Weekly Digest
April 4 – April 10, 2026
5 opinions this week
Lopez v. Lengyel
COA03
In a dispute between two professional online streamers, the Austin Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's dismissal of an informal marriage claim. The trial court had granted a no-evidence summary judgment, finding there was insufficient proof of an agreement to be married or a public 'holding out' as spouses. However, the appellate court analyzed the 'mosaic' of evidence provided by the claimant—including testimony about an agreement made to facilitate international travel during COVID-19, representations made to family and household staff, and the use of the partner's surname. The court held that even though the parties used inconsistent labels online (such as 'boyfriend') for professional branding purposes, the accumulated evidence was enough to create a factual dispute that must be decided at trial rather than dismissed early.
Litigation Takeaway
“Proving a common-law marriage depends on the 'cumulative force' of evidence, such as statements to family, household staff, and government officials. Inconsistent public messaging—especially when motivated by privacy or professional branding—does not automatically defeat a marriage claim; instead, it creates a credibility issue that should be resolved at trial.”
In re J.H., A.H., J.H., and Z.H.
COA01
In this parental termination case, parents challenged the trial court's jurisdiction, arguing that a trial recess made the initial start of the trial a 'sham' intended to circumvent the statutory dismissal deadline under Texas Family Code section 263.401. The parents also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding endangerment and the best interests of the children. The First Court of Appeals held that because the trial court had legitimately begun hearing the merits of the case before the deadline, it did not lose jurisdiction simply because the final decree was signed later. In reviewing the merits, the court found that the parents' history of substance abuse, criminal child endangerment, and ongoing incidents of physical injury to the children provided clear and convincing evidence to support termination.
Litigation Takeaway
“To preserve jurisdiction in CPS cases, the trial must meaningfully commence on the merits before the statutory dismissal deadline; appellate courts will reject 'sham' trial challenges if the record reflects genuine judicial activity. Furthermore, evidence of a parent's instability or misconduct during the pendency of the suit is often dispositive in endangerment and best-interest analyses.”
In re Leo Lapuerta, M.D., F.A.C.S., and The Plastic Surgery Institute of Southeast Texas, P.A.
SCOTX
In an underlying medical-negligence case, a jury returned an 11–1 defense verdict finding no proximate cause and the trial court signed a take-nothing judgment. After the plaintiff moved for new trial—re-urging charge objections and submitting a lone dissenting juror’s post-verdict letter describing deliberations—the trial court granted a new trial and later issued an amended order listing seven reasons, largely framed as charge confusion tied to Texas “loss of chance”/medical-causation principles. The Texas Supreme Court held the new-trial order was an abuse of discretion because its stated reasons rested on a misapprehension of Texas causation law; a trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial on an incorrect legal premise. The Court also condemned the submission of juror-deliberation evidence as “flagrantly improper” and refused to discount the risk that such material influenced the new-trial ruling. The Court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to render judgment on (reinstate) the jury’s take-nothing verdict.
Litigation Takeaway
“New-trial orders must rest on a legally correct, record-supported, and specifically articulated rationale—not a judge’s mistaken view of the law or post-verdict narratives about what jurors discussed. If the losing party tries to prove “jury confusion” with juror letters/affidavits about deliberations, object and move to strike; and if a new trial is granted anyway, mandamus is often the proper—and fast—remedy to reinstate the verdict and avoid a wasteful redo.”
In re Adeel Zaidi, A.K. Chagla and Prestige Consulting d/b/a Turnaround Management Group
SCOTX
In an original mandamus proceeding, relators challenged a trial court order disqualifying their lawyer after his legal assistant—who previously worked for opposing counsel on the same case and had access to privileged strategy and work product—later performed services on the matter at the relators’ firm without any evidence she was admonished or screened before touching the file. The Texas Supreme Court applied the Phoenix Founders bright-line rule governing side-switching nonlawyer staff: when a nonlawyer worked on the same matter for the other side, the nonlawyer is conclusively presumed to have obtained confidences, and the hiring firm can avoid disqualification only by timely prophylactic measures, including admonishing the employee before the employee begins work on the conflicted matter. Because the record showed the assistant performed work on the case multiple times and there was no evidence of any pre-work admonition or timely screen, the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in disqualifying counsel. The Court also rejected the argument that e-filing service notices listing the assistant as the “filer” conclusively established waiver; such notices do not, as a matter of law, prove the opposing party had actual knowledge of the disqualifying facts and then unreasonably delayed. Mandamus relief was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
“If your firm hires (or shares) a paralegal/legal assistant who previously worked on the other side of the same case, you must admonish and screen that employee before they do anything on the file—even “ministerial” tasks like e-filing—or you risk automatic disqualification under the Phoenix Founders bright-line rule. And if you’re seeking disqualification, don’t assume routine e-filing notices will defeat you on waiver; waiver requires proof of actual knowledge plus unreasonable delay, not just metadata.”
In the Interest of J.K.C.
COA08
In In the Interest of J.K.C., the Eighth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s parental rights after appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no non-frivolous issues for appeal. The court independently reviewed the full record, including the endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), the constructive-abandonment finding under subsection (N), and the best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2). After that review, the court concluded there was no arguable basis to challenge the trial court’s ruling and affirmed the termination order. The court also denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, holding that appointed counsel in termination cases must continue representation through the petition-for-review stage under In re P.M. and Family Code § 107.016(2)(B).
Litigation Takeaway
“Termination appeals are won or lost on the trial record. If trial counsel does not preserve error, develop evidence against endangerment and best interest, and create a meaningful appellate record, the court of appeals may find no arguable issue at all—even under its own independent Anders review. The case also reminds appointed counsel that representation in termination cases continues beyond the court of appeals.”