Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
723 opinions found
Carlos Franco Hernandez a/k/a Carlos Alberto Hernandez Orta v. The State of Texas
COA02
In a criminal appeal arising from sexual assault allegations involving a 13-year-old, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed two trial objections that commonly surface in family-law crossover cases: (1) whether the jury charge improperly included a Penal Code § 8.04(a) voluntary-intoxication instruction when the defendant did not affirmatively plead intoxication as a defense, and (2) whether admitting the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) nurse’s written report was reversible error as improper “bolstering.” The court held the intoxication instruction was proper because the record contained evidence of drinking from multiple sources (including the defendant’s admissions and the history reflected in the SANE documentation), and Texas law allows the instruction whenever evidence could lead jurors to think intoxication excuses conduct; the instruction tracked the statute and did not comment on the weight of the evidence. The court also held the SANE report was not excludable or reversible on a “bolstering” theory; bolstering is not a free-standing basis to exclude otherwise admissible evidence, and the argument largely collapses into hearsay/predicate issues that were not the focus of the appellate complaint. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When dealing with SANE/medical records and repeated narratives in SAPCR or protective-order trials, “bolstering” is usually the wrong objection—and often an easy one to defeat if the exhibit is independently admissible. The real battleground is foundation, purpose, and embedded hearsay (plus Rule 403/redactions). Also, if intoxication evidence is in the record, expect courts to give clarifying/limiting instructions to prevent a “drinking excuses it” theme—so plan your proof and objections accordingly and preserve the correct grounds."
Crystal Flack v. Michael Mendoza, Sr.
COA08
In this transferred appeal from a Travis County bench-tried divorce, the wife challenged a property division she claimed was impermissibly disproportionate—particularly a provision awarding the husband the first $30,000 of proceeds from the sale of the marital home. The El Paso Court of Appeals applied the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard under Texas Family Code § 7.001 (“just and right” division) and emphasized that neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, requiring the court to imply all findings necessary to support the decree. On the record presented, the implied findings could support unequal allocations based on equity considerations such as the wife’s unilateral withdrawals and trading losses that depleted community assets, removal of funds from a joint account shortly before filing, the husband’s post-separation payment of home carrying costs, and the decree’s stated rationale tying the $30,000 offset to the wife’s lack of good-faith participation in the litigation. The court also rejected the notion that a no-fault (insupportability) divorce bars a disproportionate division; fault is only one of many permissible factors. Holding that the wife failed to show the division was arbitrary, unsupported by evidence, or manifestly unfair—especially given the lack of concrete valuation proof and the presence of implied findings—the court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Property-division appeals are won or lost at trial: build a valuation record and request findings of fact. Without numbers and without findings, appellate courts will imply facts supporting a “just and right” division and rarely reverse—even if the decree looks unequal (like awarding one spouse the first $30,000 of sale proceeds). Litigation conduct and dissipation/waste evidence can justify disproportionate offsets in a no-fault divorce if tied to the record."
In re J.M.B. II
COA03
In a Travis County juvenile delinquency case, the State filed a Rule 162 nonsuit/motion to dismiss before any adjudication hearing. The trial court initially dismissed the petition but, the next day, signed an order vacating the dismissal and reset the case for adjudication based on policy concerns (including community safety and judicial confessions). The Third Court of Appeals held that, under Family Code § 51.17(a), the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure apply in juvenile cases absent conflict, and Rule 162 gives a plaintiff an absolute right to nonsuit before resting, leaving the trial court with a ministerial duty to dismiss unless collateral matters (pending claims for affirmative relief) remain. Because no collateral matters were shown, the trial court had no discretion to undo the nonsuit by vacating the dismissal and resetting the case. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order vacating the dismissal, reinstate the nonsuit-based dismissal, and enter the nonsuit in the minutes.
Litigation Takeaway
"A properly timed Rule 162 nonsuit is mandatory, not discretionary: absent collateral claims for affirmative relief (fees, sanctions, counterclaims), the court must dismiss and cannot later “revive” the case for policy or case-management reasons. If a trial court refuses to honor—or tries to vacate—a nonsuit dismissal, mandamus can be the fastest way to enforce the ministerial duty and stop a case from being pushed back to trial."
Lonis v. Kinzie
COA02
In a Denton County family-law enforcement case, the trial court signed an order revoking a previously suspended commitment and enforcing support obligations, including contempt/commitment provisions and an arrearage money judgment. The pro se appellant attempted to appeal the December 8, 2025 enforcement order but filed the notice of appeal on February 2, 2026—after the 30-day jurisdictional deadline—and did not file any postjudgment motion extending the timetable or any timely motion for extension under the appellate rules. Applying Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b), 26.1, and 26.3 and the Supreme Court’s guidance in Verburgt, the Fort Worth court held it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the notice was untimely and no extension was sought; the appellant’s pro se status did not excuse noncompliance. The court also reiterated that contempt rulings are not reviewable by direct appeal, so the contempt/commitment portions were independently nonappealable, and any attack on the arrearage judgment likewise failed due to the untimely notice. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law enforcement, deadlines and remedies are everything: calendar the notice-of-appeal deadline immediately for any arrearage money judgment, and don’t try to “appeal the contempt” (contempt is typically reviewable only by habeas if confined or, in limited cases, mandamus). A late notice of appeal without a timely extension request is jurisdictional and will get the entire appeal dismissed—even for pro se litigants."
Estate of Samantha Skaggs; Robbin Skaggs, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Samantha Skaggs; and Walter Skaggs Sr. v. Peternett, Inc. d/b/a Showdown
COA02
In this Tarrant County case, the plaintiffs sued a bar under the Texas Dram Shop Act but failed to conduct any discovery during the applicable period. Although their pleadings stated they intended to conduct discovery under Level 3, they never obtained a signed Level 3 discovery-control plan. The trial court applied default Level 2 deadlines, quashed the plaintiffs' late discovery requests, denied a continuance, and granted a no-evidence summary judgment after striking the plaintiffs' unauthenticated evidence. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that Level 2 rules govern by default unless a signed Level 3 order is entered, and the plaintiffs waived their right to contest the summary judgment by failing to challenge the exclusion of their evidence on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pleading for 'Level 3' discovery is not enough to extend your deadlines; you must obtain a signed Level 3 discovery-control plan from the court. Without that signed order, default Level 1 or Level 2 deadlines apply, and a failure to conduct discovery within those windows can lead to the quashing of late discovery and an indefensible no-evidence summary judgment. Furthermore, always ensure your summary judgment evidence is authenticated and specifically cited, as 'document dumps' are easily excluded."
In the Interest of M.L. and E.L., Children
COA11
In a CPS termination appeal involving repeated cocaine use and newborn/child drug exposure, the Eleventh Court of Appeals reviewed whether the evidence met the clear-and-convincing standard for multiple pleaded predicate grounds under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)—endangering conditions/surroundings (D), endangering conduct (E), prior termination based on (D)/(E) (M), and “born addicted” (Q)—and for best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The record showed multiple positive drug tests by Mother and at least one child, removals of two children, and later relapse while pregnant; but it also showed substantial rehabilitation (counseling, medication management, completion of outpatient treatment, and sustained negative tests) and a Department-supported monitored return that later failed due to the live-in partner’s marijuana-positive test rather than Mother’s. Applying the heightened legal- and factual-sufficiency standards for termination, the court conducted a ground-by-ground audit, requiring a tight evidentiary fit between the statutory elements and the proof rather than relying on a generalized “drug case” narrative. The court therefore affirmed the termination order in part, but reversed and remanded in part because one or more of the challenged statutory grounds and/or related findings (including best-interest as tied to those grounds) were not supported by clear and convincing evidence on this record.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even in strong drug-exposure cases, appellate courts will scrutinize each termination ground separately—so build an element-by-element record. If a third party’s drug use is the trigger (e.g., during a monitored return), prove the parent’s knowledge and protective capacity (or, for the defense, document prompt removal and safety measures). And if you plead “born addicted” under § 161.001(b)(1)(Q), you must prove addiction/withdrawal with medical precision—not just exposure or suspicion."
Corey Morrell v. Burton Baker, Individually and in his Professional Capacity; Lummus, Hallman, Pritchard & Baker, P.C.; and Mercer Transportation Co., Inc.
COA02
In a multi‑defendant, multi‑claim lawsuit, the trial court granted a combined Rule 91a and TCPA motion, dismissing several causes of action “with prejudice,” but the same order stated that the plaintiff’s “only remaining claims” were certain numbered counts in a referenced “Third Amended Petition.” The record did not contain that pleading, and the plaintiff pointed out the order’s internal inconsistency (dismissed claim titles versus allegedly surviving numbered counts). The trial court denied a motion to clarify and later signed a separate order awarding attorney’s fees under Rule 91a.7 and TCPA § 27.009(a)(1), including a Mother Hubbard clause and enforcement language, and it restricted discovery as to one defendant until fees were paid. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed finality under Lehmann/Elizondo by looking first to the face of the orders and then the record. Because the dismissal order itself indicated claims remained pending and was ambiguous/internally inconsistent about what survived, and because the fee order contemplated ongoing litigation and did not supply unmistakable finality language, the court held there was no final judgment disposing of all claims and parties. With no applicable statute authorizing an interlocutory appeal in this posture, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 91a/TCPA win plus a fee award is not automatically appealable. Before noticing appeal, confirm the order unmistakably disposes of all claims and all parties (or obtain a severance). Do not rely on a Mother Hubbard clause or enforcement language to create finality—any “remaining claims” language, references to the wrong live pleading, or other internal inconsistencies can trigger a jurisdictional dismissal and waste months while the trial court case keeps moving."
In the Interest of C.H., a Child
COA02
In a SAPCR enforcement action, Mother sought reimbursement for prenatal and postnatal medical expenses that the parties’ agreed order required Father to pay 50% of after Mother “furnish[ed]” receipts/bills/EOBs by a set deadline. Father admitted nonpayment but argued enforcement failed because Mother did not prove she provided the required documentation—particularly because the underlying bills and receipts were not admitted at the hearing. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied the abuse-of-discretion standard, construed the agreed order under contract principles, and rejected Father’s attempt to treat the “furnish by August 22” language as a condition precedent (noting the absence of clear conditional words like “if” or “provided that”). The court held that service evidence—Mother’s attorney’s reimbursement letter to Father’s attorney with an itemized list of providers, dates, and out-of-pocket amounts, plus electronic proof of email service—constituted some evidence that Mother complied with the order’s notice/documentation requirement, and the trial court was entitled to credit that proof over Father’s denial of receipt. The court affirmed the enforcement judgment awarding Mother $30,181 (plus interest) for unreimbursed prenatal and postnatal medical expenses.
Litigation Takeaway
"In enforcement of unreimbursed medical expenses (treated as additional child support), win or lose often turns on proving the process: documented, provable service of a reimbursement demand can satisfy “furnish/notice” provisions even if every underlying bill is not admitted, and a bare “I never got it” defense is unlikely to overcome credible service records—especially where the order’s notice language is drafted as a covenant, not a true condition precedent."
Robinson v. Kelley
COA01
In an appeal from a Brazoria County SAPCR modification order, the parties entered a later agreed modification order while the appeal was pending. Appellant’s counsel notified the First Court of Appeals by letter that the agreed order eliminated the need to continue the appeal, and appellee did not oppose. The court construed the letter as a motion to dismiss and, because appellant no longer sought appellate relief and there was no live controversy to resolve, dismissed the appeal under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a) and 43.2(f), also dismissing all pending motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you settle a parenting-plan modification dispute during the appeal and the trial court signs an agreed modification order that replaces the challenged order, the court of appeals will typically end the case quickly—sometimes even treating an informal “no longer necessary” communication as a dismissal request. Be intentional: decide whether you want immediate dismissal, an abatement while performance occurs, or continued appellate leverage, and communicate that clearly in a formal motion whenever possible."
Strong v. State
COA02
In Strong v. State, a murder defendant sought a jury-charge instruction giving him the statutory presumption that his use of deadly force in self-defense was reasonable. The trial court refused because the presumption under Texas Penal Code §§ 9.31 and 9.32 is unavailable when the actor is “engaged in criminal activity” at the time of the force. On appeal, the Second Court of Appeals held the record conclusively showed Strong was engaged in criminal activity—unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon under Penal Code § 46.04—because he admitted he was a felon, knew he could not possess firearms, and used a firearm during the incident. Strong attempted to avoid the “criminal activity” bar by arguing § 46.04 was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment, which (he claimed) would mean his possession was not “criminal activity” and the presumption instruction was required. The court rejected using an as-applied Second Amendment attack as a vehicle to obtain the presumption instruction on these facts and affirmed. Holding: the trial court did not err in denying the presumption-of-reasonableness instruction because Strong’s felon-in-possession status was contemporaneous criminal activity, and his as-applied constitutional challenge did not entitle him to the statutory presumption in the charge.
Litigation Takeaway
"When firearms are involved, a party’s prohibited-possessor status can strip away “presumptive reasonableness” / stand-your-ground framing. If the person with the gun was committing a firearms-possession offense at the time, Texas courts can treat that as contemporaneous “criminal activity” that defeats favorable self-defense presumptions—even if the party tries to reframe the issue with a constitutional challenge. In family cases, that supports protective orders, firearm surrender provisions, and best-interest arguments focused on ongoing illegality and risk."