Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
Jose Luis Espinoza v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Jose Luis Espinoza v. The State of Texas, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a young child and two indecency-with-a-child counts. The key dispute was whether the State proved the continuous-abuse statute’s thirty-or-more-day duration element when one child could not give precise dates and the defense argued the allegations were too vague and fabricated amid a family feud over the grandmother’s estate and residence. The court applied standard legal-sufficiency review under Jackson v. Virginia and held that exact dates were unnecessary. It focused on whether a rational factfinder could infer repeated abuse over the required span from the testimony. B.H.’s testimony that Espinoza touched her genitals over clothing twenty to thirty times over about a year was enough by itself to satisfy the duration requirement, even though P.P.’s timeline was less precise. The court also rejected Espinoza’s double-jeopardy, outcry, extraneous-act, medical-records, expert-testimony, and cumulative-error complaints, treating the defense’s fabrication and credibility themes as issues for the jury rather than grounds for reversal.
Litigation Takeaway
"For Texas family litigators, Espinoza is a strong crossover case on abuse-proof sufficiency: a child’s inability to give calendar-specific dates does not defeat abuse allegations if the testimony describes repeated conduct over an identifiable span. It is especially useful in custody, modification, protective-order, and termination litigation to counter the argument that abuse claims are too vague to credit. The case also shows that outcry and SANE-related evidence can survive appellate attack when properly framed, and that motive-to-fabricate theories tied to property or inheritance disputes usually create fact issues, not automatic legal wins."
In the Interest of W.L.G., a Child
COA14
In this SAPCR appeal, the appellant moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals did not address the underlying parent-child dispute or review the merits; it simply applied Rule 42.1(a)(1), found no reason to deny the request, granted the motion, and dismissed the appeal. Because the appeal was dismissed rather than decided on the merits, the trial court’s August 29, 2025 judgment remained in effect and undisturbed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you voluntarily dismiss a family-law appeal, you usually end appellate review and leave the trial court’s order fully in place. In custody and other SAPCR cases, that means conservatorship, possession, support, and related rulings continue to control unless changed through some separate procedural vehicle."
In re Brittany Hilbert
COA05
In In re Brittany Hilbert, a pro se relator sought mandamus relief in a conservatorship-related case, asking the Dallas Court of Appeals to undo post-hearing orders affecting due process, attorney’s fees, and interim conservatorship or possession. The court did not reach those substantive complaints because the petition failed to comply with multiple mandatory requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52, including required sections, a proper certification, an appendix, and a sworn or certified mandamus record. The court also found that the petition and appendix contained unredacted sensitive data in violation of Rule 9.9. Because these procedural defects were dispositive, the court denied mandamus relief and struck the filing without addressing the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"In emergency family-law appellate practice, procedure can decide the case before the merits ever matter. A mandamus petition must strictly comply with Rule 52, include a proper certified or sworn record, and be fully redacted under Rule 9.9; otherwise even strong due-process or custody arguments may never be heard."
Kelsey v. Rocha
COA13
In Kelsey v. Rocha, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a bill of review seeking to set aside an agreed divorce decree nearly four years after it became final. Kelsey argued the decree was procured through fraud and duress, mischaracterized his separate property as community property, awarded Rocha an unfair share of the estate, and was invalid because no marriage existed. The court applied Texas’s strict bill-of-review standard, requiring proof of a meritorious claim or defense, wrongful prevention from asserting it, and that the failure to assert it was unmixed with the petitioner’s own fault or negligence. The court emphasized that Kelsey had been served, participated in the divorce, and signed a notarized agreed decree containing recitals that he read and understood it and signed voluntarily without coercion or duress. His complaints largely attacked the substantive correctness of the property division—issues for direct appeal, not a late equitable attack—and he failed to show he was prevented from raising them earlier. Because he did not satisfy the elements for bill-of-review relief, the court held the trial court properly denied his petition and left the agreed divorce decree in place.
Litigation Takeaway
"Final agreed divorce decrees are extremely hard to unwind through a bill of review. If a party believes property was mischaracterized, the division was unjust, or the marriage itself is disputed, those issues must be raised and preserved in the original case or by direct post-judgment review. Strong decree recitals about voluntariness, understanding, and fairness can be powerful protection against later attacks."
In the Interest of C.G.H. and C.H.H., Children
COA07
In a SAPCR modification appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals upheld an order requiring the children to attend public school after the current year and affirming counseling provisions for the children and mother. Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, the court held there was sufficient evidence of a material and substantial change and best interest, including testimony about the private school’s lack of accreditation, uncertified teachers, academic delay, and concerns about transparency and safety, as well as evidence of the mother’s manipulative conduct and interference with the father-child relationship. The court deferred to the trial court’s resolution of conflicting testimony and also held the mother waived her First and Fourteenth Amendment complaints by failing to preserve them in the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a schooling or counseling modification to stick, build a child-specific record with objective academic proof, concrete safety or co-parenting concerns, and a narrowly tailored request. And if you intend to raise constitutional objections to educational or therapeutic provisions, preserve them clearly in the trial court or they will be waived on appeal."
In the Interest of D.W., D.B., and J.B., Children
COA02
In this SAPCR appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction because the mother filed her notice of appeal nearly nine months after the final order was signed. The court held that a final SAPCR order is subject to the accelerated appellate timetable, so the notice of appeal was due within 20 days under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) and 28.1(b). Because no timely notice of appeal or motion for extension was filed, and neither the mother nor appointed counsel responded to the court’s jurisdictional inquiry, the appeal was not perfected and the court lacked jurisdiction. The court also noted that pro se status does not excuse compliance with appellate deadlines.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law cases, a final SAPCR order triggers an accelerated appeal, and missing the 20-day notice-of-appeal deadline can permanently forfeit appellate review. Lawyers must classify the order correctly, calendar the deadline from the signing date, and make sure responsibility for the appeal is clear—especially when appointed counsel, successor counsel, or pro se filings create confusion."
Brian Alex Bermudez v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Bermudez v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a family-violence assault conviction and the denial of a motion for new trial. The defendant argued his lawyer had an actual conflict because counsel had pending criminal charges of his own, that counsel was ineffective for not securing an additional witness to testify the complainant was intoxicated, and that the trial court wrongly excluded the complainant’s testimony after a sequestration violation. The court held the conflict claim failed because the record did not show counsel’s personal charges adversely affected any specific trial decision; in fact, counsel affirmatively pursued intoxication as a central defense theme. The omitted-witness claim also failed because the proposed testimony was cumulative of other evidence showing intoxication and did not address the assault itself. Finally, the court held the trial court acted within its discretion under Rule 614 by excluding the complainant after the defendant discussed another witness’s testimony with her during a jail call, creating a concrete risk of tailored testimony.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law litigators, Bermudez is a strong crossover case on three recurring themes: sequestration matters, speculative conflict claims usually fail, and cumulative omitted-witness testimony rarely justifies post-judgment relief. If a witness has been exposed to trial testimony through calls, texts, or hallway updates, the court has broad discretion to exclude that witness to protect the integrity of the proceeding. And if a party attacks counsel based on personal legal troubles, the attack must be tied to a specific adverse effect on representation—not just optics or suspicion."
Laura Mann v. Manuel Diaz Cabrera
COA14
In this Harris County family-law appeal, the appellant voluntarily moved to dismiss her own appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals did not address the underlying divorce or SAPCR issues because the only question before it was whether dismissal should be granted. Finding the motion unopposed and no indication that dismissal would impair any party’s right to relief, the court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, leaving the trial-court judgment in place without any merits ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
"A voluntary appellate dismissal is usually a clean exit, but it does not undo the trial court’s order. Family-law litigators should make sure the client understands that abandoning the appeal typically cements the judgment below unless the parties seek and obtain additional relief."
In the Interest of A.M., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights because Father challenged only one of three predicate grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)—subsection (N)—while leaving unchallenged the trial court’s findings under subsections (B) and (C), and he also did not challenge the best-interest finding. Applying settled termination law, the court held that one unchallenged predicate ground plus an unchallenged best-interest finding is enough to support affirmance, so reversal was unavailable regardless of Father’s attack on subsection (N). The court also rejected Father’s due-process complaint about alleged statutory and service-plan irregularities because he did not preserve that complaint in the trial court and, on appeal, failed to support it with meaningful authority, analysis, or record citations, resulting in waiver.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any family-law appeal, you must challenge every independent basis supporting the judgment and separately attack best interest when required; otherwise, the appellate court can affirm without reaching your preferred issue. Just as important, procedural and due-process complaints must be raised in the trial court and then fully briefed on appeal with authority and record support."
In re James Robert Lawson, IV
COA03
In In re James Robert Lawson, IV, the Third Court of Appeals held that a Bell County trial court lost jurisdiction to act on a child-support enforcement matter once the obligor filed a notice of removal in federal court and filed that notice in state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). Even though the enforcement hearing proceeded and the trial court later signed a capias for the father’s arrest, the court of appeals concluded the state court was barred from proceeding at all during the period between removal and remand. Relying on federal removal law and Texas precedent treating post-removal state-court orders as void, the court held the capias and related orders were legal nullities, not merely erroneous rulings. Because the challenged order was void and involved confinement-related process in a child-support enforcement case, habeas relief was proper, and the court conditionally granted relief directing the trial court to vacate the capias and related orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a notice of removal is filed in state court, the family court must stop immediately. Any contempt, capias, enforcement, or temporary order signed before remand is vulnerable as void, so practitioners should shift their efforts to federal remand practice rather than asking the state court to proceed anyway."