Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
DePriest v. DePriest
COA14
In this post-decree dispute, a husband sought amended Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (QDROs) after plan administrators rejected the originals. The wife filed counterclaims for fraud and breach of contract, attempting to relitigate the property division established in the final 2019 decree, which had already been affirmed on appeal. The trial court dismissed the wife's claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, ruling that a trial court lacks the authority to substantively alter or "undo" a final property division once plenary power has expired and appellate remedies are exhausted. The court also held that the wife waived her right to 45-day trial notice under Rule 245 by participating in the hearing without objection.
Litigation Takeaway
"A final divorce decree affirmed on appeal is truly final; parties cannot use post-decree enforcement or QDRO proceedings as a vehicle to revive old disputes or launch collateral attacks on the original property division. Furthermore, procedural rights like trial notice are waived if you participate in a hearing without making a timely objection."
Nicholson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC
COA02
In Nicholson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, the Second Court of Appeals dismissed a pro se restricted appeal because the appellant had previously been declared a vexatious litigant and was subject to a Chapter 11 prefiling order. The court analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code sections 11.101, 11.103, and 11.1035, which require a vexatious litigant to obtain permission from the appropriate local administrative judge before filing an appeal and mandate dismissal if that permission is not obtained. After the court gave Nicholson an opportunity to provide the required permission order, she instead produced materials showing that permission had been denied. Because no statutory exception applied, the court held that dismissal was mandatory.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a pro se appellant is subject to a Chapter 11 vexatious-litigant prefiling order, appellate review can be stopped at the threshold unless the appellant first gets written permission from the local administrative judge. For family law lawyers, that makes vexatious-litigant status and the existence of a permission order an early procedural checkpoint that may support dismissal without reaching the merits."
Pyrtle v. Fowler
COA14
In Pyrtle v. Fowler, a dispute arose between former cohabitants regarding the ownership and use of a home and a 2012 Lexus. The trial court granted a temporary injunction allowing the plaintiff to remain in the home and retain control of the vehicle pending trial. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether these assets met the requirements for equitable relief. The court held that while real property is considered unique and justifies an injunction to preserve the status quo, personal property like vehicles does not qualify because any harm can be adequately compensated through money damages (such as rental costs or loss-of-use value). Consequently, the court affirmed the injunction as to the residence but struck down the provisions regarding the motor vehicles.
Litigation Takeaway
"While courts will readily issue injunctions to protect your right to occupy a unique residence during a lawsuit, they generally will not do the same for vehicles or personal property because those losses can be fixed with a check for damages."
In the Interest of T.M., a Child
COA11
In this parental termination case, the Department sought to terminate a mother's rights after her child, T.M., tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana. The mother contended the exposure was accidental due to her work as a hotel housekeeper, but the Department also cited her failure to keep the child away from a drug-using father. The Court of Appeals analyzed the endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b), determining that the mother's choice to bring the child to a high-risk workplace and allow unsupervised contact with the father supported endangerment. However, the Court also scrutinized the Department's compliance with Section 161.001(f), which requires clear and convincing evidence of reasonable efforts to return the child. Ultimately, the Court issued a partial reversal and remand, holding that the Department failed to satisfy its high evidentiary burden for every mandatory statutory finding required to support the irrevocable termination of parental rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Drug exposure is not a "universal solvent" that excuses the Department from its burden of proof; practitioners must ensure that every statutory element, particularly the requirement for reasonable reunification efforts under Section 161.001(f), is supported by clear and convincing evidence to avoid reversal on appeal."
In the Interest of L.L., a Child
COA02
After a trial court terminated a Father's parental rights to his child, L.L., based on endangerment and best-interest findings, his appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief asserting the appeal was frivolous. The Second Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal existed. Finding no non-frivolous issues, the court affirmed the termination decree. However, the court clarified that under Texas Family Code § 107.016 and the Texas Supreme Court's precedent in In re P.M., appointed counsel’s obligations do not end at the intermediate court; the duty to represent the parent continues through potential proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court unless counsel is relieved for good cause.
Litigation Takeaway
"In parental termination cases, an appointed attorney's duty of representation is "sticky"—it persists through the exhaustion of all appeals, including a petition for review to the Texas Supreme Court, even if the intermediate court determines the appeal is frivolous."
In the Interest of R.D.E., a Child
COA05
In this case, a mother voluntarily placed her child in an Iowa guardianship, which was later domesticated in Texas. When the non-parent guardian filed a Texas SAPCR and the mother sought to terminate the guardianship, the trial court consolidated the two proceedings. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed this consolidation, holding that trial courts have broad discretion to combine related cases to prevent conflicting orders. The court further determined that the mother's challenges to the 'parental presumption' were either waived due to her failure to provide proper record citations in her brief or were unsupported because the existing voluntary guardianship had already altered the legal landscape regarding the child's best interests.
Litigation Takeaway
"Voluntarily entering into a guardianship—even in another state—can significantly weaken the legal 'parental presumption' in future Texas custody battles. Additionally, appellate courts strictly enforce procedural rules; failing to include specific record citations in a brief can lead to the automatic waiver of your most critical arguments."
Ex Parte Giambi Boyd
COA01
Giambi Boyd was held in pretrial detention for over 500 days on $1.2 million bail for felony charges including murder. He filed for habeas corpus, arguing that under Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, he was entitled to release or a bail reduction because the State was not ready for trial within the mandatory 90-day window. The trial court denied the request, prioritizing the severity of the offenses and community safety. On appeal, the court analyzed Article 17.151 as a mandatory statutory directive that leaves no room for judicial discretion regarding safety or the nature of the crime once the 90-day readiness period expires. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order, holding that because the State admitted it was not ready for trial due to pending lab results, the trial court was required by law to either release Boyd on a personal bond or reduce his bail to an amount he could actually afford.
Litigation Takeaway
"In "crossover" cases where a family law client is detained on high bail for felony allegations, Article 17.151 is a mandatory tool to secure their release if the State is not ready for trial within 90 days. This rule allows practitioners to bypass judicial concerns about "community safety" and the "nature of the offense" to ensure the client can participate in civil proceedings like custody evaluations and final trials."
Fanous v. Allstate Insurance
COA02
In Fanous v. Allstate Insurance, the appellant filed a notice of appeal 21 days after the mandatory 90-day deadline triggered by a motion for new trial. The appellant argued the delay was a strategic decision to avoid 'alienating' the trial judge during a pending hearing. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 26.3, concluding that appellate deadlines are strictly jurisdictional. The court held that subjective tactical concerns or the desire to maintain a judge's favor do not constitute a reasonable explanation for missing filing windows, and subsequently dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never miss a jurisdictional appellate deadline for the sake of 'trial court optics'; the appellate clock does not pause for pending motions or a lawyer's fear of alienating the trial judge."
Gonzalez v. Montalvo
COA14
In a dispute over the partition of several hundred acres of estate property, the appellant challenged the trial court's order to sell the land and its denial of a jury trial. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals first clarified that a "phase-one" partition order—which determines if property should be sold or divided in kind—is a final, appealable judgment. On the jury issue, the court held that a party cannot rely on a jury demand and fee payment made by another party who has since nonsuited their claims, as a nonsuit restores the parties to their pre-filing positions. Regarding the partition itself, the court found the trial court applied the wrong legal standard by focusing on whether individual tracts could be split equally rather than whether the aggregate estate could be fairly divided. The court affirmed the denial of the jury trial but reversed the order of sale.
Litigation Takeaway
"Always file your own jury demand and pay the fee; relying on an opponent’s request is a 'trap' because a nonsuit will immediately strip you of that jury right. Furthermore, in partition litigation, the 'phase one' order is not interlocutory—you must appeal the decision to sell versus divide immediately or lose the right to challenge it."
Childress v. Tradd
COA03
Following the death of Robert Caldwell, the executor of his estate sued Dione Childress for conversion after she removed estate property, claiming she was Caldwell's common-law wife. During litigation, Childress, acting pro se, failed to respond to discovery requests, including requests for admissions. The executor moved for summary judgment based on these 'deemed admissions.' Childress filed a response only four days before the hearing without seeking leave of court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment, holding that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c), a response filed less than seven days before a hearing is a nullity. Furthermore, under Rule 198.3, the failure to respond to admissions conclusively established the facts necessary for the estate to prevail. The court emphasized that pro se litigants are held to the same procedural standards as licensed attorneys.
Litigation Takeaway
"Procedural deadlines are absolute, and 'deemed admissions' are a litigation guillotine. In marriage and property disputes, failing to answer discovery requests can conclusively surrender your case, as courts will not grant leniency to pro se litigants who ignore the mandatory seven-day window for summary judgment responses or discovery deadlines."