Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
Thomas Joseph Radford, Jr. v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Radford, the complainant testified she ingested Xanax supplied by the defendant, lost consciousness, and woke to find the defendant penetrating her while her clothing was displaced. The defendant immediately stopped and acted as if nothing had happened when she opened her eyes. On appeal from a sexual-assault conviction, the Houston First Court of Appeals applied the legal-sufficiency standard (viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict) and focused on Texas Penal Code § 22.011(b)(3) and (5), which define “without consent” to include situations where the actor knows the complainant is unconscious/physically unable to resist or unaware the assault is occurring. The court rejected the argument that the complainant’s inability to describe the precise start of intercourse created an evidentiary gap; unconsciousness at the outset is itself affirmative proof of nonconsent under the statute. The court further held the jury could infer the defendant’s knowledge of nonconsent from circumstantial evidence and consciousness-of-guilt conduct, including that intercourse began while she was unconscious (after drugs he provided) and that he abruptly stopped and normalized the situation upon her awakening. The court affirmed, holding the evidence legally sufficient to prove both lack of consent and the defendant’s knowledge of nonconsent.
Litigation Takeaway
"When the evidence shows a person was unconscious or unaware at the outset, Texas law treats that incapacity as affirmative proof of “without consent”—the case does not fail just because the complainant cannot testify to what happened during unconsciousness. Knowledge/intent is commonly proven circumstantially; abrupt stopping, concealment, minimization, or “acting like nothing happened” can support an inference the actor knew the other person could not consent. In family-violence/SAPCR disputes, build the record around impairment, waking-condition details, and post-incident conduct to support findings even where memory is partial."
Diana Reismann Sexton v. Gilbert Sexton
COA14
In a consolidated Fort Bend County divorce/SAPCR and interspousal personal-injury action, the wife (pro se) appealed numerous rulings after the trial court granted summary judgment on her tort claims, adopted a jury verdict naming the husband sole managing conservator, entered a property division, and included a Chapter 11 vexatious-litigant finding against her. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals first analyzed whether each complaint was reviewable: it refused to revisit the indigency determination because it had already been finally reviewed under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(g); held challenges to temporary orders were moot because the final decree superseded them; and held possession/access issues were moot because the child turned 18 during the appeal. Because no reporter’s record was filed, the court could not evaluate preservation and was required to presume missing evidence supported the jury findings and discretionary rulings, making the wife’s attacks on the jury verdict and property division unreviewable. On the issues that could be decided on the clerk’s record, the court affirmed the summary judgment on the wife’s personal-injury claims as effectively a no-evidence disposition on essential elements (including causation and damages). But it held the appellate record did not affirmatively support the statutory predicates for a Chapter 11 vexatious-litigant designation, and therefore modified the final decree to delete that finding while otherwise affirming the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appeals in divorce/SAPCR cases often turn on procedure, not merits: preserve error, secure a reporter’s record, and watch for mootness as children near 18. If you seek (or oppose) a vexatious-litigant finding, treat it like a record-driven statutory remedy—without evidence in the record establishing Chapter 11 predicates, an appellate court may strike the designation even while affirming the rest of the decree."
Erique Howard v. The State of Texas
COA14
After a jury convicted Erique Howard of multiple felonies, he elected judge sentencing. In a post-verdict discussion, the judge referenced the broad punishment range and encouraged the parties to confer and, if they wanted more control over the number, attempt to reach an agreement before the court assessed punishment. After a recess, the court imposed a 50-year sentence “in accordance with the plea agreement,” and the record contained no contemporaneous objection claiming coercion/retaliation and no motion for new trial or other post-judgment motion raising involuntariness or lack of judicial inquiry. On appeal, Howard argued the sentence reflected judicial vindictiveness for exercising the right to a jury trial and that the post-verdict sentencing agreement was involuntary (and the judge should have inquired into voluntariness). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because this was not an increased sentence after a retrial, so Howard had to show actual vindictiveness from the record; the judge’s repeated statements disclaiming predetermination and the negotiated posture did not establish actual vindictiveness. The court further held the voluntariness and “duty to inquire” complaints were waived for lack of preservation because Howard did not object at the time and did not file a post-judgment motion to develop the issue. The judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you think a judge’s settlement/sentencing “range talk” crossed into coercion or retaliation, you must preserve it immediately. Make a record (objection/clarification/offer of proof), and if needed file timely post-judgment motions to develop involuntariness claims—otherwise the “the judge pressured me” narrative is usually unreviewable, and the agreement will be treated as voluntary."
Dr. Robert Corwin, Richard B. Brualdi, and The Brualdi Law Firm, P.C. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation
COA01
In a suit seeking emergency injunctive relief to stop a scheduled shareholder vote on the Exxon/Pioneer merger, the trial court denied the temporary injunction and the plaintiff nonsuited shortly thereafter. Exxon pursued sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel and law firm, and the trial court found the emergency temporary-injunction request was groundless and pursued in bad faith/for an improper purpose, awarding $69,861.19 in sanctions (primarily attorney’s fees) and related relief. The First Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Chapter 10 and Rule 13 sanctions were available even though the sanctioned lawyer/firm argued they did not sign the challenged petition/motion, because the evidence supported that they were responsible for and pursued the filings and strategy. The court also rejected the argument that the trial court improperly “circumvented” Chapter 10/Rule 13 by referencing inherent authority; the order was supported under the statutory/rule frameworks, and the record supported the trial court’s factual findings that the injunction request lacked viable legal/factual support and was used as leverage tied to timing and a broader pattern of similar litigation. Nonsuit did not eliminate the court’s power to decide the collateral sanctions issue based on pre-dismissal conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
"Emergency TRO/temporary-injunction practice is sanctions-sensitive: a voluntary nonsuit after a failed temp hearing does not erase exposure, courts may look past “who signed” to who directed and pursued the filing, and timing/pattern evidence can support a finding that an emergency request was filed for improper settlement leverage—leading to significant fee-shifting sanctions under Chapter 10 and Rule 13."
Howard v. State
COA14
After a jury convicted Howard of two aggravated sexual assaults and aggravated robbery, he elected judge sentencing. At the punishment setting the judge discussed the punishment range, commented the case carried high exposure, and encouraged counsel-client consultation and negotiation. After a recess the parties announced a post-verdict punishment agreement, and the court imposed a 50-year sentence “in accordance with the plea agreement.” On appeal Howard argued (1) due process “judicial vindictiveness” for having gone to trial and (2) that the punishment agreement was involuntary and the court failed to conduct a voluntariness inquiry. The Fourteenth Court held the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because this was not a retrial with an increased sentence after a successful appeal; therefore Howard had to prove actual vindictiveness. The record showed the judge’s remarks were facilitative/admonitory, repeatedly disclaiming any predetermined punishment, and the 50-year term matched the parties’ post-verdict agreement—so no actual vindictiveness was shown. The court also held voluntariness and “failure to inquire” complaints were forfeited because Howard made no contemporaneous objection when the agreement was adopted and filed no post-judgment motion raising involuntariness. Judgments affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you intend to later claim an on-the-record agreement (Rule 11/MBA/MSA or post-ruling deal) was coerced or involuntary, you must object immediately and/or file a timely post-judgment motion—otherwise the complaint is likely waived. And “judicial vindictiveness” is a narrow doctrine; absent a true Pearce posture, you must prove actual retaliation from the record, not just tough judicial commentary or settlement encouragement."
In re The Commitment of Raul Eliss Dominguez
COA03
In an SVP civil-commitment jury trial under Texas Health & Safety Code Chapter 841, the State’s expert psychologist referenced an unadjudicated allegation that Raul Eliss Dominguez sexually abused his four-year-old nephew. Although the issue was discussed outside the jury’s presence in a pretrial/limine setting, the trial court only cautioned counsel to object if testimony became inadmissible. When the expert mentioned the nephew allegation in front of the jury, Dominguez did not make a timely, specific objection, did not request a running objection, and did not obtain a ruling tied to the complained-of testimony. Applying TRAP 33.1 and Texas Rule of Evidence 103, the Third Court of Appeals held the complaint was not preserved and affirmed the commitment order. The court also held that, even assuming the expert’s testimony was admitted in error, any error was harmless (and effectively waived) because Dominguez later introduced the same or similar evidence through his own testimony without objection, triggering the “same evidence” rule.
Litigation Takeaway
"Motions in limine don’t preserve error. If an expert starts weaving unadjudicated “bad act” allegations into the basis for an opinion, you must object in real time, obtain a ruling (and a running objection if it will recur), and avoid later “opening the door” by eliciting the same facts yourself—otherwise you likely lose the issue both on preservation and on harmlessness under the same-evidence rule."
Erique Howard v. The State of Texas
COA14
After a jury convicted Erique Howard of multiple felonies, he elected judge-assessed punishment. Before the punishment hearing, the trial judge discussed Howard’s punishment exposure, referenced prior plea positions, and suggested a post-verdict negotiation range. After a recess, the court imposed a 50-year sentence, stating it was “in accordance with the plea agreement,” and no one objected or filed a motion for new trial claiming coercion or vindictiveness. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because this was not a resentencing after retrial, so Howard had to prove actual judicial vindictiveness from the record. The judge’s forceful comments and settlement-range discussion—paired with repeated disclaimers and a sentence matching the announced agreement—did not establish retaliation for exercising the right to trial. The court also held that complaints that the post-verdict sentencing agreement was involuntary, or that the trial court had to conduct an on-the-record voluntariness inquiry, were waived because Howard raised neither a contemporaneous objection nor a post-judgment motion developing those issues.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a judge “pushes a number” after a merits ruling, appellate courts often treat it as hard bargaining unless the record proves retaliation—and you still must preserve coercion/vindictiveness complaints immediately. If you believe a post-ruling agreement (Rule 11, parenting plan, property blueprint) was coerced, object on the record and follow up with a motion for new trial/to set aside that specifically pleads involuntariness and identifies the coercive statements; otherwise, the issue will likely be deemed waived."
Murray Lobb, PLLC v. Brandy Liss, Executor for the Estate of Mary James
COA14
In an estate dispute, the executor sued a former law firm for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging the firm “switched sides” and harmed the estate by filing and prosecuting litigation for the former joint client and by taking litigation positions attacking an assignment the firm had drafted. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals looked past the fiduciary-duty label and focused on the conduct actually pleaded: court filings, pleadings, and other litigation communications in related judicial proceedings. Because those litigation communications were a “fundamental part/main ingredient” of the alleged wrongdoing, the claims were “based on or in response to” the firm’s exercise of the TCPA-protected right to petition under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(4). The court reversed the trial court’s denial of the TCPA motion (affirming only the sanctions denial), rendered judgment dismissing the claims with prejudice, and remanded for a mandatory award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under TCPA § 27.009(a)(1).
Litigation Takeaway
"If a party repackages complaints about what a lawyer filed, argued, served, or said in a case into a tort claim like “breach of fiduciary duty,” the TCPA may require early dismissal when the litigation communications are a core part of the claim—and dismissal triggers mandatory fee-and-cost shifting. Plead (or attack) the case based on what the petition actually alleges, not the cause-of-action label."
Skorich v. The State of Texas; Woody v. The State of Texas
COA07
In a consolidated criminal appeal, the Seventh Court of Appeals reviewed injury-to-a-child convictions against the child’s mother and her live-in boyfriend arising from omissions during an interstate 18‑wheeler trip that culminated with the seven-year-old arriving at a Hereford (Deaf Smith County) ER unresponsive, severely dehydrated, and bruised. The defendants challenged (1) subject-matter jurisdiction and venue in Deaf Smith County given the multistate travel, and (2) legal and factual sufficiency—especially whether the boyfriend could be liable by omission absent parent status. Applying Texas Penal Code § 22.04, the court treated the conduct as a continuing, omission-based course of conduct with a harmful result tied to Deaf Smith County, and held Texas courts had jurisdiction and venue was proper where key components of the omission and the resulting medical crisis manifested. On sufficiency, the court held the evidence supported that the boyfriend “assumed” care, custody, and control—shown by cohabitation, day-to-day authority and discipline, integrated household functioning, and participation in decisions about when to seek medical care—creating a legal duty to act and supporting omission liability. The court also held the evidence supported the mother’s knowing or reckless mental state and causation, relying heavily on medical testimony that the child’s dehydration was chronic and consistent with withholding fluids and delayed care. The court affirmed both defendants’ judgments.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, a live-in boyfriend/girlfriend can become a duty-bearing “assumed caregiver” based on real-world control and decision-making—enough to support omission liability. For SAPCRs and protective orders, build (or attack) proof around functional caregiving facts (cohabitation, discipline, control of necessities, medical decision-making, admissions) and a clear timeline showing progressive deterioration and delayed intervention; courts will look past labels like “not the parent.”"
In the Interest of O.E.S., a Child
COA05
In a child support dispute under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), a father appealed a trial court's refusal to vacate a support order issued following a previous remand. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, finding that the father waived most of his appellate points by failing to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i). His brief lacked specific citations to the record and coherent legal analysis, which the court held is fatal to an appeal regardless of whether a party is represented by an attorney. Additionally, the court applied the 'law of the case' doctrine to reject his jurisdictional challenge, as the issue of personal jurisdiction had already been settled in a prior appeal of the same litigation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Procedural rules are just as important as the facts of your case; failing to properly cite the record or provide a clear legal argument in an appellate brief will result in a waiver of your claims. Furthermore, once a legal issue like jurisdiction is decided by an appellate court, the 'law of the case' doctrine typically prevents you from re-litigating that same issue later in the same proceeding."