Weekly Digest
April 18 – April 24, 2026
34 opinions this week
In the Interest of E.A., a Child
COA05
In In the Interest of E.A., a Child, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a bill of review seeking to set aside a default divorce decree. The former wife argued she was never served, which would excuse her from proving the usual bill-of-review elements, but the court held the record did not conclusively prove nonservice. The court relied on the substituted-service order and return, her admission that she lived at the service address, and contemporaneous evidence suggesting she knew about the divorce papers. Because nonservice was not established, she had to satisfy the traditional bill-of-review requirements, including showing that the judgment remained in place due to official mistake and without any fault or negligence on her part. The court held the failure to obtain a signed written order granting new trial within plenary power did not justify relief on this record, especially where counsel did not secure the signature and no direct appeal was pursued.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to overturn a default family-law judgment years later, a bare claim of nonservice is not enough when the service record and surrounding evidence point the other way. And if a judge orally grants a new trial, do not assume that saves the case—a written signed order must be entered before plenary power expires, or the original judgment stands.”
In the Interest of D.W., D.B., and J.B., Children
COA02
In this SAPCR appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction because the mother filed her notice of appeal nearly nine months after the final order was signed. The court held that a final SAPCR order is subject to the accelerated appellate timetable, so the notice of appeal was due within 20 days under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) and 28.1(b). Because no timely notice of appeal or motion for extension was filed, and neither the mother nor appointed counsel responded to the court’s jurisdictional inquiry, the appeal was not perfected and the court lacked jurisdiction. The court also noted that pro se status does not excuse compliance with appellate deadlines.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law cases, a final SAPCR order triggers an accelerated appeal, and missing the 20-day notice-of-appeal deadline can permanently forfeit appellate review. Lawyers must classify the order correctly, calendar the deadline from the signing date, and make sure responsibility for the appeal is clear—especially when appointed counsel, successor counsel, or pro se filings create confusion.”
Kong v. Department of Family and Protective Services
COA10
In Kong v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order striking a paternal aunt’s petition in intervention seeking managing conservatorship of two children after the parents’ rights had already been terminated. The aunt filed nearly five months after the final termination order. The court held the filing was untimely for two independent reasons: intervention generally must occur before final judgment, and once the termination order became final and plenary power expired, the closed case could not be reopened by a new intervention unless the judgment had first been set aside; separately, Texas Family Code section 102.006(c) barred a relative’s post-termination conservatorship request filed more than 90 days after termination. The court also rejected any attempt to save the pleading by treating it as an original SAPCR rather than an intervention, because the statutory deadline still controlled. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in striking the aunt’s filing.
Litigation Takeaway
“Deadlines and standing can end a family-law case before best-interest evidence ever matters. If a relative wants conservatorship after termination, counsel must act quickly—preferably before final judgment and, at minimum, within Family Code section 102.006(c)’s 90-day window. Post-judgment relabeling of a pleading will not cure untimeliness once finality and statutory standing barriers attach.”
Brian Alex Bermudez v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Bermudez v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a family-violence assault conviction and the denial of a motion for new trial. The defendant argued his lawyer had an actual conflict because counsel had pending criminal charges of his own, that counsel was ineffective for not securing an additional witness to testify the complainant was intoxicated, and that the trial court wrongly excluded the complainant’s testimony after a sequestration violation. The court held the conflict claim failed because the record did not show counsel’s personal charges adversely affected any specific trial decision; in fact, counsel affirmatively pursued intoxication as a central defense theme. The omitted-witness claim also failed because the proposed testimony was cumulative of other evidence showing intoxication and did not address the assault itself. Finally, the court held the trial court acted within its discretion under Rule 614 by excluding the complainant after the defendant discussed another witness’s testimony with her during a jail call, creating a concrete risk of tailored testimony.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law litigators, Bermudez is a strong crossover case on three recurring themes: sequestration matters, speculative conflict claims usually fail, and cumulative omitted-witness testimony rarely justifies post-judgment relief. If a witness has been exposed to trial testimony through calls, texts, or hallway updates, the court has broad discretion to exclude that witness to protect the integrity of the proceeding. And if a party attacks counsel based on personal legal troubles, the attack must be tied to a specific adverse effect on representation—not just optics or suspicion.”
In re James Robert Lawson, IV
COA03
In In re James Robert Lawson, IV, the Third Court of Appeals held that a Bell County trial court lost jurisdiction to act on a child-support enforcement matter once the obligor filed a notice of removal in federal court and filed that notice in state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). Even though the enforcement hearing proceeded and the trial court later signed a capias for the father’s arrest, the court of appeals concluded the state court was barred from proceeding at all during the period between removal and remand. Relying on federal removal law and Texas precedent treating post-removal state-court orders as void, the court held the capias and related orders were legal nullities, not merely erroneous rulings. Because the challenged order was void and involved confinement-related process in a child-support enforcement case, habeas relief was proper, and the court conditionally granted relief directing the trial court to vacate the capias and related orders.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a notice of removal is filed in state court, the family court must stop immediately. Any contempt, capias, enforcement, or temporary order signed before remand is vulnerable as void, so practitioners should shift their efforts to federal remand practice rather than asking the state court to proceed anyway.”
In the Interest of W.L.G., a Child
COA14
In this SAPCR appeal, the appellant moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals did not address the underlying parent-child dispute or review the merits; it simply applied Rule 42.1(a)(1), found no reason to deny the request, granted the motion, and dismissed the appeal. Because the appeal was dismissed rather than decided on the merits, the trial court’s August 29, 2025 judgment remained in effect and undisturbed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you voluntarily dismiss a family-law appeal, you usually end appellate review and leave the trial court’s order fully in place. In custody and other SAPCR cases, that means conservatorship, possession, support, and related rulings continue to control unless changed through some separate procedural vehicle.”
Lopez v. Inzhutova
COA07
In Lopez v. Inzhutova, the Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed a final protective order after the respondent, appearing pro se, failed to adequately brief any appellate issue. Lopez challenged the order on due-process, protective-order-violation, and cumulative-error grounds, but even after being notified that his original brief violated Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) and being given a chance to amend, his revised brief still lacked developed argument, meaningful application of authority to the facts, and sufficient legal support. The court held that pro se litigants are held to the same briefing standards as represented parties and that inadequate briefing waives appellate complaints. Because Lopez presented no issue in a form the court could review, the court affirmed the protective order without reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
“On appeal, preservation is not enough—your brief must clearly connect the law, the record, and the complained-of ruling. Family-law litigants, including pro se parties, can lose potentially viable complaints outright if they submit conclusory arguments, unsupported citations, or undeveloped analysis. For appellees, Rule 38.1 waiver can be the fastest path to affirmance when the opposing brief is defective.”
In the Interest of G.L.M., a Child
COA11
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief asserting no nonfrivolous issues. The Eleventh Court independently reviewed the record and held the evidence was legally sufficient to support termination under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), based on the mother’s pattern of drug and alcohol abuse and the resulting danger to the child, as well as the best-interest finding. The court also held that the trial court improperly relied on former section 161.001(b)(1)(O) because that predicate ground had been repealed by the 2025 amendments and the case was still pending after the amendment’s effective date. Rather than reverse, the court modified the termination order to delete the void subsection (O) finding, affirmed the order as modified, and denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M.
Litigation Takeaway
“Two practical lessons stand out: first, family-law lawyers must update pleadings and proposed orders for statutory changes because a repealed predicate ground can become void in a pending case; second, endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E) remain critically important on appeal because they can sustain termination and carry collateral consequences in future custody litigation. The case also reminds appointed counsel that an Anders affirmance does not automatically end representation in a termination appeal.”
Kelsey v. Rocha
COA13
In Kelsey v. Rocha, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a bill of review seeking to set aside an agreed divorce decree nearly four years after it became final. Kelsey argued the decree was procured through fraud and duress, mischaracterized his separate property as community property, awarded Rocha an unfair share of the estate, and was invalid because no marriage existed. The court applied Texas’s strict bill-of-review standard, requiring proof of a meritorious claim or defense, wrongful prevention from asserting it, and that the failure to assert it was unmixed with the petitioner’s own fault or negligence. The court emphasized that Kelsey had been served, participated in the divorce, and signed a notarized agreed decree containing recitals that he read and understood it and signed voluntarily without coercion or duress. His complaints largely attacked the substantive correctness of the property division—issues for direct appeal, not a late equitable attack—and he failed to show he was prevented from raising them earlier. Because he did not satisfy the elements for bill-of-review relief, the court held the trial court properly denied his petition and left the agreed divorce decree in place.
Litigation Takeaway
“Final agreed divorce decrees are extremely hard to unwind through a bill of review. If a party believes property was mischaracterized, the division was unjust, or the marriage itself is disputed, those issues must be raised and preserved in the original case or by direct post-judgment review. Strong decree recitals about voluntariness, understanding, and fairness can be powerful protection against later attacks.”
Laura Mann v. Manuel Diaz Cabrera
COA14
In this Harris County family-law appeal, the appellant voluntarily moved to dismiss her own appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals did not address the underlying divorce or SAPCR issues because the only question before it was whether dismissal should be granted. Finding the motion unopposed and no indication that dismissal would impair any party’s right to relief, the court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, leaving the trial-court judgment in place without any merits ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
“A voluntary appellate dismissal is usually a clean exit, but it does not undo the trial court’s order. Family-law litigators should make sure the client understands that abandoning the appeal typically cements the judgment below unless the parties seek and obtain additional relief.”
In the Interest of C.G.H. and C.H.H., Children
COA07
In a SAPCR modification appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals upheld an order requiring the children to attend public school after the current year and affirming counseling provisions for the children and mother. Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, the court held there was sufficient evidence of a material and substantial change and best interest, including testimony about the private school’s lack of accreditation, uncertified teachers, academic delay, and concerns about transparency and safety, as well as evidence of the mother’s manipulative conduct and interference with the father-child relationship. The court deferred to the trial court’s resolution of conflicting testimony and also held the mother waived her First and Fourteenth Amendment complaints by failing to preserve them in the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want a schooling or counseling modification to stick, build a child-specific record with objective academic proof, concrete safety or co-parenting concerns, and a narrowly tailored request. And if you intend to raise constitutional objections to educational or therapeutic provisions, preserve them clearly in the trial court or they will be waived on appeal.”
Darren Marcel Hanson v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Hanson, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a capital-murder conviction arising from the brutal beating and robbery of an elderly victim. The court held the evidence was legally sufficient because the defendant’s own admissions, the victim’s extreme injuries, the victim’s vulnerability, and the surrounding robbery evidence allowed the jury to infer intent to kill. The court also rejected the defendant’s hearsay challenge to the victim’s identification statements, not on the merits, but because the complaint was not preserved: a pretrial hearsay objection did not suffice when substantially similar evidence later came in without a renewed or running objection. Finally, the court held that a variance between the oral sentence and written judgment did not require remand and instead modified the judgment to correct clerical error before affirming as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
“The family-law crossover lesson is preservation. In abuse-driven custody, protective-order, termination, and divorce trials, a pretrial hearsay objection is not enough if the same statement later comes in through another witness or exhibit without a renewed or expressly running objection. Trial lawyers must preserve evidentiary complaints with precision every time the evidence is offered—or risk waiving a potentially strong appellate issue.”
Tutt v. State
COA02
In Tutt v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a domestic-violence conviction after rejecting a hearsay challenge to the complainant’s on-scene statements and a sufficiency challenge to habitual-offender enhancement proof. Officers forced entry after a distress call and scream, then found the complainant frightened, crying, and bearing fresh cuts. The court held that her statements to the responding officer that Tutt had cut her arm and choked her were admissible as excited utterances because the circumstances showed a startling event, close temporal proximity, ongoing stress, and statements directly related to the assault. The court also held that, under the totality of the evidence, the State sufficiently linked Tutt to two prior Missouri felony convictions for enhancement purposes. The judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law cases involving family violence, on-scene statements to police, 911 narratives, and similar contemporaneous disclosures are far more likely to come in when you can show immediacy, fear, fresh injuries, and little time for reflection. Build or attack the evidentiary mosaic—timing, demeanor, corroborating texts, photos, dispatch records, and officer observations—because those surrounding facts often determine whether violence evidence shapes custody, protective-order, and divorce outcomes.”
In the Interest of P.S.R.F., D.M.R.F., D.A.R., P.R.R., B.I.R., B.E.R., B.L.R., and Y.R.R., Children
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights to eight children after appointed counsel filed an Anders brief and the court independently reviewed the record for any nonfrivolous appellate issue. The court emphasized that the evidence supported endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), relying on proof of the mother’s continuing pattern of drug abuse and the resulting danger and instability for the children, which showed a substantial risk of harm and parental incapacity. Because no arguable challenge existed to the predicate grounds or best-interest finding, the court affirmed, but it denied appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M. because appointed counsel’s duties continue through exhaustion of appeals.
Litigation Takeaway
“In termination and custody-related litigation, substance-abuse evidence is most powerful when developed as an ongoing pattern tied directly to child danger, instability, and impaired parenting—not as isolated bad acts. Appellate lawyers should also remember that Anders review in parental-rights cases requires meaningful attention to § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) findings, and appointed counsel usually must stay on the case through the petition-for-review stage.”
In re Brittany Hilbert
COA05
In In re Brittany Hilbert, a pro se relator sought mandamus relief in a conservatorship-related case, asking the Dallas Court of Appeals to undo post-hearing orders affecting due process, attorney’s fees, and interim conservatorship or possession. The court did not reach those substantive complaints because the petition failed to comply with multiple mandatory requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52, including required sections, a proper certification, an appendix, and a sworn or certified mandamus record. The court also found that the petition and appendix contained unredacted sensitive data in violation of Rule 9.9. Because these procedural defects were dispositive, the court denied mandamus relief and struck the filing without addressing the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
“In emergency family-law appellate practice, procedure can decide the case before the merits ever matter. A mandamus petition must strictly comply with Rule 52, include a proper certified or sworn record, and be fully redacted under Rule 9.9; otherwise even strong due-process or custody arguments may never be heard.”
Jose Luis Espinoza v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Jose Luis Espinoza v. The State of Texas, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a young child and two indecency-with-a-child counts. The key dispute was whether the State proved the continuous-abuse statute’s thirty-or-more-day duration element when one child could not give precise dates and the defense argued the allegations were too vague and fabricated amid a family feud over the grandmother’s estate and residence. The court applied standard legal-sufficiency review under Jackson v. Virginia and held that exact dates were unnecessary. It focused on whether a rational factfinder could infer repeated abuse over the required span from the testimony. B.H.’s testimony that Espinoza touched her genitals over clothing twenty to thirty times over about a year was enough by itself to satisfy the duration requirement, even though P.P.’s timeline was less precise. The court also rejected Espinoza’s double-jeopardy, outcry, extraneous-act, medical-records, expert-testimony, and cumulative-error complaints, treating the defense’s fabrication and credibility themes as issues for the jury rather than grounds for reversal.
Litigation Takeaway
“For Texas family litigators, Espinoza is a strong crossover case on abuse-proof sufficiency: a child’s inability to give calendar-specific dates does not defeat abuse allegations if the testimony describes repeated conduct over an identifiable span. It is especially useful in custody, modification, protective-order, and termination litigation to counter the argument that abuse claims are too vague to credit. The case also shows that outcry and SANE-related evidence can survive appellate attack when properly framed, and that motive-to-fabricate theories tied to property or inheritance disputes usually create fact issues, not automatic legal wins.”
In the Interest of A.M., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights because Father challenged only one of three predicate grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)—subsection (N)—while leaving unchallenged the trial court’s findings under subsections (B) and (C), and he also did not challenge the best-interest finding. Applying settled termination law, the court held that one unchallenged predicate ground plus an unchallenged best-interest finding is enough to support affirmance, so reversal was unavailable regardless of Father’s attack on subsection (N). The court also rejected Father’s due-process complaint about alleged statutory and service-plan irregularities because he did not preserve that complaint in the trial court and, on appeal, failed to support it with meaningful authority, analysis, or record citations, resulting in waiver.
Litigation Takeaway
“In any family-law appeal, you must challenge every independent basis supporting the judgment and separately attack best interest when required; otherwise, the appellate court can affirm without reaching your preferred issue. Just as important, procedural and due-process complaints must be raised in the trial court and then fully briefed on appeal with authority and record support.”
In the Matter of the Name Change of A.J.G., a Child
COA08
In *In the Matter of the Name Change of A.J.G., a Child*, the El Paso Court of Appeals reversed a trial court order requiring a mother to pay $400 in reduced court costs after she filed a Rule 145 statement showing she could not afford fees in a minor name-change case. The appellate court held that her sworn indigency statement and supporting benefit, income, asset, and expense information were uncontroverted, and that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on an off-record interview process and attached documents rather than admissible evidence presented in a proper evidentiary hearing. Because the existing record showed inability to pay and no valid evidentiary basis for reduced costs, the court directed that the case proceed without payment of court costs or fees.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a family-law client files a compliant Rule 145 indigency statement, the court cannot impose filing fees or even reduced costs based on informal interviews, assumptions, or off-record documents. Make sure any challenge to indigency is handled through a formal, on-the-record evidentiary hearing with admissible proof; otherwise, the indigency showing should stand.”
In re Steven Joseph Slivinski
COA14
In this original habeas proceeding, Steven Joseph Slivinski challenged a Galveston County family-law contempt restraint and sought interim relief. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied the narrow civil habeas standard under Texas Government Code section 22.221(d), explaining that habeas review does not revisit the merits of the contempt ruling but asks only whether the relator is unlawfully restrained because he was denied due process or because the underlying order is void. The court held Slivinski failed to show either a due-process violation or a void order, so his restraint was not shown to be unlawful. The court therefore denied both habeas relief and interim relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“Habeas relief from a family-law contempt order is a narrow remedy. To win, the relator must present a tight record showing unlawful restraint based on a true due-process defect or a void underlying order—not just alleged trial-court error. In enforcement cases, precise drafting, clear notice, and a complete appellate record are critical.”
Gallegos v. State
COA04
In Gallegos v. State, the Fourth Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support an indecency-with-a-child count alleging contact with a child’s breast even though the child said the defendant touched her “chest.” The court analyzed the issue under a context-based sufficiency framework, relying on the child’s young age, her undeveloped anatomy, and her testimony distinguishing her “chest” from other body areas like her stomach and tummy. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and Arroyo, the court concluded a rational factfinder could infer she meant her breast area. The court also rejected unpreserved jury-charge complaints for lack of egregious harm and upheld the assessed court costs.
Litigation Takeaway
“A child’s imperfect or age-limited body-part vocabulary does not automatically destroy the evidentiary value of the child’s statement. In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, courts may rely on context—age, developmental stage, narrative detail, and differentiation among body areas—to draw reasonable inferences about what the child meant. The case also underscores that charge complaints must be preserved to have real appellate traction.”
In the Interest of C.S.S.
COA03
The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s refusal to terminate child-support wage withholding where the obligor claimed he had overpaid, but the Office of the Attorney General’s records and the trial court’s unchallenged findings showed unpaid arrearages and accrued interest remained. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard, treated the unchallenged findings as binding, and held that under the Family Code, withholding may continue after current support ends if arrears and interest are still owed. Because the obligor did not produce competent evidence disproving the OAG’s accounting, the trial court properly denied relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“Ending current child support does not end income withholding if arrearages and interest remain. If you want withholding terminated, you need a real evidentiary accounting—not just a claim that the numbers seem too high—and on appeal you must specifically challenge findings of fact or they will likely control the outcome.”
McBride v. Rios-Flores
COA08
In McBride v. Rios-Flores, the Eighth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the underlying family-law dispute because the appeal failed on briefing. After striking the appellant’s original brief for noncompliance with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.4 and 38.1, the court gave notice, a deadline to cure, and an express warning that continued noncompliance could result in dismissal. The appellant timely filed an amended brief, but it still consisted largely of conclusory bullet points with almost no meaningful record citations and no developed legal analysis connecting authority to the facts. Applying Rules 38.1, 38.9(a), 38.8(a), 42.3, and 44.3, the court explained that while briefing rules are construed liberally to preserve appellate review, that liberality does not require the court to research arguments or search the record on a party’s behalf. Because the amended brief still flagrantly violated the appellate rules after an opportunity to cure, the court struck the brief and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution.
Litigation Takeaway
“A family-law appeal can be lost before the court ever reaches custody, modification, support, or property issues if the brief does not actually brief them. Conclusory complaints, bare statutory citations, and weak record references are not enough; the appellant must identify the ruling challenged, state the standard of review, cite the controlling law and the exact record support, and explain why reversal is required. For appellees, this case is a useful reminder that persistent, serious briefing defects can justify waiver arguments, a motion to strike, and ultimately dismissal after notice and an opportunity to cure.”
In the Interest of E.A.A., a Child
COA12
In *In the Interest of E.A.A., a Child*, the Twelfth Court of Appeals dismissed a child-related appeal after the pro se appellant failed to file the docketing statement required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. The court sent two notices and gave the appellant an opportunity to cure, but no docketing statement was filed by the final deadline. Applying Rule 42.3(c), the court held dismissal was proper because the appellant failed to comply with the appellate rules after notice. The court also emphasized that pro se litigants are held to the same procedural standards as attorneys, so self-representation did not excuse the default.
Litigation Takeaway
“Family-law appeals can be lost before briefing begins if basic appellate filing requirements are ignored. Treat the docketing statement and other initial appellate filings as mandatory, monitor deficiency notices immediately, and do not assume a pro se party will receive procedural leniency.”
Brooks v. Wycough
COA12
In Brooks v. Wycough, a rural property dispute returned to the Tyler Court of Appeals after the trial court struck Brooks’s affidavit as a sham and granted summary judgment against his remaining equitable claims. The appellate court held that the sham-affidavit doctrine applies only when a later affidavit clearly contradicts prior sworn testimony on a material point without adequate explanation. Because Wycough relied on alleged inconsistencies between Brooks’s affidavit and his pleadings—and especially superseded pleadings—the doctrine did not apply. The court emphasized that superseded pleadings are displaced by amended pleadings and that pleadings generally are not competent summary-judgment evidence. It therefore held the trial court erred in disregarding the affidavit as a sham on that basis and rejected expanding the doctrine beyond its evidentiary foundation.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not try to strike an affidavit as a sham by comparing it to earlier pleadings. In Texas summary-judgment practice, you need a contradiction with prior sworn testimony, not just inconsistent advocacy in petitions. For family lawyers, this is especially useful in property and reimbursement disputes where theories evolve through amended pleadings.”
In the Interest of L.W. & M.W., Children
COA12
The Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed a modification order removing the mother from managing conservatorship and appointing the children’s maternal grandparents as joint managing conservators. The court held the evidence was sufficient to show a material and substantial change and that modification was in the children’s best interest where the mother’s home had become an unsafe, neglectful environment involving recurring parties, alcohol and drug use, sexual activity, criminal conduct, firearms incidents, and unstable overnight guests. Applying deferential abuse-of-discretion review, and implying findings in support of the judgment because no findings of fact were requested, the court concluded the evidence also rebutted the parental presumption by supporting a finding that the mother’s continued appointment would significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional development. The court further upheld unusually severe restrictions on the mother’s possession and communication because the trial court expressly found those limits were necessary to protect the children.
Litigation Takeaway
“In nonparent modification cases, grandparents can overcome the parental presumption with a strong, fact-specific record showing a persistent pattern of neglectful or dangerous home conditions—not just that they offer a better home. For parents, repeated evidence of drugs, alcohol, criminal activity, unsafe guests, and instability around the children is extremely hard to overcome on appeal, especially without requested findings of fact. Build or attack the case at trial, because abuse-of-discretion review gives trial courts broad latitude to impose even very restrictive access orders when tied to child safety.”
In re Levi Hardy
COA08
After a bench-trial divorce decree was signed, the wife moved for new trial and, after the original judge recused, a successor judge granted the motion without stating reasons. The husband sought mandamus, arguing the order was arbitrary because it set aside a nonjury decree without explanation and was entered by a judge who had not heard the evidence. The Eighth Court of Appeals denied relief, holding that the Texas Supreme Court’s merits-based mandamus review of new-trial orders under Columbia Medical, United Scaffolding, and Toyota is tied to protection of the constitutional right to a jury trial and has not been extended to bench-trial family-law cases. Because this was a nonjury divorce case and the relator did not show the order was void or otherwise exceptionally subject to mandamus review, any complaint about the new-trial ruling must await appeal after a new final judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law bench trials, do not count on mandamus to undo an order granting new trial—even if the order gives no reasons and even if a successor judge entered it. Treat motions for new trial as a serious merits threat, make a full record in opposition, preserve findings and post-judgment issues carefully, and prepare for retrial unless you have a true voidness or other extraordinary mandamus ground.”
In the Interest of D.A.V. and N.B.V., Children
COA04
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed a SAPCR modification order naming the father sole managing conservator and the mother possessory conservator because the mother’s pro se appeal was fatally defective. After striking her original brief and allowing rebriefing, the court held the amended brief still failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 because it lacked record citations, legal authority, and developed analysis. The court also emphasized that the appellate record did not include the reporter’s record from the November 20, 2025 modification hearing that produced the order under review, making meaningful review impossible. Applying the rule that even pro se litigants must comply with appellate procedure, the court held the mother waived her complaints and affirmed the modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law appeals, the merits do not matter if the appellant cannot present a compliant brief and the reporter’s record from the actual hearing that produced the challenged order. Preservation, Rule 38.1 compliance, and record control are often outcome-determinative—especially in custody modification cases reviewed for abuse of discretion.”
Gomez v. Richard
COA06
In Gomez v. Richard, the Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could render summary judgment after a defendant died but before any estate representative or heir was substituted into the case. After a suggestion of death was filed, the trial court still granted no-evidence summary judgment for the deceased driver and his employer. The appellate court held that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 152, once a party dies, the suit cannot proceed against that person unless a proper substitute—such as an executor, administrator, or heir—is brought in through scire facias or an equivalent substitution procedure. Because no substitute was joined for Richard, he became a legal non-entity for purposes of the litigation, and the judgment as to him was void. The court vacated that portion of the judgment and dismissed that part of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. As to the surviving employer, however, the court held the no-evidence motion was sufficiently specific and that the plaintiffs failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence, so the summary judgment for the employer was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a party dies before judgment, stop and fix the parties before the court does anything else. In Texas, failing to substitute a proper representative under Rule 152 can make a later order void, not merely erroneous. In family cases, that gives lawyers a powerful basis to challenge or prevent rulings entered after a spouse, conservator, or other key litigant dies.”
In the Interest of B.G.T. aka E.T., a Child
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. The case began when both Mother and newborn tested positive for amphetamine, and the record later showed ongoing methamphetamine use, repeated positive and refused drug tests, untreated mental-health issues, incarceration, failure to complete court-ordered services, and an unsafe proposed home with a known drug user. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the Holley best-interest factors, the court emphasized that unchallenged predicate findings and overlapping endangerment evidence strongly supported best interest, especially when contrasted with the child’s stable and successful placement with relatives. The court held that a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“Best-interest cases are won with comparative, current evidence: ongoing drug use, untreated mental illness, service-plan noncompliance, incarceration, and unsafe housing can outweigh a biological parent’s rights when the child is thriving in a stable placement. On appeal, leaving predicate grounds unchallenged can sharply narrow the fight and make a best-interest-only challenge much harder to win.”
Shepard v. Shepard
COA05
In this divorce appeal, the wife, acting without a lawyer, challenged numerous rulings including recusal decisions, due-process concerns, evidentiary limits, ADA accommodation issues, temporary orders, and the trial court’s confirmation of the marital residence as the husband’s separate property. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach those merits because, even after being notified of defects and given a chance to amend, her brief still failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. Applying the rule that pro se litigants must follow the same appellate briefing standards as attorneys, the court held that the amended brief lacked clear argument, meaningful record citations, and supporting legal authority. Because nothing was properly presented for appellate review, the court dismissed the appeal under Rule 42.3(c).
Litigation Takeaway
“A family-law appeal can be lost before the court ever considers the merits if the brief does not clearly connect preserved complaints to the record, legal authority, and the applicable standard of review. Even serious complaints about recusal, temporary orders, property characterization, or trial fairness will not be reviewed if the appellant does not comply with Rule 38.1—and pro se parties get no special exemption.”
In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. d/b/a Chase Bank
COA13
In this original proceeding, the court held that a trial court overreached when it sanctioned and held Chase Bank in contempt for alleged failure to produce subpoenaed records, release trust assets, and honor a successor trustee appointment order, even though Chase was a nonparty and had not been properly brought within the court’s personal jurisdiction for that relief. The appellate court focused on procedural due process rather than the underlying trust dispute, explaining that a subpoena, appointment order, or generalized motion in the main case does not automatically authorize contempt-style remedies or Rule 215 sanctions against a nonparty financial institution. Because the necessary procedural and jurisdictional predicates were not established on the record, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief in part and vacated the challenged contempt and sanctions relief to that extent.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want enforceable relief against a bank or other nonparty in a family-law case, build the procedural runway first. You cannot turn a subpoena dispute or third-party compliance problem into contempt or major sanctions unless service, jurisdiction, notice, and the specific rule-based remedy are all properly established.”
In re Ja’Dawn Lee-Ann Harrison
COA14
In In re Ja’Dawn Lee-Ann Harrison, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a parent could not directly appeal the trial court’s dismissal of a contempt-based motion to enforce a possession order. Because no confinement was imposed, the court treated the attempted appeal as a mandamus proceeding. On the merits, the court found no clear abuse of discretion because the movant failed to identify specific dates or instances showing violations of the possession order, and the order had expired once the child reached adulthood and graduated from high school. The court therefore denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“Contempt-based enforcement of possession orders requires precision: plead and prove specific violations of an order that is still in effect. If the trial court denies contempt relief and no one is jailed, the remedy is mandamus—not a direct appeal.”
In the Interest of N.A.G.A., a Child
COA05
Foster parents sought a family-violence protective order on behalf of a child against the child’s permanent managing conservator, relying on evidence of a prior intoxication-based endangerment incident, a criminal plea, a USCIS T-visa approval, and allegations of abuse and trafficking. The Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court, as factfinder, was entitled to conclude that this record did not prove the statutory predicates for a protective order, including trafficking, abuse, and the required family or household relationship under the Family Code. Because the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the denial, the court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“A compelling story is not enough in a protective-order case. Family-law practitioners must prove each statutory element with admissible, case-specific evidence—especially the qualifying relationship or household nexus—and cannot assume CPS history, criminal pleas, immigration findings, or a respondent’s default will carry the application.”
Armando Jesus Pedraza v. The State of Texas
COA01
In *Armando Jesus Pedraza v. The State of Texas*, the First Court of Appeals affirmed a 30-year punishment judgment after Pedraza argued his lawyer was ineffective during punishment. He claimed counsel should have objected to hearsay testimony about an online article describing prior violent conduct and wrongly advised him that he could testify while still invoking the Fifth Amendment about pending charges. The court applied *Strickland* and held the record was too undeveloped to show deficient performance or prejudice. Because counsel had no opportunity to explain the reasons for not objecting or for calling Pedraza to testify, the court would not speculate on a silent record, especially given the already extensive punishment evidence of prior violence, convictions, bond violations, and pending charges. The court therefore affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a case overlaps with criminal exposure, lawyers must prepare clients carefully before they testify because taking the stand may waive any ability to refuse related cross-examination. The case also shows that appellate complaints about bad evidence or bad strategy usually fail without a well-developed record explaining counsel’s choices, so trial lawyers should preserve objections, seek limiting rulings when appropriate, and build a record if strategy may later be challenged.”