Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
In the Interest of C.L., a Child
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E). The court held that clear and convincing evidence showed a continuing course of endangering conduct, including Mother’s failure to obtain prenatal care, refusal of medication for the newborn, inability or unwillingness to provide basic infant care in the NICU, untreated or unmanaged mental-health issues, and maintenance of an unsafe and unsanitary home. The court also rejected Mother’s argument that the Department failed to tailor services to her special needs, concluding that the record supported the Department’s reasonable efforts to reunify and that the endangerment evidence independently supported termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are won or lost on patterns, not isolated incidents. A sustained record of unsafe caregiving, untreated mental-health instability, medical neglect, and hazardous living conditions can support severe child-related relief, and a vague complaint that services were not properly tailored will not overcome strong endangerment evidence without a well-developed trial record."
In re Mackinsey Lynn Johnson
COA10
In this SAPCR modification mandamus, the Waco Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 109.001(a)(5) does not permit interim appellate attorney’s fees based merely on financial strain, litigation parity, or the need to keep counsel on the case. After the trial court ordered Johnson to pay over $49,000 in appellate fees to Spivey during the appeal, Johnson sought mandamus. The appellate court first held Johnson preserved error by repeatedly objecting at the hearing that there was no evidence the fees were necessary to preserve and protect the child’s safety and welfare during appeal. It also held mandamus was proper because compelled interim fee payments are not adequately remedied by ordinary appeal. On the merits, the court analyzed the statute textually and concluded the movant must prove an immediate child-focused necessity during the appeal itself. Because the evidence showed only reduced quality of life and concern about continued litigation—not that the child would lack housing, food, medical care, schooling, or protection—the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the appellate fee awards and related money judgments.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want temporary appellate fees under Family Code § 109.001 in a child-related case, build a record showing specific, immediate harm to the child’s safety or welfare without the fee award. If you are opposing the request, force the other side to admit the child’s basic needs remain covered and show the motion is really about funding the appeal or pressuring settlement—grounds that will not support the order after In re Johnson."
L. S. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In L. S. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the Third Court of Appeals reversed a trial court’s order terminating a father’s parental rights because DFPS failed to prove any pleaded predicate ground under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) by clear and convincing evidence. Although the record included concerning facts—such as domestic-violence allegations, arrest history, missed visits, and imperfect service-plan compliance—the court held those concerns were not enough unless they established a specific statutory ground actually pleaded. The court emphasized that best-interest evidence cannot substitute for proof of a required predicate ground, and because none was legally sufficient, it reversed and rendered judgment denying the termination petition.
Litigation Takeaway
"Serious allegations do not replace element-by-element proof. In any case seeking extraordinary relief affecting parent-child rights, the winning record must tie admissible evidence to the exact statutory ground pleaded; otherwise, even troubling facts and strong best-interest evidence will not save the judgment on appeal."
In re Damon Harrison
COA08
In this mandamus proceeding, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that once Damon Harrison filed a supersedeas bond to suspend enforcement of a money judgment, the trial court could no longer compel post-judgment discovery served under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 621a. The court analyzed the interaction between Rule 621a and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.1, concluding that a supersedeas bond becomes effective immediately upon filing and that Rule 621a discovery is a form of judgment enforcement. Because the bond was filed before the trial court signed the order compelling discovery, enforcement had already been suspended, making the order an abuse of discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the discovery order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Timing controls. In Texas family-law and other judgment-enforcement cases, Rule 621a post-judgment discovery ends the moment a valid supersedeas bond is filed. Creditors should move fast if they need asset discovery, and appellants can shut down compelled collection discovery by promptly filing an effective bond."
Berry v. State
COA05
In Berry v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed admission of testimony that the defendant was assaulting his eight-months-pregnant cohabitant immediately before striking an elderly man who intervened. The court held the evidence was admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) as same-transaction contextual evidence because it explained why the complainant intervened, how the confrontation arose, and why the charged assault occurred. The court also rejected the Rule 403 challenge, concluding the evidence’s probative value in completing the story of the offense was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, even though the pregnancy detail was emotionally charged.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a disputed incident cannot be understood without what happened immediately before it, tightly connected surrounding conduct may come in as same-transaction contextual evidence rather than impermissible propensity evidence. In family-law hearings, frame the evidence as necessary to explain sequence, motive, intervention, or the full episode—and if opposing it, attack necessity, seek narrowing or sanitizing, and build a specific Rule 403 record."
In the Interest of C.A.B. and P.B., Children
COA05
In an appeal from a post-divorce order terminating spousal support, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the support obligation in the parties’ agreed 2010 divorce decree was contractual alimony, not statutory spousal maintenance under Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code. Although the decree used the label “Court-Ordered Maintenance” and included Chapter 8 eligibility findings, the court looked to the decree’s operative language and structure: it expressly incorporated the parties’ agreement as enforceable as a contract, tied duration to remarriage or cohabitation rather than a statutory end date, required life-insurance security, and made the obligation survive the payor’s death as a charge against his estate. Because those terms exceeded or departed from Chapter 8’s statutory framework, the court concluded the obligation was contractual in nature. The court further held that Wife’s earlier enforcement efforts invoking Chapter 8 did not change the decree’s legal character. It reversed the termination order and remanded because Chapter 8’s modification and termination provisions did not govern this agreed contractual support obligation.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas divorce cases, labels do not control spousal-support characterization—the decree’s actual terms do. If an agreed decree includes support provisions that go beyond Chapter 8, such as indefinite duration, estate liability, or insurance security, courts may treat the obligation as contractual alimony, which changes the available enforcement, modification, and termination strategies. Before filing or defending a support review action, litigators should analyze the whole decree and plead the case consistent with the obligation’s true legal character."
In the Matter of the Marriage of William Christopher Cannon and Stacie Lynette Cannon
COA06
In Cannon v. Cannon, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that a divorce settlement recited in open court, agreed to by both spouses, and accepted by the trial court became binding once the court rendered judgment on it. After the August 8, 2025 hearing, the husband later objected to the written decree, refused to approve it, and argued the decree was unreliable, incomplete, and unsupported, especially as to provisions for their adult-disabled son. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Family Code section 7.006, and Texas rendition law, emphasizing that the key moment is rendition, not later signature or approval of the written decree. Because the material terms were stated on the record, both parties assented, and the judge used present-tense language showing immediate adjudication, the later decree was merely a memorialization of the earlier rendered judgment. The court held that the husband could not revoke consent after rendition to block entry of a conforming decree, and it affirmed the decree in full, including the continuance ruling and support provisions.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you settle a family case in open court, make the record count: state all material terms clearly, get both parties’ personal assent, and obtain present-tense rendition from the judge. After rendition, a party usually cannot undo the deal by refusing to sign the decree or claiming second thoughts; the real fight becomes whether the written decree actually matches what was rendered."
M.D., Jr. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to prove constructive abandonment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(N). The court focused on the statutory elements: the child had been in the Department’s conservatorship well over six months, the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child through services and case management, Father failed to maintain regular visitation or significant contact, and Father showed an inability to provide a safe environment, especially given the child’s significant medical and developmental needs. The court also rejected Father’s evidentiary complaints on harm grounds, concluding that any hearsay error tied to assault allegations was cumulative of other admitted evidence. Because one predicate ground plus the best-interest finding was enough to support termination, the court affirmed without needing to resolve every challenged ground.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination and custody-related cases alike, courts care more about documented follow-through than stated intentions. A parent facing constructive-abandonment allegations must build a concrete record of visits, requests for contact, services completed, and safety planning; sporadic effort and unmanaged instability will not suffice. For the prevailing party, this case shows the value of proving one predicate ground cleanly and supporting key facts through multiple admissible sources to blunt appellate evidentiary complaints."
Paige Lindsey Marlow v. Christopher Clayton Cooley
COA14
In a bifurcated family-law case, the trial court tried only the threshold issue of whether Paige Marlow and Christopher Cooley had an informal marriage and signed an order finding no marriage existed. Marlow appealed, but the court of appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because the order resolved only that single issue while SAPCR, child-support, and property matters remained pending. Applying Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. and the one-final-judgment rule, the court concluded the order was not final because it did not dispose of all claims and parties and did not clearly state that it did so. The court also found no statute authorizing interlocutory appeal of this type of order, so it dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A bifurcated ruling on informal marriage is usually not immediately appealable if any SAPCR, support, fee, or property issues remain. Before filing a notice of appeal, family-law counsel should perform a finality audit and consider severance—not just bifurcation—if the goal is to create an appealable judgment."
In the Interest of P.G., A Child
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(f). The case began after the child was born testing positive for methamphetamine, and the Department removed the child and implemented a court-ordered service plan requiring drug testing, counseling, parenting classes, visitation, employment, and stable housing. On appeal, the mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child and that a continuing danger prevented reunification. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient because the Department created and monitored a meaningful reunification path through services, testing, and visitation opportunities, while the mother remained unstable, attended only a small fraction of visits, tested positive for methamphetamine during the case, and lacked a concrete plan for the child’s care. The court also upheld the best-interest finding and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas child-related cases, partial compliance with a service plan does not overcome ongoing evidence of current danger. Courts focus on present sobriety, stability, consistent contact, and a realistic caregiving plan—not just whether a parent checked off classes or assessments. For practitioners, the lesson is to build a record showing either a real reunification pathway and unresolved safety risks, or, for the parent, verified proof that those risks are truly resolved by final hearing."