Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
In the Matter of B.T.
COA02
In In the Matter of B.T., the Second Court of Appeals reviewed a juvenile court's order transferring a young man to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to finish an eighteen-year murder sentence. While the court found that the transfer was required by law because the respondent could not complete his minimum confinement before turning nineteen, it identified an error regarding court costs. The appellate court held that because the respondent had been declared indigent, that status was presumed to continue through the appeal. Consequently, the court affirmed the prison transfer but modified the judgment to strike all assessed court costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"Once a party's indigent status is established under the Family Code, it is legally presumed to continue throughout the litigation; attorneys should always audit final judgments and bills of costs to ensure clerks do not improperly assess fees against indigent clients."
RCIS ENTERPRISES, LLC, Appellant v. HOUSER FABRICATION, LLC, Appellee
COA06
RCIS Enterprises, LLC appealed a bench-trial judgment in favor of Houser Fabrication, LLC for breach of contract that awarded $78,491.10 in damages, prompt-payment interest, and attorney’s fees. The Texarkana Court of Appeals applied the City of Keller legal-sufficiency standard. It upheld the trial court’s finding that a binding contract existed, reasoning that the parties’ testimony and course of performance supplied the essential terms with reasonable certainty and supported a meeting of the minds. But the court concluded the evidence did not provide a legally sufficient evidentiary bridge between the admitted invoices/testimony and the exact dollar amount awarded, so the specific damages figure could not stand. It also held the record did not establish the statutory predicates for Texas Prompt Payment Act interest, requiring that interest award to be reversed. Because the principal recovery and interest were altered on appeal, the prevailing-party posture and “results obtained” changed, so the attorney-fee award was reversed and remanded for redetermination and recalculation consistent with the modified recovery.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a bench trial, findings of fact won’t save a money judgment if the record doesn’t support the exact numbers. Tie every damages/valuation line item to specific exhibits and testimony, and build evidence for statutory interest predicates. If the recovery may be reduced on appeal, preserve the fee award by developing Arthur Andersen evidence (and segregation where needed), because changes to the “bottom line” often force a fee remand."
In Re Constance Benavides a/k/a Constance Chamberlain
COA13
After an eviction judgment was entered following a property dispute, the Relator, Constance Benavides, attempted to stay her removal by filing a supersedeas bond. However, the trial court did not set the bond amount until over a month after the judgment, and Benavides filed the bond shortly thereafter. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Property Code § 24.007, which mandates that a bond must be filed within ten days of a judgment to stay an eviction 'under any circumstances.' The court held that the statutory deadline is absolute and contains no exceptions for judicial or administrative delays, ultimately denying mandamus relief and allowing the eviction to proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In property crossover evictions, the ten-day deadline to post a supersedeas bond is a 'trap' that admits no excuses; you must aggressively move to set and file the bond within 240 hours of the judgment signature or face immediate removal from the premises, regardless of a pending appeal."
Morrison v. Morrison
Supreme Court of Texas
In Morrison v. Morrison, a former wife sought to enforce a divorce decree after her ex-husband allegedly damaged their marital home and failed to return various items of personal property. Although the original decree split the home sale proceeds 50/50, the trial court awarded the wife 100% of the proceeds as damages without making specific findings regarding the fair market value (FMV) of the losses. The Supreme Court of Texas analyzed the distinction between the power to 'enforce' a decree under Family Code Chapter 9 and the prohibition against 'modifying' a substantive property division. The Court held that while trial courts can award money judgments for breaches, they impermissibly modify a decree when they reallocate community assets without a direct evidentiary link to the proven fair market value of the damaged or missing property.
Litigation Takeaway
"To successfully recover damages for damaged or missing assets after a divorce, you must provide specific evidence of fair market value; a court cannot simply reallocate property interests as a penalty for bad behavior without a dollar-for-dollar evidentiary accounting."
IN THE INTEREST OF D.J., A CHILD, Appellant
COA05
After losing his job, a father sought to terminate his child support obligation but refused to produce discovery documents regarding his retirement accounts and foreign property interests. The trial court granted a directed verdict against him, denying the modification and imposing a $4,800 discovery sanction. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the modification, holding that a party seeking to change support must provide full financial transparency to allow the court to calculate "net resources." However, the court reversed the monetary sanction because the trial record lacked specific evidence, such as attorney fee invoices or testimony, to justify the $4,800 amount.
Litigation Takeaway
"Transparency is mandatory in support modification cases; losing your primary income does not excuse you from disclosing your broader financial estate. Additionally, any party seeking discovery sanctions must ensure the record contains specific evidentiary proof linking the amount of the sanction to the actual costs or fees incurred."
In re Juan Pardo
COA13
In this mandamus proceeding, Relator Juan Pardo sought to vacate trial court orders for his arrest via ex parte writs of attachment. Although Pardo was represented by two attorneys of record, he filed the petition pro se. The Real Party in Interest moved to dismiss, arguing that Texas law prohibits 'hybrid representation.' The Thirteenth Court of Appeals agreed, holding that a party in a civil case cannot represent themselves while concurrently being represented by counsel. Because the petition was procedurally improper, the court dismissed it without prejudice and lifted a previously granted emergency stay, effectively exposing the Relator to the trial court's enforcement orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pro se filings made by a party who is still represented by counsel of record are considered a procedural nullity. Clients must formalize the termination of their legal representation before attempting to file original proceedings independently, or they risk immediate dismissal and the loss of emergency stays."
HIGH RISK PREGNANCY DOCTORS, PLLC AND VIOLETTA LOZOVYY, Appellants v. LINCOLN PROPERTY COMPANY D/B/A LINCOLN HARRIS CSG AND DOUGLAS MACLAY III, Appellees
COA02
In High Risk Pregnancy Doctors, PLLC and Dr. Violetta Lozovyy’s dispute with a leasing agent and landlord, the plaintiffs claimed they were induced to sign a commercial lease by an oral promise that the lease would be “ineffective” or otherwise “dealt with” if Dr. Lozovyy failed to obtain hospital staff privileges within 120 days. The written lease, however, unambiguously required those privileges and contained no contingency or “escape hatch.” The Fort Worth Court of Appeals, applying the Rule 91a standard, held the fraud claim failed as a matter of law because “justifiable reliance” cannot be based on an oral representation that is directly contradicted by the clear terms of the signed contract. The court also held the DTPA claim was time-barred: the two-year limitations period was not tolled by the discovery rule because the alleged injury—the contradictory contract language—was discoverable at signing, and failing to read the contract is a lack of reasonable diligence. The court affirmed dismissal of all claims.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the written agreement says one thing and an alleged oral promise says another, Texas courts treat reliance on the oral promise as legally unjustifiable—making fraud-based attempts to unwind a signed deal vulnerable to early dismissal. In family cases, this is strong authority to defeat “side-deal” or “work-around” claims attacking MSAs/Rule 11 agreements and to resist late-filed fraud/DTPA-style claims where the complaining party could have discovered the issue by reading what they signed."
In the Interest of M.L.L., A.M.L., and B.F.L., Children
COA07
In a parental termination proceeding, a mother sought to introduce evidence of events occurring prior to a 2018 divorce decree. The trial court excluded this evidence, citing res judicata. On appeal, the mother argued this exclusion was improper. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a), which require a party to preserve error by making an "offer of proof" when evidence is excluded. The court held that because the mother failed to make an offer of proof regarding what the excluded testimony would have shown, the appellate court could not conduct a harm analysis. Consequently, the mother waived her right to challenge the exclusion, and the termination of her parental rights was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a trial court excludes evidence, simply objecting is not enough; you must make a formal or informal 'offer of proof' for the record to show the appellate court exactly what that evidence would have been and why its exclusion was harmful."
In re Hector Hernandez
COA08
After obtaining a writ of execution to recover property, Hector Hernandez filed a petition for writ of mandamus directly with the El Paso Court of Appeals because the County Sheriff refused to enforce the writ. The Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Government Code § 22.221(b), which limits its original mandamus jurisdiction to actions against specific judges, not executive officials like sheriffs. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to compel a sheriff to act unless such an order was necessary to protect the court's own jurisdiction. Because Hernandez had not first filed a mandamus action against the sheriff in a district court, the appellate court dismissed the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
"You cannot "leapfrog" the trial court when a sheriff or constable refuses to execute a writ. To compel a county official to perform a ministerial duty, you must first file a petition for writ of mandamus in the district court; filing directly in the court of appeals will result in a jurisdictional dismissal."
Dennis Maurice Jones v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Jones v. State, the defendant sought to introduce his mother’s testimony about his mental-health history during an aggravated-assault trial. When the State objected on relevance, defense counsel expressly told the trial court the testimony was offered only to support an insanity defense and “not attempting to get any sort of lesser included reckless charge.” The trial court excluded the testimony. On appeal, Jones argued the exclusion was error because the evidence would have supported a lesser-included offense instruction. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) and the “matching” preservation doctrine (Clark v. State), holding the appellate complaint did not match what was requested at trial. Because counsel affirmatively disclaimed the lesser-included theory, the trial court was never asked to rule on admissibility for that purpose and there was no preserved error to review. The court affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not “narrow-proffer” yourself into an appellate waiver. If evidence is relevant to multiple theories (e.g., best interest, statutory presumptions, significant impairment, danger), state all applicable grounds and avoid affirmative disclaimers like “not for X.” Appellate courts will hold you to the exact theory presented to the trial judge, and a trial-level disclaimer can permanently foreclose a later appeal."