Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
Venisha Arnold v. Google LLC, YouTube LLC, Alphabet, Inc, Reddit, Inc, Felixlightner-Reddit Thread Starter, Rechlin-Reddit Admin, Boshau-Reddit Admin, Munx1er-Reddit Admin, Swhitt-Reddit Admin, and Texlex-Reddit Admin.
COA01
In Arnold, the appellant attempted to immediately appeal an order granting one defendant’s Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) motion to dismiss. The trial court’s order dismissed only Reddit, left other defendants in the case, and expressly reserved the mandatory award of attorney’s fees/costs and potential sanctions for later determination—making the order interlocutory rather than final. The First Court of Appeals analyzed its jurisdiction under the final-judgment rule and the limited statutory authorizations for interlocutory appeals, focusing on Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(12), which allows an interlocutory appeal only from an order that denies a TCPA motion to dismiss. Because the Legislature did not authorize an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a TCPA motion, and the order was not otherwise final, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"TCPA asymmetry matters: if you win a TCPA motion to dismiss (including in divorce/SAPCR “family tort” skirmishes), your opponent generally cannot take an immediate appeal and must wait until a final judgment—unless the case is severed and made final. Conversely, if your TCPA motion is denied, you can appeal immediately. Plan orders and severance strategy with finality and fee issues in mind."
Brown v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Brown v. State, police returned to an apartment for a second search after an initial search warrant had expired. Rather than seek a new warrant, officers relied on consent from the apartment manager and the victim’s family (who were clearing out the unit) and on the defendant’s own statement during an interview that he did not live there and had not lived there for 18 months. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the suppression issue under Fourth Amendment standing principles, applying Texas’s abandonment doctrine (disclaimer of a possessory/privacy interest defeats a reasonable expectation of privacy) and the apparent-authority consent doctrine (a warrantless search is valid if officers reasonably believe the consenting third party has authority). Under the totality of circumstances—primary tenant deceased, unit being vacated by the family, manager’s consent, and Brown’s explicit disavowal of residency—the court held Brown lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore lacked standing to challenge the search; the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. The court also rejected claims of judicial bias, charge error, and ineffective assistance, and affirmed the murder conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Move-out disclaimers can become legal waivers: if a party tells police, a landlord, or a court “I don’t live there,” that statement can be used to establish abandonment and defeat privacy/standing arguments—making warrantless entry/search more defensible based on third-party consent. In family-law crossovers (protective orders, divorce/custody disputes), counsel should carefully manage residency/possession statements and build evidence of continuing ties (keys, utilities, mail, property left behind) if privacy or possessory rights will matter."
Lalita R. Morey v. Oaks of Devonshire Homeowners Association, Inc.
COA01
After a July 14, 2025 final judgment, the appellant filed a notice of appeal on September 23, 2025—outside the 30-day deadline in TRAP 26.1 and also outside the 15-day grace period in TRAP 26.3—and filed no post-judgment motions that would have extended the timetable to 90 days. The First Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction over a standard appeal because an untimely notice of appeal does not invoke appellate jurisdiction under TRAP 25.1(c). The appellant then asked the court to treat the late notice as a restricted appeal, but the court refused because a restricted appeal has its own jurisdictional prerequisites and the notice must strictly include the statements required by TRAP 25.1(d)(7) (including non-participation in the hearing and no timely post-judgment filings). Because the notice did not contain those mandatory declarations, the court could not construe it as a restricted appeal and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appellate deadlines are unforgiving: if you miss the 30-day notice-of-appeal deadline (and the 15-day extension window), you’re out—unless you properly perfect a restricted appeal. If you need a restricted appeal, your notice must expressly track TRAP 25.1(d)(7)’s required statements; a generic notice of appeal cannot be “converted” later by briefing or argument."
Mooneyham v. Knapp
COA14
After the death of George Knapp, Terry Mooneyham sought to establish that the two had shared an informal (common-law) marriage for seventeen years. Knapp’s estate argued there was no evidence of a specific agreement to be married and successfully moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, analyzing Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2) and holding that a claimant’s own affidavit asserting a direct agreement to be married constitutes sufficient evidence to survive a pretrial dismissal. The court clarified that whether such testimony is 'self-serving' is a matter of credibility for a jury to decide at trial, rather than a reason for a judge to throw out the case early.
Litigation Takeaway
"In common-law marriage litigation, a claimant's sworn testimony that a specific agreement to marry existed is legally sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, shifting the focus from pretrial dismissal to the credibility of the witnesses at trial."
In the Interest of J.C.D.Y. a/k/a J.Y., J.E.D.Y. a/k/a J.Y., M.M.D.Y. a/k/a M.Y., J.T.D.Y., a/k/a J.Y., Children
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s decision to terminate a mother’s parental rights following nearly a decade of chronic neglect and substance abuse. The case centered on whether "abject squalor"—including rodent infestations, lack of utilities, and malnutrition—combined with a history of marijuana use, met the high legal standard for termination. The court analyzed the evidence under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (P), focusing on the "cumulative effect" of the mother's conduct rather than isolated incidents. The court held that the persistent pattern of endangering living conditions and the prioritization of drug use over basic needs provided clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children's best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"A persistent pattern of "environmental endangerment," such as chronic lack of utilities and poor hygiene, can justify the termination of parental rights; specifically, historical CPS referrals that did not initially result in removal can be used later to establish a continuous course of conduct."
Mitchell Carter v. Administrator of the Estate of James M. Shumberg, Creg Thompson, Jon Papillon, Ryan Michael Shumberg, and InTown Builders, LLC
COA14
Mitchell Carter sought to establish ownership of four real estate lots in Harris County through claims of adverse possession and his status as a bona fide purchaser. Following a bench trial, the court entered a take-nothing judgment against Carter and quieted title in favor of the defendants. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals found that Carter waived his right to findings of fact and conclusions of law by failing to file a mandatory 'Notice of Past Due Findings' under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 297. Consequently, the court applied the 'implied findings' doctrine, assuming the trial court found all facts necessary to support the judgment. The court affirmed the take-nothing judgment, noting Carter's grantor lacked title to convey and Carter's occupancy was insufficient for adverse possession, though it modified the judgment to strike redundant declaratory relief that duplicated the quiet title action.
Litigation Takeaway
"To preserve an appeal following a bench trial, you must strictly follow the two-step process for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; failing to file a 'Notice of Past Due Findings' creates a presumption that the trial court found every fact against you, making a reversal nearly impossible."
Bonilla v. Texas
COA14
In Bonilla v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed discrepancies between an oral sentencing and a written criminal judgment involving charges of aggravated kidnapping and sexual assault. The appellant’s written judgment included a $100 fine not pronounced in court and failed to note the submission of a victim impact statement. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b), the court analyzed the record and held that oral pronouncements control over written orders. The court modified the judgment to delete the unauthorized fine and reform the record to accurately reflect the statutory citations and the victim's participation, ensuring the record "speaks the truth."
Litigation Takeaway
"A criminal judgment is a critical piece of evidence in family law; practitioners must verify that written judgments accurately reflect oral pronouncements and victim participation. Clerical errors, such as omitting a victim impact statement, can be weaponized by an opposing party to minimize a history of abuse during custody or divorce litigation, but such errors are reformable on appeal or via a motion nunc pro tunc."
Tavarius Williams v. Walden on Lake Houston Community Services Association, Inc.
COA01
After a default judgment was signed, the appellant filed a notice of appeal outside the normal deadlines and then tried to invoke Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a to restart appellate timetables based on late notice. The First Court of Appeals analyzed TRCP 306a(4)–(5) and TRAP 4.2, emphasizing that the “late notice” timetable change is not automatic: it requires a sworn Rule 306a(5) motion filed while the trial court still has plenary power, which is measured from the movant’s date of first notice/actual knowledge. Because the appellant’s own asserted knowledge date started a new 30-day plenary window that expired before he filed his sworn 306a(5) motion, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant Rule 306a relief and the appellate deadlines remained tied to the original signing date. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 306a is a short, strict lifeline for default decrees: once your client learns of the judgment, you generally have 30 days to file a sworn Rule 306a(5) motion (and get an order) in the trial court—waiting for the court of appeals to flag a jurisdiction problem is too late, and a late-filed notice of appeal cannot be cured."
Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Susana Lopez
COA08
In Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Susana Lopez, a state employee sued for retaliation, alleging she was fired for filing internal complaints and requesting FMLA leave. The HHSC argued she was terminated for chronic training delinquency and unauthorized cell phone use. Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether Lopez's firing was a 'pretext' for retaliation. The court found that because Lopez admitted to the policy violations and failed to provide evidence of 'similarly situated' employees being treated differently, she could not overcome the agency's legitimate reasons. The court held that the agency retained its sovereign immunity and dismissed the case, emphasizing that subjective belief and timing are not enough to prove a retaliatory motive.
Litigation Takeaway
"To defeat a 'neutral' excuse in court—whether it is an employer's policy or a parent's justification for denying visitation—you must provide objective evidence that the reason is factually false or applied inconsistently. Suspicious timing or personal feelings of unfairness are legally insufficient to prove that an opponent’s stated reason is a mere pretext for retaliation."
E-VOLVE ENERGY HOLDINGS, LLC v. MP2 ENERGY, LLC
COA05
In a dispute sent to AAA arbitration, E‑Volve sought to vacate/modify an award confirmed by the Collin County trial court, arguing the arbitrator exceeded her authority and made erroneous offset/damages determinations. The Dallas Court of Appeals first held the confirmation order was a final, appealable judgment because it contained clear, unequivocal Lehmann finality language (“disposes of all claims and all parties and is final and appealable”), even if the order lacked detailed recovery terms. On the merits, applying the FAA/TAA’s narrow vacatur/modification standards, the court held the party challenging an award bears the burden to provide a complete, authenticated arbitration record. Because no transcript of the final arbitration hearing existed (and appellant provided only unauthenticated materials), the appellate court was required to presume the missing evidence supported the award, making review of the alleged errors impossible. The court affirmed confirmation of the arbitration award.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want any meaningful chance to overturn or modify a private arbitration result—especially in high-stakes divorce/custody arbitrations—secure a court reporter and preserve an authenticated record. Without a transcript, appellate courts will presume the evidence supported the arbitrator, and challenges that the arbitrator exceeded their powers or got the facts wrong will usually be dead on arrival."