Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
Rodrigues v. Office of the Attorney General of Texas
COA14
In Rodrigues v. Office of the Attorney General, a father attempted to discharge over $500,000 in child support arrears by claiming the state failed to respond to his private correspondence. He further challenged the authority of the Assistant Attorney General to represent the state in court. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the suit, finding that the Office of the Attorney General has clear statutory authority under the Texas Family Code to participate in child support actions. The court also clarified that procedural defects, such as a lack of formal service, do not warrant a reversal if the complaining party actually attends the hearing and participates in the legal process.
Litigation Takeaway
"The Office of the Attorney General holds broad statutory power in child support matters that is very difficult to challenge procedurally. Furthermore, if you appear and argue your case at a hearing, you generally waive the right to complain about technical notice or service errors later."
Shelton v. Flores
COA14
In Shelton v. Flores, a government employee (Shelton) attempted to dismiss claims against himself by filing a Rule 91a motion under the Texas Tort Claims Act's (TTCA) election-of-remedies provision after both he and his employer, the City of Houston, were sued. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 101.106(e), which states that an employee shall be dismissed 'on the motion of the governmental unit.' The court held that because the City did not join or file the motion to dismiss Shelton, the statutory condition precedent was not met. The court concluded that individual employees lack standing to 'self-dismiss' under this provision without the employer’s active participation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Government employees, such as CPS caseworkers or law enforcement officers, cannot unilaterally exit a lawsuit under the TTCA election-of-remedies provision unless the government agency they work for formally moves for their dismissal. This provides family law litigants with strategic leverage to keep individual defendants in a case for discovery purposes, especially when an agency is reluctant to admit the employee was acting within the scope of their employment."
Angela Bass v. Mercedes Benz Financial Services USA LLC
COA01
Mercedes Benz Financial Services obtained a writ of sequestration against Angela Bass, effectively seizing or “freezing” specific personal property while the underlying case remained pending. Bass attempted to take an immediate (interlocutory) appeal from the trial court’s order granting the writ. The First Court of Appeals analyzed its own jurisdiction and reiterated that Texas appellate courts generally may review only final judgments unless the Legislature has expressly authorized an interlocutory appeal. Looking to Chapter 62 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (sequestration) and the interlocutory-appeal statute, the court concluded that an order granting a writ of sequestration is an interlocutory preservation remedy and is not among the categories made appealable by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014. While the appeal was pending, the trial court voided the sequestration order; the court further held that this eliminated any live controversy and rendered the appeal moot. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A sequestration order can quickly take property out of a party’s hands during litigation, but you generally cannot appeal it immediately. If you need relief, act in the trial court (motion to dissolve/attack bond/affidavit) and consider mandamus; otherwise, by the time a final judgment is entered—or the order is voided—the issue may be moot."
Bustamante v. Bustamante
COA01
In Bustamante v. Bustamante, the First Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court's order granting a bill of review—which vacated a prior 2023 judgment without resolving the underlying merits—could be immediately appealed. The court analyzed Texas jurisdictional principles, noting that appellate review is generally limited to final judgments unless a statute specifically authorizes an interlocutory appeal. Because the order only 're-opened' the litigation and did not fall under the authorized list of interlocutory appeals in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"The granting of a bill of review is a non-appealable interlocutory order if the underlying merits remain unresolved. Practitioners must proceed through a second trial on the merits before they can challenge the propriety of the bill of review on appeal."
William Delawrence Lewis v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Lewis, the First Court of Appeals considered whether evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for failure to stop and render aid when the defendant claimed he never collided with the crashed vehicle. Witnesses and reconstruction evidence showed Lewis drove a high-performance car at extreme speeds while “pacing” another car in apparent competitive driving for more than a mile; the other car then lost control, crashed, and caused a death and serious injury, and Lewis did not stop. Applying Tex. Transp. Code §§ 550.021 and 550.023 and precedent holding that “involved” is broader than “collision,” the court focused on whether Lewis’s conduct contributed to the accident. The court held that even without definitive proof of physical contact, a rational jury could find Lewis was “involved” because his high-speed, side-by-side driving was a contributing factor in the sequence of events, and credibility conflicts about contact were for the jury. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, you don’t always need proof of an actual impact to show someone was “involved” in a dangerous incident—participation in high-risk, competitive driving can be enough. In custody and divorce cases, that makes it easier to frame reckless behavior (and related criminal exposure) as endangering conduct for best-interest restrictions and as fault/waste considerations in a “just and right” property division."
Bictor Guzman v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Guzman v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed the requirements for admitting jailhouse call recordings into evidence. The defendant challenged the authentication of calls linked to his 'System Person Number' (SPN), arguing the State hadn't proven he was the speaker. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Evidence 901, determining that authentication is a 'low hurdle' satisfied by a combination of voice identification from a witness familiar with the speaker and technical data from a records custodian. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recordings, as the proponent only needs to produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to find the evidence is genuine, rather than ruling out every other possibility of identity theft or PIN sharing.
Litigation Takeaway
"Jailhouse recordings are a powerful and accessible evidentiary tool in high-conflict litigation. To overcome authentication objections, practitioners should pair testimony from a witness who can identify the party's voice with jail records linking the call to the party's unique ID number. This 'low hurdle' for admission means that even if an opposing party claims someone else used their PIN, the recording will likely be admitted, leaving the weight of that evidence to be decided by the trier of fact."
Cove Funding, LP and its Subsidiary HPS Admin, LLC v. Marcy Barba and Jorge Barba
COA03
In a post-judgment enforcement proceeding, a third-party lender intervened in a receivership, asserting a priority security interest and requesting the turnover of assets. The trial court denied the turnover motion but did not issue specific findings regarding the validity of the lender's lien. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether the order met the 'discrete issue' finality standard for receiverships or qualified as a mandatory injunction. The court held that because the order was a simple denial that did not conclusively adjudicate the underlying ownership rights or substantial interests of the third party, it was an interlocutory order over which the appellate court lacked jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"To prevent third-party claimants from disrupting a receivership through interlocutory appeals, practitioners should seek a simple denial of turnover requests rather than a formal adjudication of the claim's merits. Conversely, third parties seeking to appeal a denial must ensure the order contains specific findings that finally adjudicate their substantial rights or act as a mandatory injunction."
Leslie Parrish v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Parrish v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether a seven-year delay in executing an arrest warrant barred the revocation of community supervision. The appellant asserted a "due diligence" defense; however, the court held that this statutory defense is strictly limited to violations for failure to report or failure to remain in a specified location. Because the State proved a separate violation—failure to provide written employment verification—the court affirmed the revocation, noting that a single proven violation is sufficient. Additionally, the court modified the judgment to remove a fine that was included in the written order but never orally pronounced by the judge, confirming that the oral pronouncement controls in the event of a conflict.
Litigation Takeaway
"A single technical violation of court-ordered supervision, such as failing to provide employment paperwork, is enough to support a revocation regardless of "due diligence" defenses on other counts. Always cross-reference the court's oral ruling against the written judgment to ensure no unauthorized fines or conditions were added."
National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company v. Payne & Keller Company, By and Through Its Duly-Appointed Receiver, Peter D. Protopapas
COA14
In this case, a receiver attempted to domesticate a South Carolina order in Texas under Chapter 35 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code (the Texas version of the UEFJA). Third-party insurers intervened and filed motions to vacate, then attempted to appeal the filing as a final judgment. The Court of Appeals analyzed whether domesticating a non-final foreign order "upgrades" its status to a final Texas judgment. The court held that because the underlying South Carolina order was interlocutory on its face, its domestication in Texas resulted only in an interlocutory order, not a final appealable judgment. Consequently, because the trial court had not ruled on the motions to vacate and no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal for such a filing, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Domesticating a foreign order in Texas under Chapter 35 only creates an appealable judgment if the original foreign order was final; if the out-of-state order is temporary or interlocutory, it remains unappealable in Texas, potentially freezing enforcement if a motion to vacate is pending."
Tumey v. Crawford
COA14
In Tumey v. Crawford, the appellant attempted to appeal a trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). However, the appellee’s request for mandatory attorney’s fees remained unresolved in the trial court. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(12), which specifically authorizes interlocutory appeals only when a TCPA motion is denied, not when it is granted. Following the principle that judgments are not final until all claims—including attorney's fees—are resolved, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal and dismissed the case.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, you cannot immediately appeal the granting of a TCPA dismissal if the issue of attorney’s fees is still pending; for family law litigants, this means a successful movant can effectively block an opponent's appeal by keeping the fee adjudication active in the trial court."