Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
In the Matter of the Marriage of Chadwick Lyle Soma and Valerie Lynn Soma
COA12
In Soma v. Soma, the husband sought reimbursement in the divorce for community funds used to build a house on land owned by the wife’s parents. The court held that proof of money spent was not enough. Because the house was built on third-party land, the husband had to prove the marital estate actually owned a legally cognizable reimbursement claim and provide competent evidence of its value. The evidence was disputed on whether the in-laws had promised to convey acreage, whether the house was part of the realty, and whether any reimbursement claim could be reliably valued. Deferring to the trial court’s credibility and valuation determinations, the Tyler Court of Appeals held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying reimbursement and affirmed the overall property division.
Litigation Takeaway
"If spouses improve land owned by parents or in-laws, do not assume the divorce court will reimburse the money spent. To recover, you must prove the marital estate owns an enforceable claim, not just that community funds were used, and you must present clear title, fixture, and valuation evidence. Informal family promises, tax filings, and receipts alone may not be enough."
In re Feliciano Sanchez and Leticia Sanchez
COA04
In this original proceeding, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that parties could not use a new injunction and declaratory-judgment suit in Medina County to stop enforcement of an Atascosa County foreclosure order by arguing the property was protected homestead. The Atascosa court had already decided the exemption issue and had jurisdiction over the parties, the case, and the foreclosure remedy. The appellate court explained that even if the foreclosure court got the homestead question wrong, that would make the order merely erroneous or voidable, not void. Because only void judgments may be collaterally attacked, the Medina County suit was an impermissible collateral attack, the temporary injunction was void, and mandamus relief was proper to require the trial court to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the later-filed suit.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a court with jurisdiction has already ruled that property may be sold or foreclosed despite a homestead claim, the remedy is direct attack in that case—not a new lawsuit in another county. In family-law enforcement disputes involving residences, owelty liens, equalization liens, or other real-property remedies, preserve the homestead issue in the original court and pursue appeal, mandamus, bill of review, or other recognized direct remedies rather than trying to relitigate the issue through a collateral injunction suit."
In re T.A.S.D.
COA04
In In re T.A.S.D., the relator sought mandamus relief arguing a Jim Wells County trial court’s initial custody order was void because Texas lacked UCCJEA home-state jurisdiction. The Fourth Court of Appeals compared the relator’s proof to Family Code section 152.201(a)(1), which asks whether Texas was the child’s home state within six months before the SAPCR was filed, not simply whether the child lived in Texas during the immediately preceding months. Because the mandamus record did not establish that Texas lacked home-state jurisdiction under that six-month lookback, the relator failed to show the order was void or that mandamus relief was warranted. The court denied mandamus, denied temporary relief as moot, and struck the petition and record for failing to redact a minor’s identifying information.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to attack a Texas custody order as void under the UCCJEA, you need a precise residence timeline and a mandamus record that disproves Texas home-state jurisdiction under the statute’s six-month lookback. Showing only that the child was out of Texas for several months before filing is not enough, and sloppy appellate redaction can create additional problems."
In the Interest of J.A.V. and J.B.V.
COA04
In a termination-by-modification case, the mother argued the termination order was defective because it omitted the findings required by Texas Family Code § 161.001(f) and (g). The Fourth Court of Appeals treated the omission as a formal drafting defect rather than a failure to make the findings, because the trial court later signed supplemental findings satisfying the statute. The court held it could modify the judgment to incorporate those supplemental findings, rejected the argument that the omission alone required reversal, and affirmed the termination judgment as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"Not every missing statutory finding in a family-law judgment requires reversal. If the trial court actually made the required findings and the record contains signed supplemental findings, the court of appeals may treat the omission as clerical or formal and modify the order to conform to the record. Trial lawyers should scrub final orders for mandatory findings before signature, and appellate lawyers should evaluate whether a facial defect is truly substantive or can be cured by modification."
Wilma Elder and Timothy Elder v. Korinthia Monique Miller
COA14
In a malpractice suit, the trial court granted a TCPA motion dismissing the defendant’s counterclaims and later signed an order awarding the plaintiffs $8,775 in mandatory TCPA attorney’s fees. Although that order called itself a “final judgment” as to the fee award, the plaintiffs’ own malpractice claim remained pending. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied Lehmann and held the fee order was still interlocutory because it neither actually disposed of all claims and all parties nor clearly and unequivocally stated that it did so. As a result, Rule 329b’s plenary-power deadlines never started, the trial court retained jurisdiction, and it erred by denying a later summary-judgment motion for lack of jurisdiction. The court reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family cases, a fee or sanctions order is not truly final just because it uses the words “final judgment.” If live claims remain, the order is usually interlocutory unless it disposes of all parties and claims or contains unmistakable Lehmann-finality language. Do not assume plenary power has expired after a piecemeal ruling; check for unresolved issues, and use severance or precise drafting if true finality is intended."
In Re Ka C. Wong, M.D.
COA08
After a defense jury verdict in a medical-negligence case, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s amended motion for new trial through a bare one-page order that gave no reason beyond stating it had considered the motion, response, and argument of counsel. The El Paso Court of Appeals applied In re Columbia, In re United Scaffolding, and related Texas Supreme Court authority requiring post-verdict new-trial orders to state an understandable, reasonably specific, legally valid, and case-specific reason. Because the order identified no legal standard and no specific defect in the verdict, it failed facial review at step one, so the court did not reach the merits of any alleged contradiction or insufficiency in the verdict. The court held the trial court abused its discretion and conditionally granted mandamus directing the trial court to vacate the deficient new-trial order.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a Texas trial court sets aside a jury verdict and grants a new trial, the order itself must explain why with a legally recognized, case-specific reason. In family-law jury cases, a conclusory new-trial order is an immediate mandamus target before the case is retried."
In re Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, Dollar Tree challenged discovery orders requiring statewide and nationwide documents and corporate-representative testimony about allegedly similar incidents, understaffing, shrink, and security practices at other stores. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the requests were facially overbroad under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 192.3 and 192.4 because they were not properly limited to substantially similar incidents within a reasonable temporal, geographic, and operational scope, and the trial court’s “similarly situated” label did not cure the defect. The court also held Rule 199.2(b)(1) does not allow a party to obtain the same overbroad information through corporate-representative deposition topics. Because the harm from compelled overbroad discovery cannot be adequately remedied on appeal, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If discovery asks for 'all similar incidents,' 'all complaints,' or records from multiple locations without a tight tie to the pleaded issues, a defined time frame, and a reasonable geographic or operational limit, it is vulnerable to objection and mandamus. In family-law cases, this opinion is a strong roadmap both for defeating fishing-expedition discovery and for drafting narrower comparator requests that are more likely to survive challenge."
In Re The Commitment of Gerald Lee Ricks
COA01
In this Texas SVP commitment appeal, the dispute was whether Gerald Ricks had a statutory “behavioral abnormality” making him likely to commit future predatory sexual violence, not whether he was a repeat sexually violent offender. The First Court of Appeals held the evidence was sufficient because the State tied Ricks’s repeated child-sex offenses, relapse while on supervision and in treatment, continued attraction to female children, minimization, and inconsistent testimony to a forensic psychiatrist’s opinion that he remained high risk. The court also rejected Ricks’s complaint that he was barred from questioning the State’s expert about the State’s withdrawal of another expert, holding the issue was not preserved and, even if preserved, no reversible error was shown.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases involving abuse or child-safety concerns, past misconduct can support present-risk restrictions when it is paired with relapse, treatment failure, minimization, ongoing deviant interests, and qualified expert testimony connecting those facts to future danger. Just as important, if a court limits cross-examination of an opposing expert, make a precise record and offer of proof or the complaint may be lost on appeal."
Victoria Trading Company, LLC v. Gurnard
COA08
In a Reeves County mineral-title dispute, successors claiming through a wife argued that her 1920 direct deed conveying separate real property to her husband was void because Texas law supposedly required an intermediary strawman transfer. The El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed former Article 1114 and the historical case law, especially Riley v. Wilson, and held that the governing law required only the husband’s joinder and the wife’s privy acknowledgment. Because the deed satisfied those statutory protections, and Riley did not create an extra-statutory strawman requirement, the direct interspousal deed was valid. The court therefore affirmed summary judgment upholding the deed and the title chain through the husband.
Litigation Takeaway
"When an old interspousal deed is under attack, start with the statute in effect when the deed was signed—not modern assumptions or overreadings of old cases. If the historical formalities were satisfied, courts are unlikely to invent extra requirements, which can make title and characterization issues suitable for summary judgment."
In the Interest of T.R.C.
COA09
In In re T.R.C., the Beaumont Court of Appeals considered whether the Department proved the statutory prerequisites for termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(f)(1). The case centered on a medically fragile child with Type 1 diabetes and the Department’s concerns about Mother’s care, but the court refused to rely on generalized safety concerns, voluminous medical records, or adverse impressions in place of element-specific proof. Applying the clear-and-convincing evidence standard, the court held the record did not legally suffice to show that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to Mother or that, despite those efforts, a continuing danger in the home prevented return. The court therefore reversed the termination order and rendered judgment denying termination, and it separately reversed the Department’s permanent managing conservatorship appointment because the trial court failed to make the finding required by Family Code section 153.002(c)(1).
Litigation Takeaway
"When a family-law remedy depends on specific statutory elements, the court cannot fill evidentiary gaps with a difficult record, broad safety narratives, or stacks of medical records. For termination under section 161.001(f)(1), the Department must prove actual reasonable reunification efforts and a continuing danger that still prevents return; for everyone else, the case is a reminder to force element-by-element proof and insist on required statutory findings."