Weekly Digest
May 9 – May 15, 2026
33 opinions this week
In the Interest of E.M.F., a Child
COA05
In this Dallas SAPCR modification appeal, a pro se father challenged a post-jury modification order, but the court never reached the merits because his briefing was fatally inadequate. After the court notified him that his original brief violated Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 and gave him a chance to amend, his amended brief still failed to identify coherent appellate issues, cite the record, apply governing law, explain preservation, or show harm. Relying on Rules 38.1, 38.9, and 44.3, and cases such as Bertucci and Bolling, the court held that appellate courts may liberally construe briefs but cannot become advocates by searching the record and constructing arguments for a party. Because the amended brief still presented no reviewable issues, the court held the father waived his complaints and affirmed the modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
“On appeal, even a potentially valid family-law complaint is lost if it is not framed as a specific, preserved, rule-supported issue with governing authority, record citations, and harm analysis. A deficiency notice is a final chance to fix substance, not just formatting; if the amended brief still forces the court to guess, waiver and affirmance are likely.”
Noyes v. State of Texas for the Protection of Samantha Jo Voges
SCOTX
In a protective-order case, the trial court entered a lifetime ban on Jonathan Noyes’s possession of firearms after finding reasonable grounds to believe he had engaged in criminal stalking. Noyes argued the firearm prohibition violated the Second Amendment and the Texas Constitution. The Supreme Court of Texas did not decide whether the lifetime ban was ultimately constitutional, but it held that Noyes had adequately preserved those constitutional complaints for appellate review. Because the court of appeals had decided the case before United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), clarified the governing framework for firearm restrictions tied to protective orders, the Court vacated the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded for reconsideration under Rahimi.
Litigation Takeaway
“Protective-order firearm restrictions are not boilerplate. If you want to challenge or defend a firearms ban—especially a lifetime ban—make a clear record on the constitutional basis, scope, and duration of the restriction. Noyes shows Texas courts will not impose an unduly technical preservation standard, but lawyers still need to expressly raise the issue and build a record that can survive review under Rahimi.”
In the Interest of I.W.O., a Child
COA10
In this SAPCR modification appeal, Mother argued the trial court wrongly kept the parties’ child from testifying live before the jury about his schooling, medical care, visitation with Father, and desire not to live with Father. The Waco court held that a child’s testimony is not exempt from ordinary evidentiary rules and that Rule 403 can permit exclusion when the proposed testimony would be needlessly cumulative of evidence already admitted through therapists, counselors, providers, the custody evaluator, the parents, and an offer of proof. The court distinguished Callicott as a competency case, not a rule creating an automatic right to present a child witness. Even assuming exclusion was error, the court found no reversible harm because the child’s views were already in the record and Mother could not show the absence of live testimony probably caused an improper judgment. The judgment appointing Father sole managing conservator was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want a child to testify in a custody-modification jury trial, do more than say the child’s preferences are important. Be prepared to show what the child will add that no other witness or record already covers. And if the testimony is excluded, a detailed offer of proof is essential—but it will not win reversal if the same substance is already elsewhere in the record.”
Rideout v. Rideout
COA02
In Rideout v. Rideout, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld a Chapter 7B protective order after finding sufficient evidence that a former husband engaged in stalking of his ex-wife in the post-divorce co-parenting context. The evidence showed a continuing course of conduct: repeated unwanted appearances at her church, child activities, gym, restaurants, and stores; hostile and excessive AppClose messages; apparent monitoring of her vehicle and location; and disregard of prior communication limits and a 30-foot stay-away restriction. Applying Chapter 7B and Penal Code sections 42.072 and 42.07, the court treated the case as a pattern-based stalking record rather than isolated incidents, giving weight to both Hallie’s testimony that she felt scared and alarmed and the objective reasonable-person standard. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support reasonable grounds that Colby committed stalking and affirmed the two-year protective order.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family cases, stalking can be proven through a pattern of unwanted surveillance, repeated proximity, hostile co-parenting messages, and violations of prior boundaries—even when the conduct happens around children’s events or other ordinary shared spaces. Build the case as a chronology, preserve app messages and location-monitoring evidence, and use prior Rule 11 agreements or injunctions to show notice, intent, and a continuing course of conduct.”
In the Interest of G.S.S. and S.D.S., Children
COA11
In a Department-filed termination case, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 107.013(a)(1) required the trial court to appoint counsel for an indigent incarcerated father who appeared in opposition to termination. Although the record contained significant evidence of domestic violence, substance abuse, incarceration, and danger to the children, the appellate court focused on the threshold procedural issue: the father requested appointed counsel, was indigent, and opposed the suit, so the statute was triggered. Because the trial court denied counsel without a hearing, the court held that the father’s statutory right to counsel was violated and reversed the termination order as to him, remanding for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas termination cases, appointed-counsel issues are not housekeeping—they can undo an otherwise strong judgment. If an indigent parent appears in opposition to a government-filed termination suit, counsel must be appointed under Family Code § 107.013, including for incarcerated parents, and failure to do so is a reversal trap.”
In the Interest of R.A., a Child
COA02
Father appealed after a Texas trial court dismissed a UCCJEA temporary emergency-jurisdiction case involving a child already subject to a Washington custody order. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals did not reach whether the Texas dismissal was correct when entered. Instead, it focused on mootness and the provisional nature of Texas Family Code § 152.204. After the appeal was filed, Washington—the state with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction—entered temporary custody orders addressing the child’s safety, care, therapy, and Father’s access. Because those later Washington orders superseded the emergency relief Father sought to preserve in Texas, the court held there was no longer any effective appellate relief available and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is only a short-term bridge, not a way to convert Texas into the permanent custody forum. In interstate custody disputes, if the decree state continues exercising jurisdiction and enters operative custody orders, any Texas appeal tied to emergency jurisdiction may become moot fast.”
Cylear v. Johnson-Cylear
COA03
In Cylear v. Johnson-Cylear, the husband argued the trial court had to order the marital home sold based on an alleged agreement incident to divorce. The court rejected that claim because the appellate record contained neither a signed written agreement nor a reporter’s record of any enforceable open-court Rule 11 agreement. It also held that temporary orders requiring the house to be listed for sale were only interim directives and did not amount to a Family Code section 7.006(b) finding that an agreement was just and right. Even if some prior agreement existed, the parties repudiated any nonbinding deal by later trying the property division as a contested issue. The court therefore affirmed the decree awarding the home to the wife.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want a divorce property agreement to control the final decree, make it provable and make it binding: get it signed and filed, or recite it in open court on the record, and obtain an express just-and-right finding if needed. Temporary orders about listing or managing property are not a substitute, and trying the issue on the merits can amount to repudiation of any earlier nonbinding agreement.”
Hartley v. State
COA13
In Hartley v. State, the appellant argued that the written community-supervision order incorrectly gave him 116 days of jail-time credit instead of the 120 days orally pronounced by the trial court. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because, while the appeal was pending, Hartley was discharged from community supervision. Applying Texas mootness principles and Ex parte Canada, the court held that once Hartley was no longer confined, under supervision, or otherwise restrained by the challenged order, there was no live controversy and no meaningful relief the court could grant. Because no mootness exception was shown, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Timing can be everything. In family-law enforcement and contempt matters, complaints about jail credit, short-term confinement, temporary restrictions, or expiring compliance orders can become moot before an appeal is decided. If the challenged restraint may end quickly, lawyers should consider faster vehicles like mandamus, habeas, emergency relief, or immediate correction in the trial court, and build a record of any ongoing collateral consequences.”
In Re Jim S. Adler & Associates, Frank W. Robertson, Michael Gomez, David J. Sacks, Jr., and Marco Antonio Rodriguez
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus and vacated a trial court’s order disqualifying one law firm from jointly representing a client and a second law firm sued in the same case. The plaintiff argued joint representation created a Rule 1.06 conflict because it sued one defendant for breach of an alleged fee contract and the other for tortious interference with that contract. The appellate court held disqualification was improper because both represented parties took the same present position: the alleged contract never existed or was invalid and unenforceable. The court emphasized that Rule 1.06 does not mandate disqualification based on a theoretical conflict created by an opponent’s pleadings; the movant must show a real, current, material adversity and resulting prejudice. Because no actual present conflict was shown, the trial court abused its discretion, and mandamus was the proper remedy.
Litigation Takeaway
“A disqualification motion cannot succeed just because opposing pleadings imagine a future conflict between jointly represented parties. In Texas litigation—including family cases—the movant must prove a real, present, material conflict and prejudice, not merely speculative adversity. If aligned clients are advancing the same defense, Rule 1.06 alone does not force separate counsel.”
Israel Villalobos v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Villalobos v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to sentencing without a presentence investigation report and without a separate punishment hearing after adjudication, and whether the written judgment accurately reflected the trial court’s oral true findings on the motion to adjudicate. The court held the ineffective-assistance claims failed because Villalobos had already waived a PSI and Texas law permits a unitary adjudication-and-punishment proceeding, so counsel’s conduct was not shown to be deficient on this record. But because the written judgment misstated which allegations were found true, and the State conceded the errors, the court reformed the judgment under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b) to match the actual oral findings and affirmed the judgment as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume a written judgment is accurate just because the court’s oral ruling was clear. If a judgment overstates or misstates the findings actually made, that error can distort later family-law litigation involving custody, protective orders, enforcement, or credibility. Verify the criminal record against the oral pronouncement and seek correction or appellate reformation before the judgment is used as shorthand proof in family court.”
In the Interest of A.M.K., A Child
COA14
In In re A.M.K., the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held Texas lacked initial child-custody jurisdiction under the UCCJEA because the child had not lived in Texas for six consecutive months immediately before Father filed his SAPCR. The court measured residence from the commencement date, assumed in Father’s favor that the child’s departure to Georgia was only a temporary absence, and still found the child’s maximum Texas residence was only 5 months and 20 days. Because the six-month home-state requirement in Texas Family Code §§ 152.102(7) and 152.201(a)(1) was not met, Texas could not exercise home-state jurisdiction. The court also upheld the trial court’s decision that, even aside from Father’s significant-connection argument, Georgia was the more appropriate forum under § 152.207.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not file a Texas custody case on a rough six-month estimate. Under the UCCJEA, the home-state clock is exact, temporary absence cannot cure a mathematical shortfall, and even a possible significant-connection argument may fail if another state is the more appropriate forum.”
Huskey v. White
COA14
In Huskey v. White, the father sought to terminate child support as his son reached adulthood, while the mother and the Office of the Attorney General asked the court to order indefinite support under Texas Family Code section 154.302 for an adult disabled child. After a bench trial, the trial court found the son’s developmental and language-related disabilities existed or were known before age eighteen, that he required substantial care and personal supervision, and that he would not be capable of self-support, then ordered the father to continue paying $1,420 per month indefinitely. On appeal, the court applied abuse-of-discretion review and held the record contained probative evidence supporting those findings, including the child’s diagnoses, special-education history, modified coursework, low literacy, inability to drive or live independently, dependence on his mother, and SSI benefits. The court also emphasized that because no findings of fact and conclusions of law were requested, it would imply all findings necessary to support the judgment if supported by the record. The support amount was likewise upheld, and the father’s complaint about an improper judicial comment was waived for lack of preservation.
Litigation Takeaway
“Adult-disabled-child support cases are won or lost on a functional record, not labels alone: build or attack evidence showing whether the child can actually live and work independently. And after a bench trial, always request findings of fact and conclusions of law, because failing to do so gives the appellee a major advantage on appeal.”
In the Matter of J.H.M.
COA01
In In the Matter of J.H.M., the First Court of Appeals considered whether a juvenile determinate sentencing judgment had to be reversed because it did not expressly state the reasons for committing the child outside the home as required by Texas Family Code section 54.04(i). The court held that this omission was not fundamental error. Because J.H.M. did not preserve the complaint in the juvenile court, the issue was forfeited. The court also found no showing of harm and concluded that the record otherwise supported the disposition. Reviewing the evidence of the murder offense, firearm use, gang-related evidence, supervision problems, and the juvenile court’s findings on best interest, reasonable efforts, and inability to provide adequate home supervision, the court affirmed both the TJJD commitment and the later transfer to TDCJ.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume a missing statutory finding or recitation automatically wins an appeal. If an order omits required language, preserve the complaint in the trial court, seek correction, and explain the harm. If the record otherwise supports the ruling, an appellate court may treat the omission as a forfeitable drafting defect rather than reversible error.”
Dongmei Pan and Arconslp LLC v. Lihua Wang and Shufeng Zhang
COA14
In Pan v. Wang, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected efforts to turn promises made during an extramarital affair into actionable fraud or fiduciary-duty claims. The dispute involved both affair-related allegations and separate business, wage, and property issues, including financial transfers, a joint venture, unpaid salary, and ownership of real property. Relying on Texas public policy favoring preservation of marriage, the court held that Texas does not recognize claims based on promises to leave a spouse, marry a paramour, or continue an adulterous relationship, and that an affair alone does not create a fiduciary relationship or legally justifiable reliance. Applying that rule, the court upheld the trial court’s refusal of jury submissions and exclusion of duplicative evidence aimed at those non-cognizable theories, while affirming the judgment on the remaining ordinary commercial and property claims.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas courts will not award damages for broken promises made in the course of an affair. In family-law and related property litigation, lawyers should separate adultery facts that may matter for recognized issues—like property tracing, reimbursement, or fault—from barred tort or reliance theories based on promises to divorce, marry, or continue the relationship.”
Michael Eugene Dreelan v. Martha Estupian Dreelan
COA05
In Dreelan v. Dreelan, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a divorce decree finding that the husband committed both actual and constructive fraud on the community estate. The evidence showed he used his superior control over marital finances, along with a power of attorney signed by the wife, to sell the parties’ Forney home, divert the proceeds, and position the Terrell house as his separate property without the wife’s informed consent. The record also included evidence of transfers to a paramour, gifts to third parties, unaccounted cash withdrawals, and diverted business distributions. Applying Texas Family Code section 7.009 and established fraud-on-the-community principles, the court held that a spouse’s formal participation in a transaction does not defeat a fraud claim when that spouse did not knowingly consent to the ultimate disposition of community assets, and that fiduciary duties between spouses—and under a power of attorney—support relief. The court upheld reconstitution of the community estate and the $133,979.16 money judgment as part of a just-and-right division, rejecting the husband’s one-satisfaction challenge.
Litigation Takeaway
“Informed consent matters more than signatures. If one spouse uses control over finances, title, or a power of attorney to redirect community assets without full disclosure, Texas courts can find fraud on the community, reconstitute the estate, and award a money judgment. For trial lawyers, detailed tracing, fiduciary-duty evidence, and findings of fact can make or break these claims.”
Manka v. Acosta
COA04
In Manka v. Acosta, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed a civil-assault verdict arising from a courthouse encounter during a family-law case. The defendant argued the evidence was insufficient because there was no bodily injury and the video did not clearly show the precise grabbing alleged. The court rejected that framing, holding that offensive-contact assault under Texas Penal Code section 22.01(a)(3) does not require bodily injury. Applying ordinary legal- and factual-sufficiency review, the court relied on the plaintiff’s testimony, corroborating witness testimony, security video showing escalating physical contact and invasion of personal space, the plaintiff’s immediate reaction and outcry, and surrounding circumstances to conclude the jury could infer both that the contact occurred and that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known it would be regarded as offensive or provocative. The court therefore held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support liability.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law-adjacent settings, intrusive touching does not become legally trivial just because it leaves no injury or is only partially captured on video. Lawyers should treat courthouse, mediation, and exchange-site conduct as potential tort and family-case evidence: immediate outcry, witness observations, partial surveillance footage, and contextual proof can be enough to prove offensive-contact assault and to shape credibility, protective-order, conservatorship, and trial-strategy issues.”
Mack v. State
COA04
In Mack v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals rejected a legal-sufficiency challenge to child-sexual-assault convictions where the child did not visually observe the perpetrator during the assaults. The court applied Jackson v. Virginia and article 38.07, emphasizing that identity may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence and that a child complainant’s testimony alone can support conviction. Here, the child testified she recognized the defendant by his distinctive smell, cigarette odor, breath, bodily presence, and the surrounding household circumstances, and she later identified him in court. The court held that the cumulative force of that testimony, along with corroborating outcry context, was enough for a rational jury to find identity beyond a reasonable doubt despite the absence of physical evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
“A child’s abuse allegation is not weak just because the child did not see the alleged abuser or there is no forensic proof. In family-law cases, courts may give significant weight to sensory-based identification, household context, and outcry testimony when assessing safety, credibility, and possession restrictions. If you are advancing the claim, build the full context carefully; if you are defending it, attack the reliability of the identification itself—not merely the lack of corroboration.”
In the Interest of J.E.F. and J.J.F., Children
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court held that, even on a thin record, legally and factually sufficient evidence showed the father knowingly exposed the children to endangering conditions and engaged in an endangering course of conduct. Key facts included an incident where the children were left alone and the father returned intoxicated, his resulting abandonment and child-endangerment conviction, domestic-violence concerns, a protective-order violation, and instability caused by incarceration. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the deferential sufficiency review required in termination cases, the court concluded those facts supported both the environmental endangerment finding under subsection (D) and the conduct-based endangerment finding under subsection (E), and affirmed under In re N.G.
Litigation Takeaway
“Endangerment findings are often built from a pattern, not a single event. In both termination and private custody litigation, facts like unsafe supervision, intoxication, family violence, protective-order violations, criminal conduct, and incarceration can support major restrictions on parental rights. Lawyers should build a detailed record tying each fact to either the child’s environment, the parent’s course of conduct, or both—because appellate courts will closely review subsection (D) and (E) findings and those findings can have lasting consequences.”
In the Interest of A.T.G., A.G.G., A.G.G. II, A.G.G., and A.G.G., Children
COA07
In In re A.T.G., the Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s rights to two children after the record showed a long-running pattern of domestic violence against the mother, excessive corporal punishment of the children, and a home environment dominated by fear and aggression. Although sexual-abuse allegations that triggered the case became uncertain by trial, the court held that the remaining evidence independently satisfied Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court analyzed subsection (D) as addressing the children’s endangering conditions and surroundings and subsection (E) as addressing the father’s endangering conduct, concluding that repeated assaults, abusive discipline with objects, intimidation, and the children’s persistent fear were legally and factually sufficient under both grounds. The court therefore upheld termination and the related no-contact relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“Domestic violence is not collateral to custody or termination litigation—it is direct evidence of child endangerment. Even if one major allegation weakens, a well-developed record showing a pattern of violence, abusive discipline, intimidation, and child fear can still support severe restrictions or termination.”
Brigham v. State
COA05
In Brigham v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defendant challenging an Article 38.072 outcry ruling must preserve the exact complaint made on appeal. The defense broadly objected to the forensic interviewer being designated as the outcry witness "in this case," but on appeal argued a narrower theory: that the interviewer may have been proper for some incidents, yet the child’s mother was the proper outcry witness for one specific alleged event. The court emphasized that outcry analysis is event-specific in multi-incident abuse cases, that the objecting party must distinctly identify the incident and the earlier qualifying disclosure, and that trial courts are not required to parse an undeveloped theory. Because the defense did not make that event-specific argument in the trial court, the complaint was not preserved under Rule 33.1(a), and the conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If your evidentiary objection is event-specific, your record must be event-specific too. In abuse-related family cases, broad objections to CAC, therapist, parent, or forensic-interviewer testimony will not preserve a narrower appellate complaint unless counsel clearly identifies the particular incident, the competing witness, and why that earlier disclosure legally qualifies.”
In the Interest of N. L. S. and E. J. C., Children
COA01
After Mother’s parental rights were terminated, she filed a petition to reinstate them under Texas Family Code section 161.302 while the children had not yet been adopted and were not yet subject to adoption placement agreements. Before the reinstatement hearing, however, DFPS executed adoption placement agreements for the children. The First Court of Appeals applied a strict plain-language reading of sections 161.302 and 161.303, holding that section 161.302 governs only filing eligibility, while section 161.303 governs the merits at the hearing. Because section 161.303 requires proof that the child is not subject to an adoption placement agreement at the time relief is granted, and the children were subject to such agreements at the hearing, Mother could not obtain reinstatement. The court also rejected the argument that filing a reinstatement petition creates an implied stay barring DFPS from moving forward with adoptive placement.
Litigation Takeaway
“Filing eligibility is not the same as winning on the merits. In reinstatement and other family-law cases involving timing-sensitive statutes, lawyers must confirm whether the controlling facts are measured at filing or at the hearing. A petition that is valid when filed can still fail if key facts change before the court rules, and courts will not read an implied stay into the Family Code without express statutory language.”
In re Matthiew Adrian Alirol
COA13
After a trial court granted a new trial and set aside an agreed divorce decree, the relator sought mandamus relief, arguing the ruling was improper. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals focused on the procedural posture: this was a nonjury divorce matter, not a case involving a jury verdict. Applying Texas mandamus standards, the court explained that mandamus generally requires both a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal, and that immediate mandamus review of new-trial orders is far more limited in bench or agreed-decree cases than in jury-verdict cases. Because the relator did not show the new-trial order was void or that extraordinary circumstances made ordinary appellate review inadequate, the court denied mandamus and allowed the case to proceed in the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a trial court grants a new trial after an agreed or bench-tried divorce decree, mandamus is usually not the answer. Unless you can show the order is void or that truly exceptional circumstances make appeal inadequate, the practical path is to preserve error, retry the case, and challenge the ruling in a regular appeal after final judgment.”
In the Matter of J.P., a Juvenile
COA05
In this juvenile appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed a written modification order that committed J.P. to TJJD but cited Family Code section 54.04(f), the original-disposition statute, instead of section 54.05(f), the statute governing modification proceedings. After conducting its Anders review, the court concluded the record clearly showed this was a modification case, that J.P. had pleaded true to the probation violation, and that the underlying felony adjudication made him eligible for TJJD commitment. Because the defect was a drafting error rather than a lack of authority or harmful substantive error, the court reformed the order to substitute section 54.05(f) for section 54.04(f) and affirmed the order as modified. The court also denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw because counsel’s duties continue through the petition-for-review stage absent good cause.
Litigation Takeaway
“Not every mistake in a written order justifies reversal. If the record clearly shows what the trial court intended and supports the relief granted, an appellate court may reform a mis-cited or internally inconsistent order rather than remand or reverse. For family-law litigators, that means two things: draft orders carefully, and on appeal focus on whether the defect is truly substantive and harmful or merely a correctable scrivener’s error.”
In the Interest of S.V.H.F., A Child
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights after a three-month-old infant suffered severe non-accidental head trauma while in the father’s exclusive care. The court relied on medical records showing intracranial bleeding and retinal hemorrhages consistent with abusive acceleration/deceleration injury, and held the trial court was entitled to reject the father’s innocent explanation that the child merely choked or asphyxiated on milk. Applying the clear-and-convincing sufficiency standards, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E), and because one predicate ground plus best interest is enough, it did not need to reach subsection (D).
Litigation Takeaway
“When a very young child suffers serious unexplained injuries during one parent’s exclusive care, Texas courts may infer endangerment from circumstantial medical evidence alone—even without pinpoint testimony about the exact timing or mechanism of injury. For family-law litigators, the case highlights the importance of building or attacking the exclusivity timeline, medical-record causation, and witness credibility, because a factfinder may simply disbelieve a parent’s benign account and that can be enough to sustain major protective relief.”
Cedillo v. State
COA01
In Cedillo v. State, the First Court of Appeals held that a party does not preserve an Article 38.072 reliability complaint by arguing only about who qualifies as the proper outcry witness. Cedillo challenged witness identity at the outcry hearing, but on appeal reframed the issue as whether the children’s statements to the mother, grandmother, and counselor were unreliable. The court applied Texas preservation rules and concluded that a generic or differently framed objection did not alert the trial court to a specific reliability challenge based on the statutory factors of time, content, and circumstances. The court also held that any assumed error was harmless because the complainants and CAC records provided substantially similar evidence without objection. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want appellate review of a child-disclosure reliability issue, say so specifically and build the record around reliability—not just hearsay, process, or who the proper witness is. In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, separate each evidentiary objection, get a clear ruling, and object consistently to repeated similar evidence or harmless-error will likely defeat any appeal.”
Cedillo v. State
COA01
In Cedillo v. State, the First Court of Appeals held that a party does not preserve an appellate complaint that a child’s outcry statements were unreliable under Article 38.072 by arguing only about which adult was the proper outcry witness. The trial dispute focused on witness designation—whether the mother, grandmother, counselor, or another adult was the first qualifying recipient of the child’s disclosure—not on the separate statutory reliability inquiry requiring analysis of the statement’s time, content, and circumstances. Because Cedillo did not specifically raise that reliability objection in the trial court, the court found the complaint waived. The court also held that any error would have been harmless because substantially similar abuse evidence came in through the children’s own testimony and unobjected-to medical records.
Litigation Takeaway
“In abuse-driven family cases, do not lump together distinct evidentiary objections. If you want to challenge a child’s statement as unreliable, say so clearly and tie the objection to the governing reliability standard; arguing only that the wrong adult is serving as the messenger will not preserve the issue for appeal. And if similar testimony or records come in elsewhere without objection, any evidentiary complaint may still fail on harmless-error grounds.”
In the Interest of S.M.M. and R.M.M., Minor Children
COA05
In a child-support modification case, the trial court signed a 2022 order awarding Mother $22,953.40 in attorney’s fees after taking fees under advisement at the hearing. After plenary power expired, the court later signed a nunc pro tunc judgment deleting that award and requiring each party to pay their own fees. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that because the court had not orally rendered a fee ruling at the hearing, the signed 2022 order was itself the rendition of judgment on fees. Deleting the fee award and replacing it with a take-nothing fees provision was a substantive change to the judgment actually rendered, not a clerical correction permitted by Rule 316. The nunc pro tunc judgment was therefore void, and the original fee award remained in place.
Litigation Takeaway
“Once plenary power expires, a court can fix clerical mistakes in a family-law order, but it cannot use nunc pro tunc to rewrite who owes attorney’s fees or other substantive obligations. If a signed order is the first actual rendition on an issue, any challenge to that ruling must be made through timely post-judgment motions or appeal—not later by calling the change a mere clerical correction.”
In the Interest of B.W., a Child
COA05
In In the Interest of B.W., the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a child could not appeal an order terminating his father’s parental rights when the child, through counsel, had only filed a general denial and opposed termination at trial but had not pleaded any affirmative claim for relief or identified any Family Code provision authorizing the appeal. The court analyzed the issue as a threshold question of appellate standing and subject-matter jurisdiction, explaining that participation in the trial court does not itself make someone an aggrieved party for appellate purposes. Because B.W. showed no legally recognized justiciable interest that was injuriously affected by the judgment, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction without reaching the sufficiency challenge to the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume that trial participation preserves appellate rights in a family case. To appeal, the would-be appellant must have a statutory basis to do so and must be an aggrieved party whose own legally recognized interest was harmed by the judgment; a general denial and opposition at trial are not enough.”
Dillon Austin Venson v. The State of Texas
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly designated a forensic interviewer as the Article 38.072 outcry witness even though the child first told her mother that the defendant had 'messed with' her and put his hands down her pants. The court explained that the outcry witness is not automatically the first adult who hears any allegation of abuse, but the first adult who receives a statement that describes the alleged offense in a discernible way. Because the mother described the initial conversation as brief and lacking detail, while the later CAC interview provided specific facts about the sexual touching, the trial court acted within its discretion in selecting the forensic interviewer. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient to support the indecency-with-a-child conviction and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“In child-abuse-related family litigation, do not assume the first adult listener controls the evidentiary story. Courts will focus on the first sufficiently descriptive disclosure, not merely the first mention of abuse. For practitioners, the key is to build a precise disclosure timeline, compare the exact content of each statement, and frame arguments around specificity rather than chronology.”
In Re Jose Gilberto Perez
COA05
In this original proceeding, a father sought mandamus relief after the trial court denied his request to modify SAPCR temporary orders that apparently left the child with a nonparent. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of his parental-presumption arguments because his mandamus record was fatally incomplete: he omitted the operative January 2025 temporary order, the relevant motions, and properly authenticated transcripts and exhibits from the hearings that led to the ruling. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.7 and standard mandamus principles, the court held he failed to show a clear abuse of discretion. The court also struck the petition and record for including unredacted sensitive data, and denied relief without prejudice to refiling with a compliant record.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus rises or falls on the record. Even strong family-law arguments about parental rights or improper nonparent conservatorship will go nowhere if the petition does not include the actual order being challenged, the key motions, and authenticated transcripts and exhibits from every material hearing. Also, do a final Rule 9.9 redaction check before filing.”
In the Interest of A.P.Z., a Child
COA05
In In re A.P.Z., the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a custody-modification order after Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s decision to give Father the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence. The court did not reach the merits of Mother’s evidentiary complaints because the appellate record was incomplete: it omitted the trial court’s in-camera interview of the 15-year-old child, a referenced child interview status report, and related proceedings. Applying settled Texas appellate rules, the court presumed the missing portions of the reporter’s record supported the judgment. Because Mother’s arguments depended on the state of the evidence, the court held those complaints were waived and treated the evidence as sufficient to support implied findings of material and substantial change and best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you plan to challenge a custody or modification ruling on evidentiary grounds, you must bring up a complete appellate record—especially any in-camera child interview under Family Code § 153.009. In family cases, missing hearings, report-back settings, or child interviews will usually trigger a presumption that the omitted evidence supports the judgment, making sufficiency and abuse-of-discretion complaints effectively dead on arrival.”
In Re Kathryn Copeland
COA05
In In re Copeland, a pro se litigant already subject to a vexatious-litigant prefiling order sought mandamus after the local administrative judge denied her request under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 11.102(d). The Dallas Court of Appeals held that section 11.102(d) is only a gatekeeping mechanism for deciding whether a vexatious litigant may file new litigation; it does not authorize the local administrative judge to declare the underlying vexatious-litigant order void ab initio. Because Copeland’s motion primarily sought a collateral attack on the prior order rather than permission to file identified new litigation, and because she failed to show the judge had authority to grant the requested relief, mandamus was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not use a Chapter 11 permission request as a backdoor attack on an existing vexatious-litigant order. In family-law cases, be precise about whether you are seeking permission to file new litigation, filing in an existing case, or challenging the validity of the prior prefiling order—because those are different procedural paths, and mixing them can sink the request and any mandamus challenge.”
Fulton v. State
COA07
In Fulton v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a trial court could not assess $787.50 in court-appointed attorney’s fees against a defendant who had repeatedly been found indigent when the record contained no evidence of a material change in her financial circumstances or any present ability to pay. The court relied on article 26.05(g) and Mayer v. State, emphasizing that boilerplate recitals and an administrative order entered without a hearing do not substitute for evidence. The court also struck a $500 fine that was never orally pronounced, deleted a $443 reparation award unsupported by the record, and removed a premature $15 time-payment fee. The judgment, bill of costs, and withdrawal order were modified accordingly.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a court is going to impose attorney’s fees or other monetary obligations on a party previously found indigent, the record must affirmatively show present ability to pay and any material change in circumstances. For family-law litigants, Fulton is a strong analogy for attacking unsupported fee awards, reimbursement orders, and cost assessments that rest on assumptions rather than evidence.”