Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
Everett v. State
COA08
In Everett v. State, the court addressed whether a trial court's strict time limits on jury selection (voir dire) violated a party's right to a fair trial. The defense attorney argued that the "chess clock" approach prevented him from properly vetting jurors, but he failed to provide a specific list of the questions he was unable to ask. The Eighth Court of Appeals held that simply objecting to a time limit or identifying general topics is insufficient to preserve a legal error for appeal. To successfully challenge a time limit, counsel must place the exact, unasked questions into the record. Furthermore, the court ruled that any objections to the jury selection process are waived if a party affirmatively states they have 'no objection' to the final jury panel.
Litigation Takeaway
"To protect your right to appeal a rushed jury selection, you must read your specific, unasked questions into the record at the first opportunity. Additionally, never say 'no objection' when the final jury is seated; instead, state that you accept the panel 'subject to' your previous objections to avoid waiving your client's rights."
In re L.C.
COA12
After the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) removed her children following a suspicious burn injury, a mother sought their return at an adversary hearing. Despite conflicting medical testimony and the mother’s lack of criminal or Department history, the trial court granted temporary managing conservatorship to DFPS. On mandamus, the Twelfth Court of Appeals conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court abused its discretion. The appellate court analyzed the case under Texas Family Code Section 262.201(g) and concluded that DFPS failed to satisfy the cumulative three-prong test for continued removal. Specifically, the court found that evidence of a past injury with disputed origins was insufficient to prove a "substantial risk of continuing danger" to the children, particularly given the mother's cooperation with safety plans and the absence of any prior history of violence.
Litigation Takeaway
"Evidence of a past injury is not a "blank check" for DFPS to maintain conservatorship; practitioners must hold the Department to the strict, cumulative three-prong test of Section 262.201(g), emphasizing that the Department must prove a prospective "substantial risk of continuing danger" that cannot be mitigated by reasonable efforts."
Elaine T. Marshall, et al. v. Preston Marshall
COA14
In this long-running fiduciary dispute, a beneficiary challenged a trustee’s "Wyoming Maneuver"—the merger of Texas-based trusts into Wyoming entities to avoid local oversight. After the trial court issued a temporary injunction in 2017 to preserve the status quo, the trustees later moved to dissolve it, arguing that several trusts had since terminated and the litigation had matured. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the request using the mootness doctrine for the terminated trusts and the "change in circumstances" standard for the active ones. The court held that while the injunction must be dissolved for trusts that have reached their natural termination, it remains in force for active trusts because the passage of time and completion of discovery do not eliminate the underlying risk of asset dissipation or fiduciary breach.
Litigation Takeaway
"A temporary injunction is a resilient tool that does not expire simply because a case lingers for years; it remains the most effective way to prevent a spouse or trustee from 'decanting' assets into out-of-state jurisdictions. To dissolve an aging injunction, you must prove a qualitative change in the case's risk profile or show that the specific assets have already been distributed according to trust terms."
Tims v. State
COA14
In Tims v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court must declare a mistrial when a witness unexpectedly mentions a party's prior jail or prison stays. During a trial for aggravated sexual assault, the complainant twice referenced the defendant’s history of incarceration. Although the defense moved for a mistrial both times, the trial court instead opted to give the jury prompt instructions to disregard the statements. On appeal, the court analyzed whether these 'uninvited and unembellished' remarks were so prejudicial that they couldn't be cured by a simple instruction. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, affirming that a prompt instruction to disregard is generally sufficient to neutralize the harm caused by spontaneous mentions of a party's criminal past.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a witness makes an uninvited outburst regarding a party's criminal history, you must immediately move for an instruction to disregard and then move for a mistrial to preserve the error. However, be aware that Texas law maintains a strong presumption that a jury instruction can 'cure' the error, making a mistrial difficult to obtain unless the testimony is exceptionally inflammatory."
Elaine T. Marshall v. Preston Marshall
COA14
In a dispute involving a statutory trust accounting under Texas Property Code § 113.151, a beneficiary sought to compel a trustee to provide a financial statement of the trust. By the time of the appeal, the trust had terminated and the accounting had been provided, leading the trustee to argue the claim was moot. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether the claim survived for the purposes of attorney's fees and compensatory damages. The court held that while the request for the accounting itself was satisfied, the claim remained a "live controversy" regarding the recovery of attorney's fees. However, the court clarified that the statute only provides for the production of the accounting and does not authorize the recovery of monetary damages.
Litigation Takeaway
"A statutory accounting claim is a potent tool for transparency and fee-shifting in trust litigation, as the right to attorney's fees survives even if the trustee eventually complies or the trust terminates. However, this claim alone cannot be used to recover money damages; litigators must plead separate causes of action, such as breach of fiduciary duty, to recover financial losses."
Jones v. State
COA08
In Jones v. State, the El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed a murder conviction, rejecting a self-defense claim where the defendant shot a victim several hours after an alleged robbery. The court analyzed the 'immediate necessity' requirement of the Texas Penal Code, concluding that a temporal gap of four to nine hours between a provocation and a 'preemptive strike' precludes a self-defense justification as a matter of law. Additionally, the court applied the 'Posey' rule, holding that trial judges have no duty to provide jury instructions on defensive justifications—such as the protection of property—unless they are affirmatively requested by the defendant.
Litigation Takeaway
"Past provocation is not a legal license for future violence; self-defense requires a 'split-second' immediate necessity rather than a retaliatory strike. Furthermore, trial counsel must specifically request defensive jury instructions on the record, as appellate courts will not rescue a party who fails to ask for these protections at trial."
In Re Vandever
COA07
Kathleen Vandever filed an original proceeding in the Seventh Court of Appeals seeking a writ of habeas corpus for the return of a minor child located in Tarrant County. Although the Seventh Court was handling the underlying appeal due to a docket equalization transfer, the court analyzed its authority under Government Code § 22.221 and Family Code § 157.371. The court determined that its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus is strictly limited to its geographic district unless the writ is necessary to enforce its existing jurisdiction. Because the child was located in the Second Court of Appeals' district and the Relator did not prove the writ was necessary to protect the pending appeal, the court dismissed the petition for want of territorial jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A docket equalization transfer of an appeal does not expand an appellate court's territorial jurisdiction for original proceedings. When seeking an emergency writ of habeas corpus for a child, practitioners must file in the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction or the appellate district where the child is physically located."
In the Interest of C.G.H., B.G.H., M.J.H. and C.K.H., Children
COA05
An appellant sought to overturn a final divorce decree and child custody order but failed to provide the appellate court with a reporter’s record (the trial transcript) or a brief that complied with court rules. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, ruling that without a record of the trial proceedings, it must be presumed that the evidence supported the judge's decision. Additionally, the court held that while pro se litigants are given some leeway, they must still follow the Rules of Appellate Procedure; because the appellant failed to provide proper legal authorities or record citations even after being warned, her issues were waived.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never attempt an appeal without ensuring a complete reporter’s record is filed; without a transcript of the trial, the appellate court will presume the trial judge was correct. Furthermore, pro se litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys—failing to follow briefing rules and provide specific record citations will result in the loss of your right to have your claims reviewed."
In re Rocio Gomez
COA01
Relator Rocio Gomez sought a writ of mandamus from the First Court of Appeals to vacate a divorce decree while she simultaneously had a motion to vacate the same decree pending in the trial court. The appellate court analyzed the petition under the principle that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy intended only for situations where no adequate legal remedy exists. The court determined that because the trial court still held plenary power and had already scheduled a hearing on the motion to vacate, the request for appellate intervention was premature. The court held that the trial court must be afforded the first opportunity to address and correct its own judgment through standard post-trial procedures, leading to the denial of the mandamus petition.
Litigation Takeaway
"Always exhaust your trial court remedies, such as a Motion for New Trial or Motion to Vacate, before seeking a writ of mandamus; otherwise, the appellate court will likely deny your petition as premature."
De La Vega v. Imming
COA08
In De La Vega v. Imming, a party appealed a judgment and posted a $20,000 cash bond to pause the legal process. While the appeal was pending, the parties reached a settlement. The person who appealed filed a motion to dismiss the case and asked the appellate court to return their bond money and split the court costs. The El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and determined that because the motion was filed by only one party (even though it was "unopposed"), the court did not have the authority to return the money or change the default rule that the person who appeals pays all costs. The court held that while the appeal could be dismissed, the request for the bond refund must be handled by the original trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
"When settling a case on appeal, a simple "motion to dismiss" is not enough to protect your interests. To ensure your bond money is returned promptly and costs are shared, you must file a joint agreement signed by both parties. Failing to do so can leave your cash locked in a court registry for months and leave you responsible for 100% of the appellate costs."