Weekly Digest
October 3 – October 9, 2026
30 opinions this week
In re Trumble
COA06
After an agreed divorce decree required Donald Trumble to pay his former wife’s health-insurance premiums for fifteen years and maintain life-insurance coverage, the trial court held him in contempt and conditioned suspended confinement partly on payment of the health-insurance arrearage and future premiums. The Sixth Court of Appeals held that the health-insurance obligation, which arose from the parties’ property settlement and did not qualify as statutory spousal maintenance, was a contractual debt. Under Texas Family Code § 9.012 and article I, section 18 of the Texas Constitution, payment of that debt could not be enforced through contempt or confinement. The court also held that permitting substitute life-insurance coverage clarified rather than modified the decree and that the trial court retained authority to consider the challenge to its contempt order despite expiration of ordinary plenary power. It conditionally granted mandamus relief in part and directed relief from the void health-insurance contempt provision.
Litigation Takeaway
“Before seeking contempt to enforce a divorce decree, classify the obligation by its substance, not its label. A former spouse’s contractual obligation to pay health-insurance premiums as part of a property settlement is a debt—not statutory maintenance—and may be enforced through a money judgment and lawful collection remedies, but not incarceration. Parties defending against debt-based contempt should raise Texas Family Code § 9.012 and the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt and consider mandamus when no confinement has occurred.”
Sanchez v. Sanchez
COA06
Nohemi Sanchez obtained a two-year family-violence protective order against Rodolfo Perez Sanchez based on testimony that he repeatedly physically and sexually assaulted her, violated restrictions on contact and access to the marital residence, and exposed their children to the violence. The Sixth Court of Appeals held that her detailed testimony, considered with the evidence of criminal charges, bond conditions, and subsequent prohibited conduct, was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code § 81.001. The trial court was entitled to credit Nohemi’s account over Perez’s denials, and her affidavit of non-prosecution, financial dependence, attempted reconciliation, and later communications affected credibility and weight rather than conclusively disproving abuse. Because the children witnessed the violence and reacted with fear, the court also upheld their inclusion as protected persons and the supervised-possession restrictions. Perez waived his complaint about the specificity of the trial court’s findings, and the protective order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Detailed, credible testimony can support a Texas family-violence protective order even without a criminal conviction, medical records, or photographs. An applicant’s later reconciliation, continued contact, or affidavit of non-prosecution does not necessarily defeat the case; those facts generally go to credibility, which appellate courts leave to the trial judge. Evidence that children witnessed domestic violence can also justify protecting them and restricting possession, even if they were not directly assaulted. Parties must strictly preserve complaints about inadequate findings for appeal.”
In re Vilde
COA05
Ricmonds Vilde sought habeas relief from a contempt judgment imposing confinement, along with an emergency stay and release on bond. After he was released, the Fifth Court of Appeals held that Texas Government Code § 22.221(d) and contempt-habeas precedent required a present restraint or another continuing live controversy; Vilde established neither. The court dismissed the habeas petition for want of jurisdiction, denied the emergency motion as moot, and refused to recast the proceeding as mandamus because a contempt order involving confinement must be challenged by habeas corpus.
Litigation Takeaway
“Move immediately when challenging contempt confinement. Release ordinarily moots habeas relief unless counsel proves a continuing restraint or other live controversy, and mandamus cannot be used to revive review of a confinement-based contempt order after habeas becomes moot.”
McFarlane v. State
COA02
After Shawn McFarlane violently assaulted his mother and took her property, a jury convicted him of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated assault of a family member, and family-violence assault. The Second Court of Appeals held that testimony explaining how the parties came to live together was relevant relationship evidence under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.371; remoteness alone did not make it irrelevant, and any error was harmless. But because the aggravated-robbery and aggravated-assault counts, as charged and proved, punished the same assaultive conduct and bodily injury, the dual convictions violated double jeopardy. The violation was apparent on the record and reviewable despite the lack of a trial objection. The court reversed the aggravated-robbery conviction and affirmed the aggravated-assault conviction carrying the greater punishment, along with the remaining convictions.
Litigation Takeaway
“Relationship-history evidence can provide admissible context for intrafamily violence, but counsel should still prepare for relevance, Rule 403, character-evidence, and hearsay objections. In family cases, independently prove the underlying violent conduct and tie it to conservatorship, possession, protective relief, or property issues; do not treat a conviction vacated on double-jeopardy grounds as an existing conviction. Criminal counsel should also compare overlapping counts as charged and proved because concurrent sentences do not cure multiple punishments for the same conduct.”
In the Interest of M.P. Jr. and A.P., Children
COA13
The Department sought to terminate both parents’ rights after the children were found in dangerous conditions attributable primarily to Mother. Father was incarcerated, but the Department identified him as a non-offending parent, did not show that he caused the conditions leading to removal, and acknowledged that incarceration—not refusal—prevented him from completing services and visiting. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and evaluating the best-interest factors independently from the statutory predicate grounds, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals concluded that Father’s incarceration, anticipated deportation, and inability to complete services did not establish that permanently severing his parental relationship was necessary, particularly where he regularly sought information about the children and the guardian ad litem recommended possessory conservatorship instead of termination. The court reversed the termination of Father’s rights and remanded for further proceedings, while affirming the unchallenged termination of Mother’s rights.
Litigation Takeaway
“A petitioner must prove by clear and convincing, parent-specific and child-specific evidence that termination—not merely restricted conservatorship or supervised possession—is in the child’s best interest. Incarceration, deportation, unavailable services, and the other parent’s misconduct are not substitutes for proof that the parent personally presents a danger or that less drastic alternatives cannot protect the child. Counsel should carefully distinguish a parent’s inability to participate from an unwillingness to do so and develop evidence concerning the parent’s history, continuing contact, post-release plans, and realistic alternatives to termination.”
Layton v. State
COA13
William Dewayne Layton was convicted of violating a protective order after approaching his former wife’s residence after the order’s original expiration date but during a later extension entered while he was incarcerated. The court held that Texas Penal Code § 25.07 required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Layton knew the protective order remained effective through the extension. His knowledge of the original order was insufficient, and the extension order’s direction that the clerk serve him did not prove that service occurred or create a presumption of notice. Because the State offered no return of service, delivery record, acknowledgment, testimony, admission, or other evidence that Layton knew of the extension, the court reversed the conviction and rendered a judgment of acquittal.
Litigation Takeaway
“A protective order’s existence and a respondent’s knowledge of it are separate issues. When extending or modifying an order—especially while the respondent is incarcerated—counsel should obtain and preserve affirmative proof of notice, service, or receipt. Without evidence that the respondent knew of the operative extension or modification, a knowing-violation allegation may fail and should not be treated as conclusively established in related custody or divorce litigation.”
Carrion v. State
COA11
In this aggravated-assault prosecution, John Anthony Carrion claimed self-defense after stabbing his longtime partner, while she testified that he initiated the attack following a dispute about their volatile relationship. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that the jury could reject self-defense based on the parties’ accounts, the number and location of the complainant’s wounds, Carrion’s control of the knife, and other physical evidence. It also held that Texas Rule of Evidence 403 did not require exclusion of prior violent altercations because the relationship history was highly probative of the charged assault and the competing narratives, and that value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Prior incidents of partner violence may be admitted when they provide necessary context for a disputed confrontation, credibility determination, claim of self-defense, or family-violence issue. The proponent should identify a specific non-propensity purpose and explain the evidence’s probative value; the opponent must identify a concrete Rule 403 danger that substantially outweighs that value, while preserving separate objections involving character evidence, hearsay, authentication, remoteness, or cumulative proof.”
Mobley v. State
COA02
Michael Mobley challenged the adjudication of his deferred community supervision after his girlfriend recanted allegations that he assaulted and strangled her. The Second Court of Appeals held that the recantation presented a credibility issue, not a bar to relying on her repeated contemporaneous reports, officers’ observations, photographs, and medical evidence consistent with strangulation. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the ruling and applying the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, the court concluded that the trial judge could credit the earlier, corroborated accounts over the later recantation. Because proof of one community-supervision violation was sufficient, the court affirmed the adjudication and revocation judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“A later recantation does not erase properly admitted contemporaneous evidence of family or dating violence. Attorneys should promptly preserve and present 911 recordings, body-camera footage, photographs, medical records, provider testimony, and other corroborating evidence—and should be prepared to establish admissibility—because the trial court may credit that evidence over changed hearing testimony.”
Owens v. Educational Credit Management Corporation
COA02
Sean Owens sued Educational Credit Management Corporation in state court after ECMC accessed student-loan database records and submitted them with an affidavit in support of summary judgment in related federal litigation. Looking to the factual gravamen of Owens’s privacy, negligence, computer-security, and related claims rather than their labels, the Second Court of Appeals held that claims targeting the submission and use of evidence in a pending judicial proceeding were based on or in response to ECMC’s exercise of the right to petition under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. Because Owens failed to present clear and specific evidence establishing a prima facie case for every essential element of each claim, the court affirmed dismissal with prejudice. It did not reach the alternative Rule 91a grounds and held that Owens inadequately briefed any challenge to the attorney’s-fee award.
Litigation Takeaway
“A separate claim attacking an opponent’s filing or evidentiary use of private records may trigger the TCPA, even when pleaded as a privacy, negligence, or computer-security claim. Counsel should distinguish allegedly unlawful acquisition from litigation use, identify the claim’s true factual basis, and—if the TCPA applies—present admissible, claim-specific evidence for every essential element. Appellate challenges, including objections to attorney’s fees, must also be distinctly and adequately briefed.”
Miller v. State
COA03
After Ryan David Miller’s truck left a rural road and struck a tree, officers observed beer containers, smelled alcohol, and learned that he was the sole occupant and driver. The State obtained hospital blood-alcohol records through a grand-jury subpoena, and Miller sought to suppress them as the product of an unlawful fishing expedition and defective subpoena process. The Third Court of Appeals held that the crash, odor of alcohol, open container, and Miller’s connection to the vehicle supplied specific, articulable facts supporting a DWI investigation. Because the blood was drawn and tested for medical treatment, Miller had no Fourth Amendment interest preventing disclosure of the results through valid grand-jury process; HIPAA permitted disclosure in response to qualifying legal process, and Miller failed to overcome the subpoena’s presumption of regularity. With no constitutional or statutory violation, article 38.23(a) did not require suppression, and the court affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“Medical confidentiality is not absolute, but family-law counsel cannot use grand-jury authority to bypass civil discovery protections. When intoxication or similar conduct bears on conservatorship, possession, or child safety, seek narrowly tailored medical evidence through HIPAA-compliant civil process, address privilege and protective-order concerns, and coordinate with criminal counsel. A challenge to records obtained in a related criminal case should identify a specific defect in the legal process; generalized privacy objections are unlikely to suffice.”
Gipson v. Couto Homes, Inc.
COA13
In a dispute over whether Couto Homes breached contractual requirements governing the placement of a water well and septic system, Gipson challenged the jury charge and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a defense verdict. The court held that Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 272 and 274 required Gipson to object before submission and to identify distinctly both the challenged portion of the charge and the specific legal basis for the complaint. Because Gipson failed to make a timely, sufficiently specific objection, the charge complaint was not preserved for appellate review. The court further concluded that the disputed evidence did not establish breach as a matter of law and was legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, so it affirmed the judgment for Couto Homes.
Litigation Takeaway
“Treat the charge conference as a distinct and critical stage of trial. To preserve a complaint about a defective jury question, instruction, or definition—including in a Texas family-law jury trial—identify the exact language at issue, explain the specific legal defect, and obtain a ruling before the charge is read. Prior briefing, a proposed charge, a generalized objection, or a post-verdict motion is not a substitute. If the complaint concerns an omitted submission, tender a substantially correct written request under Rule 278 and preserve the ruling in the record.”
In the Interest of C.K. and K.A.R.
COA09
The Department sought termination of Mother’s parental rights based on methamphetamine use, unstable and unsafe housing, violent and criminal conduct, violation of a safety plan, missed drug tests, inconsistent visitation, and failure to complete court-ordered services. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and reviewing both legal and factual sufficiency, the Beaumont Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence showed a voluntary, continuing course of conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Mother’s negative drug tests did not outweigh her admitted and documented drug use, presumptively positive missed tests, and broader pattern of instability. The court affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights and the Department’s appointment as permanent managing conservator.
Litigation Takeaway
“A single positive drug test may not establish endangerment, but substance abuse combined with missed testing, violence, unstable housing, safety-plan violations, criminal exposure, poor visitation, and failure to complete services can prove an endangering course of conduct. A parent defending against termination should present a complete, documented record of sustained sobriety, treatment, stable housing, consistent visitation, and compliance—not merely isolated negative tests.”
In re John Constantine
COA03
Natalie Arriaga sought discovery of John Constantine’s net worth to support exemplary damages on gross-negligence and negligent-entrustment claims arising from a motor-vehicle accident involving Constantine’s babysitter. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 41.0115 permits such discovery only when submitted evidence supports a reasonable finding that the claimant is substantially likely to prevail on the exemplary-damages claim. Although Constantine knew the driver previously had suffered a stroke, the record showed that the driver had a valid unrestricted license, had driven without prior accidents or citations, and reportedly had been medically cleared to drive. Because there was no evidence that Constantine actually recognized a serious risk and proceeded with conscious indifference—the subjective element of gross negligence—the Third Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by authorizing and compelling net-worth discovery. It conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to vacate the challenged orders.
Litigation Takeaway
“A request for exemplary damages does not automatically permit discovery of an opposing party’s net worth. The requesting party must submit evidence supporting a substantial likelihood of proving every required element, including the applicable culpable mental state; pleadings, proof of an accident, and evidence of ordinary negligence are insufficient. In family cases involving joined tort or third-party claims, counsel should distinguish ordinary financial discovery for property or support issues from net-worth discovery governed by § 41.0115, insist on a written finding and the least burdensome discovery method, and consider mandamus before sensitive financial information is disclosed.”
In the Interest of E.J., a Child
COA11
The Department sought termination after E.J. and his mother tested positive for drugs and the mother later demonstrated a recurring pattern of methamphetamine use, missed testing and visits, unstable housing and employment, and interrupted communication. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and the nonexclusive Holley best-interest factors, the Eleventh Court of Appeals considered the mother’s recent sobriety, counseling, sober-living participation, and substantial service-plan completion but held that the trial court could weigh those late improvements against her history of relapse and instability, her attendance at only about 40% of visits, and the uncertainty of her proposed placement. Because E.J. was thriving and bonded in a long-term foster home whose family planned to adopt him, the court held the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). It also upheld the findings that the Department made reasonable reunification efforts and that continuing danger prevented E.J.’s return, affirming the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Termination cases turn on sustained, verifiable change—not merely technical service-plan compliance or a short period of sobriety before trial. A parent opposing termination should prove durable sobriety outside a structured setting, consistent visitation, verified child-ready housing and employment, and a practical reunification plan. Counsel seeking termination should present a chronological record connecting relapse, disengagement, and instability to the child’s need for safety and permanence.”
Maya Management Group LLC v. Chapman
COA02
After Vanessa Chapman obtained a no-answer default judgment against Maya Management Group for a store slip-and-fall, Maya challenged the unliquidated damages in a restricted appeal. The court held that the default admitted properly pleaded liability facts but did not establish that the fall caused Chapman’s medical expenses or noneconomic injuries. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 243, affidavits showing that medical services and charges were reasonable and necessary did not prove causation, and the record contained no competent evidence supporting pain and suffering, mental anguish, or physical impairment. The court affirmed liability, reversed the damages award, and remanded for a proceeding limited to causation and the amount of damages.
Litigation Takeaway
“A default is not a blank check. Even when liability is admitted, the party seeking unliquidated relief must offer competent, category-specific evidence connecting the actionable conduct to each claimed loss. In family-law default prove-ups, counsel should independently prove property values, reimbursement or fraud losses, attorney’s fees, tort damages, and all required best-interest or statutory findings—and ensure every referenced exhibit is actually admitted.”
In the Interest of S.M.C. and A.J.C., Children
COA05
In a divorce and conservatorship case, the trial court prohibited Father not only from allowing the children contact with their paternal grandfather, a registered sex offender, but also from allowing any member of Father’s family to be present during his possession periods. Applying Texas Family Code § 153.002 and abuse-of-discretion review, the Fifth Court of Appeals concluded that possession restrictions must be reasonably related to the children’s best interest and tailored to risks established by the evidence. Although the record supported protective measures concerning Paternal Grandfather, it did not show that every paternal relative posed a danger or would facilitate prohibited contact. The court therefore held that the blanket restriction was overbroad, modified the decree to impose narrower relief supported by the record, and affirmed the decree as modified; the unchallenged no-contact injunction concerning Paternal Grandfather remained in effect.
Litigation Takeaway
“A possession injunction must match the proven risk: evidence concerning one dangerous relative does not justify excluding an entire side of a child’s family. A party seeking broad restrictions should present individualized evidence as to every person covered and explain why narrower safeguards will not work. A party opposing an overbroad order should propose targeted language, preserve specific objections, and complete the Rule 297 findings process to avoid adverse implied findings on appeal.”
In the Interest of M.L., H.L., and G.L.
COA09
The Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed an order modifying the parents’ joint managing conservatorship by appointing the father sole managing conservator, naming the mother possessory conservator, and restricting her possession. Comparing conditions at the time of the 2021 agreed decree with post-decree developments, the court held that recurring unsafe and unsanitary conditions in the mother’s home, evidence of alcohol misuse and impaired parenting judgment, and inadequate responses to the children’s serious behavioral and mental-health needs were legally and factually sufficient to establish a material and substantial change under Texas Family Code § 156.101(a)(1) and to show that modification was in the children’s best interest. The court also rejected the mother’s charge, evidentiary, possession, reconstructed-verdict, and cumulative-error challenges and affirmed the modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
“A successful conservatorship-modification case requires more than proof of poor parenting: counsel must compare current circumstances with those existing when the prior order was rendered and connect material post-order changes to the children’s best interest. Recurring conditions supported by photographs, neutral witnesses, medical records, and expert testimony are especially persuasive. Trial counsel should also preserve charge and evidentiary objections, make offers of proof, and request a jury poll if the verdict is uncertain.”
Molina v. State
COA11
Ricardo Molina Jr. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his indecency-with-a-child convictions, arguing that the child’s delayed disclosure, alleged inconsistencies, and lack of corroboration undermined proof of sexual intent. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that the jury could infer intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire from Molina’s intimate touching, sexual statements, isolation of the child, and instruction to keep the incident secret. Because the complainant was under seventeen when the offenses occurred, Article 38.07 did not require corroboration of her testimony. The court treated Molina’s denial and credibility attacks as matters for the jury and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“A child’s admissible testimony can carry substantial evidentiary weight even without physical evidence, an eyewitness, or an immediate disclosure. In family-law abuse disputes, counsel should focus on competency, admissibility, authentication, consistency of core details, surrounding circumstances, and the connection between the evidence and the specific statutory relief sought. Delayed disclosure and competing accounts generally affect credibility and weight rather than creating a categorical corroboration requirement, although Article 38.07 and the Jackson criminal-review standard do not directly govern civil family-law cases.”
In the Interest of M.J., a Child
COA07
The Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Father’s parental rights to M.J. under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The evidence showed recurring domestic violence against Mother, methamphetamine and marijuana use, missed drug testing, failure to participate in recovery services, limited contact with the child, hostile communications, and broader service-plan noncompliance. The court concluded that this evidence established both an endangering home environment and a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of endangering conduct. The Department was not required to prove that Father’s conduct was directed at M.J. or caused an actual injury. Given Father’s unresolved risks and M.J.’s safety, stability, and bond with the foster family, the evidence also supported the best-interest finding. After independently reviewing the record under Anders and examining the subsection (D) and (E) findings as required by In re N.G., the court found no arguable basis for reversal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Domestic violence against a coparent and ongoing substance abuse can establish child endangerment even when the child was not directly assaulted or visibly injured. Courts may consider the cumulative pattern—including missed drug tests, incomplete services, limited visitation, and hostile communications—rather than viewing each incident in isolation. A parent facing endangerment allegations should promptly document sustained behavioral change through consistent testing, treatment, services, and visitation. On appeal, subsection (D) and (E) findings should be challenged separately because they can have serious consequences in later termination proceedings involving another child.”
In the Interest of E.J.G.-S., E.G.A., and E.J.A., Children
COA04
The Department sought to terminate Father’s parental rights based on domestic violence, alcohol-related instability, incarceration, and delayed completion of services. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that the Department failed to prove Father’s responsibility for statutory endangerment by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence was legally insufficient under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) because Mother was identified as the domestic-violence perpetrator and the record did not show that Father knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in endangering surroundings. It was factually insufficient under § 161.001(b)(1)(E) because Father’s caregiving history, regular and appropriate visitation, disputed reasons for service delays, and progress by trial outweighed an inference that he pursued a deliberate course of endangering conduct. The court reversed and remanded the termination of Father’s rights while affirming the judgment as to Mother.
Litigation Takeaway
“Termination evidence must be parent-specific and tied to the exact statutory predicate ground. Household instability, incarceration, delayed services, or another parent’s misconduct may justify intervention, but they do not establish endangerment without clear and convincing proof of the respondent parent’s knowledge, acts, omissions, or deliberate course of conduct. Counsel should separately develop and preserve sufficiency arguments under subsections (D) and (E), emphasizing evidence of caregiving, appropriate visitation, rehabilitation, service progress, and domestic-violence victimization where applicable.”
Berman v. Rogan
COA04
Michael Berman sued Brooke Rogan for assault by offensive contact and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from alleged nonconsensual contact at a bar. The trial court granted Rogan’s no-evidence summary-judgment motion and awarded her $17,167.50 in attorney’s fees as Rule 13 sanctions because Berman purportedly lacked evidence. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that Berman’s fact-specific affidavit supplied more than a scintilla of evidence on offensive-contact assault, although his intentional-infliction claim failed. It further held that losing on no-evidence summary judgment does not itself establish that a pleading was groundless when filed or brought in bad faith or for harassment. The court therefore reversed the assault judgment and fee sanction, affirmed the disposition of the intentional-infliction claim and related preserved rulings, and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
“An unsuccessful claim is not automatically a sanctionable one. A party seeking Rule 13 sanctions must separately prove that the challenged filing was groundless based on the facts and law available when filed and that it was brought in bad faith or to harass. Family-law litigants responding to no-evidence motions should also preserve discovery complaints through a verified continuance motion or Rule 166a affidavit and obtain express rulings on evidentiary objections.”
In the Interest of J.J.L., a Child
COA04
The Department sought termination of Mother’s parental rights after her infant became unresponsive and was found to have ingested marijuana. The trial court terminated under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O) and found termination was in the child’s best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). Applying clear-and-convincing-evidence review and deferring to the bench trial’s credibility determinations, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the best-interest finding. Although Mother challenged the endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E), she did not challenge the independent grounds under (N) and (O); because only one predicate ground is required, those unchallenged findings supported termination. The court nevertheless reviewed the challenged (D) and (E) findings because of their potential collateral consequences and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
“In a termination appeal, challenge every predicate ground that can independently support the judgment; leaving one ground unchallenged may make best interest the only remaining path to reversal. At trial, separately develop the best-interest record and connect drug use or unsafe conditions to concrete risks to the child, while remembering that challenged endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E) still require appellate review because of their future collateral consequences.”
Jackson v. State
COA04
Anthony Shannon Jackson represented himself at a misdemeanor bench trial carrying possible confinement after signing a written counsel-waiver form, but the record contained no colloquy showing that he clearly elected self-representation or understood his right to retained or appointed counsel and the dangers of proceeding pro se. Applying constitutional waiver standards and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 1.051(g), the Fourth Court of Appeals presumed against waiver and declined to infer the required admonishments from unrecorded pretrial hearings. It held that allowing Jackson to proceed without counsel or a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver was fundamental error, reversed the conviction, and remanded. The analysis provides a due-process framework for Texas family-law contempt proceedings in which incarceration is possible, including proceedings governed by Texas Family Code section 157.163.
Litigation Takeaway
“When confinement is possible in a Texas family-law contempt proceeding, a signed waiver or unrepresented appearance is not enough. Before testimony, admissions, or any other substantive self-representation, the court should make a recorded inquiry addressing the right to retained and, when applicable, appointed counsel; the risks of self-representation; and whether any waiver is clear, knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. A silent record or unrecorded colloquy can render the contempt order vulnerable to reversal or habeas relief—even if confinement is suspended or the disposition is agreed.”
1 Coventry Court, LLC v. The Downs of Hillcrest Residential Association, Inc.
COA05
Coventry Court and the Downs of Hillcrest Residential Association disputed whether an April 2022 Rule 11 settlement authorized entry of judgment after Coventry objected that the agreement was tentative and withdrew consent to rendition. The Dallas Court of Appeals distinguished an agreed judgment, which requires the parties’ consent when judgment is rendered, from contractual enforcement of a settlement, which requires proper pleadings, notice, proof, and adjudication. It also concluded that a later release signed after monetary sanctions and threatened civil and criminal contempt did not bar appellate review because the surrounding coercion called into question whether Coventry voluntarily waived its appellate rights. The court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
“A court generally cannot render an agreed judgment on an ordinary Rule 11 settlement after a party withdraws consent, even if the settlement may remain enforceable as a contract. The proponent must pursue a properly pleaded enforcement claim and prove entitlement to relief. Family-law counsel should identify whether an agreement is governed only by Rule 11 or by a Family Code mediated-settlement statute, confirm present consent before rendition, and preserve evidence of coercion when contempt pressure leads to a release or purported appellate waiver.”
Austin v. Falls of Kirkwood, LP
COA01
After the trial court signed a final judgment, the appellant filed an untimely motion for new trial and notice of appeal, arguing that delayed receipt of the judgment reset the appellate timetable under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a. The First Court of Appeals held that merely stating a late-notice date in a motion for new trial was insufficient. Rule 306a(5) required a sworn motion, notice, a hearing, proof of the first date of notice or actual knowledge, and an express trial-court finding under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.2. Because the appellant did not satisfy those requirements, the deadlines ran from the judgment’s signing date, making the notice of appeal untimely. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Late notice of a divorce decree or other appealable family-law order does not automatically extend appellate deadlines. Counsel should immediately file a sworn Rule 306a(5) motion, present evidence at a hearing, obtain an express written finding establishing the first date the party or counsel received notice or actual knowledge, and ensure that finding is included in the appellate record. When possible, file a protective notice of appeal under the earliest plausible deadline.”
In re L.S. Jr.
COA02
After the child’s mother died, the child’s stepfather sought to modify conservatorship based on his actual care, control, and possession of the child. While the case was pending, Texas Family Code Section 102.0031 took effect and imposed new requirements for the affidavit supporting nonparent standing. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the statute applied because the suit remained pending on its effective date and that the stepfather’s earlier affidavit did not satisfy the new requirements. Evidence concerning the child’s preference, the stepfather’s parental role, and the risk of emotional harm addressed the conservatorship merits but could not cure the jurisdictional affidavit defect. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the father’s jurisdictional challenge, but it left the trial court to decide the stepfather’s unresolved request for leave to amend.
Litigation Takeaway
“In a pending or newly filed nonparent custody case governed by Section 102.0031, counsel must treat the supporting affidavit as a threshold jurisdictional requirement and ensure that it independently alleges concrete facts satisfying every statutory element. Strong best-interest evidence, temporary orders, and proof overcoming the fit-parent presumption cannot substitute for a compliant affidavit. Nonparents should expressly request leave to amend in the alternative, while parents should raise affidavit defects promptly through a plea to the jurisdiction and consider mandamus if the trial court permits the case to proceed without statutory standing.”
Nixon v. State
COA14
In this criminal appeal with family-law crossover significance, Nixon challenged his aggravated-sexual-assault-of-a-child conviction based on the complainant’s delayed disclosure and credibility disputes, and argued that double jeopardy barred retrial after he requested a mistrial prompted by the State’s late disclosure of a witness interview. The Fourteenth Court held that the child complainant’s direct testimony was legally sufficient under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.07 and that delayed reporting, prior denials, and conflicting accounts concerned credibility and evidentiary weight for the jury, not legal sufficiency. Retrial was not barred because the record did not show that prosecutors intended to provoke the mistrial or intentionally withheld exculpatory evidence to avoid a probable acquittal. The court also rejected the confrontation and evidentiary challenges and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“A delayed child-abuse disclosure does not automatically defeat the allegation; it ordinarily creates a credibility issue that counsel must develop through a complete chronology, admissible evidence, careful cross-examination, and appropriate expert testimony. When evidence is disclosed late, seek the remedy available under the governing procedure and build a complete record showing materiality, prejudice, and—when legally required—intent; an excerpt or unsupported allegation of misconduct may be insufficient on appeal.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Christina Marie Quillen and Paul Arthur Daniel
COA05
In this divorce, the parties disputed whether the husband’s jewelry-business receipts supported the maximum guideline child-support award despite his claim that business expenses left little profit. Applying Texas Family Code §§ 154.062 and 154.065, the Fifth Court of Appeals held that self-employment income is a child-support resource and that an obligor must substantiate claimed ordinary and necessary business expenses. Because bank records showed substantial deposits, the husband controlled the business, and his expense evidence was inadequate, the trial court could impliedly find monthly net resources at or above the $9,200 guideline cap. The court therefore affirmed the $2,760 monthly guideline award for three children. It also held that decree language allowing a future request to reconsider conservatorship, possession, or access after a positive drug or alcohol test was not an impermissible advisory opinion.
Litigation Takeaway
“A self-employed parent cannot rebut evidence of substantial business receipts merely by citing aggregate account withdrawals, tax deductions, or low reported personal income. The parent should prove each material expense is ordinary, necessary, and business-related with reliable records and testimony. Counsel seeking support should pursue bank, merchant-processing, cash-flow, and business-paid personal-expense records; counsel anticipating an appeal should also request detailed findings on revenue, allowable expenses, statutory deductions, and net resources.”
Bhavin Shah v. HMC RFG Investors LLC
COA05
HMC RFG Investors LLC sued Florida resident Bhavin Shah and opposed his special appearance with a notarized affidavit and attachments. Shah argued that the evidence was hearsay, unauthenticated, and unsupported by personal knowledge. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a expressly permits courts to consider party-filed affidavits when deciding special appearances, so the affidavit was not barred by the general hearsay rule. The notarized affidavit was also self-authenticating under Texas Rule of Evidence 902(8), Shah inadequately briefed his personal-knowledge challenge, and any error in admitting the attachments was harmless because the affidavit independently supported the ruling. Concluding that the record established specific personal jurisdiction, the court affirmed the order denying Shah’s special appearance.
Litigation Takeaway
“In a family-law special appearance, a global hearsay objection ordinarily will not exclude an affidavit authorized by Rule 120a. Attorneys should use fact-specific, notarized affidavits to establish or negate Texas contacts, while separately addressing personal knowledge, competency, authentication, conclusory statements, and each attachment’s admissibility. To obtain reversal, an appellant must also explain why the challenged evidence probably affected the jurisdictional ruling.”
In the Interest of M.S., a Child
COA07
The Department sought to terminate Mother’s parental rights to M.S. for constructive abandonment under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(N), relying on her limited contact, missed visitation, lack of participation in services, and mental-health instability. The Seventh Court of Appeals held that constructive abandonment requires clear and convincing proof of the Department’s own reasonable efforts to reunify the family under sections 161.001(b)(1)(N) and 161.001(f). Although the Department created a service plan, it did not prove that Mother received it or that anyone explained its requirements, and the plan was excluded from evidence. The Department also failed to act on continuing-care recommendations it received after Mother completed a behavioral-health program. Because a parent’s shortcomings cannot substitute for evidence of meaningful reunification efforts, the court found the evidence legally insufficient, reversed the termination judgment, and rendered judgment denying termination on the constructive-abandonment ground.
Litigation Takeaway
“A service plan does not establish reasonable reunification efforts merely because it was drafted or incorporated into an order. The Department must prove that the completed plan was delivered and explained, that appropriate services and visitation were meaningfully facilitated, and that individualized treatment recommendations were acted upon. Parent’s counsel should challenge reasonable efforts as a separate element and seek rendition when the Department presents legally insufficient proof at trial.”