record citations or developed analysis, upheld the finding that the 570 FM 1358 property was community based on conflicting evidence, and upheld the characterization of DM High Roller as Wife’s separate property based on tracing testimony and admissions. Because the decree divested Husband of proven separate property, the court reversed and remanded the overall property division.
Litigation Takeaway
"Characterization wins or loses property cases in Texas divorce. If you can clearly trace an asset as separate property, the court cannot award it to the other spouse, and divestiture will usually require reversal without a harm analysis. But separate-property claims must be proved and briefed asset by asset with precise record citations, because weak tracing and undeveloped briefing will leave the community presumption intact."
Adrian Ross Bey v. Virginia Pond
COA14
In a bill-of-review proceeding, a father sought to set aside a prior SAPCR judgment. The mother obtained dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, and the Office of the Attorney General separately succeeded in quashing the father’s subpoena. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Rule 91a is categorically unavailable in suits brought under the Texas Family Code, and that this bar extends to a bill of review attacking a SAPCR judgment because the proceeding’s purpose was to undo and retry a Family Code case. The court also rejected the argument that the dismissal could be affirmed under the trial court’s inherent authority, noting the father was not given a proper opportunity to present the prima facie merits of his bill of review. The court reversed the Rule 91a dismissal and remanded, but affirmed the order quashing the subpoena.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not use Rule 91a as a dismissal shortcut in Family Code litigation—even in a procedurally separate bill of review. If the case arises under the Family Code, counsel must use authorized tools such as special exceptions, summary judgment where proper, jurisdictional challenges, or a merits hearing, and should preserve error if a court tries to dispose of the case under Rule 91a anyway."
In re Aaron Nicholas Thomas
COA09
After a trial court entered a default protective order, it granted the respondent’s motion for new trial during its plenary-power period based on alleged defective service and lack of notice. The relator sought mandamus, arguing among other things that he did not receive notice of the new-trial hearing. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held mandamus was unavailable because this was a nonjury new-trial order entered while the trial court still had plenary power, so the relator had an adequate appellate remedy: he could seek reconsideration and reinstatement in the trial court and, if necessary, challenge the ruling on appeal from a final order. The court also concluded the complained-of notice problem did not create the extraordinary circumstances needed for mandamus relief, and the order was not void.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a family-court judge sets aside a default order in a bench proceeding while plenary power is still open, do not assume mandamus is the answer. First build your record in the trial court, move for reconsideration, and preserve any service or notice complaints for a later appeal; absent a void order or truly exceptional harm, appellate courts will expect you to use those ordinary remedies."
In re Rachel Michelle Atherton
COA09
In this original proceeding arising from a divorce, the parties’ marital residence was sold under temporary orders and the net proceeds were deposited into the court’s registry. Rachel Atherton argued the residence was the parties’ homestead and asked the trial court to either release enough proceeds for her to buy a replacement home before the six-month exemption period in Texas Property Code section 41.001(c) expired, or toll the exemption while the funds remained unavailable in the registry. The Beaumont Court of Appeals relied chiefly on London v. London and the protective purpose of section 41.001(c) to hold that when homestead-sale proceeds are unavailable because they are held in the court registry, the six-month exemption may be equitably tolled. Because no party showed a valid lien against the homestead proceeds and the trial court’s failure to rule threatened forfeiture of the exemption solely through delay, the court held the trial court abused its discretion. Mandamus was conditionally granted, directing the trial court to timely rule on the motion or preserve the exempt status of the proceeds while in the registry and for six months after delivery.
Litigation Takeaway
"If divorce-related homestead sale proceeds are sitting in the court registry, do not let the six-month exemption deadline pass without action. Ask early for either release of funds or an order tolling the exemption, and if the trial court’s inaction threatens loss of homestead protection, mandamus may be the right remedy."
In the Interest of S.K. and A.K., Children
COA02
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the mother did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence but instead argued that the jury charge improperly defined “endanger” and that her appointed counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge drug-test evidence. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the jury-charge complaint was waived because no objection was made in the trial court, and longstanding Texas Supreme Court precedent forecloses any due-process exception to ordinary preservation rules in termination cases. The court also rejected the ineffective-assistance claim because the criminal forensic licensing and accreditation statutes the mother relied on apply only in criminal cases, so counsel was not deficient for failing to make a meritless objection. The court affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination cases do not get a free pass on error preservation. If you want to complain about the jury charge on appeal, you must object clearly and on the record in the trial court. And ineffective-assistance arguments will fail if the omitted objection had no valid legal basis—especially when counsel tries to import criminal evidentiary rules into a civil family-law case."
Balderas v. Balderas
COA09
In Balderas v. Balderas, the petitioner filed for divorce and made multiple attempts to serve the respondent, including citation, certified mail, substituted service, and publication-related efforts, but never perfected service as required by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. After the trial court twice issued notices of intent to dismiss for want of prosecution, the petitioner responded to the first but failed to file a timely motion to retain after the second notice. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the trial court acted within its discretion in dismissing the case because attempted service is not the same as perfected service, a substituted-service order does not complete service without a Rule 107-compliant return, and the petitioner failed to show the diligence and good cause required to retain the case on the docket.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, service efforts alone will not save a case from dismissal—service must actually be perfected, and any dismissal notice must be answered with a timely, rule-compliant motion to retain showing specific diligence and good cause."
In the Interest of A.A., a Child
COA01
In *In re A.A.*, the First Court of Appeals reviewed a termination order based on endangerment grounds after the Department removed an infant following a domestic-violence incident and concerns about the mother’s mental-health stability. The court held the evidence was legally sufficient to support predicate grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and also legally sufficient on best interest. But applying the clear-and-convincing factual-sufficiency standard, the court concluded the Department relied too heavily on the mother’s past conduct and not enough on the full record showing current improvement: completed services, resumed medication, negative drug tests, recent housing and employment stability, substantial visitation, and a bond with the child. Because that disputed evidence was too significant to permit a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Past endangerment and a strong foster placement do not automatically prove termination is in a child’s best interest. In close child-related cases, lawyers must build a record that addresses present circumstances—service completion, stability, compliance, bonding, and why those facts do or do not reduce risk—because factual-sufficiency review can undo a ruling that rests mainly on historical misconduct."
In the Interest of E.B.J., J.B.J., B.B., and C.B.J., Children
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s rights to all four children and Father’s rights to the three girls, holding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and best interest under section 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on evidence of a deliberate pattern of severe physical abuse of Brian, including multiple hand fractures in different stages of healing, corroborated by medical testimony, school observations, child disclosures, and Charlotte’s testimony describing ongoing abuse and concealment. As to Father, the court held that subsection (E) was also satisfied because evidence showed he knew of Mother’s abuse and failed to protect the children. The court further held that abuse directed at one child can support endangerment findings as to siblings, and that the Department did not need to prove a material and substantial change in circumstances as an element of its termination claim in this post-2023 proceeding. Because subsection (E) and best interest were supported, the court did not reach the remaining predicate grounds.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are built on patterns, not isolated incidents: severe abuse of one child, combined with the other parent’s failure to intervene, can justify termination and strongly influence conservatorship disputes involving all siblings. For litigators, the case shows the value of tying together medical proof, child statements, witness observations, therapy evidence, and parental denial to prove a continuing safety threat."
In the Interest of R.R.D. and L.R.W., Children
COA05
In In re R.R.D., the parents tried to directly appeal temporary orders requiring them to participate in protective services under Texas Family Code § 264.203. The Dallas Court of Appeals treated the issue as purely jurisdictional and held that because the challenged orders were temporary family-law orders, Family Code § 105.001(e) barred an interlocutory appeal. The court further concluded that § 264.203 did not create an independent right to immediate appellate review, and because the parents identified no other statute authorizing interlocutory jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(a).
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a burdensome temporary family-law order can be appealed just because it has immediate consequences. Before filing a notice of appeal, confirm there is an express statutory basis for interlocutory review; otherwise, counsel should consider alternatives like mandamus, trial-court modification, and preserving error for appeal after a final order."