Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
In re Aaron Nicholas Thomas
COA09
After a trial court entered a default protective order, it granted the respondent’s motion for new trial during its plenary-power period based on alleged defective service and lack of notice. The relator sought mandamus, arguing among other things that he did not receive notice of the new-trial hearing. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held mandamus was unavailable because this was a nonjury new-trial order entered while the trial court still had plenary power, so the relator had an adequate appellate remedy: he could seek reconsideration and reinstatement in the trial court and, if necessary, challenge the ruling on appeal from a final order. The court also concluded the complained-of notice problem did not create the extraordinary circumstances needed for mandamus relief, and the order was not void.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a family-court judge sets aside a default order in a bench proceeding while plenary power is still open, do not assume mandamus is the answer. First build your record in the trial court, move for reconsideration, and preserve any service or notice complaints for a later appeal; absent a void order or truly exceptional harm, appellate courts will expect you to use those ordinary remedies."
In the Interest of E.B.J., J.B.J., B.B., and C.B.J., Children
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and best interest under section 161.001(b)(2). The record showed Mother engaged in a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the children through severe and escalating abuse of Brian, corroborated by medical testimony, school observations, and the children’s statements. As to Father, the court held that knowing exposure to Mother’s abuse and failure to protect the children likewise supported an endangerment finding. The court also relied on trauma evidence, the parents’ shifting explanations and denials, and the children’s safety and permanency needs to uphold best interest. Because one predicate ground plus best interest is enough, the court did not need to reach the other predicate grounds or the parents’ argument that the Department had to prove a material and substantial change in circumstances.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are won or lost on pattern, corroboration, and parental insight. A documented course of abuse, failure to protect, inconsistent explanations, and refusal to acknowledge responsibility can support termination—and in non-termination SAPCR cases, the same proof can justify major restrictions on conservatorship and possession."
In the Interest of R.R.D. and L.R.W., Children
COA05
In In re R.R.D., the parents tried to directly appeal temporary orders requiring them to participate in protective services under Texas Family Code § 264.203. The Dallas Court of Appeals treated the issue as purely jurisdictional and held that because the challenged orders were temporary family-law orders, Family Code § 105.001(e) barred an interlocutory appeal. The court further concluded that § 264.203 did not create an independent right to immediate appellate review, and because the parents identified no other statute authorizing interlocutory jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(a).
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a burdensome temporary family-law order can be appealed just because it has immediate consequences. Before filing a notice of appeal, confirm there is an express statutory basis for interlocutory review; otherwise, counsel should consider alternatives like mandamus, trial-court modification, and preserving error for appeal after a final order."
In the Interest of A.A., a Child
COA01
In *In re A.A.*, the First Court of Appeals reviewed a termination order based on endangerment grounds after the Department removed an infant following a domestic-violence incident and concerns about the mother’s mental-health stability. The court held the evidence was legally sufficient to support predicate grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and also legally sufficient on best interest. But applying the clear-and-convincing factual-sufficiency standard, the court concluded the Department relied too heavily on the mother’s past conduct and not enough on the full record showing current improvement: completed services, resumed medication, negative drug tests, recent housing and employment stability, substantial visitation, and a bond with the child. Because that disputed evidence was too significant to permit a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Past endangerment and a strong foster placement do not automatically prove termination is in a child’s best interest. In close child-related cases, lawyers must build a record that addresses present circumstances—service completion, stability, compliance, bonding, and why those facts do or do not reduce risk—because factual-sufficiency review can undo a ruling that rests mainly on historical misconduct."
In re Rachel Michelle Atherton
COA09
In this original proceeding arising from a divorce, the parties’ marital residence was sold under temporary orders and the net proceeds were deposited into the court’s registry. Rachel Atherton argued the residence was the parties’ homestead and asked the trial court to either release enough proceeds for her to buy a replacement home before the six-month exemption period in Texas Property Code section 41.001(c) expired, or toll the exemption while the funds remained unavailable in the registry. The Beaumont Court of Appeals relied chiefly on London v. London and the protective purpose of section 41.001(c) to hold that when homestead-sale proceeds are unavailable because they are held in the court registry, the six-month exemption may be equitably tolled. Because no party showed a valid lien against the homestead proceeds and the trial court’s failure to rule threatened forfeiture of the exemption solely through delay, the court held the trial court abused its discretion. Mandamus was conditionally granted, directing the trial court to timely rule on the motion or preserve the exempt status of the proceeds while in the registry and for six months after delivery.
Litigation Takeaway
"If divorce-related homestead sale proceeds are sitting in the court registry, do not let the six-month exemption deadline pass without action. Ask early for either release of funds or an order tolling the exemption, and if the trial court’s inaction threatens loss of homestead protection, mandamus may be the right remedy."
In the Interest of S.K. and A.K., Children
COA02
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the mother did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence but instead argued that the jury charge improperly defined “endanger” and that her appointed counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge drug-test evidence. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the jury-charge complaint was waived because no objection was made in the trial court, and longstanding Texas Supreme Court precedent forecloses any due-process exception to ordinary preservation rules in termination cases. The court also rejected the ineffective-assistance claim because the criminal forensic licensing and accreditation statutes the mother relied on apply only in criminal cases, so counsel was not deficient for failing to make a meritless objection. The court affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination cases do not get a free pass on error preservation. If you want to complain about the jury charge on appeal, you must object clearly and on the record in the trial court. And ineffective-assistance arguments will fail if the omitted objection had no valid legal basis—especially when counsel tries to import criminal evidentiary rules into a civil family-law case."
Loyo v. Stephen
COA14
In Loyo v. Stephen, a tort creditor sought to execute on real property that had been community property during marriage but was later awarded to the nondebtor spouse in the divorce decree as her separate property. The court analyzed Texas Family Code § 3.202(d) using a plain-language approach and held that "all community property" remains subject to a spouse’s tort liability incurred during marriage. The court concluded that the debtor spouse’s liability was incurred, at the latest, when the arbitrator issued the fiduciary-duty award and the trial court confirmed it during the marriage, even though the confirmation order later merged into a final post-divorce judgment. The court also rejected the argument that the final judgment had to expressly restate the tort finding or attach the arbitration award. Because the liability arose during marriage, the former community property awarded to the nondebtor spouse remained reachable, and the judgment authorizing execution was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A divorce decree does not automatically shield former community property from a spouse’s tort creditors. Family lawyers must investigate pending tort and arbitration exposure before dividing property, because if liability was fixed during marriage, retitling an asset to the nondebtor spouse may not prevent later execution under Family Code § 3.202(d)."
In re Jarrod Heath Aaron
COA12
In this original proceeding arising from a SAPCR modification case, the petitioner sought mandamus after the trial court denied his motion to transfer venue from Van Zandt County to Smith County, where the children had allegedly lived for more than six months. The court focused on Texas Family Code §§ 155.201(b) and 155.204(b), emphasizing that while transfer may be mandatory when residency requirements are met, timeliness depends on the movant’s procedural posture. Because the relator filed the modification petition himself, he was a petitioner and was required to file any motion to transfer at the same time as his initial pleading. His later-filed transfer motion was therefore untimely, and the residency facts could not cure that defect. The court held that the trial court correctly denied transfer, retained authority to proceed with case-management orders such as mediation, and did not abuse its discretion; mandamus relief was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you file the modification, file the transfer motion with the petition or lose the right to mandatory transfer. In Chapter 155 cases, strong residence facts do not matter if the petitioner misses the filing deadline."
In re Tempus Holdings, Inc. d/b/a The Lodge Card Club, and Locus Enterprises, LLC
COA04
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying an out-of-state lawyer’s Rule 19 pro hac vice application without evidence supporting any permissible ground under Rule 19(d). The opponent argued unauthorized practice, ethical concerns, and generalized “good cause,” based on the lawyer’s name appearing on pleadings signed by Texas counsel, attendance at a deposition, and speculation that he might be a witness. Relying on AutoZoners, Verhalen, Rule 19, Government Code section 81.101, and Rule 3.08 authorities, the court concluded those objections were unsupported and legally insufficient. Because the denial deprived the client of chosen counsel and could not be adequately remedied on appeal, the court granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to block pro hac vice admission in Texas, you need evidence tied to Rule 19(d)—not suspicion, rhetoric, or tactical complaints about duplication, expense, or a possible witness issue. For family lawyers, this case is a strong mandamus tool when a trial court excludes qualified out-of-state counsel without a record-based reason."
In Re Maj. Christina I. Leake
COA07
In this mandamus proceeding arising from a long-running SAPCR, the relator argued that filing written objections under Texas Family Code section 201.015 automatically stripped the associate judge of authority to receive filings, send hearing communications, and continue handling the case. The Amarillo Court of Appeals rejected that reading, holding that section 201.015 creates a mechanism for de novo review by the referring court after an associate judge’s order, but does not revoke the authority granted to associate judges under section 201.007. Because the relator did not show that the associate judge acted outside the powers authorized by statute, and also failed to establish other mandamus prerequisites such as presentment, unreasonable delay, and a precise record, the court denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"A section 201.015 objection is not a pause button on an associate judge’s authority. If you want mandamus relief, you must identify a specific act outside section 201.007, build a clean record showing presentment and delay where relevant, and act quickly—especially when challenging temporary orders or case-administration issues."