Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
In re April Renee McDowell
COA08
In this mandamus proceeding, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that a trial court’s second ex parte TRO restricting a mother’s possession and access to her child was void because it did not include a date-certain expiration and instead purported to remain in effect until further order or until it expired by operation of law. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 680 strictly, the court explained that ex parte TROs must expire by their own terms within no more than 14 days, with only one like-period extension absent consent. Because the mother expressly refused to consent to any extension, the later TRO also operated as an impermissible additional extension of the earlier TRO. The court granted mandamus in part, vacating only the void TRO portion while leaving intact the notice and setting for the temporary-injunction hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
"In emergency family-law cases, ex parte TROs must be drafted with exact Rule 680 compliance: include a specific expiration date, do not use open-ended “until further order” language, and do not treat a hearing reset as consent to extend restraints. If a court rolls one TRO into another without a valid expiration date or express consent, the restrained party has a strong mandamus challenge even though the temporary-injunction hearing may still go forward."
Gnadt v. Moody National Bank
COA14
In Gnadt v. Moody National Bank, the dispute arose after the estate of a deceased wife claimed rights in assets remaining in her late husband’s estate, then later argued it should have received notice when the husband’s executor sought resignation and discharge. The court analyzed Estates Code sections 361.003 and 22.018 and adopted the narrower view that notice is required only for someone who presently has a property right in or claim against the estate, not someone who merely once held a qualifying status such as spouse or devisee. Because the parties’ settlement agreement broadly resolved their community-versus-separate-property dispute and released future claims, the court held the wife’s estate no longer remained an interested person entitled to citation. The probate court therefore did not err by refusing to set aside the discharge order for lack of notice.
Litigation Takeaway
"In post-death marital property disputes, a broad settlement release can do more than end the merits fight—it can also eliminate future probate notice and participation rights. Family lawyers should expressly preserve any desired notice rights or interested-person status when settling estate-related property claims."
Haskett v. Pitchford
COA01
In Haskett v. Pitchford, the First Court of Appeals affirmed sanctions and a turnover order arising from post-judgment litigation over excess proceeds from a tax sale. The appellant argued he received too little notice of the sanctions hearing, but the court held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21(b) generally requires only three days’ notice and, more importantly, any complaint about inadequate notice was waived because he did not object or seek relief in the trial court as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court also rejected his other sanctions complaints because they were unpreserved, inadequately briefed, or unsupported by the record, and it upheld the turnover order because the related judgment had not been superseded.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a sanctions hearing is set on short notice, do not save the complaint for appeal. Object immediately, request a continuance if needed, explain the prejudice on the record, and obtain a ruling. In family-law cases, courts will apply ordinary preservation rules strictly in sanctions and post-judgment enforcement proceedings."
Williamson Music 1st, LLC v. EQYInvest Owner II, Ltd, LLP
COA06
In a commercial lease dispute, the Texarkana Court of Appeals upheld the landlord’s damages award but reversed the attorney’s-fees award. The court held that although the tenant failed to prove its mitigation defense strongly enough to defeat the breach-of-lease judgment, the landlord’s fee evidence was legally insufficient because it did not adequately segregate recoverable fees from unrecoverable fees. Relying on Texas fee-segregation law, including Tony Gullo Motors, the court explained that conclusory testimony, block billing, and a single undifferentiated fee request will not support an award unless the services are truly inextricably intertwined. The result was affirmance of the merits judgment and reversal of the fee award.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want attorney’s fees in a Texas family case, do not offer only a global number. When a case includes mixed claims or mixed relief, you must segregate fee-authorized work from non-compensable work—or specifically prove why the work was inseparable. For challengers, this case is strong authority for objecting to block-billed, conclusory, and non-segregated fee proof in divorce, SAPCR, modification, and enforcement proceedings."
Atudonyang v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
COA05
In Atudonyang v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Wells Fargo sued on a credit-card account, and the defendant tried to challenge service by filing pleadings labeled as special appearances and motions to quash. The Dallas Court of Appeals focused on the substance of those filings rather than their titles. Because the defendant’s arguments attacked only the manner and alleged defects of service—not whether he was amenable to personal jurisdiction in Texas under Rule 120a—the court held the purported special appearances were not true special appearances. Instead, they operated as general appearances. The court further held that the defendant’s later filings, including a counterclaim and other requests for affirmative relief, independently constituted general appearances that waived any complaint about citation or defective service. The trial court’s denial of the special appearance and motion to quash was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not use a special appearance to complain about defective service. In Texas family law cases, a true Rule 120a special appearance is only for challenging personal jurisdiction; service defects belong in a motion to quash. If a party files the wrong threshold pleading—or seeks affirmative relief before the jurisdictional sequence is protected—they may make a general appearance and waive service objections entirely."
In the Interest of B.B., a Child
COA06
In *In the Interest of B.B.*, the Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed a modification order appointing Mother sole managing conservator after nonparent conservators repeatedly violated court orders. The dispute centered on whether circumstances had materially and substantially changed under Texas Family Code § 156.101(a)(1)(A) and whether giving Mother primary conservatorship was in the child’s best interest. The court relied on evidence that the Broomfields moved the child outside the geographic restriction, denied Mother court-ordered access, filed collateral litigation in another county, and were held in contempt for thirty-six violations. The court also considered Mother’s evidence of rehabilitation, including sobriety, steady employment, church involvement, and a stable plan for the child, along with amicus testimony supporting reunification. Applying deferential abuse-of-discretion review and the fit-parent principles recognized in *In re C.J.C.*, the court held the trial court had sufficient evidence to find both material change and best interest, and it affirmed the modification. The court also rejected the venue complaint because a prior mandamus proceeding had already determined that transfer based on the child’s residence in Smith County was improper since that residence resulted from unjustifiable conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
"In custody modification cases involving nonparents, enforcement problems can become the strongest merits evidence. A parent who shows present stability and rehabilitation can regain managing conservatorship, especially when the nonparent conservators undermine the child’s relationship with the parent through relocation violations, denied access, contemptuous conduct, or manipulative litigation tactics."
In the Interest of J.Z.S., a Child
COA14
In *In re J.Z.S.*, the father sought to modify conservatorship to obtain the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence, or alternatively to change possession, communication, and information-sharing terms. Although both parents agreed there had been a material and substantial change in circumstances under Texas Family Code section 156.101(a)(1), the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that this only satisfied the threshold requirement for modification. The court separately analyzed best interest and concluded the trial court acted within its discretion in finding father did not prove that the requested changes would benefit the child. The evidence showed the child was thriving with Mother, was happy in his school and community, and wanted more time with Father but did not want to change residences. Given the child’s stability, conflicting testimony about parental conduct and information sharing, and Father’s history of sporadic exercise of possession, the court affirmed the denial of modification.
Litigation Takeaway
"An agreed material and substantial change does not win a modification case by itself. In Texas custody modifications, the movant must connect the facts to the specific relief requested and prove that the requested change—not just some intervention—serves the child’s best interest. If the child is thriving in the current placement, complaints about relocation, interference, or poor communication may support narrower remedies, but not necessarily a change of primary residence."
In the Interest of C.L., a Child
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E). The court held that clear and convincing evidence showed a continuing course of endangering conduct, including Mother’s failure to obtain prenatal care, refusal of medication for the newborn, inability or unwillingness to provide basic infant care in the NICU, untreated or unmanaged mental-health issues, and maintenance of an unsafe and unsanitary home. The court also rejected Mother’s argument that the Department failed to tailor services to her special needs, concluding that the record supported the Department’s reasonable efforts to reunify and that the endangerment evidence independently supported termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are won or lost on patterns, not isolated incidents. A sustained record of unsafe caregiving, untreated mental-health instability, medical neglect, and hazardous living conditions can support severe child-related relief, and a vague complaint that services were not properly tailored will not overcome strong endangerment evidence without a well-developed trial record."
Arana v. State
COA14
In Arana v. State, the child complainant initially made multiple detailed abuse disclosures to a school counselor, CPS, a forensic interviewer, and the prosecutor’s office, but at trial she partially recanted, minimized, and claimed not to remember important details. The State argued that the father’s conduct had procured that diminished testimony, triggering forfeiture by wrongdoing under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.49. The court explained that a witness can be treated as unavailable not only by absence, but also through claimed memory loss or recantation as to the subject matter of prior statements. Once forfeiture by wrongdoing applies, both hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections to the prior testimonial statements are lost. The court ultimately affirmed, holding at minimum that any assumed error in admitting the prior statements was harmless because similar evidence came in through the complainant’s own testimony.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a child or other key witness backs away from prior allegations, family-law lawyers should treat that shift as an evidentiary issue, not just a credibility problem. Preserve prior statements early, build a clear record of claimed memory loss or recantation, request a hearing outside the factfinder’s presence, and object consistently—because appellate courts are unlikely to reverse if the same evidence comes in elsewhere without objection."
Michelena v. Michelena
COA13
In Michelena v. Michelena, a former wife tried to use the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA) to attack her ex-husband’s transfer of homestead property to relatives after she had obtained a property-division judgment against him. The court focused on TUFTA’s threshold requirement that there be a transfer of an 'asset' and held that Texas homestead property is not an asset under TUFTA because property generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law is expressly excluded by Texas Business and Commerce Code section 24.002(2)(b). The court rejected the creditor’s argument that hypothetical excess sale proceeds might have become reachable under Property Code section 41.001(c), explaining that the case involved an actual transfer of exempt homestead realty, not nonexempt proceeds. It also held that allegations the transfer was a sham to hinder a creditor did not change the statutory analysis. The court affirmed summary judgment against the TUFTA claim.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before pleading fraudulent transfer in a divorce-enforcement case, start with exemption analysis. If the property transferred was a valid homestead, TUFTA likely does not apply, even if the transfer looks suspicious. Creditors should focus instead on abandonment, actual sale proceeds, tracing, and other nonexempt assets or remedies."