Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
Lartigue v. Farias
COA01
In Lartigue v. Farias, the First Court of Appeals held that a civil stalking claim under Chapter 85 was not subject to dismissal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. The dispute arose after Lartigue, in the context of separate unauthorized-practice litigation, sent repeated emails and placed repeated calls to attorney Farias that included abusive language, threats, and statements implying an in-person confrontation. Lartigue argued the communications were protected because they related to pending litigation and thus involved free speech and petitioning. The court rejected that framing and focused on the gravamen of the live claim: threatening, harassing, repeated conduct that allegedly caused fear and disrupted Farias’s work. Because the stalking claim was based on alleged intimidation rather than protected speech or petitioning activity, the TCPA did not apply at step one, so the court affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss without reaching prima facie proof or defenses.
Litigation Takeaway
"Not every communication connected to a lawsuit is TCPA-protected. When the real target of the claim is repeated threats, harassment, stalking, or intimidation, courts may stop the TCPA analysis at step one. In family-law cases, that makes pleading and framing critical: emphasize the coercive conduct, unwanted contacts, escalation, and safety impact—not just the fact that the parties were already in litigation."
Michael Solomon and Andria Roque-Solomon v. The Law Office of Keith M. Harris and Keith M. Harris
COA14
In this Texas appeal, former clients sued their prior lawyers for legal malpractice, but at trial the court excluded all causation and damages evidence under Rule 193.6 after a dispute over whether initial disclosures had actually been served. The exclusion swept too far: it barred the plaintiffs’ own testimony and a timely designated expert, then led directly to a directed verdict and take-nothing judgment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held Rule 193.6 does not permit exclusion of a named party’s testimony and does not justify a blanket evidentiary wipeout that effectively disposes of the case. Because the order functioned as a death-penalty sanction, the trial court was required to consider lesser sanctions, such as a continuance, before imposing it. The failure to do so was an abuse of discretion, so the judgment was reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 193.6 is a disclosure-enforcement tool, not a shortcut to end a case. If an exclusion request would knock out a party’s own testimony or otherwise leave the other side unable to present the merits, the court must treat it like a case-dispositive sanction and consider lesser remedies first."
Paul O’Brien v. Tiffanie O’Brien
COA03
In a divorce appeal, the Third Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code section 109.001 does not limit a trial court to only the precise temporary relief it granted within 60 days after the notice of appeal. Because the trial court had timely entered a valid temporary order pending appeal, it retained continuing jurisdiction under sections 109.001(b-3) and (b-4) to later modify that order after notice and hearing if circumstances had materially and substantially changed and the modification was equitable and necessary for the child’s safety and welfare. The court rejected the husband’s argument that any new relief requested after the 60-day window was jurisdictionally barred, distinguishing Morris v. Veilleux as a case where no timely temporary order had existed to modify. The court abated the appeal so the trial court could consider the requested modification under the correct legal standard.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you get a timely temporary order pending appeal, the trial court’s power is not frozen in place after 60 days. Lawyers should focus less on a blanket jurisdiction objection and more on building or attacking the statutory modification record: changed circumstances, equity, and a clear child-welfare connection."
In re Anabel Lopez Perez
COA03
In In re Anabel Lopez Perez, the relator sought mandamus relief in the Third Court of Appeals to force an Austin County Court at Law judge to execute or clarify a QDRO arising from a divorce. The court did not reach the merits of the QDRO dispute. Instead, it analyzed Texas Government Code sections 22.221 and 22.201(d) and held that its ordinary mandamus power extends only to trial judges within its appellate district, and Austin County is not in the Third Court’s district. The relator also failed to show that mandamus was necessary to protect or enforce the Third Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The petition was therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing mandamus in any post-divorce property case, especially a QDRO or decree-clarification dispute, confirm that the respondent judge sits within the appellate court’s territorial district. A strong merits argument cannot overcome filing in the wrong court, and family-law subject matter does not create mandamus jurisdiction."
Nunez v. Nichols
COA03
In Nunez v. Nichols, the Austin Court of Appeals considered whether sufficient evidence supported an order requiring a father to pay ongoing and retroactive support for his adult disabled daughter under Texas Family Code section 154.302, plus health-insurance and unreimbursed medical-expense obligations. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient because it showed the daughter’s serious physical and psychiatric conditions began before age eighteen, continued into adulthood, and left her requiring substantial care and personal supervision while not capable of self-support. The father’s evidence of limited independence, including travel and a restricted driver’s license, went to weight rather than negating the statutory elements, and his expert did not provide a vocational basis to establish employability. The court therefore affirmed the support and medical-support portions of the order, but reversed and remanded the $25,468.46 attorney’s-fee award because the record lacked the detailed proof of hours, rates, and value of services required to support that amount.
Litigation Takeaway
"For adult disabled-child support cases, courts want functional proof, not just diagnoses: build a timeline showing pre-majority onset, current inability to be self-supporting, and the need for substantial day-to-day supervision. For opponents, isolated signs of independence are usually not enough without developed evidence of actual self-sufficiency. And regardless of who wins on the merits, an attorney’s-fee award can still be undone on appeal if counsel does not present disciplined lodestar-style proof."
In the Interest of Baby Boy T; In the Interest of L.B., S.B., and B.B.
COA10
The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed a Brazos County order terminating a father’s parental rights after appointed counsel filed an Anders brief. The court independently reviewed the full record, including the father’s pro se response, and held the appeal was wholly frivolous. In addressing the required endangerment grounds under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), the court relied on severe evidence that father physically abused another child in the home, that the children at issue were exposed to that dangerous environment, that father minimized the abuse as discipline, failed to accept responsibility, failed to show meaningful therapeutic progress, and had no recommendation for reunification despite technical service completion. The court also held that appointed counsel in a termination appeal may not withdraw solely because counsel filed an Anders brief; absent additional good cause, counsel must continue representation through any petition-for-review stage.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination and other child-safety cases, courts focus on actual danger and whether the parent truly changed—not just whether services were completed. Abuse of one child, denial or minimization, and failure to benefit from therapy can support findings that other children remain at risk. For appointed appellate counsel, an Anders brief does not automatically end the representation."
Aliza Groups, Inc. v. Roshan K. Noorani
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment declaring void a deed that purported to transfer a married couple’s community homestead because the named grantor, Karim Noorani, did not sign it and the son who signed Karim’s name had no authority to do so. The court applied Texas law that a forged deed is void, not voidable, and passes no title. Roshan Noorani’s summary-judgment evidence directly established that Karim never signed the deed and that neither spouse authorized the son to execute any deed or lien on the property. The buyer’s agency and equity arguments failed because they did not create a genuine fact issue on authorization, and its appellate authority theory was not preserved because it did not match the theory raised in the trial court. The court therefore affirmed the order quieting title in Roshan’s favor.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-property litigation, especially homestead disputes, an unauthorized signature on a deed can be attacked as a void forgery, and vague claims that a child or other family member had “authority” will not defeat summary judgment without competent evidence of actual authorization. Lock down the record early on who signed, who authorized, and whether the property was community homestead property."
Raymond Matthew Thibault v. The State of Texas
COA01
In this criminal appeal, the First Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for indecency with a child by contact and upheld the admission of extraneous-act evidence that the defendant sought or took breast photographs of women, including a prior incident involving another thirteen-year-old girl. The court held the evidence was admissible for noncharacter purposes under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), especially to show intent and to rebut any claim that the touching or photographing was accidental or mistaken. The court also concluded under Rule 403 that the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, particularly given the similarity of the prior conduct and the limiting instruction. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Prior sexualized conduct may be admissible when it is tied to a specific disputed issue like intent, grooming, or absence of accident—not just bad character. In family-law cases, lawyers should frame or attack this kind of evidence with precision under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403, because those rulings can heavily affect custody, possession, and protective-order outcomes."
Michael Colbert v. State of Texas
COA12
In Colbert v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals upheld an assault/family-violence conviction even though the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution. The defendant argued on appeal that trying the case the day after he elected to represent himself violated Article 1.051(e) and due process, but the court held that complaint was not preserved because he did not object, request a continuance, or otherwise raise the issue in the trial court; in fact, he stated he was ready to proceed. On the merits, the court applied the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard and deferred to the factfinder’s credibility determinations, concluding that the complainant’s 911 statements, her similar statements to the responding officer, and the defendant’s own admission that he may have hit her with the television were sufficient to support the finding of bodily injury despite her later recantation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Recantation does not erase family-violence evidence, and preservation matters. In family-law cases, judges may credit contemporaneous 911 calls, officer testimony, and party admissions over a later walk-back, so lawyers should gather and present that evidence early. And if notice or due-process problems arise in a rushed hearing, counsel must object, request specific relief, and make a record immediately or the complaint may be lost on appeal."
In re G.M.
COA02
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code Section 156.102 is triggered by the date a modification petition is filed, not the date the hearing occurs. Father filed within one year of the prior order and sought to change the conservator with the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence, so he was required to file a sufficient supporting affidavit. After the trial court found the affidavit insufficient, Section 156.102(c) required it to deny the requested relief and refuse to proceed. By nevertheless conducting an evidentiary hearing and entering temporary orders, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you seek to change primary residence within one year of the last order, the affidavit requirement is a hard gatekeeper. The key date is the filing date, and once a court finds the affidavit insufficient, it cannot simply go forward with a hearing anyway. For movants, draft a fact-specific affidavit that tracks the statute; for respondents, press for an early ruling and preserve error if the court proceeds despite an insufficiency finding."