Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
In the Interest of A.A.C.C., a Child
COA10
In *In the Interest of A.A.C.C., a Child*, the Tenth Court of Appeals held that a father’s bill of review attacking a termination order was barred by Texas Family Code section 161.211(a) because it was filed more than six months after the order was signed. The father argued he had already been adjudicated the child’s father in a separate parentage case and therefore should not have been terminated as merely an alleged father under section 161.002(b). But the court focused on procedure and finality: the termination order expressly relied on section 161.002(b), and the father filed his collateral attack well outside the six-month statutory deadline. The court also held that because he filed no written response to the Department’s summary-judgment motion, he failed to preserve arguments about misclassification, evidentiary insufficiency, lack of counsel, and invalid waiver of service. The Department’s summary-judgment evidence conclusively established the statutory basis for termination and the untimeliness of the bill of review, so summary judgment was proper.
Litigation Takeaway
"Deadlines and preservation can decide a family-law case before the merits are ever reached. If a termination order is signed under Family Code section 161.002(b), any direct or collateral attack must be pursued within the six-month window in section 161.211(a), and any reason the statute supposedly does not apply must be raised in a written trial-court response—not for the first time on appeal."
In re Cristina Gallegos Ortega
COA13
In this original proceeding, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that a Hidalgo County trial court improperly used temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to order a child returned from Texas to Mexico. The father alleged the child had always lived in Mexico, that Mexican custody proceedings were already pending, and that concerns existed about the child’s tourist-visa status, school enrollment, the mother’s immigration status, and criminal allegations tied to the child’s removal from Mexico. The appellate court concluded those facts did not show abandonment, mistreatment, abuse, or an immediate threat to the child as required by Texas Family Code § 152.204. Because emergency jurisdiction cannot be used as a substitute for home-state jurisdiction or to accomplish a merits-based transfer of possession, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its emergency order and writ of attachment.
Litigation Takeaway
"UCCJEA emergency jurisdiction is narrow and requires evidence of a real, immediate danger to the child—not wrongful removal allegations, immigration concerns, or a desire to return the child to the home-state forum. In cross-border custody cases, Texas courts cannot use § 152.204 as a shortcut to decide possession when another country is the child’s home state and no actual emergency is proven."
In the Interest of M.H.E., a Child
COA02
In a pending SAPCR, Mother tried to appeal a trial court order requiring mediation and dispute resolution. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed whether the order was appealable under Texas jurisdictional rules, explaining that direct appeals generally lie only from final judgments or from interlocutory orders made appealable by statute. Because the mediation order did not dispose of all parties and claims, the SAPCR remained pending, and no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal from this type of case-management order, the court held it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Don’t assume an unfavorable family-law procedure order can be appealed right away. Mediation and other case-management orders are usually not appealable unless they are part of a final judgment or a statute expressly allows interlocutory review; if immediate relief is necessary, mandamus—not direct appeal—is often the proper vehicle."
In the Interest of K.L.G., K.L.G., K.A.R.G., and K.L.G., Children
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights and refused to delete the trial court’s endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). Father did not challenge the separate subsection (N) predicate ground or the best-interest finding, so termination stood regardless, but the court still reviewed the challenged endangerment findings because of their collateral consequences. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient because the record showed severe abuse and neglect of the children, and Father’s own statements showed he knew for months that Mother and her boyfriend were abusing and neglecting the children yet failed to take effective protective action. That knowledge-plus-inaction supported both environmental endangerment under subsection (D) and endangering conduct under subsection (E).
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, a parent cannot avoid endangerment findings simply by saying, “I wasn’t the abuser.” If the evidence shows the parent knew the children were being abused or neglected and still left them in that environment without meaningful intervention, courts can uphold subsection (D) and (E) findings—with serious future consequences for custody, conservatorship, and later termination litigation."
Morales v. Morales
COA01
In this Harris County divorce, the First Court of Appeals reviewed a property division that included confirmation of the husband’s Raspberry Lane property as separate property, a reimbursement award to the community for mortgage principal paid on that separate property, and allocation of a six-figure SBA loan tied to the wife’s LLC. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard governing just-and-right divisions, with sufficiency review folded into that analysis, and noted that implied findings supported the decree because no past-due notice for findings was filed. Even so, implied findings could not replace evidence. The court held the record supported treating Raspberry Lane as separate property and did not reject the reimbursement framework or equitable lien securing that award. But it concluded the trial court lacked sufficient evidentiary support to assign the SBA debt as the wife’s personal liability where the evidence showed the loan belonged to Action Ready Mix, LLC and there was no adequate proof of personal liability. Because that unsupported debt allocation could have distorted the overall just-and-right division, the court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
Litigation Takeaway
"In divorce cases, debt allocation must be proved as carefully as asset characterization. If a liability belongs to an LLC or corporation, do not assume the court can assign it personally to a spouse without loan documents, guaranties, or another legal basis. And when pursuing reimbursement for community funds used on separate property, prove the separate character, trace the payments, and tie the remedy clearly to the overall property division."
Travarius Leon Dent v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Dent, the court affirmed admission of the father’s prior injury-to-a-child deferred-adjudication evidence after he testified that he was a strict but not physically abusive parent and suggested the child fabricated sexual-abuse allegations in retaliation for discipline. The court held that this testimony opened the door by creating a false impression about his parenting and made the prior child-injury evidence relevant for non-propensity purposes: rebutting that impression and undermining his retaliation/fabrication defense. The court also held that the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403, because the State had a real need for rebuttal evidence tailored to the defense theme, and the limiting instruction properly restricted the jury’s use of the evidence without commenting on the weight of the evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, a parent who claims to be merely “strict” and blames allegations on retaliation or coaching may open the door to prior abuse evidence. Frame the evidence as rebuttal of a false parenting narrative and fabrication defense—not just bad-character proof—and seek a careful limiting instruction."
Brys v. Cobb
COA01
In Brys v. Cobb, the First Court of Appeals held that when a properly authenticated California judgment was filed in Texas under the UEFJA on July 21, 2023, it immediately became a Texas judgment. The judgment debtor waited more than a year to file a motion for new trial and later asked the Texas court to declare the foreign judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The appellate court did not reach the underlying jurisdictional challenge to the California judgment because the dispositive issue was timing: under Chapter 35 and Texas Rules 306a and 329b, any attack on a domesticated foreign judgment must be brought through the same procedures and within the same deadlines that apply to Texas judgments. Because the trial court’s plenary power expired 30 days after domestication and no timely post-judgment motion was filed, the later orders granting a new trial and declaring the judgment void were themselves void. The court vacated those post-deadline orders and left the domesticated California judgment fully enforceable in Texas.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat the UEFJA filing date like the signing date of a Texas final judgment. If you want to attack a domesticated foreign judgment, move immediately—waiting can forfeit even a personal-jurisdiction or voidness challenge. If you represent the creditor, a proper UEFJA filing can quickly become a powerful enforcement and settlement tool once the deadline passes."
In the Interest of I.S.
COA09
In *In the Interest of I.S.*, the Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed a jury-tried termination order after concluding Father waived his appellate sufficiency complaints by failing to preserve them in the trial court. The case arose after the Department sought termination following evidence that the parties’ infant suffered multiple serious injuries, including a femur fracture and liver injury, that medical providers considered suspicious for abuse and inconsistent with the parents’ explanations. On appeal, Father challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting predicate grounds under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (N), as well as best interest, but the court held that in a civil jury trial those complaints had to be preserved through recognized procedural steps such as a directed-verdict motion, charge objection, JNOV, motion to disregard, or motion for new trial. Because Father did not take the required steps, the court did not reach the merits of his sufficiency complaints. The court also rejected Mother’s issues, affirming termination, holding that the Department’s appointment as managing conservator stood once termination was affirmed, and concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s motion for mistrial.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any Texas family case tried to a jury, even a strong appellate sufficiency argument is worthless if counsel does not preserve it. Legal-sufficiency complaints require the right trial-court vehicle, and factual-sufficiency complaints in a jury case generally require a motion for new trial. Treat jury-charge objections and post-verdict motions as essential trial work, not appellate clean-up."
In re Tracy Hoots
COA12
In In re Tracy Hoots, a pro se relator sought mandamus relief in a family-law dispute, alleging her children were removed without lawful process and that the trial judge had a conflict of interest. The Tyler Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the petition failed to comply with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7: it included no certified or sworn copy of any challenged order, no adequate mandamus record, and identified no specific trial-court ruling or refusal to act that could be reviewed. Applying the rule that mandamus requires a sufficient record showing a clear abuse of discretion, and that pro se litigants are held to the same procedural standards as lawyers, the court held the relator failed to establish entitlement to extraordinary relief and denied the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus is won or lost on the record. In family-law cases, even serious complaints about child removal, due process, or judicial bias will fail unless the petition identifies a specific reviewable trial-court action and includes a Rule 52 appendix and mandamus record with certified or sworn materials supporting every factual assertion."
Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez v. The State of Texas
COA10
In this criminal crossover opinion with clear family-law implications, the Waco Court of Appeals held that Sanchez waived his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial complaint because he never made an unambiguous speedy-trial demand and never obtained an adverse ruling. His priority-setting request, ready announcements, court appearances, and rejection of a plea offer were not enough, especially where the record also showed defense-acquiesced and defense-caused delays. The court also upheld admission of an examining physician’s testimony and report recounting a child’s statements translated from Spanish by an advocacy-center employee, concluding the trial court properly treated the translator as a language conduit after developing a reliability record under Saavedra, and any confrontation complaint failed because the child testified and was cross-examined at trial. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If delay matters, preserve it precisely: file a clear motion for prompt trial or hearing, state the prejudice, object to resets, and get a ruling. And when child statements come through a translator, admissibility will often turn on whether the proponent builds a record showing the interpreter was neutral, qualified, and functioning only as a language conduit."