Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
Jennifer Jo Stricker v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Stricker v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed a trial court's exclusion of a public spectator during jury selection due to a large venire panel filling the courtroom. The appellate court analyzed the closure under the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, applying the four-prong Waller v. Georgia test. Because the trial court failed to consider reasonable alternatives to accommodate the spectator or make specific findings on the record justifying the closure, the court held that the exclusion constituted a structural error. Consequently, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial without the need for a showing of actual harm.
Litigation Takeaway
"Limited seating or a crowded gallery is not a valid legal reason to exclude public spectators from a jury trial; doing so without specific constitutional findings creates a 'structural error' that can automatically void your entire case on appeal regardless of the evidence."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Brittany Lea Lannen and Clint Douglas Lannen
COA10
Years after her divorce, Brittany Lannen sought a declaratory judgment to determine if her ex-husband's 'right to purchase' specific real estate—a provision included in their 2014 divorce decree—was still valid or had been waived. The trial court dismissed her suit, agreeing with the husband's argument that the lawsuit was an impermissible 'collateral attack' on a final judgment. On appeal, the Waco Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. The court analyzed the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) and concluded that because the decree incorporated a settlement agreement 'enforceable as a contract,' the UDJA was the proper procedural tool to interpret the parties' legal rights. The court held that seeking to construe the meaning or validity of a contract within a decree is not an attempt to overturn the judgment, but rather a request for the court to define the current legal status of those provisions.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your divorce decree incorporates a settlement agreement as an enforceable contract, you can use the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to clarify or interpret its terms years later. This allows parties to resolve disputes over property rights—like purchase options or rights of first refusal—without being barred by rules that usually prevent people from 'attacking' final judgments."
Gutmann v. Hennig
COA13
In Gutmann v. Hennig, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals addressed a situation where a trial court's 'sua sponte' severance of a partial summary judgment created a 'two-front war,' forcing parties to litigate in both trial and appellate courts simultaneously. The Appellee, who had won the summary judgment, requested that the appellate court reverse his own victory and vacate the severance to save costs and promote judicial economy. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.1(c), which allows an appellate court to grant an appellee more favorable relief than the trial court did for 'just cause.' Finding that the parties' mutual desire for efficiency and the Appellant's lack of opposition constituted just cause, the court reversed the summary judgment without reaching the merits and vacated the severance order, effectively reconsolidating the case for a single trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"A 'win' in the form of a partial summary judgment can become a liability if a severance forces you to defend that win on appeal while simultaneously litigating the rest of the case at the trial level. If the costs of fragmented litigation outweigh the benefit of the judgment, parties can use Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.1(c) to seek a 'consensual remand'—reversing the summary judgment and vacating the severance to reconsolidate the estate's litigation into a single, more cost-effective proceeding."
In the Matter of the Estate of Henry Matthew Platt
COA09
In a dispute over the validity of a holographic will, the sister of the decedent attempted to disqualify the will through expert handwriting testimony. However, the expert's comparison samples (exemplars) did not consist of the decedent's own signature, but rather signatures the decedent allegedly made on behalf of his parents. The trial court excluded the expert's testimony, and the Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed. The court analyzed the case under Texas Rules of Evidence 703 and 705, concluding that because the expert lacked a 'control' sample of the decedent's actual name and signature, there was an unreliable foundation and an 'analytical gap' that rendered the opinion inadmissible.
Litigation Takeaway
"Expert testimony is only as reliable as the data supporting it; if your handwriting expert relies on representative or third-party signatures rather than authenticated personal signatures, the testimony is likely to be excluded for lack of foundation."
In the Matter of M.A.R. Jr., A Child
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court's order committing a minor, M.A.R. Jr., to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD). The conflict centered on whether the State had satisfied the "reasonable efforts" requirement of the Texas Family Code before removing the child from his home environment. Despite the child's diagnoses of autism and ADHD and his father's willingness to take custody, the Court analyzed the extensive history of failed interventions—including community supervision, psychiatric services, and a residential facility placement where the minor accumulated hundreds of incident reports. The Court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the finding that local resources were exhausted and that commitment was necessary for the child's rehabilitation and public safety.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a child's removal from the home is at stake due to behavioral issues, the 'paper trail' is everything; a documented history of 'graduated sanctions' and failed local interventions is often the deciding factor in satisfying the legal 'reasonable efforts' standard."
In Re Jose Francisco Quintero and JQ Brick Repair & Restoration Services, LLC
COA14
In a mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether experts who author counteraffidavits under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 18.001 are protected from deposition by the consulting expert privilege. The trial court had ordered the depositions of four experts who provided counteraffidavits but were not designated as testifying witnesses. Analyzing Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 192.3(e) and 192.7, the appellate court determined that because the experts were not designated to testify and their work was not reviewed by any testifying experts, they remained privileged consultants. The court held that serving a counteraffidavit does not constitute a waiver of the consulting expert privilege, and thus the trial court abused its discretion by compelling the depositions.
Litigation Takeaway
"Attorneys can effectively challenge the reasonableness of medical or professional expenses by using Section 18.001 counteraffidavits from consulting experts who remain immune from deposition, so long as those experts are never designated to testify and their work product is not shared with testifying experts."
Salmeron v. Atascocita Forest Community Association
COA01
Homeowners who had sued to stop an HOA foreclosure were electronically served with the HOA’s plea to the jurisdiction and notice of submission, but they did not respond by the submission date and the trial court granted the plea and dismissed the case. On motion for new trial, the homeowners argued Hurricane Beryl caused a power/internet “system outage” that prevented timely receipt of e-service and warranted relief under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21(f)(6), along with a three-day extension under Rule 21a(c) and relief under the Craddock framework. The First Court of Appeals held that Rule 21(f)(6) does not provide automatic tolling based on a general disaster; the movant must present specific, evidence-backed facts showing when notice was actually received or when the outage ended and why they could not act (including seeking a continuance) once access was restored. Because the homeowners offered no concrete timeline for restoration of electricity/access or diligent efforts to monitor e-service—and their participation in a later hearing undercut the claim that they were unable to engage with the court—the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying new trial and letting the dismissal stand. The court also held the three-day rule for mail service does not apply to e-service, and the motion for new trial was too conclusory to satisfy Craddock’s “no conscious indifference” requirement.
Litigation Takeaway
"E-service deadlines start immediately and aren’t automatically extended by storms or outages. If you miss a deadline and claim a “technical failure,” you must prove it with a detailed outage timeline (when access returned/when notice was actually seen), show diligent efforts to check the case, and seek prompt relief (e.g., continuance/extension) as soon as you can—otherwise the judgment/dismissal is likely to stand."
In re Michael David Jones
COA10
The Tenth Court of Appeals dismissed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Michael David Jones, who sought immediate release from jail regarding criminal charges. The court analyzed the Texas Government Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, determining that intermediate appellate courts lack original jurisdiction over criminal habeas matters, as that power is reserved for the Court of Criminal Appeals, district courts, and county courts. The court held that while it has the authority to hear original habeas petitions in civil cases—such as family law contempt proceedings—it has no legal authority to reach the merits of a habeas claim arising from criminal detention.
Litigation Takeaway
"Understand the 'why' behind a client's incarceration before filing for relief. If a client is jailed for civil contempt (like unpaid child support), the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to hear a writ of habeas corpus. However, if the client faces criminal charges (like custodial interference), the writ must be filed in a trial court first. Filing in the wrong forum leads to a jurisdictional dismissal and keeps your client in jail longer."
In Re Benjamin Oshea Calhoun
COA01
Benjamin Oshea Calhoun (pro se) filed an original petition for writ of habeas corpus in the First Court of Appeals seeking a reduction of bail set in his pending Harris County criminal case. The court focused on subject-matter jurisdiction, contrasting (1) Texas Government Code § 22.221(d), which gives intermediate courts of appeals original habeas jurisdiction only when a person is restrained for violating an order, judgment, or decree in a civil case (i.e., civil-contempt-type restraints), with (2) Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 11.05, which vests original criminal habeas jurisdiction in the Court of Criminal Appeals, district courts, and county courts. Because Calhoun sought original habeas relief directed to a criminal bond issue—outside the narrow civil-order restraint contemplated by § 22.221(d)—the court held it had no original habeas jurisdiction to consider the request and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction (without reaching the merits, and noting the petition’s TRAP 52 defects were not the primary basis for disposition).
Litigation Takeaway
"Forum-check habeas relief. Texas courts of appeals can entertain original habeas only for restraints tied to violation of a civil-case order (common in family-law contempt); they cannot take original habeas to reduce criminal bail. If the restraint is criminal (even if factually related to a family dispute), file original habeas in the proper trial court under Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.05 and reach the court of appeals only through appellate review."
Ronald L. Crawford, Jr., Appellant v. Yasser Aftab Sharif, Appellee
COA01
In a post-foreclosure eviction (forcible detainer), the occupant argued the foreclosure sale was fraudulent and that the trial court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the case necessarily involved title. The First Court of Appeals rejected that argument, explaining that Texas justice courts (and county courts on de novo appeal) have jurisdiction to decide only the right to immediate possession, not title, and that a challenge to foreclosure validity does not defeat jurisdiction unless possession and title are so intertwined that possession cannot be decided without first adjudicating title. Because the purchaser presented proof of the foreclosure purchase and notice to vacate, and the occupant did not show the title issues were inseparable from possession (and provided no reporter’s record), the courts could decide possession independently. The court affirmed the judgment awarding possession (and, given the absent record, presumed the evidence supported damages and attorney’s fees as well).
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, you usually can’t stop an eviction by attacking the underlying foreclosure or transfer: forcible detainer is about immediate possession, not who ultimately owns title. For family-law “holdover spouse” situations, use justice-court eviction when a decree/transfer document provides an independent right to possession (often via tenancy-at-sufferance language), and don’t expect a separate title/decree attack to automatically stall removal."