Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
723 opinions found
Estate of Samantha Skaggs; Robbin Skaggs, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Samantha Skaggs; and Walter Skaggs Sr. v. Peternett, Inc. d/b/a Showdown
COA02
In this Tarrant County case, the plaintiffs sued a bar under the Texas Dram Shop Act but failed to conduct any discovery during the applicable period. Although their pleadings stated they intended to conduct discovery under Level 3, they never obtained a signed Level 3 discovery-control plan. The trial court applied default Level 2 deadlines, quashed the plaintiffs' late discovery requests, denied a continuance, and granted a no-evidence summary judgment after striking the plaintiffs' unauthenticated evidence. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that Level 2 rules govern by default unless a signed Level 3 order is entered, and the plaintiffs waived their right to contest the summary judgment by failing to challenge the exclusion of their evidence on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pleading for 'Level 3' discovery is not enough to extend your deadlines; you must obtain a signed Level 3 discovery-control plan from the court. Without that signed order, default Level 1 or Level 2 deadlines apply, and a failure to conduct discovery within those windows can lead to the quashing of late discovery and an indefensible no-evidence summary judgment. Furthermore, always ensure your summary judgment evidence is authenticated and specifically cited, as 'document dumps' are easily excluded."
Crystal Flack v. Michael Mendoza, Sr.
COA08
In this transferred appeal from a Travis County bench-tried divorce, the wife challenged a property division she claimed was impermissibly disproportionate—particularly a provision awarding the husband the first $30,000 of proceeds from the sale of the marital home. The El Paso Court of Appeals applied the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard under Texas Family Code § 7.001 (“just and right” division) and emphasized that neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, requiring the court to imply all findings necessary to support the decree. On the record presented, the implied findings could support unequal allocations based on equity considerations such as the wife’s unilateral withdrawals and trading losses that depleted community assets, removal of funds from a joint account shortly before filing, the husband’s post-separation payment of home carrying costs, and the decree’s stated rationale tying the $30,000 offset to the wife’s lack of good-faith participation in the litigation. The court also rejected the notion that a no-fault (insupportability) divorce bars a disproportionate division; fault is only one of many permissible factors. Holding that the wife failed to show the division was arbitrary, unsupported by evidence, or manifestly unfair—especially given the lack of concrete valuation proof and the presence of implied findings—the court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Property-division appeals are won or lost at trial: build a valuation record and request findings of fact. Without numbers and without findings, appellate courts will imply facts supporting a “just and right” division and rarely reverse—even if the decree looks unequal (like awarding one spouse the first $30,000 of sale proceeds). Litigation conduct and dissipation/waste evidence can justify disproportionate offsets in a no-fault divorce if tied to the record."
In the Interest of M.Z. and M.C.Z., Children
COA05
In a divorce case, the trial court’s final decree required the wife to sell a New Mexico residence for “fair market value.” The husband later sought enforcement and a receiver; the trial court found the decree too indefinite for contempt but issued a post-judgment “clarification order” defining “fair market value” and awarding the husband attorney’s fees and costs. While that clarification-order appeal was pending, the Dallas Court of Appeals in a separate appeal partially reversed and remanded the community-property division of the same divorce decree due to a valuation error involving performance units. Because the clarification order was tethered to the now-reversed/remanded property-division framework, any decision about the decree’s ambiguity or the propriety of the clarification would not affect the parties’ rights going forward, making the appeal moot. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and vacated the clarification order in full, including the fee and cost award.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you pursue (or defend) clarification/enforcement orders while the property division is on appeal, a later partial reversal/remand of the decree can render those post-judgment orders moot and wipe out associated attorney’s-fee awards. Manage parallel proceedings carefully, consider sequencing/abatement, and preserve independent bases for fees and relief that can survive changes to the underlying decree."
In the Interest of I.R.R., a Child
COA05
In a restricted appeal from a default SAPCR, Father argued the judgment was void for defective service and, alternatively, unsupported by evidence. The Dallas Court of Appeals first examined the face of the record for strict compliance with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 106 and 107 and held the return of service adequately identified Father and what was served; Rule 107 did not require the served petition/exhibits to be attached to the return in the clerk’s file, so the trial court had personal jurisdiction. The court then reviewed the default prove-up evidence and concluded it was legally insufficient to establish Father’s net resources, making both the guideline-based current support order and the retroactive support judgment unsustainable. Finally, the court held the record was factually insufficient to overcome the Family Code presumption that joint managing conservatorship is in the child’s best interest; the prove-up lacked substantive best-interest evidence justifying Mother as sole managing conservator with Father as possessory conservator. The court reversed the SAPCR order and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even in a default SAPCR with airtight service, you still must build a real evidentiary record: prove net resources (and show the guideline math) for current and retroactive support, and present concrete best-interest facts to rebut the joint-managing presumption if seeking a sole-managing conservatorship. For respondents, restricted appeals often succeed on sufficiency problems in thin prove-ups rather than on service defects."
Jose Guevara-Molina v. The State of Texas
COA04
In this Texas criminal appeal, the defendant challenged six convictions for knowing possession of child pornography found on his cell phone, arguing the State failed to prove he knowingly possessed the images and separately complaining about admission of message screenshots. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and Texas Penal Code § 43.26’s “care, custody, control, or management + knowledge” concept, the Fourth Court of Appeals treated the proof as a combined-force, circumstantial-evidence case: (1) the phone was seized from the defendant’s person and he admitted it was his (including the number and length of ownership), supporting control of the device; (2) a forensic extraction located the images in multiple locations on the phone, including a user-restricted “private folder,” supporting an inference of knowing retention rather than accidental presence; and (3) the defendant’s admissions (including identifying the child depicted) and related message traffic supported knowledge of the images’ existence and character. The court rejected the argument that the State had to prove he created, saved, moved, or viewed the files. On the evidentiary issue, the court held the complaint was waived because trial counsel objected on hearsay grounds, but on appeal argued lack of authentication; the appellate theory did not comport with the trial objection under Texas preservation rules. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any case turning on “digital possession” (including SAPCR and protective-order hearings), you can prove control and knowledge without a smoking-gun admission by stacking: device nexus (seized from person/owned), forensic artifacts in multiple locations (especially secure/private folders), and contextual admissions/messages. And if you want appellate leverage, object on the right ground—mislabeling an authentication problem as “hearsay” can waive your best issue."
Christopher Peoples v. The State of Texas
COA12
In a robbery‑based capital murder appeal, the Twelfth Court of Appeals held (1) the trial court properly refused a self‑defense jury instruction on capital murder alleged under Texas Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2) while allowing self‑defense on the lesser‑included offense of murder, and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting text‑message chains over authenticity and “best evidence” objections. The State alleged Christopher Peoples killed the victim while in the course of committing/attempting robbery; Peoples admitted the killing but claimed self‑defense and the defense sought a self‑defense instruction on the capital charge. The court reasoned that, under Texas precedent and Penal Code § 9.31(b)(4), a robber has no right of self‑defense against the intended victim, so submitting self‑defense on the robbery‑capital theory would misstate the law; the jury could still consider self‑defense only if it rejected the robbery predicate and reached the murder lesser. On the evidentiary issue, the court applied Texas Rules of Evidence 901 and 1001–1002, emphasizing Rule 901’s low “support a finding” authentication threshold and that ESI “originals” include any accurate printout/output readable by sight. Missing or unrecoverable attachments in a forensic extraction did not make the message threads inadmissible; that limitation went to weight, not admissibility, so long as the proponent sufficiently linked the messages to the sender and showed the exhibit accurately reflected what was extracted.
Litigation Takeaway
"For Texas family‑law trials, *Peoples* is a practical blueprint for getting texts admitted (or keeping them out). Missing attachments or an imperfect extraction usually won’t defeat admissibility if you can authenticate the messages with circumstantial “linking” facts and lay that the exhibit accurately reflects the recovered data; argue gaps go to weight, not admissibility. If opposing, focus objections on weak authorship linkage and whether the proffered output reliably/accurately reflects the source (and consider Rule 403 for misleading excerpts), not merely that the thread is incomplete."
In the Interest of J.E.H., a Child
COA07
In a Department of Family and Protective Services termination suit involving a fifteen-year-old, Mother appealed only the trial court’s best-interest finding. The Amarillo Court of Appeals applied the clear-and-convincing standard and the Holley best-interest framework, noting that unchallenged predicate findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1) (endangering conditions/endangerment/constructive abandonment) were binding on appeal and could be considered as best-interest evidence. The record showed Mother provided unsafe and unstable housing with inconsistent utilities and unsanitary conditions, failed to ensure the child’s medical and educational needs were met, had minimal visitation and support during the year-long case, and did not complete key service-plan requirements (including parenting classes and counseling). By contrast, the child was thriving in a stable placement, expressed discomfort with visits, and wanted to remain with the caregiver. Rejecting Mother’s argument that termination punished poverty/disability, the court focused on concrete safety and caregiving deficiencies and affirmed that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest under § 161.001(b)(2).
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases are won with specific, child-centered proof of safety, stability, and follow-through over time—not generalized hardship arguments. Service-plan noncompliance, minimal contact/support, and unsafe or unstable housing can carry the best-interest finding, especially when contrasted with a child’s documented progress and stated preference for a stable placement; and on appeal, unchallenged predicate grounds will be treated as established and can powerfully support best interest."
Daniel Kenneth Meek v. The State of Texas
COA09
In a family-violence assault prosecution, the State and its witnesses repeatedly referred to the complainant (and domestic violence complainants generally) as the “victim.” Defense counsel objected once—arguing the person was only a “complaining witness” because it had not been established she was a victim—but did not clearly invoke due process/presumption-of-innocence grounds and did not object again as the terminology continued throughout trial. On appeal, the defendant reframed the complaint as a constitutional due-process/fair-trial violation. The Ninth Court of Appeals analyzed the issue as an error-preservation question under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and the Marin/Clark/Broxton line of cases, explaining that even constitutional fair-trial complaints are generally forfeitable and must be preserved by timely, specific objections that comport with the theory urged on appeal, and renewed when the complained-of matter recurs (Fuentes). Because the single trial objection was not sufficiently specific/constitutional and was not renewed with each later use of “victim,” the court held the complaint was forfeited and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"If opposing counsel or witnesses repeatedly label someone a “victim” before any finding of wrongdoing, you must preserve the issue with precision: object early, state the exact legal basis you intend to raise (due process/presumption of innocence, improper bolstering/opinion, Rule 403 unfair prejudice, etc.), get a ruling, and either secure a clear running objection or object each time the term is used. One vague objection will not preserve a later constitutional appellate complaint."
Payne v. Boyd
COA04
In Payne v. Boyd, a nonlawyer brother (Donald) attempted to prosecute a lawsuit for the named plaintiff (Darrell) based on a power of attorney arising from Darrell’s pending criminal matter. Defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction asserting Donald lacked capacity and standing. The Fourth Court of Appeals distinguished capacity (a procedural defect that must be raised by verified pleading under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 93) from standing (a jurisdictional requirement that can be raised by plea to the jurisdiction and is not waivable). Because defendants did not file a Rule 93 verified pleading, any capacity challenge was waived. But Donald still lacked standing because he pleaded no personal injury to himself and could not manufacture standing by claiming agency under a POA to assert Darrell’s constitutional/statutory claims. The standing defect deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction, and dismissal was proper without leave to replead because the defect was incurable as to Donald.
Litigation Takeaway
"A power of attorney is not a license to litigate. Even if the other side fails to preserve a Rule 93 verified “capacity” objection, you can still knock out proxy-driven filings by attacking standing with a plea to the jurisdiction—standing is nonwaivable and requires the filer to allege their own concrete injury. Preserve both: verified Rule 93 capacity challenge + plea to the jurisdiction on standing."
In the Interest of E.D.A., Child
COA04
In a Department of Family and Protective Services termination case, Mother challenged only the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The Fourth Court of Appeals reviewed the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and the legal/factual sufficiency framework, applying the Holley factors and the statutory permanency and safety considerations in § 263.307. The court emphasized Mother’s admitted heroin relapse, her refusal to submit to any of eighteen requested drug tests (supporting an inference of continued use), her failure to complete key service-plan requirements (assessment/treatment, counseling, parenting class), and her pattern of missed visits as evidence of present and future danger and diminished parental ability. Against that risk evidence, the court credited proof of the child’s stability, bonding, and needs being met in an adoptive foster placement, including testimony about the child’s dysregulation after visits and the foster parents’ structured support. The court held the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding and affirmed termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases are won on a cohesive narrative: relapse plus refusal to test and failure to engage services can be powerful, forward-looking danger evidence—especially when contrasted with a child’s stability and bonding in the proposed placement. If you represent the accusing party, document test requests and noncompliance and pair it with concrete stability evidence; if you defend the parent, avoid a “refusal/disengagement” record by testing, completing treatment-focused services early, and documenting consistent visitation and objective sobriety."