Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
723 opinions found
Holloway v. State
COA02
In an indecency-by-exposure prosecution, the defendant objected under Texas Rule of Evidence 403 to the State’s use of “context” evidence surrounding the charged incident: a non-graphic photo of the child complainant and testimony about closely timed, related encounters (an earlier exposure-like incident involving the child’s mother, a later door-checking/Ring-video incident at her home, and another school-area exposure-type event). The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied Rule 403’s pro-admission presumption and the Gigliobianco balancing factors, emphasizing that evidence is not excluded merely because it is harmful; exclusion requires that unfair prejudice substantially outweigh probative value. Because the defense made intent (intent to arouse or gratify) a contested issue, the surrounding-incident evidence had heightened probative force to show sexual intent and to provide a coherent narrative explaining recognition and the complainant’s mother’s reactions. The court also noted safeguards reducing 403 risk, including limiting instructions and the absence of undue delay or cumulativeness. It held the trial court acted within the zone of reasonable disagreement in admitting both the contextual testimony and the child’s photograph and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 403 is a “substantial imbalance” rule, not a “keep it nice” rule: when intent, danger, or credibility is disputed, closely connected prior/other incidents and contextual photos can come in to “connect the dots,” especially if you (1) tie the evidence to a specific contested issue (intent/absence of mistake/fear), (2) show tight temporal and factual proximity, (3) keep the presentation non-cumulative, and (4) request/offer limiting instructions. Conversely, if you argue accident/mistake/innocent intent, expect the court to allow more context evidence and preserve your position with targeted objections and Rule 105 limits."
In re J.M.B. II
COA03
In a Travis County juvenile delinquency case, the State filed a Rule 162 nonsuit/motion to dismiss before any adjudication hearing. The trial court initially dismissed the petition but, the next day, signed an order vacating the dismissal and reset the case for adjudication based on policy concerns (including community safety and judicial confessions). The Third Court of Appeals held that, under Family Code § 51.17(a), the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure apply in juvenile cases absent conflict, and Rule 162 gives a plaintiff an absolute right to nonsuit before resting, leaving the trial court with a ministerial duty to dismiss unless collateral matters (pending claims for affirmative relief) remain. Because no collateral matters were shown, the trial court had no discretion to undo the nonsuit by vacating the dismissal and resetting the case. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order vacating the dismissal, reinstate the nonsuit-based dismissal, and enter the nonsuit in the minutes.
Litigation Takeaway
"A properly timed Rule 162 nonsuit is mandatory, not discretionary: absent collateral claims for affirmative relief (fees, sanctions, counterclaims), the court must dismiss and cannot later “revive” the case for policy or case-management reasons. If a trial court refuses to honor—or tries to vacate—a nonsuit dismissal, mandamus can be the fastest way to enforce the ministerial duty and stop a case from being pushed back to trial."
Corey Morrell v. Burton Baker, Individually and in his Professional Capacity; Lummus, Hallman, Pritchard & Baker, P.C.; and Mercer Transportation Co., Inc.
COA02
In a multi‑defendant, multi‑claim lawsuit, the trial court granted a combined Rule 91a and TCPA motion, dismissing several causes of action “with prejudice,” but the same order stated that the plaintiff’s “only remaining claims” were certain numbered counts in a referenced “Third Amended Petition.” The record did not contain that pleading, and the plaintiff pointed out the order’s internal inconsistency (dismissed claim titles versus allegedly surviving numbered counts). The trial court denied a motion to clarify and later signed a separate order awarding attorney’s fees under Rule 91a.7 and TCPA § 27.009(a)(1), including a Mother Hubbard clause and enforcement language, and it restricted discovery as to one defendant until fees were paid. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed finality under Lehmann/Elizondo by looking first to the face of the orders and then the record. Because the dismissal order itself indicated claims remained pending and was ambiguous/internally inconsistent about what survived, and because the fee order contemplated ongoing litigation and did not supply unmistakable finality language, the court held there was no final judgment disposing of all claims and parties. With no applicable statute authorizing an interlocutory appeal in this posture, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 91a/TCPA win plus a fee award is not automatically appealable. Before noticing appeal, confirm the order unmistakably disposes of all claims and all parties (or obtain a severance). Do not rely on a Mother Hubbard clause or enforcement language to create finality—any “remaining claims” language, references to the wrong live pleading, or other internal inconsistencies can trigger a jurisdictional dismissal and waste months while the trial court case keeps moving."
In the Interest of A.B., A Child
COA05
In a divorce governed by a premarital agreement (PMA) eliminating community property and treating each spouse’s earnings as separate, the parties disputed ownership of a diamond ring purchased during marriage with Husband’s earnings and allegedly titled in his name. The trial court found the ring was initially Husband’s separate property under the PMA but that Husband later made an interspousal gift of the ring to Wife, confirming it as Wife’s separate property. On appeal, Husband challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting donative intent, delivery, and acceptance under the clear-and-convincing standard. Applying abuse-of-discretion review (with legal/factual sufficiency as factors) and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Husband gifted the ring based on Wife’s testimony and circumstances: Wife selected/designed the ring, the jeweler delivered it to her, she wore it as her wedding ring for years, Husband bought a matching band later, he returned it after cleanings/appraisals, and he never demanded its return at separation. The court affirmed the decree confirming the ring as Wife’s separate property.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even with a “no community property” premarital agreement, high-value personal items can still change character through an interspousal gift. At trial, build (or attack) the gift elements—donative intent, delivery, and acceptance—using the parties’ conduct over time (possession, daily use, repairs/cleanings, related purchases, and separation behavior), because on appeal a supported gift finding is difficult to overturn under abuse-of-discretion review."
City of Houston v. Sancelia Fonteneaux
COA14
A plaintiff sued the City of Houston (and METRO) for negligence after a bus door allegedly closed on her arm while she was boarding. The City sought dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, arguing the pleadings showed no Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) motor‑vehicle waiver because the bus was operated by METRO, a separate entity, not a City employee. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied Rule 91a’s pleading-only framework—accepting the petition’s facts as true, liberally construing them, and drawing reasonable inferences—and held the live petition plausibly alleged the TTCA motor‑vehicle waiver in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021(1) by alleging the injury arose from the operation/use of a motor vehicle and, alternatively, that the bus was owned/operated/maintained and/or driven by the City (or METRO), permitting an inference at the pleading stage that a City employee acting within scope could have operated the bus. The court also refused the City’s request to render judgment based on its pending traditional summary-judgment motion because the trial court had not ruled and Rule 91a does not allow evidence-based, “backdoor summary judgment” review. The denial of the Rule 91a motion was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 91a is not a shortcut to win an immunity or “wrong entity” fight on disputed facts. If the petition pleads a concrete motor-vehicle injury mechanism and plausibly ties operation of the vehicle to a governmental unit—even in the alternative—the case will usually survive early dismissal and move into discovery; defendants should use evidence-based tools (plea to the jurisdiction/summary judgment) rather than a pleading-only Rule 91a attack."
Ava Washington v. Margaret Victoria
COA01
In a probate will contest arising from a late-in-life hospice will, the proponent of a 2016 will argued the decedent changed his estate plan because his daughter had financially exploited him, while the daughter contended the decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to end-stage illness and cognitive impairment. The First Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient under City of Keller/“more than a scintilla” review for a reasonable jury to find the decedent had testamentary capacity at the time of execution. However, the court reversed and remanded because the trial court allowed testimony supporting an inflammatory “she took his money” narrative to explain motive for disinheritance, yet excluded the daughter’s responsive rebuttal evidence. The court treated this one-sided evidentiary ruling as an abuse of discretion and concluded the exclusion probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment, making the error harmful and requiring a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the court lets your opponent introduce a damaging “financial exploitation/bad actor” story to sway motive and credibility, you must be allowed to rebut it. Preserve the issue with a clear offer of proof and a ruling—because even where the verdict is supported by legally sufficient evidence, an asymmetrical evidentiary ruling that leaves the jury with an unanswered accusation can be reversible harmful error."
Hendrickson v. State
COA10
In an indecency-with-a-child prosecution, the State called the child’s treating counselor, an LPC-Associate, to testify that she diagnosed the child with PTSD using the Child and Adolescent Trauma Screen (CATS) and to explain treatment goals. The defense objected under Texas Rule of Evidence 702, arguing the associate lacked the training/experience allegedly required by 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 681.43 to administer and interpret the CATS, and also objected that the testimony would improperly “bolster” the child’s testimony. The Waco Court of Appeals applied the Rule 702/Vela framework and abuse-of-discretion review, holding the record supported the trial court’s gatekeeping decision: the witness testified she learned the CATS in graduate school, received continuing training, and routinely used the tool with many patients, which was enough for the trial court to reasonably find qualification and reliability (within the “zone of reasonable disagreement”). The court also rejected the “bolstering” complaint because “bolstering” is an ambiguous objection and the trial objection did not clearly invoke a specific evidentiary rule or match the more developed arguments raised on appeal, so error was not preserved under TRAP 33.1/comportment principles.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family cases involving child-trauma/PTSD opinions, licensure level alone (e.g., LPC-Associate vs. psychologist) is not dispositive under Rule 702—what matters is a record showing tool-specific training and repeated, competent use. If you are opposing the testimony, do not rely on a generic “bolstering” objection; pin the challenge to a конкрет rule and theory (Rule 702 qualification/reliability/fit, Rule 403 unfair prejudice, or hearsay/conduit limits) and preserve it with a clear, matching objection and ruling."
In the Interest of C.H., a Child
COA02
In a SAPCR enforcement action, Mother sought reimbursement for prenatal and postnatal medical expenses that the parties’ agreed order required Father to pay 50% of after Mother “furnish[ed]” receipts/bills/EOBs by a set deadline. Father admitted nonpayment but argued enforcement failed because Mother did not prove she provided the required documentation—particularly because the underlying bills and receipts were not admitted at the hearing. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied the abuse-of-discretion standard, construed the agreed order under contract principles, and rejected Father’s attempt to treat the “furnish by August 22” language as a condition precedent (noting the absence of clear conditional words like “if” or “provided that”). The court held that service evidence—Mother’s attorney’s reimbursement letter to Father’s attorney with an itemized list of providers, dates, and out-of-pocket amounts, plus electronic proof of email service—constituted some evidence that Mother complied with the order’s notice/documentation requirement, and the trial court was entitled to credit that proof over Father’s denial of receipt. The court affirmed the enforcement judgment awarding Mother $30,181 (plus interest) for unreimbursed prenatal and postnatal medical expenses.
Litigation Takeaway
"In enforcement of unreimbursed medical expenses (treated as additional child support), win or lose often turns on proving the process: documented, provable service of a reimbursement demand can satisfy “furnish/notice” provisions even if every underlying bill is not admitted, and a bare “I never got it” defense is unlikely to overcome credible service records—especially where the order’s notice language is drafted as a covenant, not a true condition precedent."
Claudia Lucius Williams Smith v. Kenneth Wayne Allen
COA14
In this heirship dispute, the court addressed whether a Harris County home purchased in 1972 was separate or community property. The resolution turned on whether the decedent, Lossie Mae Smith, was informally married to Tom Willie Smith at the time of purchase. The trial court found no informal marriage existed in 1972, pointing to a deed identifying Lossie as a single woman ("feme sole") and testimony from siblings that Tom was not in her life at that time. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing that because a key letter supporting the marriage claim was never formally admitted into evidence—only placed in the court file—it lacked probative weight. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the separate-property characterization.
Litigation Takeaway
"Evidence that is merely 'in the court file' is not the same as evidence admitted at trial. To prove an informal marriage or challenge property characterization, you must formally admit your documents into evidence and preserve all procedural objections—such as concerns about legal representation or notice—at the trial level, or you risk losing your right to appeal those issues."
In the Matter of J.D.
COA14
J.D., a juvenile serving a 25-year determinate sentence for capital murder and aggravated robbery, challenged the juvenile court’s decision under Texas Family Code § 54.11 to transfer him from the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) to the Institutional Division of TDCJ (TDCJ–ID) to complete his unserved sentence rather than release him to parole supervision. On abuse-of-discretion review, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals treated the transfer decision as discretionary and asked only whether the record contained “some evidence” tied to the § 54.11(k) factors supporting transfer. Although J.D. presented evidence of rehabilitation (good institutional behavior, educational progress, and favorable therapeutic notes), the court held the juvenile judge could credit competing evidence and weigh factors differently. The court emphasized the extreme violence and manner of the offenses, TJJD’s recommendation to transfer, J.D.’s incomplete capital/serious violent offender treatment, and testimony about victim-family and community safety concerns. Because these items provided some evidence supporting transfer, the court affirmed and held the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering transfer to TDCJ–ID rather than parole release.
Litigation Takeaway
"In § 54.11 determinate-sentence transfer hearings, “doing well” in TJJD may not overcome a safety-driven record. Expect trial courts to give heavy weight to offense severity, incomplete specialized treatment, and TJJD/prosecutor recommendations—and appellate courts will usually affirm if there is some evidence supporting transfer. For family-law cases that hinge on whether a youth returns to the home, treat the juvenile transfer record as critical evidence for risk, safety planning, and temporary orders."