Opinion Library

EarnhartBuilt, LLC v. Preferred Materials, LLC, Procore Technologies, Inc., Express Lien, Inc. d/b/a Levelset, Michael Mann, and J. Earnhart, Inc.

COA05

In EarnhartBuilt, LLC v. Preferred Materials, LLC, a materials supplier filed a lien to collect $17,000 for concrete delivered to a construction project. The property owner sued, claiming the lien was "fraudulent" under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 12.002 because it was filed after the statutory deadline. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the "knowledge" and "intent" requirements of the statute, distinguishing between a lien that is merely legally invalid and one that is fraudulent. The court held that because the underlying debt for the materials was legitimate, the supplier did not have the requisite "actual knowledge" of fraudulence at the time of filing, even if the lien was procedurally defective. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the supplier.

Westyn Gregory Whetstone v. The State of Texas

COA07

In Whetstone v. State, a defendant was convicted of criminal trespass, but the written judgment erroneously labeled the offense as a Class A misdemeanor involving a 'habitation' despite the State having abandoned that specific allegation at trial. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the record under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b), which allows appellate courts to reform judgments to 'speak the truth' when they have the necessary information to do so. The court held that because the jury charge and sentencing only reflected a Class B offense, the written judgment contained a clerical error that must be reformed to reflect the actual adjudication.

COA10

In this juvenile delinquency proceeding, S.W. appealed an order committing her to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department. Her court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief asserting the appeal was frivolous and a motion to withdraw. The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code § 51.101(a), which requires counsel appointed at the initial detention stage to represent the child 'until the case is terminated.' Drawing a parallel to the Texas Supreme Court’s 'continuing duty' doctrine in parental rights termination cases (In re P.M.), the court interpreted 'termination' to mean the exhaustion of all appeals through the Texas Supreme Court. Consequently, while the court affirmed the commitment order, it denied the attorney's motion to withdraw.

EX PARTE BESSIE TEKILA MARTIN

COA02

In Ex parte Martin, the Second Court of Appeals addressed a double jeopardy challenge where a defendant claimed that out-of-county offenses were barred from prosecution because they had been 'taken into account' during a prior sentencing in another county under Texas Penal Code Section 12.45. While the court acknowledged that a valid Section 12.45 agreement bars subsequent prosecution for the admitted conduct, it found the record in this case insufficient to verify which specific offenses were included in the prior plea. Consequently, the court held that a defendant must provide a complete factual record—including the specific list of unadjudicated offenses—to sustain such a claim and remanded the case for further evidentiary development.

Christopher Michael Green v. The State of Texas

COA05

In Green v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals examined whether a trial court erred by admitting SANE (Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner) records of an unavailable victim during a criminal punishment phase. The defendant argued that admitting graphic forensic evidence without the victim's testimony was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 because he could not cross-examine the witness. The court analyzed the records' high probative value regarding the defendant's character and pattern of behavior, especially since the forensic evidence was linked to the defendant via DNA. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, ruling that forensic medical records are admissible to show a pattern of conduct even without live testimony from the victim.

Keenan DeAndre Black v. The State of Texas

COA02

In this case, a trial court orally waived a $6,000 statutory fine for a defendant found to be indigent, yet the subsequent written judgment erroneously included the fine. On appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed the conflict between the judge's verbal ruling and the written record. The court analyzed the 'bench controls the pen' doctrine, which dictates that an oral pronouncement made in open court is the legally binding judgment, while the written order is merely a record of that act. Finding a clear conflict, the court held that the oral waiver must prevail and modified the written judgment to delete the $6,000 fine.

Gannon v. The State of Texas

COA02

After Dayton Joseph Gannon was convicted of aggravated robbery for brandishing a knife and aggressively posturing toward a victim through a laundromat's glass door, he appealed, arguing that the threat of injury was not 'imminent' because the victim was armed and separated from him by a physical barrier. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory meaning of 'imminent'—defined as 'near, at hand, or on the verge of happening'—and determined that a threat is judged by the aggressor's volatility and conduct rather than the victim's defensive capabilities. The court held that the display of a deadly weapon combined with combative posturing is sufficient to establish an imminent threat, regardless of whether the victim has a weapon or is behind glass.

Mangawe v. The State of Texas

COA02

Bengamiah Mangawe appealed a conviction for continuous sexual abuse, arguing that vague testimony regarding dates (like 'November-ish') failed to meet the 30-day statutory duration requirement. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the evidence under a deferential standard, noting that a detective's testimony about Mangawe’s non-verbal 'nod' or confirmation of the timeline during an interview was substantive evidence. The court held that the jury is the sole arbiter of credibility and can resolve chronological conflicts in favor of the verdict, even when dates are approximate or admissions are not captured on audio.

Messele Kelel v. Dallas Central Appraisal District

COA05

In Messele Kelel v. Dallas Central Appraisal District, a property owner challenged a $74,250 tax valuation, presenting evidence of lower-priced comparable sales and internal settlement offers from the appraisal district as low as $30,000. The trial court granted a 'no-evidence' summary judgment in favor of the appraisal district, effectively dismissing the owner's claims. The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed this decision, ruling that the owner's evidence—specifically the comparable data and the district's own lower offers—constituted 'more than a scintilla' of evidence. The court held that while this evidence did not prove the property's value as a matter of law, it was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that must be resolved at trial.

Caldwell v. Quaid

COA14

In a divorce proceeding involving complex property characterization, the Husband designated an expert for tracing and valuation but failed to provide the actual tracing reports until six days before trial. The trial court excluded the late-disclosed tracing testimony while permitting testimony on the timely-disclosed valuation. On appeal, the Husband argued the exclusion constituted an improper 'death-penalty' sanction. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, clarifying that the exclusion was a mandatory application of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6. The court held that because the ruling did not preclude the Husband's entire defense or claim, it did not rise to the level of a death-penalty sanction and was a proper exercise of discretion due to the lack of good cause or showing of non-prejudice.