Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
In the Interest of A.M., J.M., and K.W., Children
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to prove endangerment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E) and best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The court focused on the mother’s years-long course of conduct: repeatedly entering or returning to abusive relationships, exposing the children to domestic violence, leaving them with a known violent caregiver, and minimizing or concealing the abuse even after serious assaults, police involvement, and one child’s murder. The court reasoned that endangerment may be shown by a continuing pattern of conduct that jeopardizes a child’s physical or emotional well-being, even when the violence is directed primarily at the parent rather than the child. That same pattern, combined with the mother’s instability in housing, employment, legal compliance, and protective decision-making, supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"Domestic violence evidence is powerful not just when a child is directly assaulted, but when a parent repeatedly exposes children to violent partners, ignores warning signs, and minimizes the danger. In custody, modification, and termination cases, lawyers should build a timeline showing the parent’s knowledge of the abuse, continued contact with the abuser, child exposure, and lack of protective change over time."
Blair v. Blair
COA02
In Blair v. Blair, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld a post-divorce order appointing a receiver to sell marital real property because the 2013 divorce decree expressly authorized either party to seek a receiver if the property was not sold by March 15, 2014. The court treated the receivership as a straightforward enforcement of the decree’s property-division terms rather than an extraordinary equitable remedy requiring separate proof of waste, imminent harm, or inadequate legal remedies. The court also rejected the appellant’s limitations, laches, dormancy, and due-process complaints because they were either not preserved in the trial court, not supported by the appellate record, or contradicted by record evidence showing notice. The court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing the receiver.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce decree includes a clear receiver-on-default provision for sale of real property, enforcing that provision years later is much easier and more likely to survive appeal. For both sides, Blair is also a preservation case: defenses like limitations, laches, dormancy, and due process must be clearly raised, supported by evidence, and ruled on in the trial court, or they will likely fail on appeal."
Othalon Shaw v. Omowunmi Shaw
COA02
In Shaw v. Shaw, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a final family-violence protective order entered during the parties’ divorce. The wife testified to repeated threats, choking, physical assault, forced sex, and gun-related intimidation, while the husband denied the allegations and argued the evidence was inconsistent and insufficient without stronger corroboration. Applying legal- and factual-sufficiency standards for bench trials, the court held that the trial court was entitled to believe the wife’s testimony, disbelieve the husband’s denials, and infer both past family violence and likely future family violence under Texas Family Code sections 81.001 and 85.001(a). The court emphasized that credible testimony from the applicant alone can be enough to support a protective order and that appellate courts will not reweigh express trial-court credibility findings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Protective-order appeals usually rise or fall on credibility established at trial, not on re-arguing the facts on appeal. If you represent the applicant, build a clear, detailed record and seek express credibility findings; if you represent the respondent, general denials and lack-of-corroboration arguments usually will not overcome a trial court’s decision to believe the applicant."
Youlan Varasteh-Tafti v. Manouchehr Varasteh-Tafti
COA05
In this divorce appeal, the wife challenged the trial court’s characterization of several assets as the husband’s separate property and argued the record lacked enough valuation evidence for a just-and-right division. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the husband rebutted the community-property presumption with clear and convincing evidence through specific, uncontroverted testimony that one property bought during marriage was purchased entirely with premarital investment funds and that two other properties were owned before marriage. The court explained that while documentary tracing is often helpful, it is not always required when credible testimony clearly identifies the source and character of the property and the opposing spouse offers no contrary evidence. The court also rejected the wife’s argument that paying expenses or providing unpaid labor created an ownership interest, noting those facts may relate to reimbursement but do not change title. Finally, because the wife failed to present valuation evidence at trial, she could not complain on appeal that the trial court lacked sufficient information to divide the estate or show the division was an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas property-characterization fights, uncontroverted live testimony can be enough to prove separate property even without perfect paper tracing—but only if it is specific, credible, and unrebutted. On the flip side, a spouse who does not challenge tracing testimony or put on valuation evidence will have a very hard time overturning the property division on appeal."
In the Matter of D.M.M., a Juvenile
COA13
In this accelerated appeal from a juvenile transfer order, the appellant filed a notice of appeal after the 20-day deadline but within Rule 26.3’s 15-day grace period. The court held that this was still insufficient to invoke appellate jurisdiction because Rule 26.3 requires two timely filings within the grace period: the notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time. Because the appellant did not file any extension motion until after the grace period had expired, the late explanation could not be construed to revive jurisdiction. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"When an appeal may be accelerated, treat Rule 26.3 as a two-step jurisdictional checklist: if the notice is late but still within the 15-day grace period, file both the notice of appeal and a motion for extension within that same window. A later explanation will not save the appeal."
In Re Richard Earl Purkey Jr. and Ashlyn Purkey Jordan
COA09
In re Purkey holds that a district court cannot use Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 to authorize pre-suit depositions aimed at developing claims that belong in a statutory probate court’s exclusive jurisdiction. The petitioners sought depositions to investigate alleged lack of capacity, undue influence, and trust-related issues surrounding a decedent’s 2024 will and amended trust. Looking past the Rule 202 label to the substance of the requested discovery, the Beaumont Court of Appeals concluded the anticipated claims were classic probate matters—a will contest, an effort to set aside probate, and trust disputes incident to an estate. Because Rule 202 does not expand subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court exceeded its authority by ordering the depositions. The court conditionally granted mandamus, holding that the improper pre-suit discovery could not be adequately cured on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing a Rule 202 petition, identify the real dispute and the court that actually has power to hear it. If the discovery is really designed to build a will contest, probate challenge, or trust dispute tied to an estate, you must proceed in probate court—not through a separate district-court discovery action. For family lawyers, the lesson is to screen early for probate overlap and avoid using Rule 202 as an end-run around jurisdictional limits."
In re Hoa Tran and Trang Tran
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that once defendants properly controverted a plaintiff’s medical-expense affidavit under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 18.001, they were entitled to nonparty discovery from the medical provider about how the charges were set and whether they were reasonable. The trial court had allowed only limited inquiry but barred broader topics concerning billing methodology, reimbursement history, referral relationships, and outsourced imaging arrangements. Relying on Texas’s broad discovery rules and cases such as In re North Cypress Medical Center Operating Co. and In re K&L Auto Crushers, LLC, the court concluded those topics were relevant to the live defense that the claimed medical expenses were unreasonable. Because the categorical restrictions prevented the defendants from developing that defense and could not be adequately remedied on appeal, the court found an abuse of discretion and granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the other side puts medical or treatment bills in issue, do not treat the invoice as untouchable. Once the charges are properly controverted, targeted discovery into the provider’s billing practices, reimbursement history, referral relationships, and third-party service arrangements may be available—and a blanket order blocking that discovery can justify mandamus."
In the Matter of D.M.M., a Juvenile
COA13
In this accelerated appeal from a juvenile transfer order, the appellant filed the notice of appeal after the 20-day deadline but within Rule 26.3’s 15-day grace period. The court held that this was still not enough to invoke jurisdiction because Rule 26.3 requires two timely filings within that grace period: the notice of appeal and a motion for extension in the appellate court that reasonably explains the delay. Because the appellant did not file any extension motion or equivalent filing until after the grace period expired, the late explanation could not cure the defect, and the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family-law-related appeals, a late notice of appeal is not self-curing just because it lands within Rule 26.3’s grace period. If the notice is late, counsel must also file a Rule 26.3 extension motion in the appellate court within that same window, with a reasonable explanation. Do not wait for a clerk’s defect notice or assume a later response will save jurisdiction."
Perricone v. Perricone
COA11
In Perricone v. Perricone, the Eastland Court of Appeals addressed a contested Rule 145 statement of inability to afford court costs in litigation arising from divorce and custody-related disputes. After a defendant challenged the indigency filing, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found the declarant’s financial statement contained material misrepresentations and omissions, including unsupported claims of means-tested benefits, undisclosed assets, and inaccurate income and valuation information. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f), the court held that once a contest is filed, the burden shifts to the declarant to prove inability to pay by a preponderance of the evidence. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the appellate court deferred to the trial court’s credibility findings and concluded the record supported denial of indigency status. The court also held that the challenger’s unsworn declaration was sufficient because it substantially complied with Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 132.001 despite minor technical defects.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 145 form is only the starting point. If the other side contests indigency, the party claiming inability to pay must back it up with credible, documented proof, and courts will closely examine omissions, inconsistencies, household support, and prior financial representations. For family-law litigators, Perricone is a roadmap both for attacking weak indigency claims and for preparing defensible ones."
In the Interest of B.A. and B.A., Children
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and on best interest. The record showed repeated domestic violence by the father, the mother’s knowledge of that violence, her repeated minimization and recantation of serious assaults, her continued facilitation of the father’s return after arrests, and her denial of drug-use concerns. The court analyzed subsection (D) as an endangering environment case and subsection (E) as an endangering course-of-conduct case, concluding that the mother’s failure to protect the children from recurring violence and instability supported both predicates. The same evidence also supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, minimization of domestic violence can be as damaging as the violence itself. A parent’s recantation, selective memory, denial of risk, and continued association with a violent partner can support findings on endangerment, credibility, protective capacity, and best interest across termination, custody, modification, and protective-order litigation."