Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
In the Interest of X.H.Q., a Child
COA05
In *In the Interest of X.H.Q.*, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a Texas court acting under UIFSA may establish an initial child support obligation even though the registered Arizona divorce decree previously ordered no child support. The Office of the Attorney General registered the Arizona decree and sought support after Father moved to Texas. Father argued the Texas court lacked authority to create support and lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The court rejected both arguments. Relying on Texas Family Code section 159.401 and *In re T.B.*, it concluded that a foreign decree setting support at zero does not bar a Texas UIFSA proceeding to establish support for the first time. On jurisdiction, the court held Father’s sworn waiver of service—stating he received the papers, entered an appearance for all purposes, and waived service—supported personal jurisdiction, and his coercion argument failed because the record did not show he was prevented from reading the waiver or that his free will was overborne. The court further held that, even if the waiver were ineffective, Father made a general appearance that independently submitted him to the court’s jurisdiction. The order establishing child support and medical support was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A foreign decree ordering no child support does not prevent a Texas court from establishing support under UIFSA. In interstate support cases, the real battleground is usually personal jurisdiction over the obligor, and a signed waiver or later general appearance can be enough to bind that party to a Texas support order."
In the Interest of I.G., a Child
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights to I.G. after Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on both predicate grounds and best interest. The record described neglect concerns shortly after the child’s birth, validated methamphetamine use, unsafe home conditions, Mother’s incarceration, and her later conviction and 45-year sentence for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, while the child was thriving in a grandparent placement. The court recited the governing rule that termination requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one ground under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1) plus best interest under § 161.001(b)(2), and that one supported predicate ground is enough to affirm if best interest is also supported. Although the excerpt does not include the court’s detailed merits analysis, it establishes that the trial court found grounds under § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (P), and (Q), found termination in the child’s best interest, and the appellate court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination cases, the appeal usually turns on the record built long before trial: prove multiple predicate grounds, develop separate best-interest evidence, and document how substance abuse, unsafe conditions, incarceration, and the child’s progress in placement affect the analysis. For parents, a thin record on services, alternative care options, and best interest leaves little room for a successful sufficiency challenge on appeal."
Ex parte Warren McGee
COA01
In Ex parte Warren McGee, the First Court of Appeals addressed a habeas challenge to a criminal-contempt judgment after the underlying show-cause order broadly alleged that McGee had committed a crime or engaged in conduct leading to his arrest, but did not identify the specific offense or conduct. The court’s discussion emphasized that in criminal contempt proceedings, the show-cause order operates as the charging instrument and must give constitutionally adequate notice of the alleged offense under Ex parte Estevez and Jenkins v. State. The excerpted opinion notes that a show-cause order that fails to state an offense is void, and any contempt judgment based on it is likewise void. But because the supplied opinion text is truncated, the only clear case-specific disposition is that the court affirmed the habeas court’s denial of relief after considering whether the trial court had jurisdiction to later set aside the contempt judgment and dismiss the show-cause order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat every contempt show-cause order like a criminal charging instrument. In family-law enforcement and protective-order contempt practice, vague allegations can create a structural notice defect that may jeopardize the entire contempt proceeding, so plead the exact violated provision and the specific conduct with precision—and attack deficient notice early."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Sheetal Rane and Prasanth Marreddy
COA05
In this divorce appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court improperly included a Mumbai property in the marital estate and ordered it sold because the evidence showed Wife had gifted the property to her mother before the divorce. Under Texas Family Code section 7.001, a court may divide only property that is part of the marital estate, so once the property was transferred to a third party it was no longer divisible between the spouses. Because the erroneous inclusion of the Mumbai property affected the overall property division, the court reversed and remanded for a new division.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before asking a court to divide or sell an asset in divorce, prove the spouses actually owned it at the time of divorce. In foreign-property and informal-title cases especially, a completed pre-divorce transfer to a third party takes the asset outside the marital estate and can undo the entire property division on appeal."
In the Interest of N.P.H. a/k/a N.H. and C.M.M. a/k/a C.M., Children
COA14
In In re N.P.H., Mother argued the termination decrees were void because trial allegedly did not commence before the dismissal deadline in Texas Family Code section 263.401. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected that record-based challenge, holding that because the trial on the merits began before the statutory deadline, the trial court retained jurisdiction and the decrees were not void. The court also reviewed the merits and held legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), the best-interest findings, the findings that the Department made reasonable efforts but a continuing danger remained in the home, and the conservatorship rulings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Deadline-based jurisdiction attacks rise or fall on the trial record. If you want to preserve or defeat a section 263.401 challenge, make a clear record of the dismissal date, the trial setting, the parties’ announcements, and exactly when the merits trial begins; and never assume a procedural issue eliminates the need to build a strong evidentiary record on termination and conservatorship."
Servello v. VillaSport LLC
COA14
In Servello v. VillaSport LLC, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered a temporary injunction entered in a business-disparagement and defamation suit ordering a former employee to remove a social-media video. Although the parties did not raise the issue, the court reviewed sua sponte whether the injunction complied with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. Rule 683 requires a temporary injunction order to set the cause for trial on the merits in the order itself. Because the injunction omitted a trial setting, the court held the order was void, reversed the temporary injunction, and remanded. The court also affirmed denial of the appellant’s TCPA motion to dismiss.
Litigation Takeaway
"When seeking or opposing temporary injunctive relief, do not treat Rule 683 as a technicality. The signed injunction order itself must include a merits trial setting, and appellate courts may reverse a temporary injunction for that omission even if no party raises it. In family-law cases, careful injunction drafting is as important as proving the injunction elements."
In the Interest of N.A.T., a Child
COA05
In *In re N.A.T.*, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a father could not use Texas Family Code § 161.005 to undo a prior adjudication of paternity because his mistaken-paternity petition was filed too late. Although he claimed he first learned in December 2023 that he was not the child’s biological father, the record showed he had suspected nonpaternity for years, requested court-ordered genetic testing in the 2009 divorce, and attempted at-home DNA testing in 2012. The court treated the date of awareness as a fact issue for the trial court and deferred to the trial court’s implied finding that Father was aware of facts indicating nonpaternity well more than two years before filing suit in June 2024. Because limitations barred the petition, Father failed to establish the meritorious prima facie case required by § 161.005(f), so the trial court was not required to order genetic testing. The court also held Father did not preserve his due-process complaint and affirmed the support-modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mistaken-paternity claims can be lost on limitations before any DNA test is ever ordered. If a parent suspected nonpaternity years earlier, prior requests for testing, prior statements, or prior conduct can defeat a later § 161.005 petition at the prima facie stage. For family-law litigators, this case highlights the importance of building or attacking the limitations record early and preserving any procedural or due-process complaints clearly on the record."
In the Interest of A.T., a Child
COA05
In this Dallas SAPCR appeal, alleged paternal grandparents intervened seeking standing under former Texas Family Code sections 102.004(a)(2), 102.004(b), and 153.432. The court treated standing as a jurisdictional issue and applied the no-evidence framework for challenged jurisdictional facts. Although the parties disputed whether Brent Taylor was the child’s father, the court resolved the case on a narrower ground: the intervenors produced no evidence that they were Brent Taylor’s parents. Because every standing theory depended on proving that lineage link, pleadings and assumptions were not enough. The court held the Taylors failed to raise a fact issue on grandparent status, so dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was proper.
Litigation Takeaway
"If standing depends on a family relationship, prove every link in the chain with actual evidence. In grandparent-access and conservatorship cases, allegations, shared surnames, or indirect references will not substitute for proof of lineage, and a missing jurisdictional link can end the case before the court ever reaches best interest."
In re Rachel Michelle Atherton
COA09
In this original proceeding arising from a divorce, the parties’ marital residence was sold under temporary orders and the net proceeds were deposited into the court’s registry. Rachel Atherton argued the residence was the parties’ homestead and asked the trial court to either release enough proceeds for her to buy a replacement home before the six-month exemption period in Texas Property Code section 41.001(c) expired, or toll the exemption while the funds remained unavailable in the registry. The Beaumont Court of Appeals relied chiefly on London v. London and the protective purpose of section 41.001(c) to hold that when homestead-sale proceeds are unavailable because they are held in the court registry, the six-month exemption may be equitably tolled. Because no party showed a valid lien against the homestead proceeds and the trial court’s failure to rule threatened forfeiture of the exemption solely through delay, the court held the trial court abused its discretion. Mandamus was conditionally granted, directing the trial court to timely rule on the motion or preserve the exempt status of the proceeds while in the registry and for six months after delivery.
Litigation Takeaway
"If divorce-related homestead sale proceeds are sitting in the court registry, do not let the six-month exemption deadline pass without action. Ask early for either release of funds or an order tolling the exemption, and if the trial court’s inaction threatens loss of homestead protection, mandamus may be the right remedy."
Balderas v. Balderas
COA09
In Balderas v. Balderas, the petitioner filed for divorce and made multiple attempts to serve the respondent, including citation, certified mail, substituted service, and publication-related efforts, but never perfected service as required by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. After the trial court twice issued notices of intent to dismiss for want of prosecution, the petitioner responded to the first but failed to file a timely motion to retain after the second notice. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the trial court acted within its discretion in dismissing the case because attempted service is not the same as perfected service, a substituted-service order does not complete service without a Rule 107-compliant return, and the petitioner failed to show the diligence and good cause required to retain the case on the docket.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, service efforts alone will not save a case from dismissal—service must actually be perfected, and any dismissal notice must be answered with a timely, rule-compliant motion to retain showing specific diligence and good cause."