Weekly Digest
April 11 – April 17, 2026
43 opinions this week
Estrada v. State
COA03
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed Estrada’s conviction for repeated protective-order violations. The State proved two violations within twelve months: Estrada’s contact with the protected person at the airport despite a no-contact order, and a later incident in which the complainant called 911 reporting that he came to her home and strangled her. Although the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution, the court held the trial court properly admitted the 911 call and EMS records because they were created during an ongoing emergency and for medical-response purposes, making them admissible under hearsay principles and non-testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excusing a juror for cause and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-violence cases, a later recantation usually does not erase strong contemporaneous evidence. 911 audio, EMS records, photos, neighbor testimony, and other emergency-response evidence can outweigh a complainant’s later change of story and may strongly affect protective-order, custody, and divorce litigation. Also, reconciliation does not suspend a protective order—only a court can modify it.”
In re Zermeno
COA07
In In re Zermeno, the Amarillo Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus after a trial court’s temporary orders named Father a joint managing conservator despite uncontroverted evidence that he had committed family violence against Mother within two years before the divorce was filed. The court focused on Texas Family Code section 153.004(b), explaining that the statute is not just a factor in the best-interest analysis; it prohibits appointment of joint managing conservators when credible evidence shows a history or pattern of physical abuse by one parent against the other. Because Father admitted multiple assaults, including one shortly before separation, and Mother and the parties’ adult children corroborated the violence, the trial court misapplied the law to essentially undisputed facts. The appellate court held that mandamus was the proper remedy for the unlawful temporary order and directed the trial court to vacate it.
Litigation Takeaway
“When credible evidence establishes a recent history or pattern of family violence, a Texas trial court cannot treat joint managing conservatorship as a compromise option. Family Code section 153.004(b) creates a hard statutory limit on the court’s discretion, and mandamus is available to correct temporary orders that ignore that limit.”
Sheehan v. Sheehan
COA11
In Sheehan v. Sheehan, the divorce decree awarded the wife $64,661.44 from a BB&T account in the husband’s name, but he later depleted the account and failed to deliver the funds. On enforcement, the husband argued that a money judgment would improperly modify the decree because the specific account no longer contained the money. The Eleventh Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that Texas Family Code §§ 9.002, 9.006, and especially 9.010 allow a trial court to enforce an existing property award through a money judgment when direct delivery of the awarded property is no longer an adequate remedy. Because the decree had already awarded the wife that sum, reducing the undelivered award to a money judgment did not change the substantive property division; it simply implemented it. The court also affirmed attorney’s fees under § 9.014.
Litigation Takeaway
“A spouse cannot defeat a divorce decree’s property award by draining the account or liquidating the asset from which payment was supposed to come. If the decree already awarded a sum certain, the court can enforce that award with a money judgment—and attorney’s fees—without impermissibly modifying the decree.”
In the Interest of M.L.J.
COA14
In this termination appeal, a Fourteenth Court dissent concluded that a parent’s unsupported claim of “Indian heritage” did not trigger ICWA. The dissent focused on ICWA’s statutory definition of an “Indian child,” emphasizing that the record contained no evidence the child was a tribal member, eligible for membership, or the biological child of a tribal member. Because neither parent nor the child was registered with a tribe, no tribe-specific evidence was offered, and no documentation was produced despite repeated opportunities, the dissent reasoned the trial court had no “reason to know” ICWA applied under 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). The dissent also criticized reliance on 25 C.F.R. § 23.107 to impose a broader inquiry duty based on mere suspicion, and would have held that ancestry alone is insufficient to trigger ICWA’s heightened protections.
Litigation Takeaway
“If ICWA is in play, vague statements about Native or Indian heritage are not enough. Family-law litigators should build a tribe-specific record on membership, eligibility, and parental tribal status early, because unsupported ancestry claims can create appellate risk, while a well-developed record can support the argument that ICWA was never triggered.”
In re Marriage of Runyon
COA10
In In re Marriage of Runyon, a husband challenged a divorce decree that awarded his wife a $47,990 money judgment, allowed her to relocate their child to Florida, and ordered $1,840 in monthly child support. The Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision on all counts. The court analyzed the property division under the Murff factors, concluding that the husband's high income as an anesthesiologist compared to the wife's lower earnings justified an unequal division. Regarding the move to Florida, the court applied the Lenz factors and found relocation was in the child's best interest due to the presence of extended family. The court held that the trial court acted within its broad discretion and that the wife's legal pleadings were sufficient to support the remedies awarded.
Litigation Takeaway
“Trial courts have immense discretion in dividing property and determining a child's residence; if there is a significant income gap or a clear best-interest benefit to relocation (like family support), appellate courts are highly unlikely to reverse the decision.”
In the Interest of B.C., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals largely upheld a post-answer default SAPCR order against a pro se father. The court concluded the record showed he had actual notice of the trial setting, his eve-of-trial email continuance request was not verified or supported by affidavit as Rule 251 requires, and his post-judgment effort to set aside the default did not establish reversible error under the standards governing post-answer defaults. The court also rejected his other complaints as unpreserved, inadequately briefed, or contradicted by the record. But it modified the final order to strike the child’s surname change because the mother never pleaded for that relief, and a court may not grant affirmative relief not supported by the live pleadings.
Litigation Takeaway
“Two family-law lessons stand out: post-answer defaults are hard to undo without a properly supported Craddock record, and even in SAPCR cases a final order cannot include affirmative relief that was never pleaded. Plead every item of requested relief, and if you seek to set aside a default, use a properly signed, sworn, and fully developed motion.”
In the Interest of S.M.T. and S.J.T., Children
COA14
In a pending SAPCR, the appellant tried to immediately appeal trial-court orders denying motions to correct the reporter’s record and clerk’s record. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied the final-judgment rule, noted that interlocutory orders are appealable only when a statute expressly authorizes it, and found no statute permitting an interlocutory appeal from record-correction rulings. Because the challenged orders were purely interlocutory and did not dispose of all parties and claims, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“You cannot create appellate jurisdiction by appealing a procedural ruling about the contents of the record. In family-law cases, record-correction disputes usually must be handled through the proper correction procedures, preserved for review after a final judgment, or—if truly extraordinary—addressed by mandamus rather than a stand-alone interlocutory appeal.”
In the Interest of A.S., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(F) and § 161.001(b)(2). Mother sought termination after Father failed to pay support, had no in-person contact following a Rule 11 agreement suspending access pending a mental-health evaluation, and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on both the predicate ground and best interest. The court emphasized that a failure-to-support termination requires proof of the parent’s actual ability to support the child during each month of the relevant twelve-month period; a prior support order or arrearage evidence alone is not enough. Applying deferential legal- and factual-sufficiency review, the court held the trial judge could disbelieve Father’s testimony minimizing his income and infer from the broader financial record that he had some ability to pay but failed to support the child in accordance with that ability. The same evidence, together with Father’s prolonged absence and instability in the parent-child relationship, supported the best-interest finding. The termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In a § 161.001(b)(1)(F) case, the winning record is a month-by-month ability-to-pay record, not just proof of arrearages. Petitioners should build concrete evidence of income, resources, and spending during the statutory twelve-month window, while respondents need disciplined documentary proof of genuine inability to pay because unsupported excuses and credibility problems can be fatal.”
Unger Texas Stone, LP and Shelia Unger v. Deere Credit, Inc.
COA11
The Eastland Court of Appeals reversed a restricted-appeal default judgment entered against an individual defendant and a limited partnership. The court held that Shelia Unger’s signed pro se letter, which denied liability, asserted that payments had been made and the equipment returned, and asked the court to dismiss the suit, was sufficient to constitute an answer on her own behalf because Texas courts liberally construe informal pro se filings that give fair notice of a defensive position. The same letter could not serve as a valid appearance for the limited partnership because a non-attorney cannot represent an entity. Even so, the court held the trial court erred by treating the record as though no response existed and by signing a default judgment the same day the motion was filed, without notice or an opportunity for the entity to cure the representation defect. The judgment was reversed and remanded as to both defendants.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law-adjacent default practice, any timely pro se filing by an individual that disputes the claims may defeat a no-answer default, even if informal. And if a business entity attempts to respond through a non-lawyer, the safer course is to force counsel to appear and give notice and a chance to cure—not rush to default—because due-process defects can unravel the judgment on restricted appeal.”
Pettigrew v. State
COA10
In Pettigrew v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals upheld admission of a roughly twenty-year-old extraneous child-sex-abuse allegation under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37. The defendant argued the statute was unconstitutional as applied because the prior allegation was stale, uncorroborated, never reported to police, and previously deemed “unsubstantiated” by CPS. The court rejected that argument, emphasizing that the trial court followed the statute’s safeguards by holding the required hearing, finding a reasonable juror could believe the extraneous act beyond a reasonable doubt, and conducting Rule 403 balancing. On the evidentiary issue, the court held the prior allegation was highly probative because it closely resembled the charged conduct, and the State had significant need for the evidence in a credibility-driven case. The court therefore held the statute was not unconstitutional as applied and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.
Litigation Takeaway
“Old, uncorroborated, or previously “unsubstantiated” sexual-abuse allegations may still carry significant evidentiary weight when they closely resemble current accusations and credibility is central. For family-law litigants, that means you cannot rely on remoteness or an agency’s non-substantiation label alone; you must either build a strong similarity-and-risk argument or attack the allegation’s reliability, dissimilarity, and prejudicial effect in a focused way.”
Schrotel v. State
COA10
In Schrotel v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to uphold a family-violence assault conviction arising from a dispute between spouses. The complainant testified that her husband hit her with an exercise ball, put his hand on her throat, pushed her down, and kicked or stomped on her leg, causing pain. The responding officer did not witness the assault but observed that the complainant was upset and crying, saw a heel-shaped red mark on her leg, and photographed it. On appeal, the appellant argued the complainant was not credible and that inconsistencies between her testimony, the officer’s testimony, and his denial made the evidence insufficient. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court deferred to the jury’s role in resolving credibility and conflicts in the evidence, considered the cumulative force of the testimony and corroboration, and concluded that the complainant’s testimony plus modest contemporaneous corroboration was enough for a rational jury to find bodily injury to a family member beyond a reasonable doubt.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, a factfinder can credit one party’s detailed testimony even when the other party flatly denies it. You do not need perfect corroboration; modest supporting proof like photographs, officer observations, distress, or a prompt outcry may be enough to support findings affecting protective orders, conservatorship, possession, and related divorce issues.”
In the Matter of D.A.
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order modifying disposition and committing D.A. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department after D.A. repeatedly violated probation, absconded for months, and continued using marijuana. On appeal, D.A. argued the trial court effectively refused to consider the full range of available dispositions because a requested psychological evaluation had been denied. The appellate court rejected that argument, holding the due-process version of the complaint was not preserved and that the record did not show the judge had prejudged the outcome or refused to consider lesser options. The court emphasized that a psychological evaluation is not a statutory prerequisite to a non-TJJD placement, the judge questioned D.A. about continued probation, and the trial court made the required statutory findings under the Family Code. Because substantive and probative evidence supported those findings, the commitment order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to argue on appeal that a trial court failed to consider lesser alternatives, you need a clear record showing it. Preservation, statutory findings, and concrete evidence of failed supervision matter more than rhetoric. If a denied evaluation or assessment is central to your theory, make the legal basis and resulting prejudice explicit in the trial court or the complaint will likely go nowhere on appeal.”
Rademacher v. Rademacher
COA03
In Rademacher v. Rademacher, a wife sought to set aside a Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) during a divorce, claiming she signed it under duress. She argued that her various medical conditions, anxiety, and pressure from her attorney and the mediator—who warned her that trial would be expensive and risky—rendered her signature involuntary. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the agreement under Texas Family Code § 6.602, which provides that a properly formatted MSA is immediately binding and non-revocable. The court held that 'reality-testing' by counsel regarding litigation costs and outcomes does not constitute legal duress, and because the wife failed to prove that her free agency was destroyed, the MSA remained enforceable.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas divorce law, a signed Mediated Settlement Agreement is nearly impossible to undo; feelings of pressure, anxiety, or being told that trial is a bad financial move do not constitute 'duress' that would allow a party to back out of the deal.”
In the Interest of O.A., a Minor Child
COA05
In this case, a father sought to reduce his monthly child support payments, claiming his income had decreased and he had two additional children to support. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the modification. The court emphasized that under Texas Family Code § 156.401(a), a person seeking a change must prove a 'material and substantial change' by providing clear evidence of both their financial situation at the time of the original order and their current circumstances. Because the father failed to admit recent financial documents like pay stubs into evidence—relying instead on testimony and outdated tax returns—the court held he did not meet his legal burden of proof.
Litigation Takeaway
“To successfully modify child support, you must present a complete evidentiary record; testimony alone is often insufficient without supporting documents like current pay stubs and tax returns to prove a material change in financial circumstances.”
Fuhrman v. Fuhrman
COA09
In Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, the Ninth Court of Appeals held that detailed tax-allocation provisions in an agreed divorce decree could be enforced as a contract in a separate post-divorce civil suit. The decree required Deloitte to prepare the parties’ 2020 returns, made Douglas responsible for the first $270,000 of 2020 federal income tax, and required the parties to split any excess equally. After Douglas paid his tax liability and demanded reimbursement, Nancy refused, arguing in part that Douglas had not fully performed because he did not provide a K-1. The court rejected that argument, concluding the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Douglas performed, tendered performance, or was excused, and that Nancy breached by failing to pay her allocated share. Because Douglas supported his calculation with returns, testimony, and a spreadsheet, the court affirmed a $187,244 damages award and $30,782.58 in attorney’s fees.
Litigation Takeaway
“If an agreed divorce decree allocates a financial obligation with commercial-contract precision, a former spouse may be able to enforce it later through a straightforward breach-of-contract suit and recover fees. For litigators, the lesson is to draft tax, indemnity, reimbursement, and equalization clauses with clear formulas, deadlines, and document-sharing duties—and to prove or defend those claims with actual evidence, not generalized complaints.”
In re R.H. and E.H.
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights to newborn twins after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The court focused on the mother’s methamphetamine use throughout pregnancy, the twins’ positive drug tests at birth, ongoing domestic violence involving the father, the mother’s repeated decision to allow the father back into her life despite assaults, inconsistent NICU visitation, unsafe attempts to breastfeed despite hospital warnings, and refusal to cooperate with the Department’s testing, safety-planning, and service efforts. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the Holley best-interest factors, the court held the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the mother’s instability, poor judgment, and inability to protect the children would continue, making termination in the twins’ best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“Drug use during pregnancy, continued exposure to a violent partner, and resistance to services can collectively support a best-interest finding even when a parent offers sympathetic explanations. In both CPS and private conservatorship cases, courts look for concrete protective change—not promises—and will treat past endangering conduct as strong evidence of future risk.”
Lind v. M3 Fort Worth Developer, LLC and The YoungESTone, LLC
COA10
In Lind v. M3 Fort Worth Developer, LLC, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a defendant who was properly served with the original petition but never answered did not have to be re-served with a later amended petition unless the amendment sought a more onerous judgment. Here, the amended petition made only corrective, non-substantive changes—such as fixing a name, counsel information, and service allegations—and did not change the claims, facts, or relief sought against Lind. Applying Texas default-judgment law and the restricted-appeal standard, the court concluded no service error appeared on the face of the record. The court also upheld the damages award, recognizing that default does not admit unliquidated damages or causation, but finding no reversible error in the proof presented.
Litigation Takeaway
“In default cases, the key question is not whether an amended petition became the live pleading, but whether it materially increased the responding party’s exposure. In family-law cases, re-service may be unnecessary for cleanup amendments, but if an amendment adds harsher conservatorship terms, broader property relief, fees, injunctions, or expanded enforcement remedies, failing to re-serve can jeopardize the default.”
Bradford v. State
COA10
In Bradford v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a six-year-old child’s three out-of-court identifications of her assailant were admissible as excited utterances under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(2), even though the trial court declined to admit them under Article 38.072. The court focused on whether the child remained dominated by fear, pain, and emotional shock from the assault, and concluded that the record showed continuous stress from the immediate porch disclosure through later hospital statements. The court also rejected the Confrontation Clause challenge, reasoning that the statements were spontaneous, made to the child’s mother during crisis and treatment, and were non-testimonial rather than formal accusations for prosecution. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a child’s abuse disclosure does not fit a specialized hearsay statute, do not assume admissibility is lost. Build a Rule 803(2) record showing spontaneity, timing, visible distress, injuries, and continuing trauma; in family court, that can support admission of immediate child disclosures in emergency custody, protective-order, and supervised-possession disputes. To defeat admission, focus on reflection, prompting, intervening calm, and litigation-driven questioning.”
In the Interest of J.G., J.G., and A.J.S., Children
COA13
In this SAPCR appeal, the appellant challenged a February 3, 2026 final order appointing a sole managing conservator, but the trial court later vacated that same order on February 19, 2026. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals treated the case as a pure jurisdictional question, explaining that once the underlying final order was vacated, there was no longer a live, final appealable order for the court to review. Relying on Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1), the court granted the appellant’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the appeal as moot without reaching any substantive conservatorship or child-related issues.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law appeals, always confirm that the order named in the notice of appeal is still in effect. If the trial court vacates the order after the appeal is filed, the appeal may become moot immediately, appellate deadlines may shift, and counsel may need to dismiss, abate, or perfect a new appeal from any replacement order.”
In re Diamond
COA05
In this original proceeding, the Dallas Court of Appeals denied a relator's petition for writ of mandamus challenging temporary orders and a related income withholding order issued during a SAPCR modification case. The court applied the standard set forth in In re Prudential, determining that the relator failed to prove the trial court clearly abused its discretion or that there was no adequate remedy by ordinary appeal. Beyond the merits, the court took the significant procedural step of striking the relator's petition and appendix for containing unredacted sensitive information, such as minor children's identifying data, in violation of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.9.
Litigation Takeaway
“Urgency in family law modification cases does not automatically entitle a party to mandamus relief; you must still provide a record that proves a clear abuse of discretion and the inadequacy of a standard appeal. Additionally, always double-check your redactions, as a violation of Rule 9.9 regarding sensitive data can lead the court to strike your entire filing.”
Corpus v. State
COA11
In Corpus v. State, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that a defendant did not preserve any complaint about the denial of a continuance where counsel made only an oral, unsworn mid-trial request to wait for subpoenaed mental-health records of an Article 38.37 witness. The court applied Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 29.03 and 29.08 and controlling precedent to treat the written-and-verified requirement as a bright-line preservation rule, with no due-process exception. The court also explained that, even on the merits, denial of the continuance was not an abuse of discretion because the defense knew before trial that the records were still outstanding and could only speculate about their usefulness, so there was no unexpected occurrence or concrete showing of materiality. The takeaway for family-law crossover purposes is that courts may never reach the substance of a continuance complaint if counsel fails to preserve it in proper written, verified form.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you need a continuance because key records have not arrived, do not rely on an oral trial request. File a written, verified motion, show diligence, explain specifically why the missing evidence is material, and make the record before trial if the problem is already known. Otherwise, even potentially important complaints about missing mental-health, school, CPS, or financial records may be waived on appeal.”
In re Marriage of Bueso and Cruz
COA12
The Twelfth Court of Appeals dismissed this family-law appeal because the appellate record contained no signed final judgment and no statutorily appealable interlocutory order. Although the pro se appellant claimed a March 16, 2026 order was final, the district clerk reported that the matter was still under advisement and that no order had been filed. The only document the appellant supplied was an unsigned, un-file-marked copy, which could not establish appellate jurisdiction. Applying Texas appellate-jurisdiction principles, including the rule that appeals generally lie only from signed final judgments or authorized interlocutory orders, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(a).
Litigation Takeaway
“Before filing a family-law appeal, confirm that a judge has actually signed the order and that it has been filed with the clerk. Oral rulings, draft orders, docket notes, and unsigned copies do not trigger appellate jurisdiction or deadlines, and filing too early can lead to dismissal.”
In re H.R.J., J.G.J., T.J.P., and L.P.
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and a best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2). The court focused on Mother’s ongoing illegal drug abuse, three prior removals tied to her addiction, and her decision to leave one child with that child’s father despite a protective order protecting the child from him. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations after a bench trial, the court held that this pattern showed both an endangering environment and a continuing course of endangering conduct, and that the same evidence supported termination as being in the children’s best interests. The court also emphasized that due process required review of both (D) and (E) findings because of their future collateral consequences under § 161.001(b)(1)(M).
Litigation Takeaway
“Endangerment cases are built through pattern evidence, not just proof of a single injury. Repeated drug abuse, prior removals, instability, and exposing a child to a dangerous or court-restrained adult can together support both predicate termination grounds and best-interest findings. On appeal, lawyers must separately challenge or defend subsection (D) and (E) findings because those findings can affect future cases involving other children.”
Arellano v. Arrellano
COA04
After a decedent’s children sued to void a lien on family property, the surviving spouse intervened claiming homestead rights. The trial court struck her intervention for lack of a justiciable interest, then later entered a final judgment declaring she had no homestead interest and assessed attorney’s fees against her. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the order striking the intervention was interlocutory, so it did not start plenary-power deadlines and instead merged into the final judgment, leaving the struck intervenor bound by and able to appeal the final judgment. But because the strike was based on a jurisdictional lack of justiciable interest, the trial court could not then adjudicate the merits of the intervenor’s homestead claim. The appellate court therefore vacated the homestead merits declaration, affirmed the interlocutory-jurisdiction/plenary-power ruling, and remanded for further proceedings on attorney’s fees.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you successfully strike an intervention, do not overreach in the final judgment. A struck intervenor is still bound until final judgment and can appeal, but once the court rules the intervenor lacks a justiciable interest, it cannot also decide that person’s substantive property, homestead, custody, or possession claims without an independent jurisdictional basis.”
Leonard v. Wooten and Ellison
COA05
In Leonard v. Wooten and Ellison, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defamation suit based on statements in an affidavit filed to obtain a TRO in a child-custody proceeding arose from protected petitioning activity under the TCPA. The court focused on the plaintiffs’ own allegations, which showed the challenged statements were made in a sworn filing submitted to a court for judicial relief. It then held that the judicial-proceedings privilege independently barred the defamation claim because statements in affidavits and other court-filed papers that bear some relation to the proceeding are absolutely privileged, even if alleged to be false or malicious. Because Leonard established that defense as a matter of law, the court reversed the TCPA denial by operation of law and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family cases, allegations made in affidavits or other filings submitted to obtain court relief—especially emergency custody relief—may be both TCPA-protected petitioning activity and absolutely privileged against later defamation claims. The practical lesson is to challenge allegedly false statements inside the family case when possible, and to draft emergency affidavits carefully so they stay tied to the relief requested and the issues before the court.”
In the Interest of I.J.W. and M.R.W., Children
COA08
In a suit to modify the parent-child relationship, the father tried to overturn a default modification order through a restricted appeal, arguing defects in substituted service, the return of service, default-related filings, and notice of judgment. The Eighth Court of Appeals first held that the father's separate bill of review did not disqualify him from pursuing a restricted appeal because a bill of review is an independent proceeding, not a Rule 329b post-judgment motion. But the court still affirmed because restricted appeals require error to appear on the face of the appellate record, and the key service and default documents father challenged were not included in the clerk's or reporter's record and appeared only in appellate appendices, which the court could not consider.
Litigation Takeaway
“A bill of review does not block a restricted appeal, so defaulted family-law litigants may be able to pursue both remedies. But restricted appeals live or die on the actual appellate record: if the service papers, military-status filing, last-known-address certificate, or notice documents are missing from the record, the appellate court will not consider defects shown only in brief appendices.”
Salinas v. State
COA09
In Salinas v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed a family-violence strangulation conviction after rejecting the defendant’s challenge to an unredacted 911 statement that he 'took off with a gun.' The court treated the gun reference as part of the immediate context of the reported assault, explaining the caller’s urgency and the circumstances facing dispatch and responding officers, and held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the statement’s probative contextual value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403. The court also refused to consider a separate evidentiary complaint raised later in an unauthorized supplemental merits brief, holding that distinct appellate issues must be presented in the opening brief or properly added by amendment with leave under Rule 38.7.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-violence-related litigation, courts will often admit damaging details from 911 calls and other emergency evidence when those details help explain the event’s context, fear level, and response. If you want exclusion, a generic prejudice objection is usually not enough—you must show the detail is severable, minimally probative, cumulative, or being used for improper character leverage. And on appeal, each separate evidentiary complaint must be raised in the opening brief.”
A.C. v. S.G.A.
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed an attempted appeal from an order denying a protective order and modifying visitation because related family-law proceedings—a pending SAPCR and registration of a foreign custody/support order—remained unresolved in the trial court. Applying Texas finality principles, Family Code section 81.009(c), and precedent treating temporary SAPCR-related possession and access rulings as interlocutory, the court concluded the December 4, 2025 order was not a final judgment and no statute authorized an immediate interlocutory appeal. The court therefore held it lacked appellate jurisdiction over both the protective-order denial and the visitation modification.
Litigation Takeaway
“Before filing an appeal in a family case, confirm the order is actually final or expressly appealable by statute. In pending SAPCRs or related child-custody proceedings, even urgent rulings denying protection or changing visitation may be only temporary, interlocutory orders, making mandamus, emergency trial-court relief, or pushing the case to a final order the better strategy.”
In re Megan Leigh Burch
COA14
In this original proceeding arising from a Brazoria County SAPCR, Megan Leigh Burch sought mandamus relief directing the trial court to vacate an order denying her motion to exclude an expert witness and to narrow a previously ordered child custody evaluation. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied the usual mandamus framework, requiring a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal, and emphasized that the relator bears the burden to provide a sufficient record and legal showing. Because Burch did not establish that the trial court’s expert-related and custody-evaluation rulings met that demanding standard, the court denied mandamus relief in full.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is usually a poor vehicle for challenging expert rulings or the scope of a child custody evaluation in a Texas custody case unless you can build a tight record showing both a clear legal error and harm that ordinary appeal cannot fix. Preserve specific objections, propose narrower protections, and develop evidence of irreparable harm in the trial court rather than relying on generalized complaints about bias, unreliability, or overbreadth.”
In re Cruz
COA12
In In re Cruz, the relator sought habeas relief from an alleged contempt and commitment order arising out of a family-law enforcement dispute. The Twelfth Court of Appeals focused first on whether there was a reviewable order in the record and concluded there was not: no signed, file-marked contempt order existed, the document supplied by the relator was unsigned, related appellate records reflected "no order filed," and the clerk confirmed that no signed order had been entered. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(l)(1)(B), the court held that habeas relief failed because the relator did not provide a certified or sworn copy of a signed order or any competent document showing the complained-of ruling. The court also noted the relator was not actually incarcerated, which further underscored that habeas was not supported by the procedural posture. The petition was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
“Before seeking extraordinary relief in a contempt or enforcement case, make sure there is an actual signed, file-marked order and include a certified or sworn copy in the appellate record. Family-law appellate strategy starts with record existence: courts review signed orders, not oral rulings, draft orders, or assumptions about what the trial court meant to sign.”
In re EOG Resources, Inc.
COA04
In this Texas mandamus proceeding, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that EOG’s disclosure of a redacted legal memorandum and an internal email referencing counsel’s advice did not waive attorney-client privilege as to other withheld title opinions, memoranda, and communications in underlying probate litigation over mineral interests. The court found EOG established a prima facie privilege claim through its privilege log, affidavits, and in camera submission, then rejected waiver because Rule 511 requires disclosure of a significant part of the privileged matter itself—not merely documents on the same subject or evidence that a party received and acted on legal advice. The court also rejected offensive-use waiver because EOG was only defending against claims and was not seeking affirmative relief. Because compelled disclosure of privileged material has no adequate appellate remedy, the court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its production order.
Litigation Takeaway
“A partial disclosure does not open the whole lawyer file. In Texas family litigation, opposing counsel cannot prove waiver just by pointing to a redacted memo, an email mentioning legal advice, or testimony that a client acted after consulting counsel; they must show the disclosure revealed a significant part of the withheld communication itself. And offensive-use waiver remains narrow when your client is asserting defenses rather than affirmative claims.”
White v. White
COA12
In White v. White, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that divorce-decree payments labeled as “spousal maintenance” were not true Chapter 8 maintenance because, in substance, they were installment payments for the wife’s equity in the marital home and community business interests. The court looked past the decree’s labels and contempt language and focused on the obligation’s actual purpose under the parties’ mediated settlement agreement. Because the $175,000 obligation functioned as a property-division buyout under Family Code section 7.006 rather than periodic support from future income under Chapter 8, the trial court properly refused contempt enforcement. The wife could still recover arrearages and a money judgment, but contempt was unavailable.
Litigation Takeaway
“Labels do not control enforcement. If a payment stream is really a deferred property buyout, calling it “spousal maintenance” will not make it contempt-enforceable. Texas family lawyers should clearly separate true Chapter 8 maintenance from property-equalization payments at the drafting stage and should evaluate the substance of the obligation before filing or resisting contempt.”
Peele v. State
COA04
In *Peele v. State*, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for indecency with a child and, in doing so, offered a useful evidence lesson for family-law cases built around a child’s disclosure. The key dispute was whether the child’s mother could repeat the child’s accusation even though the State initially invoked hearsay theories that did not cleanly fit the record and conceded the mother was not the Article 38.072 outcry witness. The court still affirmed because the complainant herself testified directly to the touching, the defense’s hearsay complaint did not produce reversible harm, and the record otherwise supported the verdict. The opinion underscores that appellate courts focus not just on whether “outcry” procedures were followed, but on specificity of objections, alternative admissibility theories, preservation, and whether any evidentiary error likely affected the outcome.
Litigation Takeaway
“In child-disclosure cases, hearsay fights are won on precision and preservation, not labels. If you object, force the court to identify the exact basis for admission, raise all applicable grounds, and preserve harm each time the same statement comes in. If you offer the evidence, do not rely on vague “outcry” language—build a specific evidentiary path and corroborate the disclosure so any error is harmless.”
Ortego v. State
COA01
In Ortego v. State, a husband sought to suppress incriminating text messages discovered on his cell phone by his wife, arguing the search was unconstitutional and violated Texas computer security laws. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the search under the Fourth Amendment and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23, which excludes evidence obtained in violation of the law. The court held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to private individuals acting without government involvement. Furthermore, because the husband had provided his wife with a written "Commitment to You" note granting her permission to look at his phone "for any reasons" if she had concerns, she had "effective consent." This consent defeated claims of illegal access, making the evidence admissible.
Litigation Takeaway
“Documented consent is the ultimate "kill switch" for digital privacy objections. In family law disputes, evidence found via "digital self-help" is likely admissible if there is a written agreement, a reconciliation memo, or a proven course of conduct involving password sharing and mutual device access. To protect or attack such evidence, practitioners must focus on the specific scope, duration, and potential revocation of that consent rather than general privacy rights.”
Nicholas Allen White v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Nicholas Allen White v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to prove lack of consent for indecent assault even though the complainant never verbally said “no” during the touching. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that indecent assault requires the force-based “without consent” definition from the sexual-assault statute, and instead applied the Penal Code’s general definition of consent as “assent in fact, whether express or implied.” Using that framework, the court concluded a rational jury could infer nonconsent from circumstantial evidence: the complainant had declined related advances, testified that White forced his hand down her pants, froze in fear, resisted being pulled into the men’s restroom, and immediately returned to friends crying and reported what happened. The conviction for indecent assault was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law cases, the absence of a spoken “no” does not equal consent. White is useful authority for arguing that courts may infer nonconsent from context, trauma responses like freezing, physical resistance, immediate outcry, and surrounding circumstances, even when the parties were previously friendly or flirtatious. That makes the case especially helpful in custody, protective-order, and fault-based divorce litigation involving allegations of sexual coercion or boundary violations.”
In the Interest of Z.A.A., a Child
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights to Z.A.A. after DFPS proved constructive abandonment and best interest by clear and convincing evidence. The court held DFPS made reasonable efforts to reunify by creating and discussing a family service plan and repeatedly trying to locate and contact father through phone numbers, relatives, social media, prior addresses, and his parole officer. It also found father failed to maintain significant contact, failed to support the child, and showed an inability to provide a safe environment, especially because he had substantial periods out of jail but still did not visit or engage. On best interest, the court emphasized the child’s stability and improvement in the maternal great-grandfather’s home, the adoption plan and backup caregiver plan, and contrasted that with father’s drug- and domestic-violence-related criminal history, repeated incarceration, nonparticipation in services, and ongoing absence.
Litigation Takeaway
“In constructive-abandonment cases, DFPS wins on appeal when it builds a detailed record of specific reunification efforts and the parent’s missed opportunities during periods of freedom. For family-law litigators generally, the case reinforces that stability, consistent contact, support, and a concrete permanency plan can outweigh a parent’s bare biological connection when best interest is at issue.”
Gurrola v. State
COA03
In Gurrola v. State, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the defendant waived any appellate complaint that a trauma therapist’s guilt-innocence testimony was improper victim-impact evidence. Although defense counsel objected at the outset to the witness generally on relevance, prejudice, bolstering, and victimization grounds, counsel did not obtain a running objection and did not renew those objections when the specific testimony about therapy, PTSD, trauma symptoms, and emotional effects was actually elicited. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) and preservation cases such as Martinez and Fuller, the court concluded that an initial global objection and a granted motion in limine were not enough to preserve error. Because the complaint was not preserved, the court did not reach the admissibility merits and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law trials, one opening objection to a therapist, counselor, or expert is not enough. If damaging testimony keeps coming in, you must keep objecting or secure a clear running objection; and a motion in limine never substitutes for a trial objection. Appellate issues are often lost on preservation, not merit.”
In re Lillian Gonzalez
COA14
In In re Lillian Gonzalez, the relator asked the Fourteenth Court of Appeals to order the Texas Office of the Attorney General, Child Support Division, to release child-support funds. The court did not reach the merits of whether she was entitled to the money. Instead, it analyzed its mandamus jurisdiction under Texas Government Code section 22.221 and held that courts of appeals may issue mandamus against certain judges and associate judges, but not against the OAG Child Support Division. The court also held that Gonzalez did not show the writ was necessary to protect or enforce the court’s appellate jurisdiction under section 22.221(a). Because neither basis for mandamus jurisdiction applied, the court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Before filing mandamus in a child-support payment dispute, identify the correct respondent and the source of the complained-of conduct. Even a strong complaint about withheld support funds will be dismissed if the petition is directed at a non-judicial actor like the OAG and does not show why extraordinary relief is necessary to protect the court of appeals’ jurisdiction.”
In the Interest of K.D.M. and S.I.L.
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights to two children after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and 161.003, as well as on best interest and conservatorship. The court focused on evidence of endangering surroundings and conditions, including domestic violence, unstable care arrangements, and the prior death of an infant sibling in Mother’s care that the Department linked to medical neglect. It also relied on Mother’s significant cognitive limitations and her inability to present a coherent, realistic plan for housing, childcare, schooling, therapies, supervision, and emergency response. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard, the court held that Mother’s limitations were not merely abstract diagnoses but functionally prevented her from meeting the children’s present and future needs, and that termination and appointment of the Department as sole managing conservator were in the children’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases, courts look beyond a parent’s good intentions and focus on functional parenting capacity: who will care for the child, where the child will live, how needs will be met, and how safety risks will be managed. Where cognitive limitations, domestic violence, instability, or poor safety planning affect day-to-day care, lawyers must build a concrete record with specific facts, corroboration, and workable caregiving plans.”
In the Interest of W.R.I.F.
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights to a medically vulnerable infant after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (M), and (R), and that termination was in the child’s best interest. The court emphasized Mother’s two-decade methamphetamine addiction, admitted drug use during pregnancy, prior endangerment-based terminations as to two other children, missed drug testing, unstable housing, and her failure during a monitored return to consistently meet the child’s significant medical needs, including therapy attendance and inhaler management. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard, the court treated these facts as a continuing course of endangering conduct rather than isolated lapses, and it held that the stable foster placement with the child’s sibling strongly supported best interest. The court also rejected Mother’s due-process complaint about a post-trial clarification hearing and her ineffective-assistance claim because she failed to show any substantive deprivation or prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law cases, courts look at the whole pattern, not just recent improvement. Long-term drug use, prior endangerment findings, unstable housing, and a parent’s inability to handle a child’s actual medical needs can outweigh short-term compliance and strongly support findings of danger and best interest. If you are trying the case, build a timeline, tie the conduct to the child’s real-world needs, and make a concrete record of harm for any procedural complaint.”
In the Interest of R.D., a Child
COA07
In this parental-termination appeal, the Seventh Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the reporter’s record was overdue and the court reporter ignored the court’s status request. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 35.3(c) and 37.3(a)(2), the court held that it had to take action to avoid further delay and protect the parties’ rights in an accelerated appeal. The court abated the appeal and remanded for the trial court to determine what work remained on the record, why the delay occurred, how long completion would take, and whether the original reporter could timely finish it. The court also required the trial court to arrange a substitute reporter if the original reporter needed more than twenty additional days to complete, certify, and file the record.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family appeals, especially accelerated termination cases, lawyers cannot treat the reporter’s record as a back-office issue. Monitor record deadlines aggressively, document all communications, and raise delay problems early, because appellate courts may abate the case, remand for findings, and even require a substitute reporter to keep the appeal moving.”
Martinez v. State
COA07
In Martinez v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant on community supervision could refuse a treatment-required instant-offense polygraph by invoking the Fifth Amendment after his conviction for indecency with a child was already final on direct appeal. The court focused on the narrow scope of the polygraph, which was limited to the adjudicated offense and did not reach other potentially chargeable conduct. Relying on Fifth Amendment principles discussed in Ex parte Dangelo and In re Medina, the court held that the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to questioning about an offense that can no longer expose the defendant to future criminal liability because direct appeals are exhausted. On that basis, the court concluded the refusal to participate supported revocation of community supervision. The court also modified the judgment and bill of costs to remove language suggesting future appointed-attorney’s fees could be assessed despite an indigency finding and no evidence of changed financial circumstances.
Litigation Takeaway
“A Fifth Amendment objection is not a blanket shield when the questioning is tightly limited to a finalized criminal offense. In family-law cases, lawyers should frame discovery, evaluations, and examinations with precision: if the inquiry concerns only an adjudicated offense with no remaining criminal exposure, a broad privilege claim may fail and noncooperation can carry real litigation consequences.”
Pegram v. Pegram
COA05
In Pegram v. Pegram, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed a county-court default judgment entered after the defendant failed to appear for a trial de novo from justice court. The court held the judgment was a post-answer default, not a no-answer default, because the defendant’s justice-court motion to dismiss functioned as an answer and carried forward into the county-court proceeding. Because a post-answer default requires the plaintiff to prove every element with evidence, and no reporter’s record existed, the court could not review the defendant’s legal-sufficiency challenge. The absence of a record required reversal and remand.
Litigation Takeaway
“If the opposing party has filed anything that counts as an answer, a later nonappearance does not create a no-answer default. In family cases, that means you must present admissible evidence on every element of requested relief and make a reporter’s record, or you risk reversal on appeal.”