Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
Brys v. Cobb
COA01
In Brys v. Cobb, the First Court of Appeals held that when a properly authenticated California judgment was filed in Texas under the UEFJA on July 21, 2023, it immediately became a Texas judgment. The judgment debtor waited more than a year to file a motion for new trial and later asked the Texas court to declare the foreign judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The appellate court did not reach the underlying jurisdictional challenge to the California judgment because the dispositive issue was timing: under Chapter 35 and Texas Rules 306a and 329b, any attack on a domesticated foreign judgment must be brought through the same procedures and within the same deadlines that apply to Texas judgments. Because the trial court’s plenary power expired 30 days after domestication and no timely post-judgment motion was filed, the later orders granting a new trial and declaring the judgment void were themselves void. The court vacated those post-deadline orders and left the domesticated California judgment fully enforceable in Texas.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat the UEFJA filing date like the signing date of a Texas final judgment. If you want to attack a domesticated foreign judgment, move immediately—waiting can forfeit even a personal-jurisdiction or voidness challenge. If you represent the creditor, a proper UEFJA filing can quickly become a powerful enforcement and settlement tool once the deadline passes."
Dillon v. Bamford
COA03
In Dillon v. Bamford, the Austin Court of Appeals largely affirmed the trial court’s refusal to modify conservatorship, holding the father did not prove a material and substantial change in circumstances that would justify giving him the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence or broader tie-breaking authority. The court emphasized the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, the conflicting evidence about parental conflict and safety concerns, and the guardian ad litem’s testimony that both parents were active, both homes were generally safe, and the children wanted the schedule to remain the same. But the court reversed the enforcement ruling on the parties’ agreed tax-dependency provision, concluding the trial court improperly rewrote the decree by shifting the father’s right to claim the children from 2019 to 2026 instead of enforcing the unambiguous odd-year allocation as written. The court affirmed the denial of enforcement as to tax year 2021 because the father failed to present sufficient proof of that alleged violation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Modification cases need concrete proof of a material change affecting the children, not just evidence of coparenting conflict or isolated parenting problems. And in enforcement proceedings, courts must enforce unambiguous decree language as written—especially tax-allocation provisions—but the movant still has to prove the violation with competent evidence year by year."
Harolyn Graves-Johnson v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this aggravated-assault family-violence appeal, the defendant argued the trial court wrongly excluded handwritten letters and prison messages allegedly sent by the complainant that she wanted to use to impeach him and to show the nature of their relationship under article 38.371. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the exclusion was within the trial court’s discretion because the defense did not properly authenticate the communications and did not satisfy Texas Rule of Evidence 613 by confronting the complainant with the specific statements before offering the writings as extrinsic impeachment evidence. The court also explained that article 38.371 does not override ordinary evidentiary requirements, so unauthenticated and unsupported relationship evidence may still be excluded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texts, jail messages, emails, and letters can be powerful family-violence evidence, but only if counsel lays the foundation. Authenticate the communication, connect it to the witness, give context, and if using it for impeachment, confront the witness with the exact statement first. Article 38.371 and broad “relationship evidence” arguments will not rescue sloppy predicate work."
In re Anabel Lopez Perez
COA03
In In re Anabel Lopez Perez, the relator sought mandamus relief in the Third Court of Appeals to force an Austin County Court at Law judge to execute or clarify a QDRO arising from a divorce. The court did not reach the merits of the QDRO dispute. Instead, it analyzed Texas Government Code sections 22.221 and 22.201(d) and held that its ordinary mandamus power extends only to trial judges within its appellate district, and Austin County is not in the Third Court’s district. The relator also failed to show that mandamus was necessary to protect or enforce the Third Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The petition was therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing mandamus in any post-divorce property case, especially a QDRO or decree-clarification dispute, confirm that the respondent judge sits within the appellate court’s territorial district. A strong merits argument cannot overcome filing in the wrong court, and family-law subject matter does not create mandamus jurisdiction."
Aliza Groups, Inc. v. Roshan K. Noorani
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment declaring void a deed that purported to transfer a married couple’s community homestead because the named grantor, Karim Noorani, did not sign it and the son who signed Karim’s name had no authority to do so. The court applied Texas law that a forged deed is void, not voidable, and passes no title. Roshan Noorani’s summary-judgment evidence directly established that Karim never signed the deed and that neither spouse authorized the son to execute any deed or lien on the property. The buyer’s agency and equity arguments failed because they did not create a genuine fact issue on authorization, and its appellate authority theory was not preserved because it did not match the theory raised in the trial court. The court therefore affirmed the order quieting title in Roshan’s favor.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-property litigation, especially homestead disputes, an unauthorized signature on a deed can be attacked as a void forgery, and vague claims that a child or other family member had “authority” will not defeat summary judgment without competent evidence of actual authorization. Lock down the record early on who signed, who authorized, and whether the property was community homestead property."
K.C. v. D.R.
COA02
In K.C. v. D.R., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a protective order entered against a father’s romantic partner after the child’s mother alleged threatening conduct, including an encounter involving a ski mask and baseball bat during a custody-related dispute. The court rejected the respondent’s argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or misapplied Family Code Chapter 71, explaining that Section 71.0021 can cover violence or threats directed at a person because of that person’s dating relationship with a shared third party; the applicant and respondent do not have to have dated each other. The court also rejected complaints about due process, evidentiary rulings, defensive theories, and overbreadth because they were inadequately preserved, inadequately briefed, or unsupported by accurate authority and record citations. The court ultimately held that the protective order was properly issued and emphasized that pro se litigants must comply with the same appellate briefing and preservation rules as attorneys.
Litigation Takeaway
"Chapter 71 protective orders can reach threats by a parent’s current partner against the other parent even when those two people never dated each other, so long as the conduct fits the statute’s third-party dating-violence language. For litigators, the bigger lesson is procedural: preserve every complaint, tie it to the record and the statute, and brief it accurately—Texas appellate courts will not rescue unsupported or sloppy arguments, even from pro se parties."
In the Interest of L.S.B., a Child
COA05
In In the Interest of L.S.B., a Child, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a post-remand order confirming $63,508.86 in child-support arrearages against Father. Father argued Mother had not pleaded for arrearages, that a prior 2020 modification order terminating his support obligation barred any arrearage finding, and that the evidence was insufficient. The court rejected those arguments, explaining that on remand the support accounting issue was part of the live controversy because both parties presented competing support calculations, payment records, and requested relief concerning what Father should have paid from 2016 forward. The court also held the earlier modification order could not shield Father because that order had already been reversed on appeal, leaving the trial court free to recalculate support consequences consistent with the decree, the evidence, and the appellate mandate. Finally, the court found the evidence sufficient because the record included the operative divorce decree, the Attorney General payment history, Father’s records, and Mother’s arrearage summary, which supported the trial court’s arithmetic and arrearage finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"A reversed modification order does not keep protecting a client on remand. If you open the door by asking for retroactive support reductions, credits, offsets, or termination, the court can just as easily determine the opposite and confirm arrearages if the decree, mandate, and payment records support that result. In support cases, lawyers should treat historical payment calculations as a two-way street and build a precise evidentiary record around the operative order and actual payments."
Travarius Leon Dent v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Dent, the court affirmed admission of the father’s prior injury-to-a-child deferred-adjudication evidence after he testified that he was a strict but not physically abusive parent and suggested the child fabricated sexual-abuse allegations in retaliation for discipline. The court held that this testimony opened the door by creating a false impression about his parenting and made the prior child-injury evidence relevant for non-propensity purposes: rebutting that impression and undermining his retaliation/fabrication defense. The court also held that the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403, because the State had a real need for rebuttal evidence tailored to the defense theme, and the limiting instruction properly restricted the jury’s use of the evidence without commenting on the weight of the evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, a parent who claims to be merely “strict” and blames allegations on retaliation or coaching may open the door to prior abuse evidence. Frame the evidence as rebuttal of a false parenting narrative and fabrication defense—not just bad-character proof—and seek a careful limiting instruction."
In the Interest of A.M., a Child
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights to A.M. after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support Father’s predicate grounds under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (N) and the best-interest findings as to both parents. The court analyzed Father’s repeated incarcerations, criminal conduct, long-term absence, and inability to provide a stable home holistically rather than in isolation, holding that this pattern constituted endangering conduct and constructive abandonment. It also held that A.M.’s history of instability, trauma, failed placements, both parents’ continued incarceration, and evidence that she was moving toward acceptance of adoption supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in her best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination and other family-law cases, incarceration rarely stands alone—the winning record ties repeated criminal conduct and absence to a larger pattern of instability, lack of caregiving, and the child’s need for permanence. Trial lawyers should build a child-specific chronology showing how parental unavailability affected this child, because appellate courts will review endangerment holistically and defer heavily to credibility-based best-interest findings."
In re O.L.M., a Child
COA01
In In re O.L.M., a Child, the mother tried to directly appeal temporary orders entered in a suit to modify the parent-child relationship. The First Court of Appeals treated the issue as purely jurisdictional and explained that Texas appellate courts may review interlocutory orders only when a statute expressly permits it. Relying on Texas Family Code section 105.001(e), Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014, and prior cases, the court held that temporary SAPCR modification orders are not subject to interlocutory appeal. Because the mother used a notice of appeal instead of the proper potential vehicle of mandamus, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction without reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume an urgent temporary custody or SAPCR modification order can be appealed immediately. In Texas, temporary modification orders are generally not directly appealable, so lawyers should analyze appellate jurisdiction first, preserve a mandamus-ready record, and move quickly on mandamus if immediate review is truly necessary."