Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
Darren Marcel Hanson v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Hanson, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a capital-murder conviction arising from the brutal beating and robbery of an elderly victim. The court held the evidence was legally sufficient because the defendant’s own admissions, the victim’s extreme injuries, the victim’s vulnerability, and the surrounding robbery evidence allowed the jury to infer intent to kill. The court also rejected the defendant’s hearsay challenge to the victim’s identification statements, not on the merits, but because the complaint was not preserved: a pretrial hearsay objection did not suffice when substantially similar evidence later came in without a renewed or running objection. Finally, the court held that a variance between the oral sentence and written judgment did not require remand and instead modified the judgment to correct clerical error before affirming as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"The family-law crossover lesson is preservation. In abuse-driven custody, protective-order, termination, and divorce trials, a pretrial hearsay objection is not enough if the same statement later comes in through another witness or exhibit without a renewed or expressly running objection. Trial lawyers must preserve evidentiary complaints with precision every time the evidence is offered—or risk waiving a potentially strong appellate issue."
In the Interest of G.L.M., a Child
COA11
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief asserting no nonfrivolous issues. The Eleventh Court independently reviewed the record and held the evidence was legally sufficient to support termination under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), based on the mother’s pattern of drug and alcohol abuse and the resulting danger to the child, as well as the best-interest finding. The court also held that the trial court improperly relied on former section 161.001(b)(1)(O) because that predicate ground had been repealed by the 2025 amendments and the case was still pending after the amendment’s effective date. Rather than reverse, the court modified the termination order to delete the void subsection (O) finding, affirmed the order as modified, and denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M.
Litigation Takeaway
"Two practical lessons stand out: first, family-law lawyers must update pleadings and proposed orders for statutory changes because a repealed predicate ground can become void in a pending case; second, endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E) remain critically important on appeal because they can sustain termination and carry collateral consequences in future custody litigation. The case also reminds appointed counsel that an Anders affirmance does not automatically end representation in a termination appeal."
Tutt v. State
COA02
In Tutt v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a domestic-violence conviction after rejecting a hearsay challenge to the complainant’s on-scene statements and a sufficiency challenge to habitual-offender enhancement proof. Officers forced entry after a distress call and scream, then found the complainant frightened, crying, and bearing fresh cuts. The court held that her statements to the responding officer that Tutt had cut her arm and choked her were admissible as excited utterances because the circumstances showed a startling event, close temporal proximity, ongoing stress, and statements directly related to the assault. The court also held that, under the totality of the evidence, the State sufficiently linked Tutt to two prior Missouri felony convictions for enhancement purposes. The judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases involving family violence, on-scene statements to police, 911 narratives, and similar contemporaneous disclosures are far more likely to come in when you can show immediacy, fear, fresh injuries, and little time for reflection. Build or attack the evidentiary mosaic—timing, demeanor, corroborating texts, photos, dispatch records, and officer observations—because those surrounding facts often determine whether violence evidence shapes custody, protective-order, and divorce outcomes."
In the Interest of P.S.R.F., D.M.R.F., D.A.R., P.R.R., B.I.R., B.E.R., B.L.R., and Y.R.R., Children
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights to eight children after appointed counsel filed an Anders brief and the court independently reviewed the record for any nonfrivolous appellate issue. The court emphasized that the evidence supported endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), relying on proof of the mother’s continuing pattern of drug abuse and the resulting danger and instability for the children, which showed a substantial risk of harm and parental incapacity. Because no arguable challenge existed to the predicate grounds or best-interest finding, the court affirmed, but it denied appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M. because appointed counsel’s duties continue through exhaustion of appeals.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination and custody-related litigation, substance-abuse evidence is most powerful when developed as an ongoing pattern tied directly to child danger, instability, and impaired parenting—not as isolated bad acts. Appellate lawyers should also remember that Anders review in parental-rights cases requires meaningful attention to § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) findings, and appointed counsel usually must stay on the case through the petition-for-review stage."
Lopez v. Inzhutova
COA07
In Lopez v. Inzhutova, the Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed a final protective order after the respondent, appearing pro se, failed to adequately brief any appellate issue. Lopez challenged the order on due-process, protective-order-violation, and cumulative-error grounds, but even after being notified that his original brief violated Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) and being given a chance to amend, his revised brief still lacked developed argument, meaningful application of authority to the facts, and sufficient legal support. The court held that pro se litigants are held to the same briefing standards as represented parties and that inadequate briefing waives appellate complaints. Because Lopez presented no issue in a form the court could review, the court affirmed the protective order without reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"On appeal, preservation is not enough—your brief must clearly connect the law, the record, and the complained-of ruling. Family-law litigants, including pro se parties, can lose potentially viable complaints outright if they submit conclusory arguments, unsupported citations, or undeveloped analysis. For appellees, Rule 38.1 waiver can be the fastest path to affirmance when the opposing brief is defective."
Kong v. Department of Family and Protective Services
COA10
In Kong v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order striking a paternal aunt’s petition in intervention seeking managing conservatorship of two children after the parents’ rights had already been terminated. The aunt filed nearly five months after the final termination order. The court held the filing was untimely for two independent reasons: intervention generally must occur before final judgment, and once the termination order became final and plenary power expired, the closed case could not be reopened by a new intervention unless the judgment had first been set aside; separately, Texas Family Code section 102.006(c) barred a relative’s post-termination conservatorship request filed more than 90 days after termination. The court also rejected any attempt to save the pleading by treating it as an original SAPCR rather than an intervention, because the statutory deadline still controlled. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in striking the aunt’s filing.
Litigation Takeaway
"Deadlines and standing can end a family-law case before best-interest evidence ever matters. If a relative wants conservatorship after termination, counsel must act quickly—preferably before final judgment and, at minimum, within Family Code section 102.006(c)’s 90-day window. Post-judgment relabeling of a pleading will not cure untimeliness once finality and statutory standing barriers attach."
In re Levi Hardy
COA08
After a bench-trial divorce decree was signed, the wife moved for new trial and, after the original judge recused, a successor judge granted the motion without stating reasons. The husband sought mandamus, arguing the order was arbitrary because it set aside a nonjury decree without explanation and was entered by a judge who had not heard the evidence. The Eighth Court of Appeals denied relief, holding that the Texas Supreme Court’s merits-based mandamus review of new-trial orders under Columbia Medical, United Scaffolding, and Toyota is tied to protection of the constitutional right to a jury trial and has not been extended to bench-trial family-law cases. Because this was a nonjury divorce case and the relator did not show the order was void or otherwise exceptionally subject to mandamus review, any complaint about the new-trial ruling must await appeal after a new final judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law bench trials, do not count on mandamus to undo an order granting new trial—even if the order gives no reasons and even if a successor judge entered it. Treat motions for new trial as a serious merits threat, make a full record in opposition, preserve findings and post-judgment issues carefully, and prepare for retrial unless you have a true voidness or other extraordinary mandamus ground."
In the Matter of the Name Change of A.J.G., a Child
COA08
In *In the Matter of the Name Change of A.J.G., a Child*, the El Paso Court of Appeals reversed a trial court order requiring a mother to pay $400 in reduced court costs after she filed a Rule 145 statement showing she could not afford fees in a minor name-change case. The appellate court held that her sworn indigency statement and supporting benefit, income, asset, and expense information were uncontroverted, and that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on an off-record interview process and attached documents rather than admissible evidence presented in a proper evidentiary hearing. Because the existing record showed inability to pay and no valid evidentiary basis for reduced costs, the court directed that the case proceed without payment of court costs or fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a family-law client files a compliant Rule 145 indigency statement, the court cannot impose filing fees or even reduced costs based on informal interviews, assumptions, or off-record documents. Make sure any challenge to indigency is handled through a formal, on-the-record evidentiary hearing with admissible proof; otherwise, the indigency showing should stand."
In the Interest of D.A.V. and N.B.V., Children
COA04
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed a SAPCR modification order naming the father sole managing conservator and the mother possessory conservator because the mother’s pro se appeal was fatally defective. After striking her original brief and allowing rebriefing, the court held the amended brief still failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 because it lacked record citations, legal authority, and developed analysis. The court also emphasized that the appellate record did not include the reporter’s record from the November 20, 2025 modification hearing that produced the order under review, making meaningful review impossible. Applying the rule that even pro se litigants must comply with appellate procedure, the court held the mother waived her complaints and affirmed the modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law appeals, the merits do not matter if the appellant cannot present a compliant brief and the reporter’s record from the actual hearing that produced the challenged order. Preservation, Rule 38.1 compliance, and record control are often outcome-determinative—especially in custody modification cases reviewed for abuse of discretion."
In re Steven Joseph Slivinski
COA14
In this original habeas proceeding, Steven Joseph Slivinski challenged a Galveston County family-law contempt restraint and sought interim relief. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied the narrow civil habeas standard under Texas Government Code section 22.221(d), explaining that habeas review does not revisit the merits of the contempt ruling but asks only whether the relator is unlawfully restrained because he was denied due process or because the underlying order is void. The court held Slivinski failed to show either a due-process violation or a void order, so his restraint was not shown to be unlawful. The court therefore denied both habeas relief and interim relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Habeas relief from a family-law contempt order is a narrow remedy. To win, the relator must present a tight record showing unlawful restraint based on a true due-process defect or a void underlying order—not just alleged trial-court error. In enforcement cases, precise drafting, clear notice, and a complete appellate record are critical."