Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
Perry v. Perry
COA09
In Perry v. Perry, the husband tried to use a bill of review to set aside a final divorce decree, arguing he was denied a fair chance to seek a larger share of the marital estate, a jury trial, and relief from allegedly unfair binding arbitration. The court affirmed summary judgment against him because a bill of review is an equitable remedy that is unavailable when an adequate legal remedy existed. Here, the record showed he had already filed a direct appeal from the same final decree and then voluntarily dismissed it. Because those complaints could have been raised on direct appeal, and in fact were pursued through that route, the bill of review could not be used to relitigate the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"A bill of review is not a fallback option for issues that could have been raised on direct appeal. In family-law cases, if a party challenges a divorce decree on matters like property division, arbitration, or jury-trial complaints, counsel must treat the direct appeal as the primary vehicle. Once that appellate remedy exists—and especially if it is actually invoked—a later bill of review is likely barred."
Flatt v. Tornow
COA01
In Flatt v. Tornow, a third party sued a wife involved in a divorce, alleging she accessed private communications and disclosed intimate photos and private information to others. The wife sought dismissal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, arguing the suit was based on her petitioning activity in the divorce and her speech about the marriage and affair. The First Court of Appeals rejected that framing, focusing on the gravamen of the pleaded claims: private disclosure conduct, not protected litigation activity or speech on a matter of public concern. Because the wife failed to meet her threshold burden to show the TCPA applied, the court held the analysis ended at step one and affirmed denial of the TCPA motion to dismiss.
Litigation Takeaway
"A pending divorce does not automatically turn related misconduct into protected TCPA activity. In privacy-based tort cases involving alleged disclosure of intimate images or private communications, courts will look to the actual pleaded injury and conduct, not the broader litigation backdrop. Family-law litigators should not assume subpoenas, depositions, or affair-related communications create TCPA protection."
In re Mandy Jo Cook
COA09
In In re Cook, the relator challenged a divorce decree signed nunc pro tunc after plenary power expired, arguing the substituted decree made substantive judicial changes rather than clerical corrections, including changes to property obligations, contempt-related provisions, and child-related language. But after perfecting a direct appeal from the nunc pro tunc judgment, she also sought mandamus relief. The Beaumont Court of Appeals did not decide whether the changes were clerical or judicial. Instead, applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(a) and the adequate-remedy analysis from In re Prudential and In re Team Rocket, the court held mandamus was unavailable because the relator already had an adequate appellate remedy through her pending appeal. The court also noted the mandamus record lacked the hearing transcript and that the relator had not shown she sought narrower trial-court relief, such as protecting disputed sale proceeds by depositing them into the court registry. Mandamus and temporary relief were denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you already perfected an appeal from a judgment nunc pro tunc, a parallel mandamus attack will usually fail unless you can clearly show the appeal cannot protect your client. In family-law enforcement and property disputes, do not rely on calling the order 'void' alone—build a full record, seek immediate preservation remedies in the trial court, and explain why ordinary appellate review is truly inadequate."
Davis v. State
COA02
In Davis v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support deadly-weapon findings in a family-violence prosecution where the defendant used both his hands and a knife. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and Texas Penal Code section 1.07(a)(17), the court focused on whether the hands and knife, in the manner used or intended to be used, were capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The court held that repeated strangulation, choking until the complainant turned blue and nearly lost consciousness, resumed choking when she began breathing again, and the severe resulting medical injuries supported the jury’s finding that the defendant’s hands were used as deadly weapons. The court also held that the knife qualified as a deadly weapon because the defendant wielded it, threatened to hurt the complainant if she ran, and used it to force her movement and compliance, even though he did not stab her. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases involving family violence, Davis shows that courts will treat strangulation, coercive control, and threats with a household knife as highly serious evidence even when the assailant used only hands or never actually stabbed the victim. Build the record around the manner of assault, the victim’s inability to breathe or escape, threats tied to a weapon, and the medical consequences, because those facts can strongly support protective orders, custody restrictions, supervised possession, and other safety-based relief."
In Re WhiteWater Midstream, LLC, WWM Operating, LLC, MXP Parent, LLC, and Matterhorn Express Pipeline, LLC
COA14
In In re WhiteWater Midstream, the relators sought mandamus relief from orders compelling discovery and denying reconsideration, arguing the requests were overbroad and unduly burdensome. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused first on preservation under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.2(e), not on the merits of those objections. Because the relators did not timely assert overbreadth and undue-burden objections in writing before their response deadline, those objections were waived unless the trial court excused the waiver for good cause. The appellate court held the record supported the trial court’s implied finding that no good cause was shown, so compelling discovery was not an abuse of discretion. Without a clear abuse of discretion, mandamus relief was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law discovery fights, timing can matter more than the substance of your objection: if you do not serve specific written overbreadth or undue-burden objections by the response deadline, you may lose them entirely. For requesting parties, this case is a strong waiver tool; for responding parties, it is a reminder to preserve objections early, specifically, and in writing."
Grant Hanson v. Tara Louise Nugent
COA03
In this SAPCR appeal, the father challenged a final order appointing the mother sole managing conservator, restricting his possession through a tiered supervised schedule tied to negative drug tests, and excluding evidence he said showed a disability, medication-assisted recovery, and a lawful THC prescription. The court reiterated that conservatorship and possession rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, with sufficiency complaints folded into that review. But the excerpted opinion expressly resolved only the evidentiary complaint, holding it was forfeited because the father’s briefing failed to clearly identify the excluded evidence, address the trial objections, or provide supporting legal authority and analysis. The court affirmed the final SAPCR order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In custody appeals, preservation and briefing matter as much as the merits. If you want to complain about excluded evidence, identify the exact testimony or exhibit, make sure it is in the record, address the objection and ruling, and explain with authority why it was admissible. More broadly, trial courts can support sole managing conservatorship and stepped possession restrictions when the record ties a parent’s substance use to the child’s specific best-interest needs."
In the Interest of A.D., S.R., and K.A., Children
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights to three children after she challenged only the sufficiency of the best-interest finding under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The court restated the clear-and-convincing standard, the Holley best-interest factors, and the rule that evidence supporting endangerment grounds may also support best interest. The opinion highlighted evidence of methamphetamine use, a meth-possession conviction, domestic violence, a child born testing positive for methamphetamine and marihuana, prior Department involvement, and the mother’s failure to complete services and demonstrate stable, drug-free living. Applying those standards, the court held the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, past drug use, instability, CPS history, and incomplete services can strongly support a best-interest finding because courts may infer future risk from past conduct. For trial lawyers, the lesson is to build a clear timeline connecting substance abuse, criminal history, safety concerns, and service-plan performance to the child’s present and future needs."
Davet v. State
COA14
In Davet v. State, the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court violated due process by not halting the case and completing competency procedures after counsel raised concerns about his competency. The court noted that the trial judge had granted the defense motion and ordered a competency evaluation, but the process stalled when the defendant failed to appear for the scheduled exam and the evaluator reported that no opinion could be formed. Because the defendant never renewed the request, objected to proceeding to trial, or obtained an adverse ruling after the evaluation failed, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 that the complaint was not preserved. The court therefore overruled the competency issue and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Getting the initial order is not enough. If an evaluation, procedural safeguard, or court-ordered step breaks down, counsel must re-urge the issue, object to moving forward, and obtain a ruling on the record or the appellate complaint may be lost."
In the Interest of J.C.B.G., et al., Children
COA04
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court treated the case as a pattern-of-endangerment case, relying on repeated unsafe home conditions, chronic supervision failures, exposure to domestic conflict and inappropriate adults, unsafe transportation practices including children riding unrestrained, failure to obtain proper medical care after injuries, and the severe burn injuries suffered by an infant while in Mother’s care. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the distinct analyses for environmental endangerment under subsection (D) and conduct-based endangerment under subsection (E), the court held the record showed both an endangering environment and a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the children’s physical and emotional well-being. Because the best-interest finding also stood, the termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment findings are often won or lost through accumulation, not one dramatic event. In Texas family cases, a documented pattern of poor supervision, unsafe caretakers, transportation safety failures, minimization of injuries, and chronic instability can justify severe restrictions or termination even when the parent points to service compliance or some favorable facts."
In the Interest of X.H.Q., a Child
COA05
In *In the Interest of X.H.Q.*, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a Texas court acting under UIFSA may establish an initial child support obligation even though the registered Arizona divorce decree previously ordered no child support. The Office of the Attorney General registered the Arizona decree and sought support after Father moved to Texas. Father argued the Texas court lacked authority to create support and lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The court rejected both arguments. Relying on Texas Family Code section 159.401 and *In re T.B.*, it concluded that a foreign decree setting support at zero does not bar a Texas UIFSA proceeding to establish support for the first time. On jurisdiction, the court held Father’s sworn waiver of service—stating he received the papers, entered an appearance for all purposes, and waived service—supported personal jurisdiction, and his coercion argument failed because the record did not show he was prevented from reading the waiver or that his free will was overborne. The court further held that, even if the waiver were ineffective, Father made a general appearance that independently submitted him to the court’s jurisdiction. The order establishing child support and medical support was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A foreign decree ordering no child support does not prevent a Texas court from establishing support under UIFSA. In interstate support cases, the real battleground is usually personal jurisdiction over the obligor, and a signed waiver or later general appearance can be enough to bind that party to a Texas support order."