Weekly Digest
August 15 – August 21, 2026
44 opinions this week
In the Interest of G.H.G. and H.R.G.
COA05
In In re G.H.G., the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether a divorce decree improperly gave a parenting facilitator authority to decide when a father could advance through phases of a three-step possession schedule and whether the decree varied from the parties’ mediated settlement agreement. Reading the MSA as a whole, the court held the agreement authorized the facilitator to determine when Father could move to the next phase of the step-up schedule, not just from Phase One to Phase Two. The court also held the decree did not violate Family Code §§ 153.606 and 153.6061 because it expressly preserved the trial court’s exclusive jurisdiction over conservatorship, possession, access, and support, making the facilitator’s role one of implementation rather than adjudication. The decree’s clarifying language about the court retaining authority was treated as a permissible statutory clarification, not an improper alteration of the MSA.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want a parenting facilitator to act as the gatekeeper for a step-up possession schedule, draft the decree so the phases and progression criteria are fixed by the court, the facilitator only determines compliance with those criteria, and the decree expressly states the court keeps exclusive jurisdiction. Also, make the MSA internally consistent and preserve objections carefully—especially if you do not want your own proposed language used against you on appeal.”
In the Interest of J.M.
COA02
In In re J.M., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a mediated settlement agreement in a SAPCR that satisfies Texas Family Code section 153.0071(d) is binding and must be reduced to judgment under section 153.0071(e). After Mother signed an MSA appointing the Department as managing conservator and giving her supervised possession largely by mutual agreement with Grandmother, she later sought a new trial to obtain more specific and enforceable visitation terms, arguing the agreed structure gave Grandmother too much discretion and was fraudulently induced. The court rejected that effort, explaining that Mother did not dispute the MSA’s statutory compliance, the final order tracked the parties’ agreement, and she offered no evidence proving any recognized exception such as fraud. Because a motion for new trial cannot be used to rewrite an irrevocable MSA simply because implementation later proves unsatisfactory, the trial court properly denied relief and the judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Treat every custody MSA as final drafting, not a rough outline. If the agreement complies with section 153.0071, the court will usually enforce it as written, so vague 'mutual agreement' possession terms and supervision details must be negotiated before signing. If the problem is fraud or coercion, build proof immediately; if the problem is later noncooperation or changed circumstances, use modification or enforcement—not a motion for new trial to get a better deal.”
Salzido v. State
COA02
In Salzido v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld a conviction for indecency with a child by sexual contact, rejecting the argument that the absence of DNA or other physical corroboration made the evidence legally insufficient. The court held that under Article 38.07(a), the child complainant’s detailed testimony alone could support the conviction if the jury believed it, and appellate review required deference to the jury’s credibility determinations under Jackson v. Virginia and Article 38.04. The court also affirmed the exclusion of the grandmother’s testimony about the child’s flea-market statement, concluding the record did not show the child was still dominated by the stress of the alleged event, so the statement did not qualify as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2).
Litigation Takeaway
“In family cases involving child-abuse allegations, do not assume the lack of medical, forensic, or third-party corroboration defeats a claim if the factfinder credits specific testimony. At the same time, do not assume a child’s out-of-court statement about abuse automatically fits the excited-utterance exception; you must build a record showing the child was still under the stress of the event when speaking.”
Patrick Lawler v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Lawler v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld multiple child-sex-offense convictions against a sufficiency and double-jeopardy challenge. The court held that the child’s disclosures to several adults, two forensic interviews, and trial testimony were legally sufficient despite inconsistencies because credibility and reconciliation of conflicting statements were for the jury. It also held that the convictions did not violate double jeopardy because the evidence let the jury tie each count to a distinct act or criminal episode, and it modified the judgments to conform unpronounced fines to the oral pronouncement.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law cases involving abuse allegations, generalized proof is weaker than incident-specific proof. If you need restrictions, supervised access, protective relief, or family-violence findings, build the record so each requested ruling is tied to a distinct act, disclosure, time, or circumstance. Multiple outcry statements can still be powerful even when imperfectly consistent, so long as the factfinder can reasonably distinguish what event each statement describes.”
In re Joshua George Peacock
COA14
In In re Peacock, the trial court held Joshua Peacock in contempt in a post-divorce enforcement case based on alleged failures to pay two child-support installments and to comply with insurance and life-insurance-proof obligations. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that contempt in a family-law enforcement case must strictly track the motion for enforcement and the proof because Texas Family Code sections 157.002 and 157.166, along with due process, require specific notice of each alleged violation and a contempt order that specifically states the manner of noncompliance. Because the contempt order went beyond the notice provided in the enforcement motion and imposed coercive conditions not properly tethered to the pleaded violations, the order was void to that extent. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the contempt order.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want contempt, plead each violation with exact dates, amounts, and conduct, then make sure the contempt order mirrors those allegations exactly. In Texas family-law enforcement, overbroad pleadings or orders can destroy an otherwise valid contempt remedy, and respondents should compare the motion, evidence, and order line by line for due-process defects.”
Nadia Muraira v. Wesley William Hall
COA03
In Muraira v. Hall, the Third Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 162.012 barred a biological father’s bill of review filed more than six months after a final adoption order. Hall argued the adoption should be undone because he was not served, was not joined despite being the biological father, and the adoptive mother and biological mother allegedly procured the judgment by fraud. The court rejected those theories, explaining that § 162.012 creates an unusually strict finality rule for adoption decrees: after six months, both direct and collateral attacks are barred unless the challenge is based on the rendering court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because complaints about lack of service, nonjoinder, and fraud do not amount to subject-matter-jurisdiction defects, Hall’s attack could not proceed. The court also noted that a bill of review must be filed in the court that rendered the original judgment, not a different district court. It reversed the trial court’s judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the bill of review.
Litigation Takeaway
“Adoption orders get extraordinary finality in Texas. If more than six months have passed, lawyers cannot revive an attack by labeling service defects, omitted-parent claims, or fraud as “jurisdictional”; only a true subject-matter-jurisdiction challenge survives. Practitioners should do exhaustive notice, paternity, and joinder work before the adoption is signed, and any bill of review must be filed in the rendering court.”
In the Interest of S.G.H. and W.C.H., Children
COA13
In In re S.G.H. and W.C.H., the trial court dismissed a modification case for want of prosecution, and after plenary power expired Father filed a separate bill of review. Although the trial court granted the bill of review and vacated the dismissal, it later signed a new modification order in the original cause number rather than retrying the merits in the bill-of-review proceeding. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that granting a bill of review does not restore plenary power in the original case; instead, any retrial must occur in the separate bill-of-review action. Because the 2024 modification order was signed in the original cause years after dismissal, it was void, so the court vacated the order and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“A bill of review can wipe out an old judgment, but it does not reopen the original case for a new merits ruling. In family cases, lawyers must move all post-bill-of-review litigation into the bill-of-review cause number; if the court signs a modification or other merits order in the old dismissed case after plenary power expired, that order may be void and the entire effort wasted.”
Monte Albert v. Madeena V. Albert
COA03
In this divorce appeal, the husband challenged the decree’s debt allocation, attorney’s fee award, and related rulings with arguments focused largely on alleged Army misconduct and the wife’s supposed incompetence. The Third Court of Appeals held that his complaints were waived because his briefs lacked record citations, developed legal analysis, and supporting authority, even after he was given a chance to rebrief. The court also refused to consider exhibits attached to the appellate brief that were not part of the trial record and held that any competency-related complaint was neither preserved nor adequately briefed. The divorce decree was therefore left undisturbed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Appellate complaints in family-law cases live or die on briefing. If a party does not tie each issue to the actual appellate record, preserved trial-court error, and supporting authority, the court of appeals can treat the issue as waived—even after giving a chance to rebrief.”
In re La Joya Independent School District
COA13
In this mandamus proceeding, La Joya ISD challenged a trial court order compelling production of emails, texts, memoranda, letters, and recordings from an outside-counsel-led internal discrimination investigation. The court analyzed whether the district made a prima facie showing that the communications were made to facilitate legal services under Texas Rule of Evidence 503 and that the investigative materials were prepared in reasonable anticipation of litigation under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.5. Relying on the legal-services contract, pre-suit notice letter, counsel’s affidavit, and the scope of the requested materials, the court held the files were protected by attorney-client privilege and work product, that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering production, and that mandamus was proper because disclosure of privileged material cannot be cured on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“When discovery targets a lawyer-directed internal investigation, relevance is not enough. Build a privilege record with affidavits, engagement documents, and objective signs of anticipated litigation; if the court still orders production of privileged files, mandamus may be the fastest and best remedy.”
In the Interest of D.W., J.W., and I.W., Children
COA10
The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights after holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court rejected the mother’s argument that a 2022 agreed SAPCR order barred consideration of older evidence, explaining that the Department had abandoned termination in that earlier proceeding, so there was no prior merits denial. On the merits, the court analyzed the children’s environment and the mother’s conduct as a continuing pattern of endangerment: admitted drug use in the home, domestic violence, sexual-abuse concerns, criminality, instability, leaving the children with the father despite known risks, continued association with him despite no-contact concerns, and later unsafe supervision and housing instability. The court held this evidence also supported the best-interest finding and affirmed termination as to both parents.
Litigation Takeaway
“A parent does not have to be the direct abuser to face severe consequences. In Texas family cases, knowingly exposing children to a dangerous partner or unsafe home conditions can support endangerment findings, possession restrictions, conservatorship changes, and in CPS cases termination—especially when the risky relationship or instability continues after warnings, removal, or court orders.”
Havens v. State
COA13
In Havens v. State, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals upheld a conviction for assault-family violence by impeding breath or circulation. The defendant argued the evidence was insufficient because the complainant had inconsistencies in her story, memory gaps, a prior methamphetamine history, and there was conflicting testimony about intoxication and how her injuries occurred. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court held those points raised credibility and weight issues for the jury, not legal-insufficiency grounds on appeal. Because the complainant testified Havens choked her until she lost consciousness and that testimony was corroborated by medical records, provider testimony, photographs, and prompt outcry evidence, a rational jury could find the elements of Penal Code § 22.01(b)(2)(B) beyond a reasonable doubt.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-violence cases, strangulation allegations supported by medical records, photos, and prompt outcry can carry the day even when the complaining witness has credibility vulnerabilities, inconsistent recall, or substance-use history. For family-law litigators, impeachment alone is often not enough; the real battle is whether there is corroboration of the core assault narrative and whether the opposing side can offer a coherent alternative explanation for the injuries.”
Wilma Reynolds and Carl Gordon v. Quantlab Financial, LLC; Quantlab Incentive Partners I, LLC; Quantlab Trading Partners US, LP; and David Reynolds
COA14
After years of post-divorce litigation, Wilma Reynolds filed yet another suit alleging David Reynolds and the Quantlab entities concealed bonus and compensation information during the divorce, causing the marital estate to be undervalued. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied Texas’s transactional res judicata doctrine and held the new fraud, conspiracy, misrepresentation, conversion, and undivided-property claims all arose from the same nucleus of operative facts as the prior divorce-related cases. The court rejected Wilma’s argument that the facts had changed because in camera documents supposedly had not been reviewed for damages or property-division relevance, concluding that this was only a repackaging of previously rejected allegations. The court affirmed summary judgment, denial of further discovery and access to the in camera materials, and sanctions.
Litigation Takeaway
“You cannot relitigate an old divorce-property dispute by changing the label on the claim. If the alleged hidden-asset or compensation-concealment theory was or could have been litigated in the divorce or prior post-decree proceedings, res judicata will likely bar later fraud, tort, or undivided-property suits—and repetitive refilings may draw sanctions.”
Moritz v. Moritz
COA03
In Moritz v. Moritz, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed a divorce decree denying the wife’s request for spousal maintenance. The court explained that Texas Family Code section 8.051 requires more than proof of a long-term marriage or general financial hardship: the spouse seeking maintenance must prove an inability to meet minimum reasonable needs and also establish a specific statutory ground for eligibility. Because the wife did not clearly identify the subsection she relied on, did not develop evidence showing inability to meet her minimum reasonable needs, and did not address the diligence requirement applicable to ten-year-marriage claims under section 8.051(2)(B), she failed to show entitlement to maintenance as a matter of law. The court also affirmed the property division, denial of reimbursement, and rejection of evidentiary complaints due to lack of findings, lack of preservation, and inadequate briefing.
Litigation Takeaway
“Spousal maintenance in Texas is a strictly statutory remedy, not a general fairness argument. Lawyers must plead the exact Family Code basis, prove minimum reasonable needs with concrete evidence, and, in ten-year-marriage cases, present diligence evidence to overcome the presumption against maintenance. More broadly, Moritz shows that weak records, missing findings, waived objections, and thin appellate briefing can sink otherwise sympathetic claims.”
In the Interest of S.C., Jr., J.A.V., and K.A.V., Children
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(Q). Father was serving concurrent 12-year and 15-year prison sentences after convictions for multiple offenses, including domestic-violence assault and evading arrest, and the Department filed its petition on July 9, 2024. The court focused on whether Father would be unable to care for the children for at least two years from that filing date and held the evidence was sufficient because parole had already been denied, he would not be eligible again for at least two years, and his suggested relative placement never developed into a workable care plan. The court also rejected Father’s unpreserved constitutional challenge, holding that termination appeals do not excuse preservation requirements under a fundamental-error theory.
Litigation Takeaway
“When litigating incarceration-based termination or parenting disputes, courts want concrete proof, not possibilities. Speculative parole, prison programming, or vague claims that a relative could help will not defeat a showing that an incarcerated parent cannot care for a child during the statutory period; lawyers need hard release-date evidence and a real, documented caregiving plan.”
In the Interest of M.A., a Child
COA02
In In re M.A., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Family Code Section 154.130(a)(3) does not require a trial court to make child-support findings on its own unless the ordered support actually deviates from the statutory guideline amount. The father argued the modified support order was effectively above-guidelines because the court ordered $1,610 per month without making deviation findings. The appellate court rejected that argument after applying the statutory framework: Father had one child before the court and one other child not before the court, so Section 154.129 required a 17.5% multiple-family guideline percentage, and because his net monthly resources exceeded the statutory cap, that percentage applied only to $9,200 under Section 154.125. Since 17.5% of $9,200 equals $1,610, the order matched the guideline amount exactly and was not a deviation. The court also held that Father's challenge to only one modification ground did not warrant reversal because the trial court found alternative grounds under Section 156.401(a).
Litigation Takeaway
“Before complaining that a child-support order lacks Section 154.130 findings, first do the guideline math. If the court simply applied the correct multiple-family percentage and the statutory net-resources cap, the order is still a guideline order, not a deviation. Real appellate issues usually lie in the net-resources evidence, the cap, the other-child adjustment, or preservation—not in demanding findings the statute never required.”
Williams v. State
COA01
In Williams v. State, the First Court of Appeals held that a party does not preserve error about excluded or redacted portions of a record by making only a generic objection that the exhibit is incomplete or misleading. The defendant argued on appeal that redacted mental-health and prior-history references in a Children’s Assessment Center record were necessary to support an alternate explanation for the complainant’s allegations, but at trial he did not specifically articulate that theory, did not offer the unredacted record, and did not make an adequate offer of proof showing the substance and relevance of the excluded material. The court therefore held the evidentiary complaint was not preserved, and it likewise held that the defendant forfeited his due-process 'complete defense' argument because that constitutional ground was not distinctly raised in the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you believe a redacted or partial record creates a misleading picture, do more than say it is incomplete. Tender the omitted material, explain exactly why it is admissible and relevant, obtain a ruling, and preserve the substance of the exclusion through an offer of proof or sealed exhibit. And if you want to rely on a constitutional theory, raise that theory expressly in the trial court too.”
United Waterworks, LLC and Gary Tompkins v. Pranesh Jayaprakash
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment that was based entirely on deemed admissions after the defendants failed to answer requests for admissions because their lawyer’s email-routing system mistakenly sent the filings into an inactive folder. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 198.3 and the Texas Supreme Court’s decisions in Marino, Wheeler, and Goudeau, the court held the verified explanation showed good cause because the failure resulted from accident or mistake rather than conscious indifference, and the plaintiff showed no undue prejudice because the case was still early in the schedule with ample time before discovery cutoff and trial. Because the deemed admissions conclusively established liability and damages and were used as a case-ending trapdoor instead of a merits determination, the trial court should have withdrawn them, so the final judgment was reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“Deemed admissions are useful to narrow issues, but they are risky when used to win an entire case by default. If missed admissions resulted from a documented clerical or e-service mistake and withdrawal will not meaningfully prejudice the other side, Rule 198.3 should provide relief—especially when the admissions decide the core merits. Family lawyers should build independent proof for summary judgment and use RFAs mainly for authentication and truly undisputed facts.”
Cherry v. Williamson
COA02
In Cherry v. Williamson, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a divorce decree after the pro se wife challenged rulings on conservatorship, child support, the child’s surname change, attorney withdrawal, and alleged judicial bias. The court did not reach the merits because her appellate briefing failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1: it lacked coherent legal argument, supporting authority, and citations to the appellate record, and it relied in part on documents attached to the brief that were not part of the record. Applying the rule that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys, the court held the complaints were inadequately briefed, unpreserved, or both, and affirmed the final decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“Even serious family-law complaints can be lost on appeal if they are not preserved in the trial court and presented with record citations, legal authority, and a clear connection to a specific ruling. Pro se status does not relax appellate briefing rules, and documents attached to a brief cannot replace the appellate record.”
Fields v. State
COA02
In Fields v. State, the defendant sought recorded calls and text messages with a confidential informant under Article 39.14, arguing the materials were discoverable and relevant to her defense. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Article 39.14 does not override privileges because the statute requires disclosure only of material that is 'not otherwise privileged.' Applying Texas Rule of Evidence 508, the court concluded the requested communications were protected because producing them would reveal the informant’s identity. The court further held that the defendant did not make the concrete showing needed to trigger Rule 508’s exception for testimony necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence, and she also failed to show the materials contained exculpatory information. Because no exception defeated the privilege, the trial court properly denied discovery.
Litigation Takeaway
“Broad discovery rights do not automatically defeat privilege. In family-law litigation, if requested recordings, messages, reports, or third-party communications would reveal protected identities or privileged source information, the requesting party must do more than show relevance—they must identify a valid exception and build a concrete record showing why disclosure is legally required.”
Patrick Lawler v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Lawler v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld convictions for sexual performance by a child and multiple aggravated sexual assault offenses arising from a child’s disclosures to school staff, forensic interviewers, and a caregiver. The defendant argued the evidence was insufficient because the child’s statements were inconsistent and evolved over time, and he also claimed double jeopardy based on multiple punishments involving the same child. Applying deferential legal-sufficiency review, the court held that the jury could credit the child’s testimony despite omissions, inconsistencies, and incremental disclosures, and could reasonably infer inducement from the defendant’s authority and the child’s statements that he “had to” comply. The court also held that double jeopardy was not violated because the convictions were based on distinct acts occurring on different occasions, not the same unit of prosecution. The court modified the judgments to remove unpronounced fines and otherwise affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases involving child abuse allegations, inconsistent or piecemeal child disclosures do not automatically defeat the case. Build the record incident-by-incident and outcry-by-outcry, preserve the child’s language, and separate distinct acts, dates, and recipients so the factfinder can credit the child and draw reasonable inferences from authority, dependency, and context.”
Gagnon v. Gagnon
COA12
In Gagnon v. Gagnon, the Tyler Court of Appeals addressed post-divorce enforcement of a domesticated California judgment and whether a Texas trial court could use a turnover order to authorize sale of the debtor spouse’s LLC membership and partnership interests. The court first held it lacked jurisdiction to revisit the debtor’s renewed attack on enforcement of the foreign judgment because any challenge to the earlier enforcement order had to be raised in a timely appeal, and the prior appeal was untimely. On the merits of the turnover order, the court applied Texas Business Organizations Code sections 101.112(d) and 153.256(d), which make a charging order the exclusive remedy for satisfying a judgment from an LLC membership interest or partnership interest. Because the trial court authorized the receiver to sell those entity interests through a turnover order without using the charging-order procedure, the court held the trial court abused its discretion and reversed that portion of the order.
Litigation Takeaway
“When collecting a divorce-related money judgment, do not assume a broad turnover order can reach every business asset the debtor owns. If the target is an LLC membership interest or partnership interest, Texas law requires a charging order, and a turnover sale of the ownership interest itself is reversible error. The case also underscores a separate appellate lesson: missing the deadline to appeal an earlier enforcement order usually cannot be fixed by appealing a later contempt or turnover order.”
In the Interest of I.L.Y. aka I.L.Y.H. and M.R.M., Children
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E). The court analyzed Mother’s conduct as a continuing course of endangerment, relying on drug use during pregnancy, the infant’s positive amphetamine test at birth, criminal activity, repeated incarceration, apparent intoxication while caring for the infant, and Mother’s ongoing failure to achieve stable housing, employment, and completion of key services. Because a single predicate ground plus best interest is enough to affirm, and subsection (E) has collateral consequences under In re N.G., the court addressed and upheld subsection (E), affirmed best interest, and declined to reach Mother’s challenges to subsections (N) and (Q).
Litigation Takeaway
“Pattern evidence wins endangerment cases. Courts look past isolated incidents and focus on whether drug use, criminal conduct, incarceration, untreated issues, and instability together show a voluntary course of conduct that jeopardizes a child’s well-being. For litigators, the lesson is to build or rebut the chronology with concrete proof of either continuing danger or verified rehabilitation.”
Scholler v. State
COA09
In Scholler v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for assault by impeding breath against a dating partner. The complainant testified Scholler squeezed her throat, covered her mouth, and made it difficult for her to breathe. The court analyzed the record under Jackson v. Virginia, deferring to the jury’s role in resolving credibility disputes and considering the cumulative force of the evidence, including corroborating neck marks, petechiae, tenderness, and pain with swallowing observed by law enforcement. The court rejected arguments that the complainant’s ability to breathe somewhat, Scholler’s denial, or alleged shortcomings in the police investigation defeated sufficiency, and it affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-violence, custody, and protective-order cases, strangulation does not require proof of total airway blockage or unconsciousness. A detailed victim account plus modest corroboration—photos, officer observations, petechiae, swallowing pain, and contemporaneous symptom testimony—can be enough to support a finding of family violence, while a bare denial and attacks on investigative quality usually will not carry the day.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Steven O. Steele and Rachel L. Steele
COA06
In this Texas divorce appeal, the wife challenged the property division by arguing the trial court failed to implement disability-related accommodations, allowed disclosure and evidentiary unfairness, and ultimately made an unjust division of the community estate. The Texarkana Court of Appeals applied the abuse-of-discretion standard under Family Code Section 7.001 and focused on whether the appellate record showed preserved, harmful error that materially affected the just-and-right division. The court found the record showed the husband complied with the exhibit-production order, did not show the wife was denied any accommodation she actually requested, and did not establish unfair surprise or prejudice from any disclosure problems. It also held the property division had a reasonable basis because the wife failed to show the decree was manifestly unjust or unfair, especially where her own testimony undermined the feasibility of awarding her the marital home and the court still allowed her to testify about excluded documents. The decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Property-division appeals are won or lost on the record. To reverse a divorce decree, the complaining party must preserve specific objections, obtain rulings, and show how the alleged procedural or evidentiary error probably caused an unjust and right division; generalized fairness complaints are not enough.”
In the Interest of D.L.B., D.L.B., and D.L.B., Minor Children
COA04
In this SAPCR modification dispute, the trial court signed a final order that added a sentence making the mother solely responsible for the children’s insurance costs unless she provided documentation by a certain date, even though that condition was not in the parties’ mediated settlement agreement. After plenary power expired, the trial court tried to delete that sentence through a judgment nunc pro tunc. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that nunc pro tunc relief can correct only clerical error, not judicial error, and the controlling question is what judgment the court actually rendered—not what it intended or should have rendered. Because there was no prior oral pronouncement, memorandum, docket entry, or other competent evidence showing the court had rendered a different judgment before signing the February 16, 2024 order, the signed order itself was the rendition. Deleting the sentence was therefore a substantive change to the judgment actually rendered, making the nunc pro tunc order void. The court vacated the nunc pro tunc judgment and reinstated the original order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume a mediated settlement agreement, mandate, or obvious drafting mistake can be fixed later by nunc pro tunc. Once plenary power expires, a family court can correct only clerical mistakes, and if the signed order is the only evidence of rendition, substantive cleanup is too late. Build a clear rendition record, compare orders line-by-line to the MSA before signing, and move quickly within plenary deadlines if the signed order varies from the agreement.”
In the Interest of R.R., a Child
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed a SAPCR order naming both parents joint managing conservators of a medically fragile child, ordering a week-on/week-off schedule, allocating certain independent decision-making rights, and setting no child support. The mother argued the evidence required greater restrictions because of alleged domestic violence, abuse, intimidation, and medical neglect, and also complained about an asserted reporter’s-record error. Applying the child’s best-interest standard under Texas Family Code § 153.002 and highly deferential abuse-of-discretion review, the court held that the trial judge was entitled to resolve conflicting testimony in the father’s favor, especially where DFPS had ruled out abuse allegations and the medical-neglect proof was underdeveloped. Because no findings of fact were requested, the appellate court implied all findings necessary to support the judgment and concluded the record supported a reasonable best-interest determination.
Litigation Takeaway
“Serious allegations alone rarely win a custody appeal. To overturn a conservatorship ruling, counsel must build a detailed, child-centered record tying abuse, coercive conduct, or medical lapses to concrete harm or risk and must request findings of fact; otherwise, abuse-of-discretion review and implied findings will usually carry the judgment.”
Lacy v. State
COA12
In Lacy v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals considered whether statements made during a domestic-violence investigation should have been suppressed because the defendant was handcuffed when he made them. The court analyzed the distinction between an investigative detention and custody under Miranda and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22, holding that temporary handcuffing for officer safety during an active on-scene investigation does not automatically amount to custody. The court also separately analyzed whether the statements resulted from interrogation, concluding that the body-camera statements were made during an investigative detention and that the patrol-car recording did not show questioning or its functional equivalent reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses. The court affirmed admission of the statements.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume a recorded statement is vulnerable simply because the speaker was handcuffed. In family-violence-related divorce, SAPCR, and protective-order cases, the real questions are whether the person was actually in custody and whether police engaged in interrogation. If the recording arose during temporary scene control or contains volunteered statements, it may remain highly usable in parallel family-law litigation.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Jimmie Wayne Wilson and Amy Elaine Bradshaw
COA12
In this divorce appeal, the Tyler Court of Appeals found that the final decree incorrectly listed the parties’ marriage date as March 24, 2025, even though the petition and both parties’ testimony showed they married on August 25, 2018. The court treated the mistake as a clerical error in a statutorily required recital under Texas Family Code Section 6.712, not a judicial error, and held that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b) allowed it to reform the decree on its own because the appellate record conclusively established the correct date. The court modified the decree to reflect the true marriage date and otherwise affirmed. It also held that the husband waived his complaints about the property division, including issues tied to the Toyota Corolla and alleged inequity, because his appellate briefing was conclusory and lacked supporting authority and record citations.
Litigation Takeaway
“Small decree mistakes can often be fixed on appeal without a remand if the error is purely clerical and the record clearly shows the correct fact. But substantive property-division complaints will go nowhere unless they are thoroughly briefed with legal authority, record citations, and a clear abuse-of-discretion argument.”
Estate of John Anthony Gonzales
COA12
In Estate of Gonzales, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that a woman claiming to be a decedent’s surviving spouse had standing to participate in a contested heirship proceeding because she proved a post-divorce informal marriage at a threshold in limine hearing. After the parties’ 2014 divorce, the claimant presented evidence of a new agreement to be married, cohabitation in Texas as spouses, and holding out to others as married under Texas Family Code section 2.401(a)(2). The court treated standing as an early proof issue under Estates Code section 22.018, deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations, and concluded the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support surviving-spouse status. The court affirmed that once spouse status was established, the claimant was an interested person entitled to participate in the estate case.
Litigation Takeaway
“If marital status is the gateway to standing or property rights, expect Texas courts to decide it early and treat that hearing like the main event. In alleged common-law remarriage cases after divorce, be ready at the threshold hearing to fully prove or disprove a new present agreement to marry, cohabitation as spouses, and consistent holding out—because you may not get a second chance later.”
Marco Castro v. Monica Silva Castro
COA08
In Castro v. Castro, the husband challenged a divorce attorney’s-fees award on appeal, arguing the trial court improperly based the award in part on a temporary spousal-support issue. The El Paso Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the record showed he never preserved the complaint in the trial court. He did not object when wife’s counsel requested to prove fees by affidavit, did not object to the affidavit after it was filed, did not challenge the interim fee ruling, and did not object to the fee provisions in the final decree or later payment-related filings. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a), and relying on authorities treating fee complaints as ordinary preservable error, the court held that any challenge to the legal basis or evidentiary support for the fee award was waived. The court therefore overruled the issue without addressing whether the $15,000 fee award was substantively proper.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to challenge attorney’s fees in a family-law case, you must object in the trial court—early, specifically, and repeatedly if necessary. Silence to affidavit proof, interim rulings, or decree language will likely waive appellate review, even if the fee award may have been vulnerable on the merits.”
In re SBC Transportation, Inc.
COA05
In this mandamus proceeding, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 41.0115 strictly requires a written order expressly finding that the claimant showed a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of an exemplary-damages claim before a trial court may compel net-worth discovery. The trial court had ordered production "in accordance with" section 41.0115 after notice and hearing, but it did not include the required express finding in the order itself. Reading the statute according to its plain text, the court rejected implied findings and incorporation by reference, concluded the trial court abused its discretion, and conditionally granted mandamus because disclosure of confidential net-worth information cannot be adequately remedied on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a statute conditions intrusive financial discovery on a threshold showing and a written finding, the signed order must contain that finding expressly. In family cases involving joined tort claims, punitive theories, or other sensitive financial discovery, do not rely on a general statutory reference—draft and insist on a facially compliant order, because mandamus may be available once private financial information is improperly compelled.”
Larry Wayne Richard v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Larry Wayne Richard v. The State of Texas, the First Court of Appeals held that late disclosure of evidence does not automatically require exclusion under article 39.14(a). The defendant challenged the admission of jail calls disclosed shortly before the punishment phase, but the court, relying on State v. Heath, explained that exclusion requires a willful discovery violation, express or implied, including a failure to exercise reasonable diligence. Because the record showed only late disclosure and did not establish when the State learned of the calls, what efforts it made to obtain them, or that it failed to act diligently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the recordings.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want late-produced evidence excluded, timing alone is not enough. Build a record showing possession, control, when the other side learned of the evidence, and what search or production efforts were or were not made; without proof of willful nondisclosure or lack of reasonable diligence, courts are likely to admit the evidence and consider lesser remedies instead.”
In re Alex Albano Jaramillo and ATL Dump Ends, LLC
COA05
In this original proceeding, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that mandamus was proper when the trial court repeatedly heard discovery motions, made oral rulings, acknowledged that written orders were needed, and then failed for an unreasonable time to sign orders memorializing those rulings. The underlying dispute involved sensitive medical and counseling records, a motion to quash, a protective order, and an independent medical examination. The court applied settled mandamus standards, emphasizing that ruling on properly filed motions is a ministerial duty and that, once the court has orally decided the issues, indefinitely withholding written orders can amount to a failure to rule. Because the lack of signed orders prevented enforcement of subpoenas, delayed discovery, and impaired trial preparation, the relators had no adequate remedy by appeal. The court therefore conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to reduce its oral rulings to written orders.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family cases, oral discovery rulings are not enough when providers, experts, or parties need a signed order to act. If the court has heard the motion, ruled from the bench, and unreasonable delay in signing an order is stalling discovery or trial preparation, build a record of presentment, proposed orders, follow-up requests, and concrete prejudice—then mandamus may be the only effective remedy.”
Kadarrion Kanard Scott v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Scott v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a murder conviction after holding the trial court correctly refused a manslaughter lesser-included instruction because the evidence showed the defendant pointed a gun at another person’s face and fired after a third party pushed his arm, which did not raise a rational inference of mere recklessness. More relevant for family-law practitioners, the court also upheld admission of jail calls and an absent witness’s prior statements under forfeiture-by-wrongdoing principles, where the evidence showed coordinated efforts to keep the subpoenaed witness from appearing or to influence her testimony. The court concluded the calls were highly probative of the witness’s absence and admissibility of her statements, and they survived Rule 403 objections. The judgment was modified and affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a key witness disappears after being subpoenaed, texts, calls, or third-party coordination showing efforts to keep that witness away can be the foundation for admitting the witness’s prior out-of-court statements. In family cases involving protective orders, custody, enforcement, or hidden assets, lawyers should build a tight timeline, preserve communications, and be prepared to prove the causal link between witness tampering and nonappearance.”
Chiles v. State
COA05
In Chiles v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support a capital-murder conviction based on the deaths of a pregnant woman and her unborn child in the same criminal transaction. The court relied on recent prenatal records showing a normal pregnancy, autopsy findings showing no independent fetal abnormality, and the medical examiner’s testimony that the mother’s fatal gunshot wound cut off oxygen to the fetus and caused the fetus’s death. Although the defense highlighted uncertainty about the precise timing of fetal death based on decomposition evidence, the court treated that as a conflict for the factfinder to resolve, not a failure of proof. Applying Jackson legal-sufficiency review, the court held the State did not need to prove the exact moment of fetal death with absolute certainty so long as the cumulative medical and circumstantial evidence allowed a rational jury to find causation and that both deaths occurred during the same criminal transaction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Medical causation does not fail just because an expert cannot identify the exact minute or sequence of injury. In family-violence and expert-driven family-law disputes, a court may uphold causation findings based on the combined force of medical records, expert opinion, and circumstantial facts—especially where the record shows a normal baseline and no persuasive alternative cause.”
State of Texas v. Todd Moffat
COA01
In State of Texas v. Moffat, the First Court of Appeals reversed a habeas order that had set aside a family-violence assault conviction. The applicant argued that photographs, injury evidence, and medical proof were false or misleading because they did not match the complainant’s account and suggested a prior car accident caused the jaw fracture. The court held that false-evidence habeas relief requires more than showing inaccuracies; the challenged evidence must be materially false and material to the conviction. Here, even if some injury-related proof was misleading, it was not central to the guilty verdict because other evidence supported the assault finding. The court also rejected the actual-innocence theory because the relied-on accident evidence and expert analysis were not shown to be truly newly discovered. The court therefore reversed the habeas relief on both grounds.
Litigation Takeaway
“Not every inconsistency in photos, medical records, or witness narratives will justify reopening a judgment. For post-judgment relief, the challenged evidence must be outcome-significant, and any supposedly new evidence must truly be newly discovered rather than a stronger later attack on proof that could have been developed earlier.”
In the Interest of W.W.-R., a Child
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and the trial court’s best-interest finding. The child was born with meconium positive for marijuana, Mother tested positive at delivery, and she continued to test positive for multiple substances throughout the case despite services and treatment opportunities. The court analyzed subsection (E) as requiring a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangers the child, and it held that Mother’s persistent drug use, substance-related visitation concerns, incarceration, and inability to provide or identify a safe placement satisfied that standard. The court further held that the same evidence of chronic substance abuse, instability, prior CPS history, and lack of a stable caregiving plan legally and factually supported the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
“Repeated drug use becomes powerful family-law evidence when it is developed as a pattern tied to parenting risk, instability, incarceration, and the absence of a safe care plan—not just as isolated positive tests. For parents defending these claims, partial service compliance is rarely enough without documented sustained sobriety, stability, and a vetted alternative caregiver.”
Harrison v. State
COA07
In Harrison v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a defendant waived his Rules 403 and 404(b) complaints about pornography-related search-history, image, and video evidence by later telling the trial court he had 'No objection' when the same exhibits were reoffered for publication to the jury. Although defense counsel had initially made specific objections and obtained a running objection, the trial court later required any renewed offer of the exhibits to be brought back for a further ruling after additional predicate was laid. Because counsel did not renew the objections at that later stage—and instead affirmatively accepted the evidence—the court found error was not preserved under Rule 33.1(a). The court also explained that, even if preserved, the trial court would not have abused its discretion because the challenged evidence closely tracked the charged step-family relationship and was probative of intent rather than mere character conformity.
Litigation Takeaway
“A running objection is not bulletproof. If the court defers, conditions, or stages admission of evidence, treat each later offer, publication, or reuse as a fresh preservation moment. Never say 'No objection' to evidence you may want to challenge on appeal; instead, renew the prior objection and obtain a ruling.”
Harrison v. State
COA07
In Harrison v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a defendant waived prior Rule 403 and 404(b) complaints about digital child-sex evidence when, after obtaining a running objection, he later said "No objection" after the trial court required the exhibits to be reoffered before publication to the jury. The court reasoned that the earlier running objection did not preserve error indefinitely once the evidentiary posture changed and the court required a renewed offer and ruling. The court also explained that, even if preserved, the search-history and image evidence was sufficiently probative because it mirrored the alleged familial dynamic and was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
“A running objection is not self-executing forever. If the court requires an exhibit to be reoffered, family law trial counsel must renew the objection or expressly state that the prior objection continues; saying "No objection" will likely waive the issue on appeal.”
Koorasingh v. State
COA05
In Koorasingh v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals rejected a legal-sufficiency challenge to sexual-assault convictions based on timing and limitations language in the jury charge. The defendant argued the State failed to prove the assaults occurred on the exact pleaded date and failed to prove the prosecution was timely because the charge said the offenses had to occur before indictment and not be barred by limitations. The court held that "on or about" pleading does not require proof of the exact date, and sufficiency is measured by the hypothetically correct jury charge rather than unnecessary surplus language in the actual charge. Because limitations was an affirmative defense, not an element of the offense, and the charged child-sex offenses had no applicable limitations bar, the State had no sufficiency burden to prove timeliness merely because the charge referenced it. The court affirmed the judgments.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not let surplus wording in a charge, instruction, pleading, or order become a fake appellate element. In family cases, sufficiency review turns on the statutory predicates actually required for relief, not extra descriptive language about timing, notice, or other facts unless the law truly makes those facts essential or the issue is properly raised as a defense.”
Harrison v. State
COA07
In Harrison v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a party waives an evidentiary complaint when, after previously making Rule 403 and 404(b) objections and obtaining a running objection, counsel later says "No objection" at the point the trial court requires the evidence to be re-offered for publication to the jury. The trial court had deferred final use of certain electronic evidence and expressly required a later ruling before the jury could see it. Because defense counsel affirmatively stated "No objection" at that later offer, the court held error was not preserved under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court also stated that, even if preserved, the challenged evidence was sufficiently probative and closely connected to the charged conduct to survive Rule 403 review.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas trials, preservation is stage-specific: an earlier objection—even a running objection—may not protect you if the court defers admission, publication, or final ruling. When the exhibit comes back up, renew the objection on the record and do not say "No objection" unless you intend to waive the issue.”
Koorasingh v. State
COA05
In Koorasingh v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals upheld convictions for child sexual assault and continuous family violence after the defendant argued the evidence was insufficient because the State did not prove the exact offense date alleged and did not separately prove the prosecutions were timely. The court applied the standard Texas "on or about" rule, holding that the State need not prove the precise date in the indictment so long as the evidence shows the conduct occurred before indictment and within any applicable limitations period. The court also held that limitations is an affirmative defense, not an element the State must prove in its case-in-chief, and because sexual assault of a child had no limitations period here, the absence of separate limitations proof did not undermine the convictions.
Litigation Takeaway
“Approximate dates usually do not defeat a case by themselves. If timing is not a statutory element or a properly raised defense, courts will treat date imprecision as a credibility issue rather than a legal-sufficiency failure. In family law cases involving abuse, family violence, or delayed disclosures, lawyers should distinguish between facts that must be proved and surplus timing language, while preserving true timeliness defenses expressly when timing actually matters.”
In the Interest of S.V.M. and V.I.M., Children
COA05
In In re S.V.M., the Dallas Court of Appeals upheld a divorce court’s decision to invalidate a premarital agreement after finding Wife did not sign it voluntarily under Texas Family Code section 4.006. The agreement was signed the day before the wedding after the parties had traveled for the ceremonies, and the appellate court emphasized that voluntariness is a fact-driven issue heavily dependent on witness credibility and the surrounding execution circumstances. The court also rejected Husband’s complaints about the refusal to make additional findings and about the property division, concluding that his requested findings were largely evidentiary or contrary to the trial court’s credibility determinations and that the record did not show disputed valuation evidence requiring more detailed findings under section 6.711. The court modified the decree only to delete unsupported language stating that Wife’s attorney’s fees were necessary for the support of Wife and the children, and otherwise affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Premarital agreements rise or fall not just on drafting, but on the execution story. If voluntariness is challenged, trial courts have broad room to credit testimony about wedding pressure, timing, lack of meaningful review, and unequal bargaining circumstances—and appellate courts will rarely disturb those credibility calls. For litigators, requests for additional findings should focus on true ultimate issues, not an attempt to relitigate witness credibility.”
Mathis v. State
COA06
In Mathis v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for assault family violence causing bodily injury, holding the evidence was legally sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia. The complainant testified that Mathis hit and choked her during multiple incidents, and her account was corroborated by injury photographs, 9-1-1 calls, family-member testimony, officer observations, rideshare evidence, and Mathis’s own recorded statements. The court emphasized that appellate review does not reweigh credibility disputes and must defer to the jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence when a rational factfinder could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Litigation Takeaway
“Family-violence claims become far more persuasive when testimony is backed by contemporaneous corroboration such as photos, 9-1-1 recordings, officer observations, third-party witnesses, timeline evidence, and party admissions. For family-law cases, Mathis is a strong reminder that credibility attacks alone may fail when the record contains multiple reinforcing sources of proof.”