Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
In re Ja’Dawn Lee-Ann Harrison
COA14
In In re Ja’Dawn Lee-Ann Harrison, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a parent could not directly appeal the trial court’s dismissal of a contempt-based motion to enforce a possession order. Because no confinement was imposed, the court treated the attempted appeal as a mandamus proceeding. On the merits, the court found no clear abuse of discretion because the movant failed to identify specific dates or instances showing violations of the possession order, and the order had expired once the child reached adulthood and graduated from high school. The court therefore denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Contempt-based enforcement of possession orders requires precision: plead and prove specific violations of an order that is still in effect. If the trial court denies contempt relief and no one is jailed, the remedy is mandamus—not a direct appeal."
In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. d/b/a Chase Bank
COA13
In this original proceeding, the court held that a trial court overreached when it sanctioned and held Chase Bank in contempt for alleged failure to produce subpoenaed records, release trust assets, and honor a successor trustee appointment order, even though Chase was a nonparty and had not been properly brought within the court’s personal jurisdiction for that relief. The appellate court focused on procedural due process rather than the underlying trust dispute, explaining that a subpoena, appointment order, or generalized motion in the main case does not automatically authorize contempt-style remedies or Rule 215 sanctions against a nonparty financial institution. Because the necessary procedural and jurisdictional predicates were not established on the record, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief in part and vacated the challenged contempt and sanctions relief to that extent.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want enforceable relief against a bank or other nonparty in a family-law case, build the procedural runway first. You cannot turn a subpoena dispute or third-party compliance problem into contempt or major sanctions unless service, jurisdiction, notice, and the specific rule-based remedy are all properly established."
Gomez v. Richard
COA06
In Gomez v. Richard, the Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could render summary judgment after a defendant died but before any estate representative or heir was substituted into the case. After a suggestion of death was filed, the trial court still granted no-evidence summary judgment for the deceased driver and his employer. The appellate court held that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 152, once a party dies, the suit cannot proceed against that person unless a proper substitute—such as an executor, administrator, or heir—is brought in through scire facias or an equivalent substitution procedure. Because no substitute was joined for Richard, he became a legal non-entity for purposes of the litigation, and the judgment as to him was void. The court vacated that portion of the judgment and dismissed that part of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. As to the surviving employer, however, the court held the no-evidence motion was sufficiently specific and that the plaintiffs failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence, so the summary judgment for the employer was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a party dies before judgment, stop and fix the parties before the court does anything else. In Texas, failing to substitute a proper representative under Rule 152 can make a later order void, not merely erroneous. In family cases, that gives lawyers a powerful basis to challenge or prevent rulings entered after a spouse, conservator, or other key litigant dies."
Estrada v. State
COA03
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed Estrada’s conviction for repeated protective-order violations. The State proved two violations within twelve months: Estrada’s contact with the protected person at the airport despite a no-contact order, and a later incident in which the complainant called 911 reporting that he came to her home and strangled her. Although the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution, the court held the trial court properly admitted the 911 call and EMS records because they were created during an ongoing emergency and for medical-response purposes, making them admissible under hearsay principles and non-testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excusing a juror for cause and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-violence cases, a later recantation usually does not erase strong contemporaneous evidence. 911 audio, EMS records, photos, neighbor testimony, and other emergency-response evidence can outweigh a complainant’s later change of story and may strongly affect protective-order, custody, and divorce litigation. Also, reconciliation does not suspend a protective order—only a court can modify it."
Schrotel v. State
COA10
In Schrotel v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to uphold a family-violence assault conviction arising from a dispute between spouses. The complainant testified that her husband hit her with an exercise ball, put his hand on her throat, pushed her down, and kicked or stomped on her leg, causing pain. The responding officer did not witness the assault but observed that the complainant was upset and crying, saw a heel-shaped red mark on her leg, and photographed it. On appeal, the appellant argued the complainant was not credible and that inconsistencies between her testimony, the officer’s testimony, and his denial made the evidence insufficient. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court deferred to the jury’s role in resolving credibility and conflicts in the evidence, considered the cumulative force of the testimony and corroboration, and concluded that the complainant’s testimony plus modest contemporaneous corroboration was enough for a rational jury to find bodily injury to a family member beyond a reasonable doubt.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, a factfinder can credit one party’s detailed testimony even when the other party flatly denies it. You do not need perfect corroboration; modest supporting proof like photographs, officer observations, distress, or a prompt outcry may be enough to support findings affecting protective orders, conservatorship, possession, and related divorce issues."
Rademacher v. Rademacher
COA03
In Rademacher v. Rademacher, a wife sought to set aside a Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) during a divorce, claiming she signed it under duress. She argued that her various medical conditions, anxiety, and pressure from her attorney and the mediator—who warned her that trial would be expensive and risky—rendered her signature involuntary. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the agreement under Texas Family Code § 6.602, which provides that a properly formatted MSA is immediately binding and non-revocable. The court held that 'reality-testing' by counsel regarding litigation costs and outcomes does not constitute legal duress, and because the wife failed to prove that her free agency was destroyed, the MSA remained enforceable.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas divorce law, a signed Mediated Settlement Agreement is nearly impossible to undo; feelings of pressure, anxiety, or being told that trial is a bad financial move do not constitute 'duress' that would allow a party to back out of the deal."
In the Interest of M.L.J.
COA14
In this termination appeal, a Fourteenth Court dissent concluded that a parent’s unsupported claim of “Indian heritage” did not trigger ICWA. The dissent focused on ICWA’s statutory definition of an “Indian child,” emphasizing that the record contained no evidence the child was a tribal member, eligible for membership, or the biological child of a tribal member. Because neither parent nor the child was registered with a tribe, no tribe-specific evidence was offered, and no documentation was produced despite repeated opportunities, the dissent reasoned the trial court had no “reason to know” ICWA applied under 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). The dissent also criticized reliance on 25 C.F.R. § 23.107 to impose a broader inquiry duty based on mere suspicion, and would have held that ancestry alone is insufficient to trigger ICWA’s heightened protections.
Litigation Takeaway
"If ICWA is in play, vague statements about Native or Indian heritage are not enough. Family-law litigators should build a tribe-specific record on membership, eligibility, and parental tribal status early, because unsupported ancestry claims can create appellate risk, while a well-developed record can support the argument that ICWA was never triggered."
In re Diamond
COA05
In this original proceeding, the Dallas Court of Appeals denied a relator's petition for writ of mandamus challenging temporary orders and a related income withholding order issued during a SAPCR modification case. The court applied the standard set forth in In re Prudential, determining that the relator failed to prove the trial court clearly abused its discretion or that there was no adequate remedy by ordinary appeal. Beyond the merits, the court took the significant procedural step of striking the relator's petition and appendix for containing unredacted sensitive information, such as minor children's identifying data, in violation of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.9.
Litigation Takeaway
"Urgency in family law modification cases does not automatically entitle a party to mandamus relief; you must still provide a record that proves a clear abuse of discretion and the inadequacy of a standard appeal. Additionally, always double-check your redactions, as a violation of Rule 9.9 regarding sensitive data can lead the court to strike your entire filing."
In the Interest of J.G., J.G., and A.J.S., Children
COA13
In this SAPCR appeal, the appellant challenged a February 3, 2026 final order appointing a sole managing conservator, but the trial court later vacated that same order on February 19, 2026. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals treated the case as a pure jurisdictional question, explaining that once the underlying final order was vacated, there was no longer a live, final appealable order for the court to review. Relying on Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1), the court granted the appellant’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the appeal as moot without reaching any substantive conservatorship or child-related issues.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law appeals, always confirm that the order named in the notice of appeal is still in effect. If the trial court vacates the order after the appeal is filed, the appeal may become moot immediately, appellate deadlines may shift, and counsel may need to dismiss, abate, or perfect a new appeal from any replacement order."
Corpus v. State
COA11
In Corpus v. State, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that a defendant did not preserve any complaint about the denial of a continuance where counsel made only an oral, unsworn mid-trial request to wait for subpoenaed mental-health records of an Article 38.37 witness. The court applied Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 29.03 and 29.08 and controlling precedent to treat the written-and-verified requirement as a bright-line preservation rule, with no due-process exception. The court also explained that, even on the merits, denial of the continuance was not an abuse of discretion because the defense knew before trial that the records were still outstanding and could only speculate about their usefulness, so there was no unexpected occurrence or concrete showing of materiality. The takeaway for family-law crossover purposes is that courts may never reach the substance of a continuance complaint if counsel fails to preserve it in proper written, verified form.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you need a continuance because key records have not arrived, do not rely on an oral trial request. File a written, verified motion, show diligence, explain specifically why the missing evidence is material, and make the record before trial if the problem is already known. Otherwise, even potentially important complaints about missing mental-health, school, CPS, or financial records may be waived on appeal."