Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
In re Adeel Zaidi, A.K. Chagla and Prestige Consulting d/b/a Turnaround Management Group
SCOTX
In an original mandamus proceeding, relators challenged a trial court order disqualifying their lawyer after his legal assistant—who previously worked for opposing counsel on the same case and had access to privileged strategy and work product—later performed services on the matter at the relators’ firm without any evidence she was admonished or screened before touching the file. The Texas Supreme Court applied the Phoenix Founders bright-line rule governing side-switching nonlawyer staff: when a nonlawyer worked on the same matter for the other side, the nonlawyer is conclusively presumed to have obtained confidences, and the hiring firm can avoid disqualification only by timely prophylactic measures, including admonishing the employee before the employee begins work on the conflicted matter. Because the record showed the assistant performed work on the case multiple times and there was no evidence of any pre-work admonition or timely screen, the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in disqualifying counsel. The Court also rejected the argument that e-filing service notices listing the assistant as the “filer” conclusively established waiver; such notices do not, as a matter of law, prove the opposing party had actual knowledge of the disqualifying facts and then unreasonably delayed. Mandamus relief was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your firm hires (or shares) a paralegal/legal assistant who previously worked on the other side of the same case, you must admonish and screen that employee before they do anything on the file—even “ministerial” tasks like e-filing—or you risk automatic disqualification under the Phoenix Founders bright-line rule. And if you’re seeking disqualification, don’t assume routine e-filing notices will defeat you on waiver; waiver requires proof of actual knowledge plus unreasonable delay, not just metadata."
In re J.H., A.H., J.H., and Z.H.
COA01
In this parental termination case, parents challenged the trial court's jurisdiction, arguing that a trial recess made the initial start of the trial a 'sham' intended to circumvent the statutory dismissal deadline under Texas Family Code section 263.401. The parents also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding endangerment and the best interests of the children. The First Court of Appeals held that because the trial court had legitimately begun hearing the merits of the case before the deadline, it did not lose jurisdiction simply because the final decree was signed later. In reviewing the merits, the court found that the parents' history of substance abuse, criminal child endangerment, and ongoing incidents of physical injury to the children provided clear and convincing evidence to support termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"To preserve jurisdiction in CPS cases, the trial must meaningfully commence on the merits before the statutory dismissal deadline; appellate courts will reject 'sham' trial challenges if the record reflects genuine judicial activity. Furthermore, evidence of a parent's instability or misconduct during the pendency of the suit is often dispositive in endangerment and best-interest analyses."
Ivan Lopez-Lopez v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Ivan Lopez-Lopez v. State, the First Court of Appeals reviewed a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child where the defendant’s primary appellate argument was that the complainant was not credible because her disclosures became more detailed over time and because the alleged abuse was too frequent to believe. Applying the Jackson/Brooks legal-sufficiency standard, the court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and refused to reweigh the jury’s credibility determinations. The court held the complainant’s testimony alone can be legally sufficient under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.07, and her testimony established the statutory elements of continuous sexual abuse under Texas Penal Code § 21.02(b) (child under 14, defendant 17 or older, two or more acts over a period of at least 30 days). The court rejected “evolving disclosure” and “too much abuse to be true” themes as credibility attacks for the jury, not grounds to overturn the verdict on appeal, and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Credibility-only challenges rarely win on appeal. A child’s incremental or “evolving” disclosure is treated as common—not inherently suspicious—and a factfinder may credit it. In family cases involving abuse allegations, expect appellate courts to defer to the trial court’s credibility calls; build (or attack) the case with objective, admissible proof and preserve legal-error issues (evidentiary rulings, due-process limits), not just arguments that the witness “wasn’t believable.”"
Maria Martinez v. Mario Antonio Perez Batres
COA03
Maria Martinez filed a restricted appeal to challenge a default divorce decree. However, the appellate court discovered that all twelve exhibits admitted during the initial hearing were missing from the record because the trial judge had released the originals to the husband’s lawyer, who never filed them with the district clerk. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and determined that this created a significant 'record-integrity problem' that could not be fixed by simple supplementation. The court held that the appeal must be abated and remanded to the trial court, ordering the trial judge to 'settle the record' by either securing an agreement between the parties or holding a hearing to reconstruct the missing evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"Winning your hearing is only the first step; you must ensure your evidence is officially filed and preserved with the court clerk. If exhibits are 'released' to an attorney rather than filed, it can lead to expensive delays and secondary 'record reconstruction' hearings if the case is ever challenged on appeal."
Rickye Henderson v. Ali Arabzadegan
COA03
In a quiet-title/deed-fraud lawsuit, the defendant repeatedly obstructed discovery—producing no responsive documents, asserting meritless objections, giving inconsistent explanations about missing devices/accounts, and refusing to comply with a court-ordered forensic imaging protocol designed to obtain electronically stored information (ESI) and test suspected fabrication. After incremental discovery orders and express findings of intentional concealment and repeated noncompliance, the trial court imposed “death-penalty” sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215 by striking pleadings/defaulting the defendant on liability, leaving only damages for a bench prove-up. The defendant then failed to appear for the damages trial, and the court rendered judgment quieting title, declaring the deed void, and awarding damages and attorneys’ fees. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals held the sanctions were “just,” directly related to the discovery abuse, and consistent with due process; it also rejected complaints that excluded evidence (including purported newly discovered racially offensive emails) required reversal in a post-default posture, and affirmed an interlocutory summary judgment disposing of the defendant’s breach-of-contract counterclaim.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts can and will strike pleadings and default a party who games ESI discovery—especially when a tailored forensic imaging order (with privilege safeguards) is ignored. Build a careful record of repeated noncompliance, prejudice, and the ineffectiveness of lesser measures; on appeal, due-process and “critical evidence” arguments are unlikely to resurrect liability after a sanctions default, and the case may proceed only on damages (if the sanctioned party even shows up)."
In the Interest of A.C. and E.C., Jr., Children
COA06
In a termination-of-parental-rights appeal from Gregg County, Mother challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s predicate findings and best-interest determination. The Sixth Court of Appeals (Texarkana) applied the clear-and-convincing evidence standard and the Supreme Court’s modern sufficiency framework, emphasizing deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations and reasonable inferences while reviewing the entire record “holistically.” Because endangerment findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) have collateral consequences in future cases, the court conducted mandatory review of those challenged grounds and held the evidence legally and factually sufficient to prove (D) (endangering conditions/surroundings) and (E) (endangering conduct/course of conduct). The court also evaluated best interest under § 161.001(b)(2) using the Holley factors as nonexclusive guideposts and held the record supported the best-interest finding as to both parents (including Father, who challenged only best interest). The termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment is proved—and sustained on appeal—through the cumulative story, not a single “bad fact.” If you’re pursuing or defending a termination (or litigating custody restrictions with endangerment themes), build and attack a record that ties specific unsafe conditions and a parent’s course of conduct to the child’s exposure to risk. Also, preserve and litigate grounds (D) and (E) directly: appellate courts must review challenged D/E findings, and those findings can follow a parent into future cases."
Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm v. Michael A. Pohl and The Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
COA01
A Texas lawyer obtained another lawyer’s vendor-held files—attorney–client fee contracts and extensive client lists—through a marketing vendor involved in a prior dispute and used the information to target those individuals with notices that triggered hundreds of responses and follow-on barratry-related litigation and grievances. A Harris County jury found the contracts and lists were protectable trade secrets under the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA) and that the defendant misappropriated them, awarding multiple damages categories plus exemplary damages and fees. The First Court of Appeals agreed that client fee contracts and client lists can qualify as TUTSA trade secrets when they have independent economic value from secrecy and the owner takes reasonable confidentiality measures (including instructions and agreements with vendors and controlled access), and that evidence of acquiring the materials from a third party and then using them to conduct targeted outreach supported misappropriation. However, the court partially reversed the judgment because parts of the damages package and related relief were not supported by legally sufficient evidence and/or did not fit TUTSA’s permitted damages frameworks, and it remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Litigation Takeaway
"Client lists, intake/CRM exports, and even signed fee agreements can be trade secrets in Texas—especially in “client poaching” fights involving vendors or departing lawyers—but winning liability is only half the battle. To survive appeal, the firm must prove (1) real secrecy measures (including vendor confidentiality controls) and (2) a damages model that matches TUTSA (actual loss, unjust enrichment, or reasonable royalty) without double-counting; otherwise, even a strong verdict can be pared back or sent back for a do-over."
Daniel Cisneros Leyva v. The State of Texas
COA14
In a capital-murder/robbery appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether the State sufficiently corroborated an accomplice co-defendant’s testimony under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.14, and whether the jury should have been instructed that other witnesses were accomplices. Applying the required method—disregarding the accomplice’s testimony and examining the remaining record—the court held the corroboration threshold is modest: non-accomplice evidence need only “tend to connect” the accused to the offense, not independently prove every element. Here, the non-accomplice evidence included (1) witnesses placing the group together shortly before the offense, (2) the defendant’s own statements putting him at the scene, (3) descriptions of the shooter’s clothing and a laser-equipped gun consistent with the defendant’s admissions, (4) cell-phone location/communication evidence showing coordination and post-incident calls, and (5) inconsistencies/falsehoods in the defendant’s accounts. The court also affirmed the refusal to give accomplice-witness instructions for other witnesses because the record contained no evidence they participated in the charged capital murder/robbery; mere association, presence, or tangential benefit is not enough to make someone an accomplice for charge purposes.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a case turns on one “insider” witness, don’t argue each corroborating fact must independently prove the whole story. Instead, focus the judge (or jury) on whether there are multiple independent circumstances that collectively *tend to connect* the accused to the alleged conduct (texts/calls, location data, third-party records, injuries/clothing/timeline congruence, and inconsistent denials). Conversely, resist attempts to discredit every supporting witness as “complicit” unless there is concrete evidence the witness participated in the *act alleged*, not just relationship drama or proximity."
Cory Cornell Parker v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Cory Cornell Parker v. State, the defendant attended jury selection and the State’s case-in-chief but failed to return when trial resumed for the defense case, claiming by text that he was being taken by ambulance to a hospital. Despite hours of opportunity and repeated requests, neither Parker nor counsel provided basic, verifiable information (hospital name/location, provider contact, admission/discharge details, documentation), and counsel’s continuance requests were oral and unsupported. The trial court denied a continuance, declined to conduct an unverified phone call, found Parker’s mid-trial absence voluntary, and proceeded; Parker returned after deliberations began. On appeal, the First Court of Appeals held the record supported the trial court’s discretionary finding that Parker voluntarily absented himself and that denying the unsupported oral continuance requests was not an abuse of discretion. The court also rejected Parker’s ineffective-assistance claims based on counsel’s failure to file a written continuance motion or seek a writ of attachment because Parker did not show deficient performance and, critically, failed to show prejudice (a reasonable probability of a different result). The court further found no reversible error regarding assessed costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"When the other side claims a last-minute “emergency” to stop a hearing or trial, frame it as a proof-and-diligence issue: insist on real-time, verifiable details and competent documentation, make the timeline record, and push for express findings. Unsupported, oral continuance requests—especially timed to derail an evidentiary turning point—can properly be denied, and a party who withholds readily confirmable information risks a finding that the absence is voluntary/strategic."
Brisby Ray Brown v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Brisby Ray Brown v. State, the defendant challenged his aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction, arguing the jury charge improperly allowed a non-unanimous verdict by submitting, in the disjunctive, two distinct aggravated-assault offenses: (1) aggravated assault predicated on bodily-injury assault and (2) aggravated assault predicated on threat-by-assault, tied to different alleged deadly weapons. Applying the two-step jury-charge framework, the First Court of Appeals assumed/recognized charge error under Landrian because those are separate statutory aggravated-assault crimes requiring jury unanimity as to which offense was committed. However, because Brown did not object on unanimity grounds, the court reviewed only for Almanza egregious harm, considering the entire charge (including a general unanimity instruction), the evidence, closing arguments, and the record as a whole. On this record, the court concluded any error did not egregiously affect the fairness of the trial or the basis of the verdict and therefore affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a case is submitted on multiple alternative legal/factual predicates that carry different consequences, you must preserve error by forcing clarity at trial—object, request separate submissions/findings, and get a ruling. Otherwise, even a real “unanimity/ambiguity” problem will likely be upheld under a highly deferential harm standard, a lesson that translates directly to broad, multi-theory “family violence” findings in Texas family-law cases."