Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
723 opinions found
Skorich v. State; Woody v. State
COA07
During an interstate trucking trip, a seven-year-old arrived at a Hereford, Texas ER unresponsive, profoundly dehydrated, and covered in bruises. The mother and her non-parent boyfriend were convicted of injury to a child based on a course of conduct that included chronic water deprivation, corporal punishment, and delayed medical care. On appeal, they challenged Texas subject-matter jurisdiction and Deaf Smith County venue because much of the travel occurred outside Texas, and the boyfriend challenged the legal sufficiency of proof that he had a duty to act (required for omission liability under Penal Code § 22.04). The Seventh Court of Appeals treated the events as a continuing, mobile criminal episode and held Texas had jurisdiction because the State tied critical elements and the resulting serious bodily injury to Texas, including the child’s deterioration and medical crisis culminating in Texas. The court further held venue was proper in Deaf Smith County because the evidence connected the offense to that county, including the child’s emergent presentation and treatment in Hereford and supporting timeline/location proof. On the merits, the court held the evidence was legally sufficient that the boyfriend assumed “care, custody, and control” through cohabitation/household integration, discipline authority, shared finances, and influence over medical decisions—creating a legal duty supporting omission liability. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient that the mother knowingly or recklessly caused serious bodily injury and bodily injury by omission through chronic deprivation of water and failure to obtain timely medical care, and it affirmed both convictions.
Litigation Takeaway
"In custody and protective-order litigation, a parent’s live-in romantic partner can be treated as a de facto caregiver with enforceable duties when the facts show they functioned in the family unit (discipline, daily supervision, finances, medical decision-making). Also, “neglect” theories (withholding basic necessities and delaying medical care) can support endangerment and family-violence findings as an omission-based course of conduct—especially in mobile-family cases—so anchor proof to where the child’s decline manifested and where the crisis was discovered/treated to defeat jurisdiction/venue attacks."
Skorich v. The State of Texas; Woody v. The State of Texas
COA07
In a consolidated criminal appeal, the Seventh Court of Appeals reviewed injury-to-a-child convictions against the child’s mother and her live-in boyfriend arising from omissions during an interstate 18‑wheeler trip that culminated with the seven-year-old arriving at a Hereford (Deaf Smith County) ER unresponsive, severely dehydrated, and bruised. The defendants challenged (1) subject-matter jurisdiction and venue in Deaf Smith County given the multistate travel, and (2) legal and factual sufficiency—especially whether the boyfriend could be liable by omission absent parent status. Applying Texas Penal Code § 22.04, the court treated the conduct as a continuing, omission-based course of conduct with a harmful result tied to Deaf Smith County, and held Texas courts had jurisdiction and venue was proper where key components of the omission and the resulting medical crisis manifested. On sufficiency, the court held the evidence supported that the boyfriend “assumed” care, custody, and control—shown by cohabitation, day-to-day authority and discipline, integrated household functioning, and participation in decisions about when to seek medical care—creating a legal duty to act and supporting omission liability. The court also held the evidence supported the mother’s knowing or reckless mental state and causation, relying heavily on medical testimony that the child’s dehydration was chronic and consistent with withholding fluids and delayed care. The court affirmed both defendants’ judgments.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, a live-in boyfriend/girlfriend can become a duty-bearing “assumed caregiver” based on real-world control and decision-making—enough to support omission liability. For SAPCRs and protective orders, build (or attack) proof around functional caregiving facts (cohabitation, discipline, control of necessities, medical decision-making, admissions) and a clear timeline showing progressive deterioration and delayed intervention; courts will look past labels like “not the parent.”"
Mosser v. Flagstar Bank, FSB; Select Portfolio Servicing Inc.; First Guaranty Mortgage Corporation; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
COA05
In a Texas homestead lending/foreclosure dispute, the borrower challenged a home-equity (“cash-out”) lien as constitutionally noncompliant and void and sought discovery from multiple entities in the loan/servicing chain. Defendants moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment. The borrower filed a properly supported Rule 166a(g) motion for continuance explaining he needed basic, targeted discovery—foundational documents and testimony necessary to respond to the dispositive motions—especially after later-joined parties and procedural events effectively limited meaningful discovery time. The trial court denied the continuance and granted summary judgment. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals first rejected a post-submission jurisdiction/standing attack tied to a later-recorded “corrective” assignment, holding it still had appellate jurisdiction and that any assignment/standing issues could be addressed on remand. Turning to the merits, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Rule 166a(g) continuance where the record showed the requested discovery was essential—not a fishing expedition—to oppose summary judgment. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court can’t force a party to lose on summary judgment while blocking the minimum discovery needed to respond. If you face early dispositive motions in a property-heavy case, preserve error with a verified, nonconclusory Rule 166a(g) continuance request that ties specific discovery to specific summary-judgment elements and demonstrates diligence—especially when key parties were added late or discovery time was functionally curtailed."
In the Interest of S.S.F.R. and S.J.F.R., Children
COA05
In this Collin County divorce case, a husband appealed the final decree regarding property division and child possession orders. However, acting without an attorney, the husband filed an appellate brief that failed to identify specific legal errors or provide citations to the trial record and legal authorities as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. The Dallas Court of Appeals gave the husband an opportunity to fix these issues, but his amended brief remained noncompliant. The court analyzed the case by emphasizing that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and that the court cannot act as an advocate or search the record for errors not clearly presented. Consequently, the court held that the husband waived his right to review and affirmed the trial court's divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Success on appeal requires more than just being unhappy with a trial court's decision; you must follow strict briefing rules. Whether represented by counsel or appearing pro se, an appellant must clearly tie their complaints to the trial record and specific legal authorities, or they risk having their appeal dismissed without the court ever considering the actual merits of their case."
Diamond Hydraulics, Inc. v. GAC Equipment, LLC d/b/a Austin Crane Service
SCOTX
In a commercial breach-of-contract/warranty dispute where causation turned on expert engineering testimony, the defendant timely designated an expert but, after multiple resets, its testifying expert became unavailable shortly before trial due to a job change, relocation out of state, and an express refusal to testify. The defendant promptly notified the other side and moved to substitute another engineer from the same firm who had helped prepare the report, offering to limit the substitute to the same opinions. The trial court excluded the substitute under Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6, denied continuances, and forced the defendant to try the case with no causation expert; the jury returned a plaintiff’s verdict and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court held that Rule 193.6’s “good cause” exception, while demanding, is not an “impossible” standard, and that the trial court misapplied the rule by rigidly denying substitution when the unavailability was outside the party’s control and the party acted promptly and in good faith to mitigate any prejudice. Because the exclusion was effectively case-dispositive in an expert-driven case, the error was reversible; the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a properly designated expert becomes genuinely unavailable near trial (job change, relocation, refusal to testify), don’t assume you’re stuck: act immediately, document the unavailability, offer a true substitute with the same opinions, and propose cure measures (deposition/limited continuance). Courts cannot weaponize Rule 193.6 deadlines to force trial without essential expert proof when the problem is outside your control and you move diligently."
In re M.S.
COA02
In a modification of a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR) between a mother and a nonparent former partner, the trial court initially maintained the nonparent's joint managing conservatorship and possession rights over the mother’s objection. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals, applying the "fit-parent presumption" established in In re C.J.C., held that a trial court cannot grant or continue a nonparent's possession or conservatorship rights over a fit parent's objection without evidence of extraordinary circumstances or parental unfitness. Finding that the record consisted primarily of interpersonal conflict rather than evidence of significant harm to the child, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court to vacate its orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"Temporary orders are a critical constitutional battleground in parent-vs-nonparent disputes. Litigators must treat the "fit-parent presumption" as the controlling standard from the outset; a nonparent cannot rely on the "status quo" or "best interest" alone to maintain rights, but must instead prove extraordinary circumstances to overcome a fit parent's objection."
C. R. F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In a bench-trial termination case, the mother challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting endangerment grounds and the best-interest finding after she led police on a late-night, 100+ mph chase with her three young children in the car and the Department removed the children. The Third Court of Appeals evaluated the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and viewed the evidence cumulatively, not as a single-incident lapse. It held that the high-speed flight, combined with the children’s unstable living conditions (sleeping and eating in the car, poor hygiene and inadequate clothing), outstanding felony warrants (including custodial interference), and unresolved mental-health/substance-use concerns supported findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) (endangering conditions) and (E) (endangering conduct). Applying the Holley best-interest framework, the court emphasized the children’s stability and improvement in a Kentucky placement, concerns that the mother’s hostile communications destabilized the placement and the children, and the mother’s failure to document sobriety/treatment after moving out of state. The court affirmed termination, upheld the finding that the Department made reasonable reunification efforts despite the mother’s relocation, and affirmed appointment of the Department as permanent managing conservator.
Litigation Takeaway
"High-risk conduct that exposes children to danger—even without physical injury—can support termination and heavily influence custody outcomes, especially when paired with instability, unresolved mental-health/substance issues, and combative communications that harm the children’s emotional stability. If a parent moves out of state during a CPS/SAPCR case, they must proactively secure admissible proof of service completion and sobriety; courts will not treat the move as shifting the agency’s duty to fund or arrange out-of-state services."
In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile
COA05
In a juvenile delinquency jury trial for indecency with a child by contact, jurors reported that a State investigator seated in the gallery as the child complainant’s “support” repeatedly used gestures (e.g., “thumbs up,” motions to look at him, refocusing cues) that functionally coached the child during live testimony. The Fifth Court of Appeals analyzed the conduct as State-sponsored interference with the juvenile’s right to confrontation and meaningful cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment and Texas Constitution art. I, § 10, emphasizing that confrontation protects not just physical presence but an opportunity to test credibility free from real-time outside shaping. Applying constitutional harm review, the court held the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the child’s testimony was central and credibility-driven, and the jury’s evaluation was tainted by observed prompting from a State agent. The court reversed the adjudication and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a child witness is testifying, a “support person” cannot become a coach. If any aligned adult is visible to the child and signals, gestures, or otherwise prompts answers during testimony, object and demand an immediate inquiry; build a record (including juror/counsel affidavits if discovered later) and seek striking testimony, mistrial/new trial, or appellate reversal. In family cases, use the same due-process/credibility framework to challenge the reliability of child testimony or statements and to request prophylactic courtroom controls (neutral support, no line-of-sight, no signaling, on-the-record admonishments)."
In the Interest of D.R.S., a Child
COA07
In a parental-rights termination appeal, the parent’s appointed appellate counsel sought to withdraw after briefing due to a newly arising, irreconcilable conflict of interest caused by new employment. Recognizing that termination appeals are accelerated and implicate the parent’s right to effective representation, the Seventh Court of Appeals held it could not proceed on the merits without a trial-court ruling and an adequate record regarding the conflict and any need for substitute counsel. The court therefore abated the appeal, suspended appellate deadlines, and remanded to the trial court to rule on withdrawal, decide whether substitute appellate counsel must be appointed, and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, with a supplemental clerk’s and reporter’s record due by a set expedited deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family-law appeals—especially parental-termination cases—an attorney conflict is a threshold issue that can halt the appeal. Raise conflicts immediately and build a clear trial-court record (order, findings, and hearing record) on withdrawal and substitution, or the appellate court may abate the case and suspend deadlines until representation issues are resolved."
In the Matter of J.D.
COA14
J.D., a juvenile serving a 25-year determinate sentence for capital murder and aggravated robbery, challenged the juvenile court’s decision under Texas Family Code § 54.11 to transfer him from the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) to the Institutional Division of TDCJ (TDCJ–ID) to complete his unserved sentence rather than release him to parole supervision. On abuse-of-discretion review, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals treated the transfer decision as discretionary and asked only whether the record contained “some evidence” tied to the § 54.11(k) factors supporting transfer. Although J.D. presented evidence of rehabilitation (good institutional behavior, educational progress, and favorable therapeutic notes), the court held the juvenile judge could credit competing evidence and weigh factors differently. The court emphasized the extreme violence and manner of the offenses, TJJD’s recommendation to transfer, J.D.’s incomplete capital/serious violent offender treatment, and testimony about victim-family and community safety concerns. Because these items provided some evidence supporting transfer, the court affirmed and held the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering transfer to TDCJ–ID rather than parole release.
Litigation Takeaway
"In § 54.11 determinate-sentence transfer hearings, “doing well” in TJJD may not overcome a safety-driven record. Expect trial courts to give heavy weight to offense severity, incomplete specialized treatment, and TJJD/prosecutor recommendations—and appellate courts will usually affirm if there is some evidence supporting transfer. For family-law cases that hinge on whether a youth returns to the home, treat the juvenile transfer record as critical evidence for risk, safety planning, and temporary orders."