Weekly Digest
August 8 – August 14, 2026
52 opinions this week
Mitchell v. State
COA14
In Mitchell v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly barred cross-examination of the State’s key eyewitness about prior diagnoses of bipolar disorder, ADHD, and major depression because the defense did not show those conditions affected the witness’s perception, memory, or truthfulness at the time of the events. The court treated the issue as one of relevance and evidentiary foundation, not automatic impeachment or unlimited confrontation. Relying on Texas impeachment and confrontation authorities, the court explained that mental-health diagnoses alone do not create admissible credibility evidence; the proponent must establish a concrete nexus between the condition and testimonial reliability. Because the offer of proof showed only diagnostic history, with no demonstrated impact on the witness’s ability to perceive, recall, or testify truthfully, the exclusion was within the trial court’s discretion and did not violate confrontation rights.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases, a mental-health diagnosis by itself is not fair game for impeachment. If you want to use a witness’s depression, bipolar disorder, ADHD, or similar condition to attack credibility, you need evidence tying that condition to perception, memory, narration, or truthfulness at the relevant time; otherwise, expect a relevance and Rule 403 objection to stick.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Kathryn Marks Smith and Carey Dennis Smith
COA10
In this divorce appeal, the wife challenged the trial court’s characterization of disputed assets as the husband’s separate property and the denial of her reimbursement and interspousal tort claims. While that appeal was pending, she sold real property awarded to her in the decree. The Tenth Court of Appeals applied the acceptance of benefits doctrine, focusing on whether her post-judgment conduct showed dominion over decree-awarded property and whether that conduct made meaningful relief on appeal impracticable. Because her issues could have required remand of the entire community estate for a new just-and-right division under Texas Family Code § 7.001, and because the sold real property had been dissipated and later developed, the court concluded the estate could not be meaningfully restored. The court held that by selling the awarded property, the wife accepted the benefits of the decree and was barred from appealing, so the appeal was dismissed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you plan to appeal a divorce property division, do not sell or materially alter real property awarded in the decree while the appeal is pending. In Texas, characterization and reimbursement complaints often put the entire community estate back in play, and disposing of awarded real estate can trigger the acceptance of benefits doctrine and kill the appeal altogether.”
In the Interest of K.K., a Child
COA10
In *In the Interest of K.K.*, the Waco Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). Mother argued the danger to the child was primarily caused by Father, her brother, and other adults, not by her own conduct. The court rejected that framing and held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient because Mother knowingly exposed K.K. to domestic violence, intoxicated and aggressive adults, unstable housing, and unsafe caregiving conditions, while also becoming severely intoxicated herself and lacking any meaningful safety or housing plan. Applying the clear-and-convincing sufficiency standards from *In re J.F.C.* and *In re C.H.*, the court emphasized that endangerment does not require actual injury and may be shown through a parent’s acts, omissions, and failure to remove the child from known danger. The court held that Mother’s pattern of poor protective choices supported termination under both subsections (D) and (E).
Litigation Takeaway
“A parent cannot avoid endangerment findings by blaming a violent partner, relative, or roommate if the evidence shows the parent knowingly kept the child in that dangerous environment or failed to act. For family-law litigators, the case underscores that pattern evidence—domestic violence exposure, substance abuse, unstable housing, and tolerance of unsafe third parties—can drive not only termination cases but also conservatorship restrictions, supervised access, and emergency custody relief.”
In the Interest of K.J.L., a Child
COA14
In In re K.J.L., the Department shifted mid-trial from seeking termination to seeking appointment of the child’s maternal grandparents as sole managing conservators. The written SAPCR mediated settlement agreement listed the grandparents as parties, but neither grandparent signed or initialed it. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the grandparents had standing to appeal because the decree aggrieved them by imposing conservatorship on them, and it analyzed Texas Family Code section 153.0071(d) strictly: an MSA is binding only if each party to the agreement signs it. Because the trial court rendered judgment on an MSA that expressly included nonsigning parties, the MSA was not binding as a matter of law. The court reversed the conservatorship decree and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not ask a court to render on a family-law MSA until every person identified as a party to the agreement has signed it. If a grandparent, intervenor, or other nonparent is named in the MSA, that signature is not a technicality—it is a statutory requirement for a binding agreement under section 153.0071(d).”
Perry v. State
COA01
In Perry v. State, the defendant argued the trial court improperly admitted a mother’s outcry testimony about abuse acts different from the oral-sex allegation charged in the indictment. The court did not decide whether the outcry ruling was actually wrong; instead, it assumed error and focused on harm under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). Because the complainant herself later testified without objection to the same and more extensive abuse, the challenged testimony was cumulative and could not have affected the verdict except slightly. The court also upheld admission of forensic interview excerpts after defense opening statement suggested no disclosure had occurred, reasoning the evidence was admissible to correct a misleading impression. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Winning an evidentiary objection is not enough to win an appeal if the same facts come in elsewhere without objection. In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, lawyers must preserve objections across the whole record and be careful in opening statement, because broad claims about "no disclosure" can open the door to otherwise disputed interview or outcry evidence.”
In re Triple C Project Services, LLC
COA01
In this mandamus proceeding, the First Court of Appeals held that a company’s post-incident witness interview notes and internal meeting minutes were protected as non-core work product under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.5. After a workplace death, the company’s nonlawyer representatives gathered information following OSHA involvement and advice from outside risk and safety professionals, and the company president supplied an uncontroverted declaration showing the investigation was conducted in anticipation of OSHA proceedings and wrongful-death litigation rather than in the ordinary course of business. The court rejected arguments that the materials lost protection because no lawyer created them or because suit had not yet been filed, and it further held the plaintiffs failed to prove substantial need and undue hardship because witness identities and contact information had been produced, some witnesses had already been deposed, and OSHA materials provided alternative sources. The trial court therefore abused its discretion by ordering production, and mandamus relief was conditionally granted.
Litigation Takeaway
“Work product protection is not limited to lawyers. If nonlawyer representatives create witness notes or internal summaries after a triggering event when litigation is substantially likely, those materials can remain protected if the resisting party builds a strong evidentiary record showing anticipation of litigation and not ordinary business practice. On the other side, a party seeking the materials must prove real substantial need and undue hardship—not just that contemporaneous notes would be useful.”
In the Interest of M.A. Jr. and N.A., Children
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Family Code section 161.001(f) requires more than a boilerplate finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return children to their parents before termination. Although the court reviewed and largely upheld the underlying termination-related findings on endangerment and best interest, it distinguished between evidentiary sufficiency and statutory compliance in the written order. Because the termination order contained only a conclusory reasonable-efforts recital and did not specifically state what reunification efforts the Department made, the order failed to satisfy the statute. The court therefore affirmed the remaining supported findings in part, but reversed and remanded in part for entry of a statutorily compliant order.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a statute requires specific findings, generic order language is not enough. In termination cases and beyond, family-law practitioners should draft and review final orders line by line to ensure the judgment itself contains the particularized findings the statute requires, because a defective order can create reversible error even if the evidence otherwise supports the result.”
Larry Franklin v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Franklin v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a defendant in a revocation proceeding preserved no appellate complaint about the denial of a continuance because he requested only an oral continuance during the hearing and never filed a written, sworn motion as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 29.03 and 29.08. Franklin tried to frame the issue as both a due-process violation and ineffective assistance, but the court rejected any exception to the written-and-sworn requirement. The court also found the direct-appeal ineffective-assistance record inadequate because appointed counsel announced ready, explained that he had met with Franklin multiple times and prepared for the hearing, and the record showed that Franklin refused to cooperate. The revocation orders and ten-year sentences were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you need a continuance, preserve it the right way. In family law and protective-order-related proceedings, a last-minute oral request—especially after announcing ready—will rarely support appellate relief. File the motion in the form the governing rules require, verify it when necessary, and make a specific record showing diligence and concrete prejudice.”
In re Makayla Montoya-Frazier and Buckle Bunnies Fund
COA02
In this original proceeding, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a Texas Rule 202 presuit deposition petition without admissible evidence to support Rule 202.4’s required findings. The petitioner relied mainly on a verified petition, briefing, and news articles to justify deposing anticipated defendants and obtaining broad document production, while the respondents offered evidence of burden. The court explained that Rule 202 is an exceptional presuit procedure and that the required findings must be supported by competent evidence—not pleadings, attorney argument, or unauthenticated media materials. Because the targets were anticipated defendants, the Rule 202 order was ancillary and not appealable, so mandamus was the proper remedy. The court conditionally granted mandamus, ordered the trial court to vacate the order granting the petition and deny it, and dismissed the attempted appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Rule 202 is not a shortcut to pre-lawsuit merits discovery. If you want a presuit deposition, especially against an anticipated defendant, you must present admissible evidence showing either that the deposition will prevent a failure or delay of justice or that its likely benefit outweighs its burden. If the other side gets a Rule 202 order without that proof, mandamus may be the fastest and best fix.”
Rullman v. Rullman
COA02
In Rullman v. Rullman, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a Tarrant County divorce because neither spouse satisfied Texas Family Code § 6.301 when suit was filed. The dispute centered on whether the wife’s stays at a Fort Worth house owned by the parties amounted to Texas domicile for six months and Tarrant County residence for ninety days, despite the couple’s longstanding life in Colorado and evidence that her time in Texas was intermittent, temporary, and tied to marital turmoil and travel. Applying settled law that domicile requires both physical presence and intent to make Texas a fixed and permanent home, and that county residence likewise requires actual living in the county with good-faith intent to remain, the court deferred to the trial court’s fact findings. It held that ownership of Texas property, repeated stays, and family connections were not enough to prove the required intent or continuity, so dismissal of the divorce action was proper.
Litigation Takeaway
“Treat Family Code § 6.301 as a threshold proof issue, not a pleading formality: before filing in Texas, confirm the full six-month domicile and ninety-day county residence periods with objective evidence showing an actual, permanent move, because temporary stays, second homes, and frequent travel can get a divorce case dismissed after significant litigation.”
Wilcox v. Duran
COA02
In Wilcox v. Duran, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered whether two counterclaims arising from a bitter custody-related dispute—abuse of process and a claim based on allegedly false police reports—could be dismissed under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. The court first held the TCPA motion was timely because the counterclaims were newly added by amended pleading and contained different elements, creating a new 60-day deadline under Montelongo. But on the merits, the court held the movant failed to meet the TCPA’s threshold burden to show the claims were based on, related to, or in response to protected petitioning or free speech. The court focused on the gravamen of the claims: misuse of legal process and knowingly false reporting, not protected advocacy itself. Because simply characterizing litigation conduct or police communications as protected activity was not enough, the court affirmed denial of TCPA dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law-related tort fights, do not assume the TCPA automatically applies just because the alleged misconduct involved court filings, procedural tools, or police reports. Courts will look at the gravamen of the claim, and allegations of abuse of process or knowingly false reporting may fall outside Chapter 27 altogether. For movants, win step one with a precise statutory fit before arguing evidence; for nonmovants, frame the claim around wrongful misuse or falsity rather than protected communications.”
In the Interest of B.K.M. and J.J.M.S., Minor Children
COA08
In In re B.K.M., the father filed a modification suit after a prior child-support order naming the maternal grandmother as sole managing conservator was declared void. He sought to recover alleged support overpayments and damages tied to that void order, but the court held that a modification case under the Texas Family Code is limited to changing conservatorship, possession, and support prospectively, not awarding reimbursement or damages for payments made under prior orders unless a separate, properly pleaded cognizable claim supports that relief. The court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to award overpayment reimbursement, and it also upheld the modification order addressing current conservatorship, possession, and child support based on best-interest evidence, the children’s in-camera interview, and the father’s incomplete income proof.
Litigation Takeaway
“Pick the right procedural vehicle and plead the right remedy. A Texas modification suit can fix conservatorship, possession, and support going forward, and may allow arrears recalculation, but it is not a catch-all way to claw back prior child-support payments or seek damages from a void order without an independent, properly pleaded claim.”
Daniel Rincones v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Rincones v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld admission of evidence that the defendant allegedly forced sexual acts on his wife during the same episode as the charged family-violence assault. The defense argued the sexual-assault allegations were uncharged extraneous misconduct and too prejudicial under Texas Rule of Evidence 403. The court treated the evidence as same-transaction contextual evidence because it was intertwined with the assaultive conduct and helped the jury understand the full course of violence, the complainant’s emotional state, and the medical history given for treatment. Applying Rule 403, the court held the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, especially because the State did not overemphasize the sexual allegations and the trial court gave a limiting instruction. The conviction for assault causing bodily injury was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“When sexual coercion or other inflammatory misconduct is part of the same violent episode, courts may admit it if it genuinely helps explain the event rather than simply attacking character. For family-law litigators, the key fight is Rule 403: proponents should frame the evidence as necessary context tied to a live issue like family violence, fear, or danger, while opponents should push for redaction, narrower alternatives, and a record showing the evidence is being used mainly for emotional impact.”
In the Interest of G.W. and M.W., Children
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals dismissed Mother’s appeal from an order terminating her rights to only two of three children in a pending SAPCR. Applying Lehmann finality principles, the court examined the live pleadings and record, noted that claims involving the third child and that child’s father remained pending, and found no severance, abandonment, or clear finality language. Because the order resolved fewer than all parties and claims and was not independently appealable under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a), the court held the order was interlocutory and dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“In multi-child or multi-party family cases, do not assume a major ruling is immediately appealable. Before filing a notice of appeal, confirm that every party and claim has been disposed of, or obtain a severance or clear abandonment; otherwise the appeal may be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”
Larry Franklin v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Franklin v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed revocation of Larry Franklin’s community supervision for stalking and protective-order violations after rejecting his complaint that the trial court should have continued the revocation hearing. Franklin orally asked for “a continuance or a reset,” arguing he had Fifth Amendment concerns and was not in agreement with counsel, but he did not file a written, sworn motion. The court held that under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 29.03 and 29.08, a continuance request must be written and verified, and an oral request preserves nothing for appellate review. The court further held that labeling the request as a due-process, right-to-counsel, or Fifth Amendment issue did not create an exception to those preservation requirements. The court also noted the record showed counsel had met with Franklin repeatedly and that Franklin failed to show specific prejudice from proceeding. The revocation judgments were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you need a continuance in a procedurally sensitive case—especially one involving protective orders, contempt, enforcement, or overlapping criminal exposure—do not rely on an oral request. Put the motion in writing, verify it when required, and make a concrete record of specific prejudice; constitutional buzzwords will not rescue a defective continuance request on appeal.”
Nichelle-Marie Guadalupe v. Benjamin Rodriguez
COA03
In Guadalupe v. Rodriguez, the father sought to modify conservatorship to obtain the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence, alleging the children—both at least 12—would express that preference in an in-chambers interview. After a bench trial and off-the-record child interviews, the trial court granted the modification. On appeal, the mother argued the court erred by not ensuring a record of the interviews. The Austin Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that Texas Family Code section 153.009(f) requires a record only if a party, the amicus attorney, the attorney ad litem, or the court affirmatively requests one. Because no one requested a record, there was no trial-court error. The court further held that the missing interview transcript was treated as omitted evidentiary material supporting the judgment, not as presumptively harmful error, and it affirmed the conservatorship modification.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want an appellate record of a child’s in-chambers interview, you must expressly request it under Family Code 153.009(f). Otherwise, the lack of a transcript will not be reversible error, and on appeal the missing interview may be presumed to support the custody ruling—making it much harder to overturn a conservatorship or modification order.”
Milan Paul Hlavina Von Bielka v. Hanna Kotlanova Hlavina Von Bielka
COA14
In Von Bielka, the husband tried to set aside a 2015 default divorce decree through a bill of review filed more than seven years later, arguing the decree was void because substituted service was defective and the wife did not satisfy Texas divorce residency requirements. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether the decree was truly void, because only a void judgment escapes the four-year limitations period for bills of review. The court upheld the trial court’s findings that substituted service at the Houston address was valid and that the wife met the domicile and county-residency requirements under Family Code sections 6.301 and 6.308 despite significant ties to the Czech Republic. Because the decree was not void as to the divorce and property division, the ordinary four-year limitations period applied, and the husband’s late attack was barred.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to protect a default divorce decree, build a clean record on service and residency from day one. If you want to attack an old decree after four years, you need hard proof of a true jurisdictional defect that makes the judgment void—not just evidence the decree may have been wrong or unfair.”
In the Interest of J.M.H., a Child
COA06
Mother and Stepfather sought to terminate Father’s parental rights so Stepfather could adopt the child after Father was convicted of ten felony counts of possession of child pornography and sentenced to consecutive prison terms. The Texarkana Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(P) because Father knowingly engaged in criminal conduct, was imprisoned as a result, and official TDCJ records showed he would remain confined for well over two years from the petition’s filing date. The court rejected Father’s testimony about possible earlier release as speculative and also found the record showed he had no adequate care arrangement for the child during incarceration. The same evidence—along with the child’s stable home with Mother and Stepfather, Father’s lack of support and limited contact, and Stepfather’s intent to adopt—supported the best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2).
Litigation Takeaway
“In imprisonment-ground termination cases, the conviction alone is not enough: build the record with the petition filing date, prison records, parole and release evidence, and proof the incarcerated parent has no concrete care plan for the child. For the defending parent, speculative parole testimony will usually fail unless backed by records and a realistic caregiving arrangement.”
Amber Nicole Perez v. Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests (SNAP), Inc.
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed and dissolved a temporary injunction against Amber Nicole Perez because the written order did not strictly comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. Although the trial court had orally indicated SNAP showed potential harm, the order itself failed to state the reasons for issuance and failed to set the case for trial on the merits. Applying settled Texas authority that Rule 683 must be satisfied within the four corners of the injunction order, the court held the defects rendered the injunction void and limited the appellate remedy to reversal, dissolution, and remand.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas, a temporary injunction can be lost on appeal even when the underlying facts may support relief if the written order does not strictly comply with Rule 683. Family law lawyers seeking injunctions should ensure the signed order itself states case-specific reasons for irreparable harm and includes a trial setting; lawyers opposing injunctions should check for these facial defects before litigating the merits.”
In the Interest of V.L.G. and J.M.A. Jr., Children
COA13
After a 2018 final order denied termination but left the Department as permanent managing conservator, the Department refiled under Texas Family Code § 161.004. The court compared circumstances at the time of the earlier order with those at the 2025 trial and held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to show a material and substantial change: the father had since been indicted, convicted of injury to a child, and sentenced to sixty years in prison, and the children had moved from instability to a successful long-term foster placement where they were bonded, thriving, and seeking permanency. The court also upheld the endangerment findings under § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and affirmed termination in full.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a prior order denies termination, that does not end the case forever. For any family-law case involving a changed-circumstances standard, the winning strategy is a tight 'then versus now' record showing specific post-order developments—especially criminal convictions, incarceration, placement changes, and the child’s current need for stability and permanency.”
Kamel v. Zacharko
COA05
In Kamel v. Zacharko, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a one-year protective order under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 7B.003 after finding sufficient evidence that the respondent stalked his former dating partner. The record showed a continuing course of unwanted electronic conduct after the relationship ended, including repeated texts at odd hours, dozens of rapid-fire messages, threats to disclose intimate information and alleged photos or videos to the applicant’s family and children, direct messages to the applicant’s minor child about personal matters, and a false HIV message intended to alarm her. The court distinguished an earlier appeal involving a dissolved temporary injunction under Rule 683, explaining that Chapter 7B protective-order relief is a separate statutory remedy. Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard and Penal Code section 42.072’s stalking elements, the court held the trial court had reasonable grounds to believe stalking occurred and that the final protective order was properly issued. It also rejected procedural complaints about the temporary ex parte order because the final hearing cured those issues and the evidence independently supported the final order.
Litigation Takeaway
“When post-breakup conduct consists of repeated unwanted digital contact, threats to expose intimate information, or alarming communications involving children, family lawyers should evaluate Chapter 7B stalking-based protective-order relief instead of relying only on temporary-injunction practice. Build the record around the statutory stalking elements: a course of conduct, the applicant’s actual reaction, the objective reasonable-person standard, and why future conduct is likely without court intervention.”
In the Interest of L.Q.-W., L.W., and L.W., Children
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a mother’s parental rights after evidence showed she attempted suicide by ingesting antifreeze and alcohol while she was the sole caregiver for three very young children. The court held that this incident, combined with her untreated mental-health issues, failure to complete services, minimal visitation, and failure to appear at trial, was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment findings under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court also upheld the best-interest finding and affirmed denial of placement with the children’s grandfather because the record supported the trial court’s conclusion that his home was not a safe relative placement.
Litigation Takeaway
“A mental-health crisis can support an endangerment finding when the evidence ties the episode to immediate danger to the children, especially where the parent is the only available caregiver. Relative placement is never automatic—family members must prove their home is presently safe, and preservation and briefing defects can sink appellate complaints.”
James Forrest v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Forrest v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for aggravated assault by threat with a deadly weapon after the defendant argued the evidence was too inconsistent to support the verdict. The complainant testified that Forrest pointed a gun at him, threatened to kill him, and fired during the encounter; officers recovered physical evidence—including shell casings, a bullet hole, and injuries consistent with a struggle—that generally corroborated that account. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court held that credibility disputes, conflicting testimony, and incomplete forensic details were for the jury to resolve, and that the offense was complete once Forrest threatened imminent bodily injury while using or exhibiting the firearm. The court also rejected a jury-charge complaint, concluding the evidence did not require a voluntary-act instruction because the alleged conduct included Forrest’s voluntary act of pointing the gun.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a case turns on a firearm-backed threat, the factfinder may credit one party’s account even if the stories conflict and the physical evidence is not perfectly neat. For family-law cases involving protective orders, custody restrictions, or temporary orders, Forrest is a useful authority for the point that pointing a gun and threatening harm can be enough if the surrounding evidence materially supports the complainant’s version.”
In re Makayla Montoya-Frazier and Buckle Bunnies Fund
COA02
In this Fort Worth mandamus proceeding, Zach Maxwell sought presuit discovery under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 from Makayla Montoya-Frazier and Buckle Bunnies Fund, claiming he needed a deposition and documents to investigate potential claims and avoid a failure or delay of justice. The court held that Rule 202.4’s required findings cannot rest on a verified petition, attachments, or attorney argument alone; the petitioner must present admissible evidence showing either that the likely benefit of the requested discovery outweighs its burden or expense, or that the discovery is needed to prevent a failure or delay of justice. Because Maxwell failed to provide competent evidence supporting either pathway, the trial court abused its discretion by granting the petition. The court dismissed the attempted appeal for lack of jurisdiction, treated the matter as mandamus because the targets were anticipated defendants, and conditionally granted mandamus directing the trial court to vacate the Rule 202 order and deny the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
“Rule 202 is an extraordinary presuit tool, not a shortcut to ordinary discovery. If you want presuit discovery, build a real evidentiary record with admissible proof of necessity and burden-benefit; if you oppose it, attack unsupported allegations, hearsay attachments, and attorney argument, and be prepared to pursue mandamus when the order targets an anticipated defendant.”
In re Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA02
In this original proceeding, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could extend a CPS dismissal deadline after a monitored return to a parent failed. DFPS filed a Chapter 262 case, the court later ordered a monitored return under Family Code Section 263.403, and after the return failed, the trial court set a new dismissal date under Section 263.403(c). The trial court then later purported to extend that deadline under Section 263.401(b) and reset trial beyond the Section 263.403(c) date. The appellate court analyzed the statutory scheme and held that once a monitored return is ordered and later revoked, Section 263.403(c) controls the operative dismissal deadline. Because Section 263.403 creates its own deadline framework, Section 263.401(b) cannot be used to add another extension after the post-removal deadline has been set. The court conditionally granted mandamus, holding that the extension order was an abuse of discretion and that appeal was inadequate because jurisdiction would be lost automatically if trial did not begin by the Section 263.403(c) deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
“In CPS cases, and in family cases that intersect with them, statutory dismissal deadlines are jurisdictional and cannot be stretched by agreement or routine continuance practice. Once a monitored return fails, immediately recalculate the deadline under Section 263.403(c) and make sure trial starts by that date; if the court sets trial beyond it, preserve the issue and consider mandamus quickly.”
In the Interest of O.P.R., A.J.R. and H.T.R., Children
COA05
In this Dallas divorce appeal, the court affirmed a decree giving the parents a 50/50 possession schedule and ordering no child support. Mother argued the trial court should have used a standard or expanded standard possession order and should not have deviated from guideline support. Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, the court held the trial judge could credit evidence that Father was heavily involved in the children’s daily care, consistently exercised his time, and was the parent the children turned to for comfort, while also considering evidence of Mother’s supervision and medical-judgment lapses, including the peanut-allergy incident. Because the record supported the best-interest finding for equal possession, the court also held the trial court acted within its discretion in deviating from guideline child support and ordering that neither parent pay support. The court rejected Mother’s remaining procedural and constitutional complaints and affirmed the decree in full.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want 50/50 possession and no child support in a Texas family case, win it with detailed best-interest evidence about actual caregiving, availability, supervision, and how the schedule works in real life. On appeal, these rulings are highly deferential, so trial-level record building, damaging admissions, and error preservation usually decide the case.”
In re Estate of Sherri Michele Gillette, Deceased
COA07
After a wife was killed before her divorce was finalized, her estate remained in an open probate proceeding while the administrator later sued the husband in district court over will and beneficiary issues. When the husband later sought similar relief in probate, the administrator argued res judicata based on the district-court judgments. The Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment, holding that res judicata failed because the movant did not conclusively prove the earlier district-court judgments were rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. The court explained that the Declaratory Judgments Act does not create subject-matter jurisdiction, and a district court’s general jurisdiction alone does not establish authority over probate-centered claims tied to an open estate administration.
Litigation Takeaway
“Before relying on res judicata in probate-adjacent family disputes, prove the first court actually had subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims. Declaratory-judgment labels and general district-court jurisdiction are not enough when the dispute belongs in probate.”
Jason Gregory Noble v. The State of Texas
COA09
In Jason Gregory Noble v. State of Texas, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a motion for new trial after Noble’s aggravated assault-family violence conviction. Noble argued that a post-trial affidavit from the complainant warranted a new trial as newly discovered evidence and showed the State relied on false evidence. The court held the affidavit did not satisfy the new-trial standard because it was largely cumulative of credibility issues already present at trial, served mainly to impeach the State’s proof, and was unlikely to change the result given the State’s corroborating evidence, including medical records, photographs, body-camera footage, and third-party testimony. The court also rejected the false-evidence claim, explaining that a later recanting or contradictory affidavit from a non-testifying complainant does not establish a due-process violation without proof that materially false evidence was actually used at trial and probably affected the verdict.
Litigation Takeaway
“Later recantations are not magic bullets. In family-violence-related family law cases, lawyers should build or attack the case with contemporaneous, corroborating evidence—medical records, photos, body-cam, and third-party witnesses—because a post-judgment affidavit that merely changes the story will often be treated as impeachment-only and insufficient to reopen the case.”
In the Interest of B.M., III, a Child
COA06
After the child’s mother died, the child’s maternal uncle and father each sought conservatorship. The father challenged the uncle’s standing, arguing that as the surviving parent his own claim defeated any right of the uncle to bring the SAPCR. The court rejected that argument and analyzed standing under Texas Family Code § 102.003(a)(9), which turns on whether the claimant proved actual care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months ending within ninety days before suit. Because the evidence showed the child had lived with the uncle for years, remained with him after the mother’s death, and that the uncle exercised a continuous day-to-day caregiving role, the uncle satisfied the statute. The court held that a parent’s competing conservatorship request goes to the merits, not jurisdiction, and affirmed the judgment appointing the uncle sole managing conservator.
Litigation Takeaway
“In nonparent SAPCR cases, standing is claimant-specific and fact-driven: if your client can prove six months of actual care, control, and possession within the statutory window, a parent’s competing conservatorship claim does not automatically knock the case out. Build the record around daily caregiving facts, dates, and continuity—not just kinship or best-interest concerns.”
Williams v. Nunnally-Williams
COA04
In Williams v. Nunnally-Williams, the former wife sought to enforce a divorce decree awarding her part of the husband’s thrift savings plan after she discovered most of the funds had been withdrawn before transfer. The husband argued the suit was barred by Family Code section 9.003(a)’s two-year deadline and filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The court rejected that approach, holding section 9.003(a) is not jurisdictional because the statute contains no clear statement tying timely filing to the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, it is a limitations defense that must be pleaded and proved as an affirmative defense. Even treating the husband’s plea as a summary-judgment motion under Rule 71, the court held he failed to conclusively prove that section 9.003(a) applied to the wife’s constructive-trust and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims or that the property fit the statute’s scope. The court affirmed the judgment for the wife.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not use Family Code section 9.003 as a plea-to-the-jurisdiction shortcut in post-divorce property enforcement cases. If you want to rely on it, plead limitations, use the correct procedural vehicle, and bring evidence proving the statute applies to each claim and each type of property at issue.”
In re Environment Plus, Inc., R. Alexander Conant, and Joshua Eames-Cepero
COA03
In this mandamus proceeding, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a trial court in a garnishment case could not impose Rule 13 or Chapter 10 sanctions for allegedly sanctionable pleadings filed earlier in a separate contract case. The court analyzed sanctions jurisdiction as proceeding-specific, not dispute-specific, and concluded that once the original case was separate—and its sanctions request had already been dismissed after plenary power expired—the garnishment action could not be used to revive sanctions authority over filings from that prior cause. The portions of the sanctions order tied to the earlier contract suit were therefore void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and were vacated by conditional mandamus. The court denied mandamus as to sanctions based on conduct within the garnishment proceeding itself because those complaints were not jurisdictional and the relators failed to make the evidentiary showing required to prove that immediate payment would so impair litigation that appeal was inadequate.
Litigation Takeaway
“Sanctions under Rule 13 and Chapter 10 must be sought in the same cause number where the challenged filing occurred. In family-law practice, courts and lawyers cannot bundle conduct from a divorce, modification, enforcement, turnover, or garnishment matter into one later sanctions order just because the disputes involve the same parties. If a court sanctions conduct from a separate proceeding, that portion of the order is vulnerable as void and mandamus may be the fastest fix.”
Terrell v. Duke
COA04
In Terrell v. Duke, the wife appealed a divorce decree that resolved property division, conservatorship, possession, child support, name-change, and competing tort claims after a lengthy jury trial. But she did not secure a reporter’s record. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that most of her complaints—including challenges tied to an alleged premarital agreement, a prior SAPCR order, evidentiary sufficiency, juror-contact complaints, mistrial, and sanctions—depended on the trial evidence or events occurring during trial. Applying longstanding Texas appellate rules, the court presumed the omitted evidence supported the judgment, explained that documents in the clerk’s record are not evidence merely because they were filed, and concluded it could not assess error or harm without the trial record. The court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to win a family-law appeal, you need the record. Without a reporter’s record, Texas appellate courts will usually presume the evidence supports the judgment, making challenges to property division, conservatorship, support, premarital-agreement enforcement, and trial-conduct rulings effectively dead on arrival.”
Ronald White v. The State of Texas
COA07
In White v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a defendant who had preserved hearsay objections to a child’s recorded outcry lost those complaints by later telling the trial court “no objection” when the recording was formally offered before the jury. The court applied Texas preservation rules, especially Dean v. State and Thomas v. State, and concluded the record did not plainly show that counsel’s statement was merely procedural or not intended as abandonment. The court also held that a vague reference to “unfair prejudice” did not preserve a Rule 403 complaint and that an appellate challenge to outcry testimony failed because it did not match the objections made at trial. The court therefore rejected the evidentiary complaints on preservation grounds rather than reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
“Preservation can be lost at the moment evidence is admitted. In family law trials, if you object pretrial or outside the factfinder’s presence, do not later say “no objection” when the exhibit is offered unless you intend to waive the issue. Renew the objection, obtain a running objection, or clearly state the exhibit is admitted subject to your prior objection. Also, state Rule 403 specifically and make sure your appellate argument matches your trial objection.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Kara Bagley and Jason Bagley and in the Interest of J.B. and K.B., Children
COA12
In Bagley, the Tyler Court of Appeals reversed a child-support award because the trial court set Jason Bagley’s net monthly resources at $7,237.18 without any evidence of his actual income. The record showed only that he was employed and paid certain expenses, but it did not include pay stubs, tax returns, employer records, or testimony quantifying wages or other income under Texas Family Code § 154.062. The court held that monthly expenses and isolated payments cannot be used to reverse-engineer net resources. It distinguished cases allowing expense evidence to impeach reported income when actual income evidence already exists, and concluded that using expenses as a substitute for statutory resource proof was an abuse of discretion. The child-support portion of the decree was reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not expect a court to infer child-support income from lifestyle or expense evidence alone. To support a guideline award, put actual § 154.062 resource evidence in the record—or expressly proceed under the minimum-wage presumption in § 154.068 if income proof is unavailable.”
In the Matter of K.J.F., a Juvenile
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order transferring K.J.F. from TJJD to TDCJ on a determinate sentence despite evidence of a low IQ and an asserted intellectual-disability claim. The court applied an abuse-of-discretion standard and focused on the statutory transfer factors, including the seriousness of the underlying offenses, K.J.F.’s extensive violent and disciplinary history in custody, the services TJJD provided, his minimal progress in treatment, and ongoing public-safety concerns. The court held that low IQ or alleged intellectual disability is relevant but not dispositive and does not categorically bar transfer when the overall record supports a finding that rehabilitation has failed and continued confinement in TJJD is not appropriate.
Litigation Takeaway
“Diagnostic labels rarely win family-law-style discretionary cases by themselves. Whether the issue is custody, modification, placement, or restrictions, courts will usually give more weight to actual conduct, service history, safety risks, and measurable functioning than to IQ scores or disability labels standing alone.”
In the Interest of B.R.M. and M.M.M., Children
COA07
In this SAPCR modification appeal after a jury trial, the mother challenged the evidence supporting an order naming the father sole managing conservator and awarding attorney’s fees against her. The Amarillo Court of Appeals focused first on preservation, explaining that after a jury trial a legal-sufficiency complaint must be preserved through a recognized vehicle such as a directed-verdict motion, JNOV, charge objection, motion to disregard, or a motion for new trial specifically raising no-evidence grounds. Although the mother filed a post-judgment motion for reconsideration, the court held that even if treated as a motion for new trial, it was too general and did not specifically assert legal insufficiency, so the complaint was not preserved. The court also held she failed to show harmful error regarding juror questions and alleged inattentiveness, and that her factual-sufficiency and attorney’s-fee complaints were inadequately briefed. The modification order and fee award were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a family-law case is tried to a jury, do not assume you can raise a no-evidence complaint for the first time on appeal. Preserve legal sufficiency with a specific directed-verdict motion, charge objection, JNOV, motion to disregard, or motion for new trial that clearly identifies the challenged finding and says why the evidence is legally insufficient; a generic motion to reconsider will not do the job.”
Next Level Automotive, LLC v. Allied Solutions, LLC
COA07
In Next Level Automotive, LLC v. Allied Solutions, LLC, the Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed a no-answer default judgment because the record did not affirmatively show strict compliance with Texas service rules. The return on file appeared to relate only to a writ of sequestration, not service of the citation and petition, and it contained impossible dates showing process was received and returned before the citation was even issued. Applying Rule 124 and Texas Supreme Court precedent requiring strict compliance in default cases, the court held the defective return failed to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Because valid service was not shown on the face of the record, the default judgment was void and the case was reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“Default judgments in Texas family-law cases are only as strong as the service record. Before taking a default divorce, SAPCR, modification, or enforcement order, make sure the clerk’s file clearly proves service of the correct citation and live petition, with a compliant return and coherent dates; if the record requires inference, the default is vulnerable to reversal.”
Hurt v. Goswami
COA05
In Hurt v. Goswami, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that documents produced in discovery are not automatically self-authenticating just because they came from the opposing party. The appellants tried to rely on the appellees’ expert designation and discovery responses as summary-judgment evidence, but the court explained that Rule 902 did not make those materials self-authenticating and Rule 193.7 applied only if the proponent showed notice of intended use and no timely good-faith authenticity objection. Because the record did not show Rule 193.7 notice, the trial court properly excluded the exhibits as unauthenticated. The court also upheld exclusion of other exhibits on relevance grounds, found any error harmless, and affirmed admission of fee testimony under Rule 193.6.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to use the other side’s produced documents in a summary judgment, hearing, or trial, do not assume production alone authenticates them. Build a Rule 193.7 record by giving notice, preserving proof of service, and addressing any authenticity objection, or be prepared to authenticate the documents another way.”
In the Interest of A.V.
COA04
In In the Interest of A.V., the Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights. The dispute on appeal was whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support termination, especially under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E), which requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being. The court analyzed the father’s repeated domestic violence against the mother, failure to complete core court-ordered services, refusal or failure to submit to drug testing, inconsistent participation in intervention programs, and minimal visitation with the child as a single pattern of endangering conduct rather than isolated shortcomings. It held that this cumulative evidence, together with the child’s stability in a relative placement and the father’s weak bond with the child, was sufficient to support subsection (E), best interest, and the judgment terminating his parental rights.
Litigation Takeaway
“Pattern beats piecemeal explanations. In Texas family-law cases, repeated domestic violence, missed services, skipped drug tests, and weak parent-child contact can be woven into one persuasive endangerment narrative. Lawyers seeking restrictions or termination should present these facts cumulatively; lawyers defending against them must build documented compliance and engagement early, because courts will not excuse each problem in isolation when the overall record shows instability and disengagement.”
M.B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In M.B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the Third Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court order terminating a father’s parental rights to two children after appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no meritorious issues for appeal. The court independently reviewed the entire record, as required in Anders cases, and specifically examined the trial court’s endangerment findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) because those findings carry collateral consequences in future parent-child litigation. Finding no nonfrivolous issue as to the predicate grounds, best-interest finding, or any other aspect of the decree, the court affirmed. The court also denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, holding under In re P.M. that appointed counsel’s duties continue through any proceedings in the Supreme Court of Texas, including filing an Anders-compliant petition for review if requested by the client.
Litigation Takeaway
“Even when an appeal appears hopeless, Texas termination cases require careful record review and special attention to endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E), because those findings can affect future family-law cases. For trial lawyers, the lesson is to fully develop and preserve the record on child-endangerment allegations; for appointed appellate counsel, filing an Anders brief does not end the representation.”
Terrell v. Duke
COA04
In Terrell v. Duke, the wife appealed a divorce decree raising numerous challenges to property division, conservatorship-related rulings, tort findings, and trial-management decisions. But no reporter’s record was filed after her effort to obtain it without cost failed. The court of appeals held that an appellant bears the burden to provide a sufficient record showing reversible error, and without a reporter’s record it must presume the omitted trial evidence supports the judgment. Applying that rule, the court concluded it could not review complaints that depended on trial evidence, including alleged conflict with a premarital agreement, alleged inconsistency with a prior SAPCR order not included in the record, legal- and factual-sufficiency challenges, and complaints about juror contact, mistrial, sanctions, and evidentiary rulings. Because the missing record foreclosed meaningful review, the court affirmed the divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“If your appeal depends on what happened at trial, you need the reporter’s record. In Texas family-law appeals, arguments about property division, conservatorship, prior orders, premarital agreements, tort findings, sanctions, and evidentiary error will usually fail without it because the appellate court will presume the missing evidence supports the judgment.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Michelle DeJean and Robert Dean DeJean, Jr.
COA05
In this Dallas divorce appeal, the husband challenged several parts of the decree, including an award of contingent appellate attorney’s fees to the wife. The court affirmed the trial court’s property division, waste findings, and treatment of trial-level fees, but it separately analyzed whether the evidence supported conditional appellate fees. Applying Rohrmoos and Yowell, the court held that testimony giving only bottom-line amounts for an unsuccessful appeal and Supreme Court review was conclusory because it did not explain the expected appellate work, hours, rates, or other Arthur Andersen reasonableness factors. Because the evidence was legally insufficient, the court reversed the contingent appellate fee award and rendered a take-nothing judgment on those fees while otherwise affirming the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want contingent appellate fees in a family-law judgment, do not offer only a lump-sum number. Build a record with opinion testimony showing the anticipated appellate tasks, projected hours, rates, and why each stage-specific fee is reasonable and necessary under Arthur Andersen, or the fee award is vulnerable to reversal and rendition.”
Thomas McClendon v. The State of Texas
COA07
In McClendon v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether a trial court’s exclusion of the defendant’s out-of-court statements to a friend during a police pursuit required reversal. The defendant argued the statements were admissible under the present-sense-impression or excited-utterance exceptions and supported his defense that he did not realize officers were trying to stop him. The appellate court assumed, without deciding, that excluding the statements was error, but held the error harmless under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). In reaching that result, the court reviewed the entire record and concluded the same defensive theory reached the jury through other evidence, including the friend’s admissible observations that the defendant sounded confused and the defendant’s own detailed testimony about his state of mind. Because the excluded statements were cumulative and even partly double-edged, the court had fair assurance the ruling did not affect the verdict and affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Even if a trial court wrongly excludes evidence, reversal is unlikely when the same point comes in elsewhere. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to both preserve the evidentiary complaint and build a harm record showing the excluded proof was unique, central, and not merely cumulative of other testimony or documents.”
Price v. Clayborn
COA01
In Price v. Clayborn, a former husband filed a pleading labeled as a bill of review to attack post-divorce enforcement and receivership orders involving the former marital residence. The court looked past the title of the filing and analyzed its substance, concluding it was not a true bill of review because it did not seek to set aside the final divorce decree; instead, it sought only to undo later post-judgment orders allegedly inconsistent with the decree and MSA. Once characterized as a motion to set aside post-judgment orders, the appeal failed because denial of that type of motion is not independently appealable, and any direct appeal from the June 4, 2024 receiver and enforcement orders was untimely. The First Court of Appeals dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“In post-divorce property cases, the label on your pleading does not control—the relief you actually seek does. If you are challenging an enforcement or receivership order rather than the divorce decree itself, use the correct procedural vehicle and meet the appellate deadline tied to that order, or you may lose the case on jurisdiction before the court ever reaches the merits.”
Yakovlev v. Yakovleva
COA01
In Yakovlev v. Yakovleva, the spouses signed a valid postnuptial partition agreement stating that each spouse’s earnings, retirement benefits, stock, and other employment-related benefits would remain that spouse’s separate property. In the divorce, the trial court nevertheless treated portions of Sergey’s IRAs, 401(k), and pension earned before August 1, 2022 as community property, awarded Maria a share of those assets, and entered a money judgment as part of the overall division. The court of appeals analyzed the agreement under Texas Family Code sections 4.102 and 4.104, applied ordinary contract-construction principles, and held that the agreement’s text controlled characterization of the disputed assets. Because a divorce court may divide only community property and may not indirectly invade separate property through an offset or money judgment, the trial court abused its discretion. The court reversed the property division, vacated the money judgment, remanded for a new just-and-right division consistent with the agreement, and affirmed the child-abduction-prevention provisions.
Litigation Takeaway
“A valid postnuptial or partition agreement is not just an equitable factor—it controls characterization. In any divorce involving a marital property agreement, lawyers must resolve characterization first, draft the decree to track the agreement’s actual language, and object to any attempt to use offsets or money judgments to reallocate separate property.”
In the Interest of Z.I.A.B., Z.J.T.B. a/k/a Z.B., and Z.S.B. a/k/a Z.B., Children
COA01
In In re Z.I.A.B., the First Court of Appeals affirmed a conservatorship order finding that the parental presumption under Texas Family Code section 153.131 had been rebutted. The dispute was whether mother, despite being the natural parent, should be appointed sole managing conservator, or whether DFPS and a godmother could be appointed instead because placing the children with mother would significantly impair their physical health or emotional development. The court examined evidence of mother’s substance abuse, positive and missed drug tests, unsuccessful discharge from treatment, failure to provide basic necessities, housing without electricity, exposure of the children to domestic violence, and the children’s resulting trauma and need for counseling and treatment. Although mother completed some services and later produced some negative drug tests, the court held the trial court could weigh those late improvements against the larger history of instability and ongoing risk. The court concluded the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the significant-impairment finding and affirmed the order appointing DFPS sole managing conservator of two children, the godmother sole managing conservator of the third, and mother possessory conservator.
Litigation Takeaway
“To overcome the parental presumption, a nonparent must present connected, concrete evidence showing that the parent’s conduct creates a real risk of significant physical or emotional impairment—not just that another placement is better. For parents, partial compliance and recent improvement usually will not overcome a record of substance abuse, instability, unmet needs, and trauma unless the rehabilitation evidence is sustained, specific, and trial-ready.”
In the Estate of Victoria B. Kubiak, Deceased
COA01
In a probate will contest, the court held that the contestant had “possession, custody, or control” of the decedent’s medical and pharmacy records because Texas statutes gave him a legal right to obtain them from the providers, even though the records were physically held by third parties. The First Court of Appeals analyzed Rule 192.7(b) together with Estates Code sections 55.101 and 55.102 and Occupations Code section 159.003(a)(8), concluding that legal access is enough to create a production duty. The court also found that the contestant waived any contrary objection by not timely asserting lack of control and that pending third-party subpoenas did not excuse nonproduction. It affirmed the trial court’s $7,727 attorney’s-fee sanction for repeated failure to comply with discovery requests and court orders.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a party has a legal right to obtain records, Texas discovery law may treat those records as within that party’s control even when a third party physically holds them. In family-law cases, do not assume subpoenas replace party-production duties, and raise any true lack-of-control objection specifically and on time or risk waiver and sanctions.”
Shereef Kamel v. Lindsay Zacharko
COA05
After Lindsay Zacharko obtained a protective order against Shereef Kamel, Kamel filed his own protective-order application just four days later. The trial court denied Kamel’s application after finding his testimony not credible and later sanctioned him $3,150 in attorney’s fees on findings that his application was groundless and filed in bad faith or for harassment. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that both the denial of the standalone protective-order application and the sanctions order were final and appealable, rejected Kamel’s unpreserved due-process complaint, and held that the written sanctions order controlled over any imprecise oral comments from the bench. The court also held that a different district judge could rule on sanctions in a rotating docket system and that the trial court’s stern comments did not establish judicial bias. The court affirmed the denial of the protective order and the sanctions award.
Litigation Takeaway
“A failed protective-order application can become sanctionable when the record shows it was not just weak, but groundless and filed in bad faith or for harassment. In family-law cases, lawyers should carefully vet reactive family-violence filings, build a clear sanctions record when a protective order is being used as leverage, and remember that on appeal the signed written sanctions order usually controls over stray oral comments from the bench.”
Christian Carmona v. The State of Texas
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed two indecency-with-a-child convictions arising from a teenage employee’s allegations that her adult supervisor touched her vagina over her jeans in one incident and her breast under her shirt and bra in another. The defendant argued the State failed to prove identity and challenged the reliability of the text-message evidence, while also complaining about the admission of a resignation email referencing other misconduct. Applying the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard, the court held the complainant’s specific testimony alone could support the verdicts under Texas law, and that the text messages, matched phone number, and surrounding circumstances further reinforced identity, sexual contact, and intent. The court also approved the limited use of the admitted extraneous-conduct evidence in the posture presented and emphasized that sufficiency review considers all evidence admitted at trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“Specific, credible testimony from a child or teen witness can be enough, and digital communications plus surrounding facts can significantly strengthen that proof even without perfect forensic recovery. For family-law litigators, allegations involving inappropriate touching or grooming should be built or challenged through layered authentication, contextual detail, and careful handling of extraneous-conduct evidence.”
Ex parte C.M.
COA05
In Ex parte C.M., the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether a juvenile habeas application could be dismissed as an impermissible successive writ under Chapter 11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. C.M., who had previously filed multiple habeas applications challenging a 1998 juvenile delinquency adjudication, filed another application in 2022. The trial court dismissed it as successive and also denied relief on the merits. On appeal, the court analyzed the civil nature of juvenile delinquency proceedings, Family Code section 56.01(o), Article V, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution, and precedent holding that criminal-procedure rules do not apply to juvenile matters unless the Legislature clearly says so. Because Chapter 11 governs criminal habeas practice and the Legislature did not incorporate its successive-writ bar into juvenile habeas proceedings, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the application on that basis. But because the trial court also denied relief on the merits, the court of appeals affirmed the ultimate denial of habeas relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume criminal procedural rules automatically apply in juvenile or Family Code proceedings. When an opponent tries to import a criminal limitation like Chapter 11’s successive-writ bar, start with the statutory classification question and require clear legislative authority. Even so, always build the merits record, because winning the procedural issue may not change the outcome.”
Williams v. State
COA05
In Williams v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a mother’s conviction for injury to a child after she challenged the sufficiency of the evidence identifying her as the abuser and complained about relevance and hearsay rulings tied to abuse-related testimony. The court held the evidence was legally sufficient because the record included the mother’s recorded admissions, sibling testimony describing repeated abuse, and medical evidence consistent with acute blunt-force trauma; under the deferential sufficiency standard, the jury was entitled to resolve conflicts and disbelieve her trial recantation and blame-shifting. The court also rejected her evidentiary complaints and modified the judgment to correct clerical errors in the Penal Code citation and lead counsel designation because the appellate record clearly supplied the correct information.
Litigation Takeaway
“In abuse-driven family cases, appeals usually turn on the record: specific evidentiary objections must be carefully preserved, and a factfinder’s credibility calls will rarely be disturbed when admissions, child testimony, and medical proof line up. The case also underscores that clerical mistakes in final orders can often be corrected on appeal when the record clearly shows the right information, without undoing the merits.”
In the Interest of A.Z.Q., a Child
COA08
The Eighth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to show a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the child. The court relied on the child’s positive cocaine and THC test, the mother’s admitted cocaine use in the child’s presence, her failure to tell medical providers about likely marijuana-gummy ingestion, her continued drug use after removal, and her failure to engage honestly in substance-abuse services despite signing a service plan. Applying clear-and-convincing sufficiency standards, the court treated the case as one about ongoing endangerment rather than a single ingestion incident and concluded the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that subsection (E) was satisfied.
Litigation Takeaway
“Drug-use cases are won or lost on pattern evidence, not isolated events. A parent’s minimization of risk, continued use after intervention, refusal to test, denial during treatment assessments, and association with unsafe drug users can support endangerment findings and, in private custody cases, justify supervised access, restrictions, and modified conservatorship.”