Weekly Digest
September 26 – October 2, 2026
37 opinions this week
Clements v. Cagniart-Singh
COA03
While Bradford A. Clements’s appeal and the Singhs’ cross-appeal were pending, the parties disputed whether they had formed an enforceable post-judgment settlement. Clements sought abatement and remand so he could pursue settlement-enforcement claims, although the record did not show that he had filed an enforcement action. Applying Mantas v. Fifth Court of Appeals and its resource-conservation rationale, the Third Court of Appeals concluded that a potential enforcement proceeding could moot the appellate controversy and therefore warranted pausing the appeal. The court granted abatement but denied remand, retained the case on its docket, and required Clements to file a status report or motion to reinstate by a firm deadline, warning that noncompliance could result in dismissal. The court did not decide whether the alleged settlement was enforceable.
Litigation Takeaway
“A disputed post-judgment settlement may justify abating a Texas family-law appeal when enforcement could moot the appellate issues, but abatement neither proves the agreement is enforceable nor automatically requires remand. Counsel should promptly file the proper enforcement action, continue protecting all appellate deadlines until relief is granted, explain exactly how enforcement could affect the appeal or cross-appeal, and strictly calendar every status-report or reinstatement deadline to avoid dismissal.”
In the Interest of D.G. and D.G., children
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Mother’s parental rights to her premature twins after she challenged only the finding that termination was in their best interest. Applying Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2), the Holley factors, and the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, the court weighed Mother’s appropriate visits, completion of some services, and loving relationship with the children against prenatal drug exposure, her post-treatment cocaine relapse, five months of missed drug tests, interrupted substance-abuse treatment, unresolved domestic-violence concerns, and failure to demonstrate lasting stability. Because the twins were progressing, bonded with their foster mother, and had an established path to adoption, the court held the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support a firm belief or conviction that termination was in their best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“Service-plan completion and affectionate, appropriate visitation may not overcome recent evidence of relapse, missed testing, incomplete treatment, domestic violence, and instability. Counsel defending parental rights should present objective proof of sustained sobriety, current treatment compliance, protective measures, and a concrete parenting plan; counsel seeking termination should connect the parent’s course of conduct to future risk and prove the child’s progress and permanency through specific placement evidence.”
Khatib v. Qaddurah
COA14
After Maha Qaddurah received a residence in her divorce, Mohammad Yousef Khatib claimed she later conveyed it to him by deed and sought to evict her through a forcible-detainer action. Qaddurah alleged that her signature had been taken from another document and attached to the deed without her knowledge or authorization. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals concluded that Khatib’s right to possession depended entirely on the disputed deed because there was no independent lease, tenancy-at-sufferance provision, or other landlord-tenant relationship. Thus, deciding possession required first deciding whether title had validly transferred—an issue a justice court cannot adjudicate under Texas Government Code § 27.031(b). The court also held that the county court at law obtained no broader authority through the de novo appeal because its appellate jurisdiction was derivative of the justice court’s jurisdiction. It affirmed dismissal without prejudice so the parties could resolve title and possession in a court with jurisdiction over real-property title.
Litigation Takeaway
“An eviction action is not the proper vehicle to recover a divorce-awarded home when possession turns on the validity of an allegedly fraudulent or forged deed. Counsel should first identify whether an independent possessory relationship exists. If possession rises or falls with ownership, pursue enforcement of the divorce decree or title-related remedies—such as declaratory relief, deed cancellation, or trespass to try title—in a court authorized to adjudicate title. A de novo appeal to the county court cannot cure the justice court’s lack of jurisdiction.”
In the Interest of D.N., D.N., D.N., D.N., D.N., and D.N., Children
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Mother’s parental rights to six children. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, the court considered the evidence cumulatively and concluded that physical abuse, exposure to domestic violence and drug use, unstable housing, food insecurity, prolonged educational and medical neglect, abandonment, and Mother’s failure to protect the children supported findings of an endangering environment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and an endangering course of conduct under § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Mother’s late completion of some services and several negative drug tests did not overcome her refusal or failure to complete other testing, continued instability, and lack of demonstrated behavioral change. The children’s preferences, progress in stable relative placements, and caregivers’ adoption plans also supported the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
“Endangerment should be proved or defended as a cumulative, fact-specific course of events rather than a series of isolated allegations. Evidence that a parent knowingly failed to protect children from abuse, neglected their basic needs, maintained unstable housing, or avoided consistent drug testing can support termination even without a positive drug test or proof of a specific resulting injury. Completing services late in the case carries limited weight unless the parent can show sustained behavioral change, sobriety, stability, and a demonstrated ability to keep the children safe.”
In the Interest of J.R., a Child
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Mother’s parental rights to J.R., a medically vulnerable child who repeatedly suffered failure to thrive and starvation after Mother failed to follow feeding instructions, maintain feeding logs, attend medical appointments, and obtain necessary care. Applying Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2), the court evaluated the entire record under the clear-and-convincing factual-sufficiency standard and the nonexclusive Holley best-interest factors. It emphasized J.R.’s recurring harm despite repeated warnings and services, Mother’s instability and limited participation, and J.R.’s weight gain and developmental progress in a stable foster placement. Because Mother also left the predicate findings under § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (N) unchallenged, those findings remained established and could inform the best-interest analysis. The court held that factually sufficient evidence supported the best-interest finding and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Build best-interest cases with a documented chronology connecting notice, offered assistance, repeated noncompliance, resulting harm, and the child’s improvement in a safer placement. On appeal, separately challenge every independently sufficient predicate ground as well as the best-interest finding; leaving predicate findings unchallenged substantially narrows the path to reversal.”
Jones v. State
COA13
Michael Jones appealed three criminal convictions, arguing in part that several bench conferences went unrecorded despite a pretrial order requiring the court reporter to transcribe them. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 13.1 and 33.1 and Valle v. State, the court held that the pretrial request and order did not preserve the complaint because counsel failed to object when the omissions occurred, thereby denying the trial court an opportunity to correct or reconstruct the record. The court also rejected Jones’s jury-qualification and jury-unanimity challenges and affirmed all three judgments.
Litigation Takeaway
“A granted motion or standing order requiring a complete reporter’s record is not enough by itself to preserve error. Family-law counsel must confirm that bench conferences and other material proceedings are being recorded, object contemporaneously if they are not, and promptly place or reconstruct the request, arguments, objections, and ruling on the record.”
Jarvis v. Jarvis
COA09
In Jarvis v. Jarvis, a husband challenged the characterization of a retirement account, commingled real-property sale proceeds, and funds used for property acquired during marriage, claiming they were derived from his separate property. Applying Texas Family Code § 3.003, the court held that identifying an original separate-property source was insufficient; the husband had to rebut the community-property presumption by clear and convincing evidence tracing the separate funds through deposits, dividends, withdrawals, transfers, and later purchases. Because his testimony and financial records did not reliably identify and quantify the separate component of the disputed assets, the court deferred to the trial court’s fact findings and affirmed the divorce decree and property division.
Litigation Takeaway
“A spouse claiming separate property must prove the complete paper trail, not merely the original source of the funds. Counsel should obtain transaction-level records, trace every transfer through commingled accounts, quantify the separate component, and use a reproducible methodology or expert when needed. Title, account control, and conclusory testimony will not overcome the community-property presumption; alternative reimbursement claims should be pleaded when tracing may fail.”
Martinez v. Noria Cadena
COA05
After the trial court dismissed the suit for want of prosecution, the appellant filed an untimely motion to reinstate. Although the trial court later purported to reinstate the case and entered additional orders, the Fifth Court of Appeals held that Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 165a and 329b limited the trial court’s plenary power to thirty days after dismissal because no timely motion extended it. Rule 306a did not provide a later deadline because its delayed-notice procedures were not invoked and proved. Accordingly, the reinstatement order and all subsequent substantive orders were void, and the court of appeals dismissed the appeal from those void orders for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Treat a dismissal for want of prosecution as an immediate jurisdictional deadline. A verified Rule 165a motion to reinstate must be timely filed, and delayed notice must be formally established under Rule 306a. A judge’s later reinstatement order, the parties’ agreement, or continued litigation cannot revive expired plenary power, and an appeal from later void orders will not preserve review of the original dismissal.”
In the Interest of B.C., a Child
COA02
The Second Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to B.C. Evidence showed a sustained course of endangering conduct, including addiction to methamphetamine, fentanyl, and heroin; fentanyl use after Mother learned she was pregnant; prior termination of her rights to seven children because of drug use; repeated criminal activity; and conduct resulting in a twelve-year prison sentence. The court treated incarceration not as independently dispositive but as part of the broader voluntary course of conduct that endangered B.C. and prevented Mother from providing stability and permanence. It also held that Mother’s generalized motion for new trial did not preserve each separate legal- and factual-sufficiency challenge because it failed to identify the challenged jury findings with specificity. Because the endangerment and best-interest findings were supported, and B.C. was thriving in a relative placement prepared to adopt her, the court affirmed the termination judgment and rejected the placement and dismissal-deadline challenges advanced by Father and Grandfather.
Litigation Takeaway
“A Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) case turns on the parent’s entire course of conduct: recurring drug use, prenatal exposure, criminal activity, prior terminations, and resulting incarceration may collectively prove endangerment even without evidence of actual injury or the child’s presence during each act. After a jury trial, counsel must also challenge each predicate ground, best-interest finding, and other material finding separately and specifically in the proper post-verdict motion; a global sufficiency objection may waive appellate review.”
Gary W. Shaw and Pamela Shaw v. 1910 Longmire LLC
COA09
After a bench trial, the trial court awarded 1910 Longmire LLC damages and attorney’s fees arising from alleged misrepresentations concerning the construction of two metal buildings. The Shaws argued on appeal that Longmire lacked standing and challenged the trial court’s findings, its treatment of exhibits, and the timing of exhibit disclosure, but they supplied only the trial exhibits—not the testimony, objections, or evidentiary rulings. The Ninth Court of Appeals held that Longmire alleged a concrete financial injury sufficient for standing and that the Shaws’ contract-party argument concerned capacity or the merits rather than constitutional standing. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6 and the presumption governing an incomplete record, the court concluded that it could not review the remaining challenges or conduct a harm analysis without the omitted testimony and proceedings. It therefore presumed the missing portions supported the trial court’s implied findings and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“An appellant must provide every portion of the reporter’s record needed to show reversible error. Exhibits alone generally cannot support challenges involving evidentiary sufficiency, credibility, objections, or harm; absent proper use of Rule 34.6(c)’s partial-record procedure, omitted testimony is presumed to support the judgment. In family-law appeals, counsel should audit and complete the record before briefing any challenge to a property division, parenting order, modification, enforcement ruling, or other fact-dependent decision.”
Phillips v. Phillips
COA03
In a guardianship proceeding, a probate court voided two deeds involving Marsha and Scott Phillips, determined their ownership interests in two properties, and recorded its summary-judgment orders in the county real-property records. Marsha then invoked Texas Government Code section 51.903, arguing that the recorded orders were fraudulent. The Third Court of Appeals held that section 51.903 provides only an expedited procedure for determining whether a recorded instrument is fraudulent under section 51.901; it does not permit a collateral attack on the evidence, legal reasoning, or property adjudication underlying an authentic court order. Because the challenged instruments were orders imposed by a court with jurisdiction—and Marsha alleged no fabrication, forgery, or defect in the documents themselves—they were not presumed fraudulent under section 51.901(c)(2)(C). The court affirmed the denial and dismissal of her motion.
Litigation Takeaway
“Section 51.903 cannot be used as a back-door appeal of a recorded divorce decree or other judicial order affecting real property. Counsel must distinguish fraud or forgery in the recorded instrument from alleged error in the underlying property ruling. Challenges to characterization, ownership, fiduciary findings, valuation, or the merits of a property division must be pursued through a direct appeal, bill of review, or another authorized remedy.”
City of Houston v. Rajendra
COA14
After Sathya Rajendra amended her negligence petition to add allegations supporting a waiver of the City of Houston’s governmental immunity, the City filed a document labeled a “reply” that addressed the new allegations and developed a new basis for dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals looked to the filing’s substance rather than its title and held that it functioned as an amended Rule 91a motion. Under Rule 91a.5(d), that amendment restarted the deadlines for the hearing, response, and further pleading amendments, making Rajendra’s response and Second Amended Petition timely. Accepting the live pleading’s allegations as true, the court also concluded that Rajendra sufficiently pleaded the Texas Tort Claims Act’s motor-driven-vehicle waiver at the Rule 91a stage and affirmed the denial of dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Courts classify filings by what they do, not what counsel calls them. When a purported Rule 91a “reply” addresses an amended petition or adds a new dismissal ground, it may be treated as an amended motion that restarts all Rule 91a deadlines. Family-law counsel should remember that Rule 91a generally does not apply to Family Code cases, but this timing rule can be critical in related civil disputes involving property, businesses, contracts, fraud, or fiduciary duties.”
Cain v. Lemoine-Cain
COA09
In this Texas relocation dispute, the father challenged a divorce decree allowing the mother, upon acceptance into a nurse practitioner program, to establish the children’s primary residence in Smith County or a contiguous county. Applying the best-interest standard in Texas Family Code § 153.002 and considering the nonexclusive Lenz relocation and Holley best-interest factors, the Ninth Court of Appeals held that factually sufficient evidence supported the restriction. The mother showed concrete educational and clinical-placement opportunities, substantially greater earning potential, access to extended-family support, and a workable possession and transportation plan. Although the move would reduce the father’s ability to attend routine school and extracurricular activities, it would not prevent meaningful possession and access. Deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations and weighing of conflicting evidence, the appellate court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“A parent seeking relocation should tie the move to a verifiable event and prove specific benefits to the children and household—such as improved income, educational opportunities, family support, and a workable possession and transportation plan. A parent opposing relocation should quantify the parenting opportunities that distance will eliminate and offer a credible local alternative. Because relocation rulings turn on the child’s best interest and credibility findings receive substantial appellate deference, both sides must build a detailed record addressing the Lenz and Holley considerations.”
In the Interest of C.M., a Child
COA02
The Department sought termination of both parents’ rights after the child was born drug-exposed with significant medical needs, while the parents failed to demonstrate sustained sobriety, complete required drug testing and services, or show an ability to meet the child’s needs. Father argued that the case was automatically dismissed under Texas Family Code § 263.401, and both parents challenged the sufficiency of the termination evidence; Mother also asserted jury-charge error. The Second Court of Appeals held that the trial court retained jurisdiction because, before the original dismissal deadline, it expressly found that extraordinary circumstances required the child to remain in the Department’s temporary managing conservatorship and that continued conservatorship was in the child’s best interest. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, the court also found legally and factually sufficient evidence supporting the predicate termination grounds. Because Mother did not properly preserve her jury-charge objections, those complaints presented no basis for reversal. The court affirmed the order terminating both parents’ rights.
Litigation Takeaway
“A Section 263.401 deadline must be treated as jurisdictional: any extension order and the required extraordinary-circumstances and best-interest findings must be made before the dismissal date. Parties should support or oppose those findings with concrete evidence concerning the child’s needs, parental progress, sobriety, testing, visitation, and ability to provide safe care. Completing some services will not overcome unresolved endangering conduct, and jury-charge complaints must be timely and specifically preserved in the trial court.”
In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M., Children
COA10
The Department sought termination of Mother’s parental rights after evidence showed that she physically abused two other children in the household, failed to obtain medical care for their visible injuries, and failed to act on warning signs that another household member may have sexually abused them. Applying Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), the court considered whether clear and convincing evidence established a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered Mother’s children. It explained that endangering conduct need not be directed at the children at issue or cause them actual injury, and that abuse of other children in the home may demonstrate danger to a parent’s own children. Although knowledge is unnecessary when the parent personally commits the endangering acts, the Department generally must prove the parent knew of a third party’s dangerous conduct. Deferring to the trial court’s credibility findings, the appellate court held that Mother’s violence, omissions, inconsistent explanations, lack of accountability, and failure to demonstrate improved protective capacity supported termination under subsection (E).
Litigation Takeaway
“Endangerment should be proved or challenged as a complete course of conduct, not as a series of isolated incidents. Abuse of another child in the household, failure to seek medical care, ignored warning signs, inconsistent accounts, and lack of meaningful behavioral change may collectively support termination even without proof that the child at issue was directly injured. When the danger comes from a third party, however, counsel must develop evidence that the parent knew of the risk. Completing services alone is not enough; the parent should show accountability, changed behavior, protective judgment, and a workable safety plan.”
Jones v. State
COA09
Jones appealed his robbery conviction and life sentence, arguing that the trial court improperly admitted injury evidence from an extraneous robbery and that the jury failed to make separate findings on two habitual-offender enhancements. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held that Jones forfeited his evidentiary complaint under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 because he objected only once, did not obtain a running objection, and allowed substantially the same evidence to be admitted before and afterward without objection. The court also concluded that Jones’s pleas of “true” relieved the State of its burden to prove the enhancement allegations; because the enhancements were no longer disputed and the charge directed the jury to treat them as true, separate findings were unnecessary. The court therefore upheld the enhanced punishment and life sentence.
Litigation Takeaway
“One objection generally does not preserve error when the same or substantially similar evidence is presented repeatedly. Family-law counsel should object each time challenged evidence is offered—or obtain an express, clearly defined running objection covering the relevant testimony, witnesses, exhibits, recordings, and expert opinions—and must secure a ruling. Counsel should also review and timely object to charge and verdict-form defects before submission.”
Travis v. State
COA10
In this criminal-law crossover case, the defendant sought to exclude a complainant’s testimony and obtain a mistrial after trial information was communicated among witnesses and others in violation of Texas Rule of Evidence 614. Applying the prejudice analysis from Bell and Webb, the Waco Court of Appeals examined whether the witness actually received another witness’s testimony and whether the communication caused her to alter her account, improperly corroborate another witness, or contradict the opposing side. Although prohibited communications occurred, the defendant identified no material change in the witness’s testimony and conceded there was no direct proof that any testimony had been affected. Because cross-examination, recall of witnesses, and comparison with prior statements provided adequate safeguards, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony or denying a mistrial.
Litigation Takeaway
“A witness-sequestration violation does not automatically justify exclusion or a mistrial. Counsel must promptly establish what information was communicated, connect it to a specific change or improper corroboration in the witness’s testimony, and explain why cross-examination or another lesser remedy cannot cure the prejudice. Preserve the issue with an evidentiary hearing, prior statements, communication records, specific objections, and rulings on alternative remedies.”
In re William Michael Talley
COA06
William Michael Talley, an incarcerated pro se litigant, sought mandamus relief compelling a trial judge to rule on pending motions, recuse, and transfer his case. The Sixth Court of Appeals determined that Talley failed to serve the respondent judge and real parties in interest, provide the certification required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(k), or authenticate the material documents in his mandamus record under Rules 52.3(l) and 52.7. His general unsworn declaration did not establish personal knowledge or state that the exhibits were true and correct copies of the originals, and neither his pro se status nor incarceration excused compliance. The court also explained that mandamus may compel a trial court to rule when the required elements are proved, but ordinarily cannot dictate the substance of a discretionary ruling such as recusal. It denied the petition for writ of mandamus.
Litigation Takeaway
“Treat Rule 52 compliance as essential to mandamus relief. Serve the respondent judge and every real party in interest, include the rule-specific petition certification, and support all material facts with certified or properly sworn record documents. To compel a ruling, authenticate evidence showing that the motion was filed, presented to the judge, and left undecided for an unreasonable time—and ask the appellate court to require a ruling, not to dictate the result.”
Denton v. Hagle
COA03
In a divorce involving property division, child support, and issues concerning the parties’ children, the parties placed a property-division and child-support settlement on the record in open court. After consulting with counsel, Denton personally confirmed that the recited terms reflected his agreement, and the trial court rendered judgment before he later objected. The Third Court of Appeals held that the oral settlement satisfied Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11 because it was made in open court and entered of record. Denton’s consent at rendition waived appellate challenges to the agreed provisions absent fraud, collusion, misrepresentation, or fundamental error, and his post-rendition objection could not withdraw that consent. The court also concluded that the settlement eliminated any reversible harm from the earlier bifurcation dispute, that Denton inadequately briefed his new-trial complaints, and that he failed to preserve his discovery complaint. The divorce decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“An oral divorce settlement can become binding when its material terms are recited on the record, the parties personally assent, and the court renders judgment. A party wishing to withdraw consent must do so before rendition; regret or objection afterward generally will not preserve an appeal. Counsel should clearly state every material term, expressly reserve any unresolved issues, obtain an unmistakable rendition, secure rulings on disputed motions, and cite specific record pages on appeal.”
Morris v. Morris
COA04
After a modification order changed the children’s primary-residence designation, imposed child support, and awarded more than $24,000 against Rachael Morris, she filed a Rule 145 statement asserting that she could not afford the appellate record. Although her uncontroverted evidence showed that her necessary monthly expenses exceeded her net income, the trial court relied primarily on her gross income, employability, potential summer work, and lack of legal-aid representation to require payment. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that Rule 145 asks whether court costs can be paid without sacrificing basic essentials such as housing and food; employment and income above federal poverty guidelines are relevant but not dispositive. Because the trial court failed to account for Morris’s net income, expenses, and debts, the appellate court found an abuse of discretion, reversed the ability-to-afford-costs order, and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“A Rule 145 determination must address the litigant’s actual ability to pay, not merely gross salary or earning capacity. Parties seeking protection should document net income, essential expenses, debts, dependents, assets, access to credit, and the financial effect of the appealed order; challengers need contrary evidence, and any order requiring payment should contain detailed findings addressing the complete financial picture.”
Munos v. Macias
COA10
After an alleged marriage failed, former intimate and business partners disputed ownership of real property purchased at a tax-foreclosure sale. Munos sought a declaration that she owned the property based on a sheriff’s tax deed naming her as purchaser, but the court treated the claim according to its substance as an action for trespass to try title. Applying Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 790 and 301, the court held that Munos had to prevail on the strength of her own title by proving a recognized basis for superior title, such as an unbroken chain of conveyances from the sovereign or superior title from a common source. The sheriff’s deed alone was only one link in the chain, and Munos did not produce the sovereign chain, establish a common source, or provide the foreclosure decree and order of sale necessary to conclusively prove a valid transfer. The court therefore affirmed the denial of JNOV and the take-nothing judgment, which vested title in Macias.
Litigation Takeaway
“When unmarried partners dispute legal ownership of real estate, a deed bearing one partner’s name may not be enough. Counsel must identify the proper title claim, join necessary parties, and assemble the complete chain of title—especially for tax-sale property—before seeking affirmative relief. A trespass-to-try-title plaintiff must recover on the strength of the plaintiff’s own title, and neither weak opposing proof nor a declaratory-judgment label can cure missing title evidence.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Carrie Marie Washington and Harold Eugene Washington
COA07
In a restricted appeal from a post-answer default divorce decree, Carrie Washington challenged relief first requested in Harold Washington’s amended counterpetition, including spousal maintenance, attorney’s fees, and a permanent injunction. The court held that these requests were more onerous than the relief sought in the prior pleading and that the record contained no certificate of service or other competent proof showing service of the amendment in strict compliance with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 21 and 21a. Because filing alone did not create a presumption of receipt, the service defect constituted error apparent on the face of the record. The court affirmed the dissolution of the marriage but reversed the portions of the decree resolving the parties’ remaining disputes and remanded them for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
“Filing an amended pleading is not a substitute for serving it. Before seeking post-answer default relief that adds financial obligations, injunctions, or other more onerous remedies, counsel should ensure the record affirmatively proves Rule 21a service—especially after opposing counsel withdraws. On restricted appeal, the absence of a certificate or other competent service evidence may establish reversible error on the face of the record.”
In Re Champion LLP
COA05
Champion LLP sought mandamus relief after the trial court left its motion to compel discovery unresolved for more than fifteen months after filing and more than a year after a hearing, despite repeated written requests, proposed orders, status conferences, and communications with court staff. Applying the rule that a trial judge has a ministerial duty to rule on a properly filed and presented motion within a reasonable time, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered the length of the delay, the judge’s knowledge of the motion, the parties’ repeated efforts to obtain a ruling, the absence of unusual complexity or demonstrated docket constraints, the prejudice to trial preparation, and the three-month benchmark in Texas Rule of Judicial Administration 7.2(c). The court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered the trial judge to issue a written ruling, while emphasizing that it could not dictate whether the motion should be granted or denied. It dismissed the request concerning the continuance motion as moot because the relevant trial date had passed.
Litigation Takeaway
“When an unresolved discovery motion stalls a family-law case, counsel should create a clear record showing that the motion was filed, presented, taken under advisement, and repeatedly brought to the judge’s attention, while documenting how the delay harms trial preparation. A delay substantially beyond Rule 7.2(c)’s three-month benchmark may support mandamus, but the appellate court can compel only a ruling—not a particular result. Any requested continuance relief must also remain tied to a live trial setting.”
In the Interest of A.M., a Child
COA07
The Department sought to terminate Mother’s parental rights to A.M. under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(M), relying on a prior order terminating her rights to another child under subsections (D) and (E). Mother argued for the first time on appeal that applying subsection (M) violated due process. Applying ordinary error-preservation rules, the Seventh Court of Appeals held that the fundamental nature of parental rights did not excuse Mother’s failure to raise her constitutional complaint in the trial court. Because she also did not challenge the sufficiency of the subsection (M) finding, and the Department introduced a certified copy of the prior termination order containing the required (D) and (E) findings, subsection (M) independently supported termination alongside the best-interest finding. The court therefore did not address her challenge to an alternative predicate ground and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Constitutional objections in termination cases must be raised specifically and timely in the trial court; labeling an issue as involving due process or fundamental parental rights will not permit first-time review on appeal. Counsel should also challenge every independently dispositive predicate ground—especially subsection (D) and (E) findings, which can later support termination as to another child under subsection (M).”
In the Interest of A.L.L.N.R. and A.R.A.R., Children
COA04
The Department sought termination of the father’s parental rights after recurring positive tests for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana, eleven missed drug tests, and repeated failures to complete recommended substance-abuse treatment. Applying Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), the Fourth Court of Appeals examined the father’s conduct as a continuing pattern rather than as isolated incidents and held that the positive and missed tests, unsuccessful treatment efforts, and failed in-home safety arrangement permitted a firm conviction that he endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being. The court found the evidence legally and factually sufficient, upheld the best-interest finding based in part on the children’s stable foster placement and bond with their prospective adoptive parents, rejected the derivative challenge to the Department’s appointment as permanent managing conservator, and affirmed the termination order as to both parents.
Litigation Takeaway
“Drug-use endangerment depends on the documented course of conduct, not merely one positive test. Counsel should build or rebut a complete chronology of confirmed and missed tests, specimen types, treatment recommendations, attendance, discharge history, safety-plan failures, and evidence of sustained sobriety. In termination and custody litigation, repeated missed testing and incomplete treatment can reinforce proof that substance abuse remains unresolved and that protective restrictions are necessary.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Bryan Wagner and Sabrina Wagner
COA06
After a contested divorce trial, the court awarded Bryan Wagner a disproportionate share of the community estate, including 60% of the marital-residence proceeds and reimbursement for documented repairs, based on evidence of Sabrina Wagner’s violence, fault in the marriage’s breakup, and property damage. The Sixth Court of Appeals held that the property division was within the trial court’s broad discretion under Texas Family Code section 7.001; it rejected other complaints as meritless, unpreserved, or inadequately briefed. Because the decree incorrectly recited that its terms resulted from the parties’ agreement, the appellate court used Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b) to delete the erroneous agreement language and affirmed the decree as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
“A contested divorce decree must accurately distinguish court-ordered provisions from genuine agreements. When the record conclusively establishes erroneous agreement language, an appellate court may correct the decree under Rule 43.2(b) without ordering a new trial. Parties must also preserve trial objections, provide competent property and valuation evidence, and adequately brief appellate complaints; otherwise, even potentially significant issues may be forfeited.”
Hernandez v. Frithiof
COA03
In a modification and enforcement proceeding involving two children, the trial court converted future child and medical support into lump-sum awards but applied the two-child rates through the younger child’s emancipation, even though the older child would reach majority thirteen months earlier. The Third Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 154.127 requires support orders to state reduced amounts for each period in which fewer children remain eligible. Because the proper figures were established in the record, the court modified the child-support award from $38,500 to $33,950 and the medical-support award from $26,400 to $18,600. The court also held that the father waived his fee-segregation complaint by failing to object at trial, but preserved his legal- and factual-sufficiency challenges after the bench trial; it therefore reversed the attorney’s-fee award and remanded the fee issue for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
“Orders covering multiple children must expressly step down child support—and any corresponding medical support—as each child’s eligibility ends. When future support is reduced to a lump sum, counsel should separately calculate every eligibility period and ensure the operative judgment contains the correct totals. In combined enforcement and modification cases, object at trial to unsegregated fees, and support every fee request with competent lodestar evidence; admission of billing records alone does not establish that fees are reasonable and necessary.”
A.G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services obtained termination of Father’s parental rights on constructive abandonment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(N), even though its live petition did not expressly plead that ground. Father argued on appeal that the resulting lack of notice was fundamental error reviewable despite his failure to object at trial. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and Civil Procedure 67 and 301, the Third Court of Appeals held that parental-rights cases remain subject to ordinary error-preservation requirements and that the narrow fundamental-error doctrine did not apply. Because the petition gave notice of possible constructive abandonment, the issue was developed and submitted without a timely pleading or notice objection, and the Department expressly sought termination on that ground in closing, subsection (N) was tried by consent. The court affirmed the termination based on subsection (N) and the unchallenged best-interest finding without reaching Father’s challenge to the separate subsection (P) finding.
Litigation Takeaway
“Object promptly when an opposing party introduces evidence or requests relief on an unpleaded theory. Even in a parental-rights termination case, characterizing the defect as a constitutional notice violation will not excuse failure to preserve the complaint, and silence may allow the issue to be tried by consent. Counsel should identify the pleading variance, explain prejudice, request exclusion, a continuance, or an opportunity to respond, and obtain a ruling. On appeal, challenge every predicate finding necessary to reverse the judgment.”
Masimula v. Masimula
COA08
After a prior appeal removed only the future spousal-maintenance award and affirmed the divorce decree as modified, the trial court entered a modified decree implementing the appellate mandate. The former husband appealed again, renewing challenges under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, seeking to set aside the post-answer default decree, and attacking the evidentiary sufficiency of the property division. The Eighth Court of Appeals held that the law-of-the-case doctrine and mandate rule barred relitigation of matters resolved or left intact in the first appeal. It further concluded that the husband had not satisfied 50 U.S.C. § 3932’s requirements for an initial stay, so he was not entitled to an additional stay or mandatory appointed counsel, and the trial court was not required to grant a stay sua sponte based solely on his military status. Because the modified decree faithfully implemented the mandate without reopening the affirmed property division or default judgment, the court affirmed it.
Litigation Takeaway
“The first appeal is generally the only opportunity to challenge all appealable portions of a divorce decree. After a limited appellate disposition, the trial court may implement only the mandate, and a modified decree does not create a second chance to attack affirmed rulings. Servicemembers seeking an SCRA stay should also submit the statute’s required written statements and command documentation; military status alone does not compel a stay or appointment of counsel.”
In re Adelide Ybarra and Leon Barba
COA03
In a Travis County will contest, the trial court barred the deposition of a disclosed California physician because he lacked a Texas medical license and the court believed his testimony would be inadmissible. It also struck a pleading under a deadline established only after the pleading had been filed. The Third Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.3(e) makes a disclosed testifying expert’s opinions and their bases discoverable regardless of whether the expert may later be excluded, and no cited authority made Texas licensure a prerequisite to the proposed testimony. Because an appeal could not adequately restore the lost opportunity to develop and preserve the expert evidence, mandamus relief was appropriate. The court also held that the trial court could not retroactively apply the later-signed pleading deadline, but it declined to consider an unpreserved due-process challenge concerning live testimony. It conditionally granted mandamus relief in part and denied it in part.
Litigation Takeaway
“Keep expert discovery separate from admissibility: a qualification or licensing challenge generally does not justify blocking the deposition of a disclosed testifying expert. When an order forecloses material expert discovery that cannot be recreated after trial, promptly build a complete record and consider mandamus. Counsel should also challenge retroactive scheduling deadlines and expressly preserve each distinct discovery, evidentiary, and due-process complaint.”
Candice Griffith and Forney Eye Associates, PLLC v. Steve Olkewicz
COA05
After a dispute during an eye-clinic visit, Steve Olkewicz alleged that clinic personnel made false statements about his conduct to his employer, resulting in his termination and reputational harm. Candice Griffith and Forney Eye Associates argued that his defamation and related tort claims were health care liability claims governed by Chapter 74 and sought dismissal because he had not served an expert report. Examining the claims’ underlying nature rather than their labels or the defendants’ status as health care providers, the Fifth Court of Appeals concluded that the claims concerned post-visit, nonclinical communications—not treatment, diagnosis, clinical judgment, or a departure from professional standards directly related to health care. The court therefore held that Chapter 74’s expert-report requirement, discovery stay, and dismissal remedy did not apply and affirmed the orders denying dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
“A claim against a health care provider is not automatically governed by Chapter 74. Courts examine the precise duty and conduct at issue: allegedly false, nonclinical statements to a third party may support ordinary tort claims without a Chapter 74 expert report, even when the parties met in a clinical setting. Counsel should classify each claim early, determine whether proof requires a professional health care standard, and preserve all procedural objections in the trial court.”
Purnell v. 1000 Main, LLC
COA14
After the trial court set Purnell’s case for July 21, her attorney timely designated that week as summer vacation under Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region Rule 14(b) and later sought a continuance. The trial court denied the request and dismissed Purnell’s claims with prejudice when counsel declined to proceed. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Rule 14(b)’s mandatory protection applies even when the trial setting predates the vacation designation. Counsel did not waive that protection because he never affirmatively agreed to the setting, repeatedly asserted the conflict, and appeared on the trial date only to preserve the objection. Accordingly, denying the continuance and dismissing the claims constituted an abuse of discretion; the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“A timely summer vacation designation can override an earlier trial setting when the governing regional rule expressly provides mandatory protection. Counsel should promptly move to continue, document compliance, obtain a ruling, preserve the objection, and avoid any post-designation statement or agreement that could constitute waiver. Courts may not use general docket-management authority—or dismiss a client’s case for refusing to proceed—to circumvent the rule.”
Roel Guerra v. Maria Fabiola Guerra and Elma Guerra Chavez
COA07
A dispute among siblings over a family limited partnership and trust led the district court to enter a temporary injunction and related winding-up relief against Roel Guerra. On interlocutory appeal, Guerra challenged the injunction, the district court’s plenary power, the finality of earlier accounting and attorney’s-fee orders, and the court’s jurisdiction in light of a related probate proceeding. Because Guerra did not provide the reporter’s record from the multi-day evidentiary hearing, the court of appeals presumed the omitted testimony and exhibits supported the injunction and its findings. The court also concluded that the prior orders were interlocutory because they neither disposed of all claims and parties nor contained unequivocal finality language, so the district court retained plenary power. Finally, the pending probate matter did not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the county court because the trust was a nonprobate asset, while the district court had statutory jurisdiction over the trust, receivership, and partnership-winding-up claims. The appellate court affirmed the challenged orders.
Litigation Takeaway
“An appellant cannot overturn an evidence-based temporary injunction without supplying the complete reporter’s record, including all hearing dates and exhibits; absent that record, the appellate court will presume the evidence supports the trial court. Counsel should also avoid assuming that an accounting, fee award, or winding-up order is final merely because it resolves an important issue. Before seeking review in a family-law or family-wealth dispute, determine whether the order is appealable or reviewable only by mandamus, secure a complete record, and carefully analyze finality and probate-versus-district-court jurisdiction.”
Tina Hall Montoya v. 3 Kings General Contracting LLC
COA05
After attorney Tina Hall Montoya sued a homeowners’ association and obtained a temporary restraining order affecting payments under a roofing contract, contractor 3 Kings intervened with a tortious-interference claim based on Montoya’s lawsuit and TRO request. Montoya moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. The Fifth Court of Appeals held that filing suit and requesting a TRO are protected exercises of the right to petition and that 3 Kings failed to offer clear and specific evidence establishing a prima facie case for every element of tortious interference, including intentional interference, causation, and actual damages. The court reversed the denial of Montoya’s TCPA motion, rendered judgment dismissing the claim, and remanded for proceedings concerning fees, costs, and sanctions under section 27.009.
Litigation Takeaway
“Family Code claims may be exempt from the TCPA, but collateral tort claims arising from pleadings, TRO applications, or other judicial communications require a separate, claim-specific analysis. Once protected petitioning activity is shown, the claimant must present concrete, element-by-element evidence—proof that a TRO affected a transaction is not, by itself, proof of intentional interference, causation, or damages.”
In the Matter of T.R., a Juvenile
COA06
T.R., a juvenile serving a fifteen-year determinate sentence for two aggravated assaults with a deadly weapon, appealed an order transferring him from the Texas Juvenile Justice Department to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. He argued that the order was too vague for meaningful appellate review and incorrectly characterized his offenses as first-degree felonies. Reviewing the order together with the full record, the Sixth Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court adequately considered the factors in Texas Family Code § 54.11 and that some evidence—including T.R.’s repeated institutional violence, incomplete programming, restrictive placement, and TJJD’s recommendation—supported the transfer. Because aggravated assault is ordinarily a second-degree felony under Texas Penal Code § 22.02(b), and the record showed no applicable first-degree enhancement, the appellate court modified the erroneous recital under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b) and affirmed the transfer order as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
“Carefully verify every statutory classification and factual recital in a proposed order, especially language that could create collateral consequences in later custody, protective-order, employment, or licensing matters. On appeal, a discretionary ruling may be upheld when the order and record together permit meaningful review and contain some supporting evidence. If the record conclusively establishes the correct wording, request appellate modification under Rule 43.2(b) as an alternative to reversal or remand.”
State v. Olivarez
COA10
In this criminal appeal with direct lessons for Texas family-law trials, the defendant obtained the complainant’s counseling records while the State was still presenting its case and before the defense began presenting evidence, but she did not request a continuance, recess, witness recall, or other relief to permit further review and use of the records. The Tenth Court of Appeals held that, even assuming a disclosure failure under Brady or article 39.14, a new trial required proof that the delayed disclosure prejudiced the defendant’s substantial rights. Because the defense had an opportunity to use the records and failed to create a record showing that the timing caused an uncured disadvantage, no reasonable view of the record supported a new trial. The court also ruled that untimely grounds added to the new-trial motion could not support relief over the State’s objection, reversed the new-trial order, and remanded the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“When important evidence is produced during trial, do not simply proceed and rely on a later motion for new trial. Promptly request a recess, continuance, additional discovery, permission to recall witnesses, or another tailored remedy; explain exactly what additional work is needed; obtain a ruling; and connect the late disclosure to a specific, uncured effect on the case. Also include every legal ground in a timely motion for new trial. Late production alone does not establish reversible harm.”
In the Interest of A.L.O., a Child
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court concluded that clear and convincing evidence of endangerment included Mother’s prenatal methamphetamine use, which caused the child to suffer neonatal withdrawal, seizures, feeding difficulties, and extended NICU care; the objectively hazardous condition of Mother’s residence; and Mother’s continued cohabitation with a drug-using partner who refused testing and services and obstructed a home visit. Although Mother had become sober, obtained employment, visited consistently, and substantially completed her service plan, the court held that these improvements did not overcome her failure to remedy the unsafe home and relationship. Given the child’s vulnerability and the stability of her foster-to-adopt placement, the evidence also supported the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
“Completing services and achieving recent sobriety may not defeat termination when a parent has not translated that progress into a safe home and protective decisions. Counsel should present concrete evidence of lasting behavioral change, suitable housing, and enforceable separation from unsafe household members; conversely, parties alleging endangerment should document specific hazards, the parent’s knowledge, prenatal drug-related harm, and continuing exposure to drug-using or noncompliant partners. Poverty alone is not endangerment, but objectively dangerous living conditions cannot be dismissed as mere economic hardship.”