Weekly Digest
October 24 – October 30, 2026
9 opinions this week
In the Interest of E.F., a Child
COA01
After an earlier agreed decree denied termination and limited Mother to supervised visitation, the Department filed a new termination case based on post-decree evidence of continuing drug abuse, impaired behavior, unsafe driving, failure to complete services, unstable housing, and inability to safely care for a nonverbal child with special needs. Mother argued that Texas Family Code § 161.004 barred the trial court from considering conduct predating the earlier decree unless the Department pleaded and proved termination under that section. The First Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that § 161.004 provides an additional basis for termination after a prior denial but is not an evidentiary exclusion rule. Under Texas Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, pre-decree evidence may provide relevant context for pleaded § 161.001 grounds and the child’s best interest when the later proceeding rests on new, post-decree conduct. Finding legally and factually sufficient evidence of endangerment, constructive abandonment, and best interest, the court affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights.
Litigation Takeaway
“A prior decree denying termination does not create an evidentiary wall. In a later case grounded in post-decree conduct, counsel may use relevant pre-decree evidence to establish context, continuity, endangerment, or best interest without proceeding exclusively under § 161.004. Counsel opposing that evidence should make timely, evidence-specific objections under the Rules of Evidence rather than rely on a blanket § 161.004 objection.”
MHI Partnership, Ltd. d/b/a Coventry Homes v. Brenda Kay Briggs and Ronald L. Briggs
COA14
In a residential-construction arbitration, the homeowners sought to vacate an award after discovering that one panel member was concurrently serving as opposing counsel in at least three matters involving clients represented by the homeowners’ law firm. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the arbitrator’s generalized disclosure of prior professional contacts did not adequately reveal these specific, ongoing adverse relationships. Because undisclosed facts that might create a reasonable impression of partiality establish evident partiality under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2), the court affirmed vacatur of the award. It also held that the order was appealable under Texas law and that the notice of appeal was timely or supported by an implied extension.
Litigation Takeaway
“Arbitrator vetting should extend beyond the parties to current relationships involving their lawyers, law firms, clients, experts, and related professionals. General statements about having worked with or against counsel do not necessarily disclose active adverse matters. Family-law counsel should conduct independent conflict checks, demand specific and continuing disclosures, object promptly to undisclosed relationships, and carefully preserve statutory vacatur grounds and appellate deadlines.”
Vinson v. Ward
COA01
Delynda Vinson sought a restricted appeal from an order granting Jeremy Ward’s motion for equitable adjustment and an award for ouster, arguing that she did not participate because she did not attend the hearing. The First Court of Appeals examined Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30 and the record, which showed that Vinson had filed a letter acknowledging the hearing, objecting to inadequate notice, opposing the motion, and denying its allegations. Because participation is measured by involvement in the decision-making event—not merely physical attendance—the court held that her written response constituted participation. Vinson therefore failed to satisfy a jurisdictional requirement for a restricted appeal, and the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Missing a hearing does not necessarily preserve the right to a restricted appeal. A letter, objection, affidavit, or other written response addressing the motion that produced the challenged order may constitute participation under Rule 30. Before pursuing a restricted appeal, counsel should review the entire record, identify the precise decision-making event, and determine whether the client made any related submission; if ordinary appellate deadlines remain open, counsel should preserve a conventional appeal.”
Reed v. Hill
COA03
After the parties’ final divorce decree established the priority for distributing proceeds from the sale of their marital residence—including Carl Lee Hill’s right to reimbursement for one-half of specified mortgage payments—the trial court released all funds in its registry to Hill because his decree-based reimbursement exceeded the available proceeds. Dominique AC Reed appealed, arguing that the release order was the first adjudication of the parties’ competing claims. The Third Court of Appeals distinguished Alexander Dubose, reasoning that the divorce decree had already determined the parties’ substantive rights and that the later order merely applied the decree’s reimbursement formula. Because the release order fell within the trial court’s enforcement authority, was consistent with the decree, and did not materially alter the property division, the court held that it was not independently appealable and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“A post-divorce order transferring funds is not necessarily appealable merely because it has immediate financial consequences. When the decree already establishes ownership, reimbursement priority, or a distribution formula, a later order calculating and releasing funds generally constitutes enforcement rather than a new adjudication. Counsel must timely appeal the decree that created the substantive rights; if a later enforcement order materially changes the decree and direct appeal is unavailable, mandamus may be the appropriate remedy.”
Maniscalco v. Womack
COA01
In this probate appeal, Jack Maniscalco challenged a jury’s rejection of his claim that his stepfather, Gene Womack, had adopted him by estoppel, as well as evidentiary rulings, jury argument, the denial of a mistrial, and issues concerning attorneys’ fees. The First Court of Appeals held that conflicting evidence—including Gene’s will referring to Jack as his child, testimony about their relationship, the absence of a formal adoption, and prior divorce pleadings stating that no children were born or adopted during the marriage—permitted the jury to reject the equitable-adoption claim. It also found no reversible error in the challenged trial rulings and affirmed the fee award. Separately, applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.5, the court held that costs attributable to unnecessary clerk’s-record materials may be allocated to the party who requested them regardless of the appeal’s ultimate disposition. It ordered Maniscalco to pay 60% of the clerk’s-record costs and assessed the remaining 40% jointly and severally among Maniscalco, Darren Womack, and Richard Womack.
Litigation Takeaway
“Appellate counsel should tailor every clerk’s-record designation to a preserved issue, jurisdictional need, or required harm analysis. Requesting the entire file as a precaution can result in a party-specific cost award under Rule 34.5 even if ordinary appellate costs are allocated differently. Counsel opposing an excessive designation should identify unnecessary items, document the resulting expense, and promptly request a specific allocation.”
In the Interest of N.C.G., N.C.G., and N.L.G., Children
COA14
The Department sought termination of Mother’s parental rights based on neglectful supervision, domestic violence, suspected substance abuse, mental-health concerns, unstable housing, and unsafe home conditions. After a bench trial, the court terminated her rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O) and found termination to be in the children’s best interest. On appeal, Mother challenged the subsection (E) and (O) grounds, § 161.001(d), and the best-interest finding, but she did not challenge the subsection (D) finding. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the unchallenged subsection (D) finding independently satisfied the requirement for at least one predicate ground. It further concluded that the entire record—including domestic violence, positive drug tests, instability, continued safety concerns, and the children’s stable prospective adoptive placement—factually supported a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the children’s best interest. The court therefore affirmed the termination judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“An appellant must challenge every independently sufficient ground supporting termination. Leaving a subsection (D) finding unchallenged permits it to sustain the predicate-ground element even if challenges to other grounds have merit. Counsel must also separately attack the best-interest finding and should not assume that completing services or having positive supervised visits will outweigh unresolved evidence of violence, substance abuse, instability, or unsafe parenting.”
Perryman v. State
COA01
Larry Perryman Jr. appealed his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, arguing that the trial court improperly admitted a forensic interviewer’s testimony as an additional child-outcry account under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.072. The First Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that admitting the testimony was error but held that any error was harmless under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b), because the child testified without objection to the same or substantially similar abuse. The court explained that harmlessness does not require exact duplication and that the interviewer did not improperly endorse the child’s credibility. It also concluded that Perryman failed to preserve bolstering as an independent objection and rejected his jury-charge complaint. The court affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“An evidentiary objection is unlikely to produce reversal when the same or substantially similar facts enter elsewhere without objection. In family-law cases involving repeated accounts of alleged child abuse, counsel should object separately to each witness and exhibit, state every applicable ground—including hearsay, statutory noncompliance, expert reliability, Rule 403, and improper credibility opinions—and build a record showing why the challenged evidence was uniquely harmful rather than merely cumulative.”
Villarreal v. State
COA03
In this criminal-law crossover case, Villarreal objected on hearsay grounds when the State first offered an unredacted SANE report, but the trial court required substantial redactions and later admitted a revised version. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and preservation authorities, the Third Court of Appeals held that the original objection did not carry forward automatically because the redacted report was materially different. Counsel’s renewed due-process, due-course-of-law, and bolstering objections—and the later statement that admission was “subject to previous objections and rulings”—did not specifically alert the trial court to a hearsay challenge. The court therefore held that Villarreal failed to preserve the hearsay complaint and affirmed without deciding admissibility or harm.
Litigation Takeaway
“When an exhibit is redacted, revised, or replaced, treat the final version as a new evidentiary event: renew each specific objection, identify the challenged portions, and obtain a ruling when the revised exhibit is offered. Do not rely on generic references to prior objections or on a different evidentiary theory to preserve hearsay, privilege, authentication, expert-reliability, or other appellate complaints.”
Rinehart v. Texas Oil Partners Permian BSW1, L.P.
COA05
In this commercial dispute with implications for family-law cases involving arbitration clauses, the defendants litigated in district court for nearly two years—pursuing venue relief, participating in discovery and sanctions disputes, and litigating injunctive matters—before first seeking arbitration on the night their summary-judgment response was due. Applying the Federal Arbitration Act and ordinary waiver principles, the Fifth Court of Appeals considered the totality of the defendants’ conduct and concluded that they had knowingly and substantially invoked the judicial process inconsistently with arbitration. The court affirmed the denial of the amended motion to compel arbitration and stay the litigation, holding that the defendants had waived any arbitration right and were therefore in default under 9 U.S.C. § 3.
Litigation Takeaway
“Identify and assert arbitration rights at the outset. A party that knows of an arbitration clause but spends substantial time seeking relief and litigating in court may waive arbitration, especially when it waits until a dispositive-motion deadline or the eve of trial. In family-law matters involving marital agreements or closely held businesses, counsel should promptly plead arbitration, move to compel, request a stay, and carefully limit any necessary temporary or emergency court relief.”