Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
York v. York
COA13
In York v. York, a mother sued her son and daughter-in-law after they convinced her to sell her home and provide over $119,000 to build a 'granny flat' on their property, only to divert the funds for their own home improvements and lock her out. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a $122,550 judgment in favor of the mother, focusing on the jury's finding of fraud. The court analyzed the timing of the financial transactions—specifically that the children contracted for their own renovations within days of receiving the mother's money—and concluded there was sufficient evidence that the children never intended to fulfill their promises. Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1, the court held that because the fraud finding independently supported the full damages award, it was unnecessary to review the additional claims of breach of contract and promissory estoppel.
Litigation Takeaway
"In multi-generational property disputes, pleading and proving fraud is a powerful strategy; if a judgment is supported by a robust fraud finding, an appellate court can affirm the entire award without even considering more technical contract-based defenses."
Elborno v. State
COA14
In Elborno v. State, a defendant challenged his ten-year sentence because the trial court failed to offer him the right of allocution—the opportunity to personally plead for mercy or identify legal bars to sentencing. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed both the common law right to mitigation and the statutory requirements under Article 42.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The court held that the common law right to allocution is forfeited if a defendant fails to object at the time of sentencing. Additionally, the court ruled that while the trial court is statutorily required to ask if there is any reason sentence should not be pronounced, the failure to do so is harmless error unless the defendant can show that a specific legal bar (pardon, incompetency, or mistaken identity) actually applied.
Litigation Takeaway
"In quasi-criminal family law enforcement proceedings, the right to speak in mitigation before being sentenced to jail is a 'use it or lose it' right; counsel must object immediately if a judge moves to pronounce confinement without providing an opportunity for allocution, or the issue is waived for appeal."
In the Interest of C.B., a Child
COA02
In this parental termination case, the Mother filed her notice of appeal one day after the 20-day deadline required for accelerated appeals. Although the filing occurred within the 15-day grace period—which typically triggers an 'implied motion' for an extension—the Court of Appeals issued a jurisdictional inquiry requesting a reasonable explanation for the delay. The Mother failed to respond to the court's inquiry. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3 and 10.5(b), concluding that while an extension can be granted for late filings within the grace period, the appellant still bears the burden of providing a reasonable justification. Because the Mother offered no explanation, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family law appeals, the 20-day filing deadline is strictly enforced and is not extended by motions for a new trial. If you miss the deadline but file within the 15-day grace period, you must proactively file a motion—or respond to court inquiries—with a 'reasonable explanation' for the delay; failing to justify the tardiness will result in a jurisdictional dismissal."
David and Rebecca Bowen v. Texas Fair Plan Association
COA01
In *Bowen v. Texas Fair Plan Association*, homeowners sued their insurance provider following a claim denial. The insurer filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, and the homeowners responded with affidavits from two experts. However, the homeowners had previously filed an amended expert designation that omitted these specific experts. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6, determining that an amended designation supersedes previous lists; by omitting the experts, the homeowners effectively de-designated them. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking the expert affidavits and affirming a take-nothing summary judgment, as the remaining evidence was unauthenticated and insufficient to create a fact issue.
Litigation Takeaway
"Always cross-reference your summary judgment evidence with your most recent Rule 194.2 expert designations; amending your witness list to "clean up" for trial can accidentally de-designate the experts you need to survive a no-evidence motion, resulting in the exclusion of their testimony."
Valladares v. State
COA14
Roger Valladares appealed his conviction for sexual abuse of a child, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to call his sister as a mitigation witness and failed to object to the admission of therapy records. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied the Strickland standard, finding that the attorney’s decision not to call the sister was a valid trial strategy to avoid "opening the door" to highly prejudicial evidence of prior bad acts. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing on the motion for new trial because the defendant failed to show that the omitted testimony would have likely changed the outcome and because the therapy records were admissible to rebut a defense theory of recent fabrication.
Litigation Takeaway
"Think twice before calling a "good character" witness in an abuse or family violence case; generalized testimony about a client's good behavior often provides a procedural gateway for the opposing side to introduce specific, devastating instances of prior misconduct that would otherwise be inadmissible."
Roger Allan Smith v. State
COA14
Roger Allan Smith appealed his conviction for the continuous sexual abuse of a child, arguing that the victim's testimony was too vague to satisfy the statutory requirement that at least two acts occurred over a 30-day period. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether a rational jury could infer the necessary duration from testimony describing the frequency of abuse rather than specific dates. The court held that evidence of a regular pattern—specifically testimony that abuse occurred "every couple of weeks to a month" beginning near a specific birthday—is legally sufficient to establish the 30-day window, even if the witness lacks "autobiographical memories" of each specific instance.
Litigation Takeaway
"To establish a "pattern of abuse" in SAPCR or Protective Order litigation, practitioners do not need to prove specific dates for every act. By establishing an "anchor date" (such as a holiday or birthday) and a consistent "frequency" (such as "every weekend"), a party can legally satisfy the evidentiary burden for a pattern of conduct through "evidentiary math.""
Gerardo Solis III v. State
COA13
In *Solis v. State*, a defendant's counsel raised a suggestion of incompetency during a revocation hearing, supported by testimony of the defendant's mental regression and inability to assist in his defense. The trial court dismissed these concerns after a brief colloquy where the defendant answered basic questions clearly, concluding he was competent. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a trial court abuses its discretion when it weighs evidence of competency against evidence of incompetency during an informal inquiry. The court clarified that if there is 'some evidence' (more than a scintilla) from any source suggesting incompetency, the trial court must stay the proceedings and appoint an expert rather than relying on its own courtroom observations.
Litigation Takeaway
"A judge’s 'vibes check' or a party's polite courtroom demeanor cannot override evidence of mental incapacity; if there is even a scintilla of evidence that a party cannot rationally assist their counsel, the court is legally required to halt proceedings and appoint a competency expert."
City of Houston v. Ezzeddine
COA14
In City of Houston v. Ezzeddine, the 14th Court of Appeals addressed whether conclusory labels such as "inadequate" or "misleading" are sufficient to survive a Rule 91a motion to dismiss. The case involved a fatal collision where the plaintiffs alleged that temporary traffic signage was insufficient but failed to provide specific factual details regarding the signs' appearance or placement. When challenged, the plaintiffs argued they could not provide more detail because discovery had not yet opened. The court rejected this "discovery trap" defense, clarifying that Rule 91a is a gatekeeping mechanism designed to dispose of meritless claims before discovery costs are incurred. The court held that because the plaintiffs provided only legal conclusions and descriptors rather than essential factual allegations, the claims had no basis in law and must be dismissed with prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"A plaintiff cannot avoid a Rule 91a dismissal by claiming they need discovery to uncover the facts necessary to support their claim. To survive a motion to dismiss in Texas, a petition must contain specific factual predicates—the 'who, what, where, and when'—rather than mere legal labels or adjectives. In family law, this is a powerful tool to shut down vague allegations of fraud or waste before expensive forensic accounting or depositions begin."
Robinson v. State
COA01
In Robinson v. State, a defendant convicted of online solicitation of a minor argued he was entitled to a 'within-three-years' statutory defense because the undercover officer he solicited was an adult close to his own age. The First Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Penal Code § 33.021, which defines a 'minor' to include individuals the actor believes to be under 17. The court held that the applicability of the age-gap defense is determined by the defendant's subjective belief regarding the victim's age—the 'persona'—rather than the officer's actual biological age. Because the defendant believed he was soliciting a 15-year-old, he was not entitled to the defense.
Litigation Takeaway
"A parent's intent to solicit a minor is the legally operative fact in determining the risk they pose to children; they cannot use the 'actual age' of an undercover officer as a technicality to minimize their conduct or protect their custody rights in family court."
In re Scott Mitchell Obeginski
COA09
In In re Scott Mitchell Obeginski, the Ninth Court of Appeals addressed a challenge to a trial court's post-judgment order sanctioning a litigant for using 'fictitious law' and filing meritless motions. The trial court ordered the litigant to pay over $10,000 in attorney's fees and required him to attend a compliance hearing. The litigant sought a writ of mandamus to vacate the order, arguing the judge improperly acted as a witness and that he had no other way to challenge the ruling. The Court of Appeals denied the request, holding that because a final judgment had been entered and the litigant failed to prove he was financially unable to post a bond (supersedeas), he had an adequate remedy through a standard appeal. The court reaffirmed that trial judges have the authority to evaluate the legal merit of filings without becoming 'fact witnesses.'
Litigation Takeaway
"Once a final judgment is signed, parties sanctioned for meritless or 'creative' legal tactics generally cannot use mandamus to bypass the trial court's order; instead, they must post a supersedeas bond and pursue a standard appeal."