Weekly Digest
May 16 – May 22, 2026
43 opinions this week
L. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In L. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the Austin Court of Appeals held that under the 2023 amendments to Texas Family Code § 161.001, a DFPS-filed termination case requires more than proof of a predicate ground and best interest: the trial court must also make a separate written finding, supported by clear and convincing evidence, that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent. The court examined the decree and the record, which showed DFPS created a tailored service plan, referred and paid for services, arranged individual and family therapy, maintained contact, provided visitation, and pursued relative placement with reunification in mind. Rejecting the mother’s argument that the efforts were not reasonable, the court emphasized that the statute requires reasonable efforts, not successful reunification, and deferred to the trial court’s adverse credibility finding against the mother. The court held the written findings were sufficiently specific and that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the reasonable-efforts finding, so it affirmed the termination decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“If reunification efforts matter, build and document them with specificity. For DFPS and child’s counsel, L.G. shows that a detailed service plan, therapy referrals, payment for services, visitation, contact logs, and relative-placement efforts can satisfy § 161.001(f). For parent-side counsel, broad complaints about unfair services are not enough—challenge the fit, accessibility, timing, and execution of the services in real time and preserve those issues in the trial court.”
In the Interest of K.A.B., a Child
COA05
In this SAPCR modification appeal, the mother argued the trial court violated due process by enforcing equal one-hour time limits that prevented her from fully testifying and offering additional exhibits. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that trial courts have broad discretion to impose reasonable, evenhanded trial limits, and the record showed the limits were applied equally, the mother was warned as her time expired, and she chose to spend her allotted time on cross-examination rather than her own affirmative proof. The court also emphasized preservation: the mother did not timely object to the time limits, did not make an offer of proof showing what excluded testimony or exhibits would have established, and did not preserve hearsay complaints by contemporaneous objection. Because the complaints were waived or inadequately briefed, and no abuse of discretion appeared on the record, the court affirmed the modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a family court imposes trial time limits, object early, explain specifically why more time is needed, and make an offer of proof for any excluded testimony or exhibits. On appeal, preservation usually matters more than generalized fairness complaints.”
Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas v. The City of Austin and Austin Transit Partnership Local Government Corporation
SCOTX
In Paxton v. City of Austin, the Texas Supreme Court addressed a trial court’s refusal to rule on the Attorney General’s plea to the jurisdiction after the opposing parties openly urged the court to withhold a ruling so they could avoid an interlocutory appeal and automatic stay under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(8). The Court held that because no written order granted or denied the plea, the court of appeals correctly concluded it lacked interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. But the Court also held that a trial court cannot defeat a governmental unit’s statutory appellate rights by deliberately refusing to rule on a properly presented jurisdictional plea. Mandamus was therefore appropriate to compel the trial court to rule, and appellate courts may either treat a premature appeal as a mandamus petition or abate the appeal and direct the trial court to issue a ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
“A trial court cannot use a non-ruling to block appellate review of a threshold jurisdictional challenge. If the court refuses to rule on a properly presented plea to the jurisdiction—especially to avoid an interlocutory appeal or stay—build a clear record and seek mandamus to force a ruling.”
Gopalan v. Marsh
SCOTX
In Gopalan v. Marsh, a jury found that the father had the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence, but the trial court’s decree awarded the mother about 57% of the possession time. The Texas Supreme Court analyzed Family Code section 105.002, the broader conservatorship statutes, and the ordinary meaning of “primary residence,” concluding that the term means the place where the child lives most of the time. Because the decree gave majority possession to the non-designating parent, it contravened the binding jury verdict. The Court reversed and remanded the possession order, related best-interest determinations on parental rights and duties, and the appellate attorney’s fee award, while otherwise affirming the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a jury awards your client the exclusive right to designate a child’s primary residence, the final decree cannot give the other parent the majority of possession time. In Texas jury-tried conservatorship cases, lawyers must align the possession schedule with the primary-residence finding, preserve objections to any inconsistent decree, and recognize that possession errors can unravel related rulings on support, parental rights, and fees.”
Weger v. Bradley
COA06
In Weger v. Bradley, a post-divorce property dispute arose over whether a receiver’s sale transferred only the 0.59-acre tract at 202 Banks Drive or also a separate 0.49-acre tract at 0 Banks Drive. The appellees argued the receiver had authority to sell both parcels, relying on the enforcement order, a later nunc pro tunc order attaching legal descriptions, and a correction deed. The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that even assuming the receiver had authority, the summary-judgment evidence created a genuine fact issue about what property was actually included in the sale. The original deed, contract, title documents, purchase price, and escrow evidence pointed only to 202 Banks Drive, so traditional summary judgment was improper. The court reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“In post-decree real-estate enforcement cases, proving authority to sell is not enough—you must also prove the disputed parcel was actually included in the transaction that closed. If the decree, receiver order, deed package, title file, and consideration do not all match, a fact issue can defeat summary judgment.”
Downstream Investments, LLC v. Krcmar
COA03
The Austin Court of Appeals reversed a traditional summary judgment that had voided a land-sale contract based on the seller’s alleged mental incapacity. The court held that contractual incapacity is judged at the time of execution, and although the guardian offered strong evidence of the seller’s stroke-related cognitive deficits, later medical evaluations, and later guardianship findings, that evidence did not conclusively prove she lacked capacity when she signed the contract. Because affidavit testimony from the realtor supported a reasonable inference that the seller understood the nature and effect of the transaction, a genuine fact issue remained and the case had to be remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you are attacking or defending a family-law agreement on incapacity grounds, the key evidence must be tied to the exact time the document was signed. Later guardianship orders, diagnoses, or generalized proof of cognitive decline may be persuasive, but they will not support traditional summary judgment if there is transaction-specific evidence that the person understood the deal when it was made.”
In the Interest of Z.S., Z.S., M.S. III, Children
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights after concluding the evidence clearly and convincingly showed endangerment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and that termination was in the children’s best interest. The court relied on severe unsanitary living conditions, untreated medical issues, exposure to sexual-abuse risk, domestic violence, and ongoing parental drug use during the case. It analyzed endangerment cumulatively, holding that the parents knowingly allowed the children to remain in dangerous surroundings and engaged in a continuing course of conduct that jeopardized the children’s physical and emotional well-being. The children’s improvement in their maternal grandmother’s placement further supported the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
“Endangerment cases are won or lost on the full pattern of danger, not one isolated event. Evidence of filthy home conditions, unsafe caregivers, domestic violence, drug use, poor visitation conditions, and lack of meaningful change after services can support termination—and in non-termination family cases, the same facts can justify supervised possession, sole conservatorship, or other protective restrictions.”
In the Interest of B.E.S.D. and T.D.G., Children
COA11
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in the best interest of the children under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The court reviewed the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and applied the nonexclusive Holley factors, emphasizing that the same evidence supporting predicate endangerment grounds can also support best interest. The court focused on the mother’s repeated marijuana use during multiple pregnancies, repeated positive drug tests at childbirth, long CPS history, prior removals, domestic violence, instability, and failure to make lasting changes despite services. As to the father of B.E.S.D., the court likewise held that his refusal to cooperate, role in the unsafe environment, and conduct supporting the predicate findings also supported best interest. The termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Pattern matters. Texas courts may infer future danger from a parent’s past conduct, and a best-interest finding does not fail just because every Holley factor was not proved. In family-law cases involving conservatorship, modification, or supervised possession, lawyers should build the record chronologically around recurring substance abuse, domestic violence, instability, noncompliance, and failure to benefit from services—not isolated incidents.”
In re Gentri Renee McLean
COA11
In In re McLean, the Eleventh Court of Appeals considered whether a trial court could temporarily transfer the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence from the mother to the father in a pending modification suit. The father relied on evidence that the mother had denied visitation, the children had school absences, and the mother tested positive for cocaine. The court held that Family Code section 156.006(b)(1) requires more than proof of parental misconduct or decree violations; the movant must show that the children’s present circumstances would significantly impair their physical health or emotional development. Because the record lacked child-focused evidence tying the complained-of conduct to present significant impairment, the temporary modification was legally insufficient. The trial court therefore abused its discretion, and mandamus relief was conditionally granted.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want temporary orders changing primary custody in Texas, you need proof of present, child-specific significant impairment—not just evidence that the other parent is obstructive, irresponsible, or tested positive for drugs. Denied visitation may support enforcement, but it does not automatically justify a temporary change of primary residence.”
Victor Hugo Prado v. The State of Texas
COA01
In this injury-to-a-child appeal, the court rejected challenges to Prado’s convictions based on jury unanimity, legal sufficiency, and accomplice-witness corroboration, holding that commission and omission were alternative manner-and-means, that the evidence of prolonged malnourishment, visible injuries, deprivation, and Prado’s control over the children’s environment was sufficient to prove knowing or intentional injury by omission, and that independent testimony and documentary evidence adequately corroborated the mother’s testimony. The court did, however, agree that because both convictions arose from a single criminal action, duplicative court costs could not be imposed in both judgments under article 102.073, so it modified one judgment to delete those costs and affirmed as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
“For Texas family-law cases, this opinion is a strong roadmap for proving endangerment through omission, not just direct abuse. A parent or paramour who controls the home and knowingly fails to feed, protect, or obtain care for a child can be framed as dangerous based on pattern evidence from daycare workers, relatives, photos, records, and other third parties. It also reminds lawyers to build corroboration beyond one compromised household witness and to audit multiple orders for duplicative cost or fee assessments.”
In re David J. Alarid
COA06
In In re Alarid, the Texarkana Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief without reaching the merits because the relator failed to provide a proper Rule 52 mandamus record. The court found that some attached documents were neither certified nor sworn, some materials appeared not to have been filed in the trial court, and the Rule 52.3(k) certification did not properly state that the petition’s factual assertions were supported by competent evidence in the appendix or record. Strictly enforcing Rules 52.7 and 52.3(k), the court held that these record defects were fatal and denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus can be lost on procedure alone. In family-law emergency and contempt matters, lawyers must ensure every material document filed below is included as a certified or sworn copy, exclude convenience exhibits that were not filed in the trial court, and use Rule 52.3(k) certification language that tracks the rule exactly. A strong merits argument will not save a defective mandamus record.”
Wood v. Wood
COA14
In Wood v. Wood, the parties’ premarital agreement and later MSA treated certain Schedule F retirement accounts as separate property to be divided equally, and their MSA required binding arbitration of disputes over drafting a decree that conformed to the agreement. When a dispute arose over decree language and use of a QDRO service to implement the retirement-account division, the wife argued the arbitrator exceeded his authority and substantively redivided property. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that the arbitrator acted within the scope of the MSA’s drafting-arbitration clause because the dispute submitted was how to implement the agreed division in the decree. The court further held that directing QDRO-related procedures was a permissible implementation mechanism, not an unlawful recharacterization or divestiture of separate property, and affirmed denial of vacatur under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 171.088(a)(3)(A).
Litigation Takeaway
“If an MSA sends decree-drafting disputes to binding arbitration, that authority can extend beyond mere wording disputes to the practical mechanics needed to carry out an agreed property division—especially with retirement assets. Lawyers should draft arbitration clauses carefully, spell out whether implementation issues like QDROs are included, and preserve any vacatur complaints precisely in the motion to vacate.”
Ryan Tolle v. Perth Tolle
COA14
In this pre-September 1, 2023 Texas SAPCR modification case, the father sought to modify conservatorship but his Rule 194 disclosures merely repeated the statutory standards of material and substantial change and best interest without identifying any underlying facts. The court held that former Rule 194.2(b)(3) required a general factual narrative supporting the claim, not just boilerplate legal conclusions. Because the suit was filed in 2022, the old disclosure rules applied despite a later amended petition. After the father failed to show good cause or lack of unfair surprise under Rule 193.6, the trial court properly excluded his modification evidence, and with no evidence left on essential elements, properly granted a directed verdict against him.
Litigation Takeaway
“In legacy family cases filed before September 1, 2023, disclosures must tell the factual story behind a modification claim. If you only recite statutory buzzwords like material and substantial change or best interest, the court can exclude your evidence and your case may be over before it reaches the factfinder.”
Gustavo Gonzalez, Jr. v. The State of Texas
COA03
In Gustavo Gonzalez, Jr. v. State of Texas, the Third Court of Appeals held that legally sufficient evidence supported aggravated sexual assault findings even though the child complainant used age-appropriate, nontechnical terms like “private” and “butt” instead of anatomical language. Reviewing the full record in the light most favorable to the verdict, the court relied on the child’s outcry, written SANE statement, body-diagram markings, and descriptions of pressure, stretching, and pain to conclude the jury could reasonably infer penetration of both the sexual organ and anus. The court also rejected the argument that the jury charge needed a special definition of “penetration,” holding the term carries its ordinary meaning and requires no additional instruction.
Litigation Takeaway
“In abuse-driven family cases, do not discount a child’s disclosure just because the child lacks anatomical precision. Texas courts will evaluate the child’s words in context, and age-appropriate terminology can carry major evidentiary weight when supported by diagrams, outcry testimony, medical or forensic witnesses, and sensory details like pain, pressure, or stretching. For family-law litigators, this is strong crossover authority for supervised possession, protective orders, emergency relief, and endangerment-based conservatorship restrictions.”
Rodriguez v. State
COA11
In Rodriguez v. State, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that Article 38.37, section 2(b) permits evidence of an extraneous child-sex offense even when the extraneous victim is a different child from the complainant in the charged case. The defendant, charged with indecency with a child involving G.T., challenged the admission of testimony from K.N. about an earlier alleged sexual assault, arguing the evidence was too dissimilar, unfairly prejudicial, and unconstitutional under Article 38.37. The court relied on prior authority, especially Wishert, to reject any same-victim limitation in the statute, held that the statute survived both facial and as-applied constitutional challenges because of its procedural safeguards, and concluded the trial court acted within its discretion after conducting the required hearing and Rule 403 balancing. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law litigators, Rodriguez is a strong crossover authority for the proposition that alleged sexual misconduct toward one child can be relevant to assessing risk to another child. In custody, modification, and protective-order cases, do not assume allegations lose force just because the child in suit is different; instead, expect courts to consider cross-child conduct as part of a broader safety and protective-capacity analysis, while still litigating reliability, corroboration, and proportionality.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Michael Adam Nelson and Jhoelayne Paixao Nelson and in the Interest of M.P.N. and M.A.P.N., Children
COA13
After the parties’ divorce decree was signed, one side sought sanctions and the other later filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship. The trial court ruled on the sanctions dispute, but the modification case remained pending. Applying Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held the sanctions order was not final because it did not dispose of all pending claims and parties, and it lacked clear and unequivocal finality language. Because no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal from the sanctions order, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume a post-divorce sanctions order can be appealed by itself. In family-law cases, appellate finality depends on whether all live claims in the case have been resolved, including later-filed modification proceedings. Before filing a notice of appeal, check the full docket and consider severance if you need a stand-alone final judgment.”
In the Interest of J.S.C. and J.M.C., Children
COA10
The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to show Father engaged in his own endangering course of conduct. Father argued the case turned on whether he knew about Mother’s drug use and neglect, but the court rejected that framing because subsection (E) was supported by Father’s independent conduct: repeated incarceration, methamphetamine use and related criminal charges, avoidance of the Department due to active warrants, refusal to begin services, and prolonged absence from the children’s lives. The court also rejected Father’s argument that conduct before formal paternity adjudication could not count, concluding that knowledge of paternity is not required when the parent had reason to believe he was the father and avoided involvement. The termination judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In endangerment cases, courts look at the parent’s overall pattern of instability—not just one bad act and not just the other parent’s misconduct. Repeated jail exposure, drug use, avoidance of CPS, failure to pursue paternity, and staying absent from the child’s life can together support termination and, by analogy, strong conservatorship and possession restrictions in other family-law cases.”
Jonathan Edward Norton v. The State of Texas
COA10
In Norton v. State, the appellant challenged a six-year prison sentence imposed after revocation of community supervision as grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution. The Tenth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because Norton never objected when sentence was pronounced and never raised the constitutional complaint in a motion for new trial or other post-trial filing. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a)(1) and preservation authorities, the court held that constitutional disproportionality complaints are waived unless timely and specifically presented to the trial court. The revocation judgment and sentence were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you believe a ruling or punishment is constitutionally excessive, say so in the trial court—clearly, specifically, and on the record. Norton is a preservation case: even serious constitutional complaints, including disproportionality, due-process, or punitive-sanctions arguments, can be lost on appeal if counsel does not object at the hearing and, when appropriate, re-urge the issue in a post-judgment motion.”
Hill v. State
COA10
In Hill v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s unpreserved facial constitutional challenge to the continuous-violence statute and held the jury charge properly tracked the statute, including its non-unanimity language and disjunctive culpable mental states. The court also addressed a mismatch between the written judgment and the appellate record: although the judgment said the enhancement paragraph was “found not true,” the record showed the jury found it true. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b), the court reformed the judgment to make the record speak the truth and affirmed as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law litigators, the key lesson is twofold: preserve appellate complaints precisely in the trial court, and always compare the signed order to the actual record. When a written judgment or order misstates what the court or jury actually found, appellate reformation may be available if the record conclusively shows the correct ruling.”
Ex parte Brayden Channing Coin
COA02
In Ex parte Brayden Channing Coin, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed denial of Article 11.072 habeas relief from a guilty plea to sexual assault. Coin argued his lawyer was ineffective for failing to investigate whether the charged conduct occurred before he turned seventeen, which would have undermined adult-court jurisdiction under Penal Code section 8.07(b), and he also claimed that bad advice made his plea involuntary. The court held those claims failed because the habeas court was entitled to credit trial counsel’s evidence that Coin personally admitted post-seventeen assaults, that counsel discussed the significance of his age, and that Coin chose a probation-focused plea strategy. Given those supported credibility findings, additional investigation into conflicting timing evidence such as the Fortnite release issue would not have changed the result, a jurisdictional challenge was not shown to be meritorious, and Coin could not show under Hill v. Lockhart that he would have rejected the plea and gone to trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“Credibility findings can decide the whole case. If the trial court credits evidence that a party was advised of the key issue, understood the stakes, and made a strategic choice anyway, later claims of bad advice, poor investigation, or involuntary agreement usually fail. For family lawyers, the lesson is to build a record of admissions, advice given, informed consent, and multiple timeline anchors so the trial court’s findings will survive appeal.”
Linh Hong Dang v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Dang v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a party cannot complain on appeal about excluded testimony unless the party made an offer of proof or the substance of the testimony was otherwise apparent from the record. The appellant argued the trial court wrongly excluded testimony about alleged law-enforcement pressure on the complainants’ mother, her alleged desire to pay attorney’s fees, and impeachment evidence about inconsistent timing of the alleged abuse. The court concluded the first two complaints were not preserved because counsel did not make an offer of proof and the missing testimony was not clear from context. On the timing issue, the court held the trial court acted within its discretion because counsel failed to satisfy the Rule 613 predicate for impeachment by prior inconsistent statement. With no preserved evidentiary error, the cumulative-error argument also failed, and the judgments were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If the judge excludes testimony, do not stop at 'objection sustained.' Make an immediate offer of proof, state why the evidence is admissible, and, if using prior inconsistent statements, lay the full Rule 613 foundation. In family-law cases built on credibility, bias, coaching, motive, or inconsistent timelines, an unpreserved exclusion issue is usually dead on appeal.”
Patrick McNeal v. The State of Texas
COA05
In McNeal v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant who pleaded guilty under a plea bargain could pursue an appeal after receiving the exact agreed sentence. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2), the court treated the case as a restricted plea-bargain appeal and examined whether any exception allowed review. The record showed no written pretrial motion ruled on before trial, no trial-court permission to appeal, and no statutory authorization for the appeal. Because the trial court’s certification stated McNeal had no right of appeal and the record supported that certification, Rule 25.2(d) required dismissal. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction without reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a related criminal case resolves through a negotiated plea and the defendant receives the bargained-for sentence, an appeal may be barred unless counsel preserved a written pretrial issue, obtained permission to appeal, or fits within a statute authorizing review. For family-law cases involving family violence or other criminal overlap, do not build strategy around the assumption that a later criminal appeal will undo the collateral effects of the plea.”
Falah Algaissi v. Taima Abu Qamer
COA02
In Algaissi v. Abu Qamer, the husband appealed a final divorce decree, challenging conservatorship, property division, and fraud findings. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that his challenges failed for two independent reasons: he did not timely secure the reporter’s record, so the court presumed the evidence supported the trial court’s rulings, and he personally signed the decree as “approved and consented to as to both form and substance,” which made the decree an agreed judgment. Applying invited-error and agreed-judgment principles, the court concluded he could not attack the very provisions he had consented to absent proof that his consent was not genuine. The decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not treat decree signature language as boilerplate. If a client may appeal, avoid signing a divorce decree as approved or consented to as to both form and substance, because that can waive challenges to custody, property, and fraud rulings. Also, timely secure the reporter’s record—without it, most family-law abuse-of-discretion complaints are effectively lost.”
In the Interest of R.G. III, a Child
COA02
In In re R.G. III, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and sufficient to support best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The court analyzed the case as a pattern-endangerment record: the father repeatedly used methamphetamine, committed domestic violence, had a history of criminal instability and incarceration, and knowingly left the child with the mother despite knowing of her repeated methamphetamine relapses. The court also emphasized the dangerous living conditions surrounding the child, including motel living, lack of school enrollment, poor supervision, and the child’s own positive methamphetamine test. Rejecting the father’s minimization and alternative explanations, the court held that the combined evidence showed both endangering surroundings and endangering conduct, and that the same proof also established termination was in the child’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas courts will treat substance abuse, domestic violence, criminal instability, educational neglect, and failure to protect from a known drug-using parent as a unified endangerment pattern. For litigators, the lesson is to build or rebut the case through cumulative proof of knowledge, relapse history, protective failures, and the child’s concrete exposure to danger—not isolated incidents or last-minute claims of improvement.”
In the Interest of G.M.M., a Child
COA07
In In re G.M.M., the father asked to reduce his child support based on reduced income, travel expenses, and responsibility for another child, but the record contained no evidence comparing his financial circumstances at the time of the prior order with his circumstances at the modification hearing and no evidence allowing the trial court to recalculate support under current guidelines. The Amarillo Court of Appeals applied Texas Family Code section 156.401 and abuse-of-discretion review, emphasizing that attorney argument, opening statements, and unsupported assertions are not evidence. Because the father failed to prove either a material and substantial change or a guideline-based 20%/$100 variance, and the record also reflected no objection when counsel stated child support would not be modified, the court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by leaving support unchanged.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to modify child support, prove it with admissible financial evidence. A movant must show either a material and substantial change since the last order or enough current financial data for a guideline recalculation under Family Code 156.401; fairness arguments, travel-cost complaints, and unsworn claims about lower income or other children will not carry the issue.”
In the Interest of S.M.S., a Child
COA12
In this SAPCR conservatorship appeal, a pro se appellant challenged a trial court order naming multiple nonparents as joint managing conservators and raised twenty-three appellate issues, including standing and jurisdiction complaints. The Tyler Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the appellant’s brief failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1: it listed issues but provided no meaningful record citations, no supporting authority, and no developed legal analysis. Applying settled law that pro se litigants are held to the same briefing standards as attorneys, the court held that inadequately briefed complaints are waived and affirmed the conservatorship order in full.
Litigation Takeaway
“On appeal, even potentially strong family-law issues are lost if they are not tied to the record, legal authority, and a developed argument. For appellants, Rule 38.1 compliance is essential; for appellees, inadequate briefing can be a powerful path to affirmance without reaching the merits.”
In the Interest of A.K.B., a Child
COA04
In In re A.K.B., maternal grandparents sought court-ordered access to their grandchild after the father cut off contact. They alleged they had been deeply involved in the child’s upbringing and raised concerns about the father’s parenting, household, and the child’s emotional distress from losing the relationship. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that Family Code §§ 153.432 and 153.433 work together, so at the standing stage a grandparent’s affidavit must allege specific facts that, if true, could overcome the fit-parent presumption and show that denial of access would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional well-being. Because the affidavits showed only a close, beneficial relationship, parenting disagreements, and generalized claims of emotional harm—not concrete facts tying denial of access itself to significant impairment—the trial court properly dismissed the suit for lack of standing.
Litigation Takeaway
“Grandparent-access cases in Texas live or die on the affidavit. A close bond, past caregiving, and criticism of a parent’s choices are not enough; the pleading must allege specific, nonconclusory facts showing that denial of access itself will significantly impair the child and that the claim can overcome the fit-parent presumption. For parents, this is a strong early-dismissal case; for grandparents, it is a warning to plead extraordinary facts with precision before filing.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Angela Zesiger and Bryan Zesiger
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a Texas trial court could enforce and clarify a divorce decree awarding a former spouse one-half of the military retirement benefits accrued during marriage. After Bryan retired, the trial court converted Angela’s formula-based share of disposable retired pay into a monthly dollar amount, included cost-of-living adjustments, entered an arrearage judgment, and ordered execution of payment paperwork. On appeal, Bryan argued federal law preempted the order, but the court rejected that argument because the USFSPA expressly allows state courts to divide and enforce disposable retired pay, and the order did not reach non-disposable pay or interfere with disability-waiver rights protected by Mansell and Howell. The court further held that expressing the already-awarded share in monthly terms was a permissible clarification under Texas Family Code Chapter 9, not an impermissible modification of the property division.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a divorce decree validly awards a share of disposable military retired pay, Texas courts can later clarify the formula into a monthly amount, include COLAs, and award arrears without violating federal law—so long as the court is enforcing the original division rather than redividing property or reaching disability-waived/non-disposable pay.”
In re Ahmed Ahmed
COA12
In a SAPCR-related mandamus proceeding, Ahmed challenged the trial court’s denial of his plea to the jurisdiction. The Tyler Court of Appeals denied relief because Ahmed failed to provide a Rule 52.7-compliant mandamus record. Although he claimed no testimony was taken at the hearing, that assertion was disputed and he admitted he was not present, so the court could not verify what occurred below. Without authenticated materials showing the nature of the hearing and any relevant testimony, the court could not evaluate whether he had established a clear abuse of discretion and entitlement to mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus can fail even when the underlying complaint may have merit if the relator does not bring a complete, authenticated Rule 52.7 record. In family-law cases, always secure and file the reporter’s record, material pleadings, orders, and proof of whether testimony was or was not taken before seeking emergency appellate relief.”
In re LOH Elkhart, LLC d/b/a Elkhart Oaks Care Center, Live Oak Healthcare, LLC, Senior Living Properties, LLC, SLP Management Holdings, LLC, and LOH Management, LLC
COA12
In this mandamus proceeding, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that a party cannot revive a case dismissed for want of prosecution by filing an unverified motion to reinstate and later trying to supply Rule 306a proof after the trial court’s plenary power has expired. The plaintiff’s case was dismissed, and her later motion to reinstate alleged lack of notice but was not verified and did not state the date she first received notice or actual knowledge of the dismissal order. The court strictly applied Rules 165a and 306a, explaining that a verified motion is required to extend plenary power and that delayed-notice relief requires a sworn Rule 306a(5) motion proving the date of first notice or actual knowledge. Because those requirements were not timely met, the trial court’s plenary power expired before it signed the reinstatement order, making that order void. Mandamus relief was therefore proper.
Litigation Takeaway
“If your family-law case gets DWOP’d, lack of notice alone does not save you. To extend deadlines, you must promptly file a verified motion and, if relying on delayed notice, strictly comply with Rule 306a(5) with sworn proof of the exact date notice or actual knowledge was first received. If the other side gets a reinstatement order without a verified Rule 165a motion or proper Rule 306a proof, that order may be void and vulnerable to mandamus.”
Austin G. Croom v. Casey L. Croom
COA05
In Croom v. Croom, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a divorce decree unambiguously awarded the wife a continuing one-half share of the parties’ present interest in AP Capital, separate from a separate $397,000 equalization judgment. Reading the decree as a whole, the court rejected the husband’s argument that the AP Capital award had been monetized and absorbed into the equalization payment merely because the asset’s value was used in the divorce balance-sheet calculations. The court concluded that “present interest” meant the community’s ownership stake at divorce, not just its then-current dollar value, and that the decree’s language awarding rights and privileges “past, present, or future” confirmed the wife’s entitlement to later sale proceeds attributable to that interest. Because the husband kept and spent those proceeds after AP Capital sold its asset, the evidence supported liability for civil theft, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. The court affirmed the substantive judgment but reversed and remanded the attorney’s-fees award.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a divorce decree separately awards a spouse an ownership interest in a business asset, do not assume a separate equalization payment buys that interest out unless the decree expressly says so. Draft decrees with precision: say whether the spouse gets the asset itself or a cash buyout, and if future distributions are intended to follow ownership, say that clearly. In enforcement, a spouse who pockets post-divorce proceeds from property awarded to the other spouse may face not just enforcement remedies, but tort and civil-theft exposure.”
Harwell v. State
COA14
In Harwell v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed admission of a defendant’s prior juvenile sexual-offense history in a child-sex prosecution. The defendant argued the delinquency petition was only an allegation, the adjudication materials were unfairly prejudicial, and his juvenile statement was inadmissible under Family Code § 51.095 because he was supposedly in custody. The court held the trial judge could evaluate the entire evidentiary record at the article 38.37 gatekeeping hearing—including the defendant’s own prior statement admitting the conduct—rather than viewing the petition in isolation, and that this evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the prior offense occurred. The court also held the redacted adjudication records survived Rule 403 because they were highly probative and the trial court reduced prejudice by removing unrelated misconduct. Finally, the court held § 51.095 did not bar the juvenile statement because the record supported a finding that the interview was voluntary and noncustodial. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Historical juvenile sexual-misconduct evidence can carry substantial weight when it is tied to corroborating records or admissions rather than offered as a bare accusation. For family-law cases involving child safety, Harwell shows that old juvenile conduct may remain highly probative if counsel can connect it to current endangerment concerns, while the best defense is to challenge reliability, remoteness, present nexus, and custodial defects—not just label the records prejudicial or stale.”
Ting Fang Chen v. Evan H. Suzuki and Oladipo A. Dada
COA14
In this medical-negligence appeal, the plaintiff sued two physicians over her husband’s ICU death and argued that a generic docket control order extended the deadline to serve a Chapter 74 expert report. The court rejected that argument, holding that Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.351’s 120-day deadline runs from the date each defendant files an original answer and is not displaced by later expert-designation or discovery deadlines in a standard scheduling order. Looking to the substance of the pleadings rather than the plaintiff’s labels, the court concluded the claims were health care liability claims because they arose from medical treatment and required expert testimony. Because no expert report was served within 120 days, dismissal with prejudice and attorney’s fees were mandatory; the court also rejected the plaintiff’s notice and default-judgment complaints.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume a generic scheduling order extends a statutory deadline. When a claim is substantively a health care liability claim, Chapter 74’s expert-report deadline is a hard trigger, and missing it can lead to mandatory dismissal with prejudice. More broadly, in family-law crossover litigation, courts will enforce specific statutory deadlines over broad docket-control language, and they will look past emotional labels to the true nature of the claim.”
Lionel Arce v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Lionel Arce v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that the trial court may have erred by designating a forensic interviewer as the Article 38.072 outcry witness instead of another earlier adult recipient of the child’s disclosure. The court did not resolve the outcry-designation dispute because the same abuse narrative was later admitted through other evidence without objection, including the child’s own testimony, the pediatrician’s testimony, and medical records containing a detailed account of the alleged abuse. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b), the court held that any evidentiary error was nonconstitutional and harmless because the complained-of testimony was cumulative of materially similar evidence that reached the jury through multiple independent channels. The conviction was therefore affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In abuse-driven family cases, one good objection is not enough. If the same allegation comes in later through the child, medical records, therapists, doctors, or other witnesses without objection, any earlier evidentiary error may become harmless on appeal. Preservation must cover every path by which the same story can enter the record; if you are offering the evidence, multiple admissible sources can protect the judgment.”
Eboni Lunsford Calbow v. Shawn Phillip Calbow
COA03
In this Texas divorce appeal, the wife sought to set aside a post-answer default divorce decree after she failed to appear for final trial. The Third Court of Appeals held that she had actual notice of the April 17, 2024 trial setting because her own verified motion for continuance expressly identified that date as the final hearing. Applying Craddock, the court concluded she did not satisfy the first element because her explanation—that she assumed the court would address or grant her continuance request without her attendance—did not negate conscious indifference. Because she knew of the trial setting, did not obtain a continuance, did not set the motion for hearing, and still failed to appear, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying her motion to set aside the default decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“A filed continuance motion does not pause trial. If you have notice of a final family-law setting, you must appear unless you have a signed continuance order or clear court authorization excusing attendance. For lawyers, Calbow is a reminder to build a clean record of notice and the absence of any continuance order; for parties, it is a warning that assuming the court will handle a continuance administratively can lead to a binding default judgment.”
Henry v. Cook
COA14
In this divorce appeal, the husband argued the trial court’s findings were too sparse to permit review of the property division because they did not disclose key valuations or explain the basis for the just-and-right division under Family Code section 7.001. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 298 required him to request specified additional or amended findings if he believed the findings were incomplete, and because he failed to do so, he waived that complaint. With no preserved challenge to the inadequacy of the findings and no judicial findings showing the values assigned to major assets and liabilities, the court could not conclude the property division was manifestly unjust or an abuse of discretion. The court also rejected his other complaints, including attorney’s fees, ineffective assistance, undisclosed-witness testimony, and failure to consider fault, and affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to complain on appeal that findings in a bench-tried divorce are too thin, you must file a specific Rule 298 request for additional or amended findings. In property-heavy divorce cases, detailed post-judgment findings practice is essential because without valuation and rationale findings, an appellate attack on a just-and-right division may be dead on arrival.”
Sorrells v. State
COA05
In Sorrells v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed convictions for indecency with a child by sexual contact, holding that the child complainant’s testimony alone was legally sufficient even though the defense presented substantial impeachment and contradictory evidence. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court explained that appellate review does not permit reweighing witness credibility and that the jury was free to believe the child’s account of the charged sexual contact. The court also rejected the change-of-venue complaint because the motion had been filed in a different cause number, so nothing was preserved for review in the appealed cases.
Litigation Takeaway
“In abuse-driven family cases, do not assume a lack of corroboration defeats a child’s allegations. A factfinder may credit a child witness despite inconsistencies or impeachment, and appellate courts will usually defer to that credibility call. For the accused party, the real work is building objective contradictions and preserving every procedural and evidentiary issue in the correct cause number.”
Dustin Lee Jones v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Jones v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a trial court could not add post-adjudication court-appointed attorney’s fees without record evidence that the defendant had present financial resources and a present ability to pay under article 26.05(g). Jones had remained indigent, told the court he could not presently pay, and the record showed no material change in his finances. The court distinguished the original $1,000 fee assessed when deferred adjudication was imposed—which was left intact as untimely to challenge—from the later-added $2,090, which it deleted along with related collection language and withdrawal orders.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a court is asked to impose a money obligation tied to ability to pay, make the record about present resources—not possible future earnings. For family lawyers, Jones is a strong analogy for resisting unsupported fee awards, enforcement-related payment orders, or other monetary obligations based on speculation rather than current evidence.”
In Re Richard Gonzales
COA13
In In re Richard Gonzales, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that a trial court exceeded the Texas Citizens Participation Act by allowing broad discovery based only on generalized claims that the information was relevant to responding to a TCPA motion. The court explained that Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 27.006(b) allows only limited discovery on a showing of good cause, which requires case-specific findings tying narrowly tailored requests to particular material facts necessary to meet the nonmovant’s TCPA burden. Because the discovery order allowed broader merits discovery without those findings, the court found an abuse of discretion and conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a TCPA motion is on file, you cannot use ordinary discovery standards to get wide-ranging documents or communications. The party seeking discovery must identify the exact material fact needed at the TCPA stage and request only narrowly tailored discovery; otherwise, an overbroad order is vulnerable to mandamus.”
In re Eureka Holdings, Inc., et al.
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a trial court overreached by imposing merits-preclusive discovery sanctions after defense counsel instructed a corporate representative not to answer deposition questions about security-budget allocations. Applying Rule 215 and the TransAmerican/Chrysler line of cases, the court explained that sanctions must bear a direct nexus to the specific discovery abuse and cannot resolve core merits issues unless the misconduct justifies that result. Because deeming foreseeability and reasonableness established, and barring contrary evidence, effectively decided essential liability elements without the required connection to the withheld discovery, the sanctions were improper. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief in part and struck the overbroad evidentiary sanctions.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas courts cannot use a discovery fight to hand one side a merits win. In family-law cases, even serious discovery obstruction does not justify sanctions that effectively decide conservatorship, property characterization, reimbursement, or other core issues unless the movant shows a tight, issue-specific nexus between the withheld discovery and the proposed sanction.”
Yeddula v. Yeddula
COA07
In Yeddula v. Yeddula, the husband tried to use a bill of review to reopen a final divorce decree, arguing the property division was based on fraudulent double-counting of mortgage debt that overstated his equalization obligation. The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that these complaints concerned the merits of the original property division—math, valuation, and debt-allocation issues shown in the divorce record or discoverable through ordinary diligence—so they amounted to intrinsic, not extrinsic, fraud. Because he had notice of trial, failed to appear, received the decree, retained counsel, and still did not pursue timely post-judgment relief, he also could not prove the required no-fault element. The court affirmed denial of the bill of review and the related enforcement orders, including appointment of a receiver to sell the homestead.
Litigation Takeaway
“A bill of review is not a second chance to relitigate property-division numbers. If the alleged error involves calculations, debt balances, or valuation issues that were presented or could have been challenged before the decree became final, Texas courts will treat the claim as intrinsic fraud and deny relief—especially when the complaining party had notice and skipped trial or abandoned post-judgment remedies.”
In the Interest of Z.R.Q., a Child
COA05
In In the Interest of Z.R.Q., the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a trial court could not retroactively wipe out child support, medical support, and related arrearages back to the date of the original order after later DNA testing excluded the adjudicated father and the court terminated his parental rights. The court analyzed the case by separating a true direct attack on the original judgment from a modification proceeding. Although Cuevas pleaded bill-of-review relief in the alternative, the final order did not vacate the 2022 support order or set aside the paternity adjudication, so the appellate court treated it as a modification order. Because Family Code § 156.401(b) bars retroactive modification of support before service or appearance in the modification suit, the trial court lacked authority to cancel support that had already accrued under the still-valid 2022 order. The court reversed the portions of the order cancelling past support and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“If your client wants to erase a prior paternity-based support order, modification is usually not enough. Later DNA exclusion or termination of parental rights may justify prospective relief, but they do not automatically cancel accrued support under an existing order. To unwind the original judgment and its arrearage consequences, counsel must pursue and obtain a true direct attack, such as a bill of review that actually vacates the prior order.”
Yeddula v. Yeddula
COA07
In Yeddula v. Yeddula, the husband tried to set aside a divorce decree through a bill of review after enforcement began, arguing the property division was fraudulently inflated by a double-counting of mortgage debt. The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that bill-of-review relief was unavailable because, although he complained of fraud in the decree’s math, he had notice of the divorce, received the signed decree, retained counsel, and had time to pursue a motion for new trial or appeal. The court applied the traditional bill-of-review elements and focused on the diligence requirement, concluding his failure to seek timely post-judgment relief was not unmixed with his own negligence. The court affirmed denial of the bill of review and left the enforcement orders, including appointment of a receiver to sell the homestead, in place.
Litigation Takeaway
“A bill of review is not a do-over for missed post-judgment deadlines. If a party has notice of the decree, hires counsel, and could have challenged the ruling through a motion for new trial or appeal, later claims of fraud in the property division will usually fail for lack of diligence.”