Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
Peele v. State
COA04
In *Peele v. State*, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for indecency with a child and, in doing so, offered a useful evidence lesson for family-law cases built around a child’s disclosure. The key dispute was whether the child’s mother could repeat the child’s accusation even though the State initially invoked hearsay theories that did not cleanly fit the record and conceded the mother was not the Article 38.072 outcry witness. The court still affirmed because the complainant herself testified directly to the touching, the defense’s hearsay complaint did not produce reversible harm, and the record otherwise supported the verdict. The opinion underscores that appellate courts focus not just on whether “outcry” procedures were followed, but on specificity of objections, alternative admissibility theories, preservation, and whether any evidentiary error likely affected the outcome.
Litigation Takeaway
"In child-disclosure cases, hearsay fights are won on precision and preservation, not labels. If you object, force the court to identify the exact basis for admission, raise all applicable grounds, and preserve harm each time the same statement comes in. If you offer the evidence, do not rely on vague “outcry” language—build a specific evidentiary path and corroborate the disclosure so any error is harmless."
In re H.R.J., J.G.J., T.J.P., and L.P.
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and a best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2). The court focused on Mother’s ongoing illegal drug abuse, three prior removals tied to her addiction, and her decision to leave one child with that child’s father despite a protective order protecting the child from him. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations after a bench trial, the court held that this pattern showed both an endangering environment and a continuing course of endangering conduct, and that the same evidence supported termination as being in the children’s best interests. The court also emphasized that due process required review of both (D) and (E) findings because of their future collateral consequences under § 161.001(b)(1)(M).
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are built through pattern evidence, not just proof of a single injury. Repeated drug abuse, prior removals, instability, and exposing a child to a dangerous or court-restrained adult can together support both predicate termination grounds and best-interest findings. On appeal, lawyers must separately challenge or defend subsection (D) and (E) findings because those findings can affect future cases involving other children."
A.C. v. S.G.A.
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed an attempted appeal from an order denying a protective order and modifying visitation because related family-law proceedings—a pending SAPCR and registration of a foreign custody/support order—remained unresolved in the trial court. Applying Texas finality principles, Family Code section 81.009(c), and precedent treating temporary SAPCR-related possession and access rulings as interlocutory, the court concluded the December 4, 2025 order was not a final judgment and no statute authorized an immediate interlocutory appeal. The court therefore held it lacked appellate jurisdiction over both the protective-order denial and the visitation modification.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing an appeal in a family case, confirm the order is actually final or expressly appealable by statute. In pending SAPCRs or related child-custody proceedings, even urgent rulings denying protection or changing visitation may be only temporary, interlocutory orders, making mandamus, emergency trial-court relief, or pushing the case to a final order the better strategy."
In re EOG Resources, Inc.
COA04
In this Texas mandamus proceeding, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that EOG’s disclosure of a redacted legal memorandum and an internal email referencing counsel’s advice did not waive attorney-client privilege as to other withheld title opinions, memoranda, and communications in underlying probate litigation over mineral interests. The court found EOG established a prima facie privilege claim through its privilege log, affidavits, and in camera submission, then rejected waiver because Rule 511 requires disclosure of a significant part of the privileged matter itself—not merely documents on the same subject or evidence that a party received and acted on legal advice. The court also rejected offensive-use waiver because EOG was only defending against claims and was not seeking affirmative relief. Because compelled disclosure of privileged material has no adequate appellate remedy, the court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its production order.
Litigation Takeaway
"A partial disclosure does not open the whole lawyer file. In Texas family litigation, opposing counsel cannot prove waiver just by pointing to a redacted memo, an email mentioning legal advice, or testimony that a client acted after consulting counsel; they must show the disclosure revealed a significant part of the withheld communication itself. And offensive-use waiver remains narrow when your client is asserting defenses rather than affirmative claims."
In re Cruz
COA12
In In re Cruz, the relator sought habeas relief from an alleged contempt and commitment order arising out of a family-law enforcement dispute. The Twelfth Court of Appeals focused first on whether there was a reviewable order in the record and concluded there was not: no signed, file-marked contempt order existed, the document supplied by the relator was unsigned, related appellate records reflected "no order filed," and the clerk confirmed that no signed order had been entered. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(l)(1)(B), the court held that habeas relief failed because the relator did not provide a certified or sworn copy of a signed order or any competent document showing the complained-of ruling. The court also noted the relator was not actually incarcerated, which further underscored that habeas was not supported by the procedural posture. The petition was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before seeking extraordinary relief in a contempt or enforcement case, make sure there is an actual signed, file-marked order and include a certified or sworn copy in the appellate record. Family-law appellate strategy starts with record existence: courts review signed orders, not oral rulings, draft orders, or assumptions about what the trial court meant to sign."
In the Interest of I.J.W. and M.R.W., Children
COA08
In a suit to modify the parent-child relationship, the father tried to overturn a default modification order through a restricted appeal, arguing defects in substituted service, the return of service, default-related filings, and notice of judgment. The Eighth Court of Appeals first held that the father's separate bill of review did not disqualify him from pursuing a restricted appeal because a bill of review is an independent proceeding, not a Rule 329b post-judgment motion. But the court still affirmed because restricted appeals require error to appear on the face of the appellate record, and the key service and default documents father challenged were not included in the clerk's or reporter's record and appeared only in appellate appendices, which the court could not consider.
Litigation Takeaway
"A bill of review does not block a restricted appeal, so defaulted family-law litigants may be able to pursue both remedies. But restricted appeals live or die on the actual appellate record: if the service papers, military-status filing, last-known-address certificate, or notice documents are missing from the record, the appellate court will not consider defects shown only in brief appendices."
Ortego v. State
COA01
After the defendant’s wife found incriminating sexual communications with their daughter in his cell phone’s trash folder, he sought to suppress the messages as the product of an unlawful search and unauthorized computer access. The First Court of Appeals held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply because the wife acted as a private individual, not as a government agent. It further concluded that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23 did not require exclusion because a written reconciliation agreement authorized the wife to inspect the phone “for any reasons,” the permission had not been revoked, and the parties’ history confirmed routine access. The court also found no material factual dispute requiring an article 38.23 jury instruction and no abuse of discretion in denying remote testimony from two defense witnesses. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Digital evidence obtained by a spouse may be admissible when prior consent, shared passwords, written transparency agreements, or an established course of access shows authorization. Lawyers seeking to use phone evidence should preserve proof of consent, authenticity, and chain of custody; lawyers challenging it should establish an express revocation, limited scope, technological circumvention, or government involvement. If remote testimony is necessary, counsel should also create a specific record showing necessity rather than mere convenience."
Ortego v. State
COA01
In Ortego v. State, a husband sought to suppress incriminating text messages discovered on his cell phone by his wife, arguing the search was unconstitutional and violated Texas computer security laws. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the search under the Fourth Amendment and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23, which excludes evidence obtained in violation of the law. The court held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to private individuals acting without government involvement. Furthermore, because the husband had provided his wife with a written "Commitment to You" note granting her permission to look at his phone "for any reasons" if she had concerns, she had "effective consent." This consent defeated claims of illegal access, making the evidence admissible.
Litigation Takeaway
"Documented consent is the ultimate "kill switch" for digital privacy objections. In family law disputes, evidence found via "digital self-help" is likely admissible if there is a written agreement, a reconciliation memo, or a proven course of conduct involving password sharing and mutual device access. To protect or attack such evidence, practitioners must focus on the specific scope, duration, and potential revocation of that consent rather than general privacy rights."
In the Interest of Z.A.A., a Child
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights to Z.A.A. after DFPS proved constructive abandonment and best interest by clear and convincing evidence. The court held DFPS made reasonable efforts to reunify by creating and discussing a family service plan and repeatedly trying to locate and contact father through phone numbers, relatives, social media, prior addresses, and his parole officer. It also found father failed to maintain significant contact, failed to support the child, and showed an inability to provide a safe environment, especially because he had substantial periods out of jail but still did not visit or engage. On best interest, the court emphasized the child’s stability and improvement in the maternal great-grandfather’s home, the adoption plan and backup caregiver plan, and contrasted that with father’s drug- and domestic-violence-related criminal history, repeated incarceration, nonparticipation in services, and ongoing absence.
Litigation Takeaway
"In constructive-abandonment cases, DFPS wins on appeal when it builds a detailed record of specific reunification efforts and the parent’s missed opportunities during periods of freedom. For family-law litigators generally, the case reinforces that stability, consistent contact, support, and a concrete permanency plan can outweigh a parent’s bare biological connection when best interest is at issue."
In re Lillian Gonzalez
COA14
In In re Lillian Gonzalez, the relator asked the Fourteenth Court of Appeals to order the Texas Office of the Attorney General, Child Support Division, to release child-support funds. The court did not reach the merits of whether she was entitled to the money. Instead, it analyzed its mandamus jurisdiction under Texas Government Code section 22.221 and held that courts of appeals may issue mandamus against certain judges and associate judges, but not against the OAG Child Support Division. The court also held that Gonzalez did not show the writ was necessary to protect or enforce the court’s appellate jurisdiction under section 22.221(a). Because neither basis for mandamus jurisdiction applied, the court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing mandamus in a child-support payment dispute, identify the correct respondent and the source of the complained-of conduct. Even a strong complaint about withheld support funds will be dismissed if the petition is directed at a non-judicial actor like the OAG and does not show why extraordinary relief is necessary to protect the court of appeals’ jurisdiction."