Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
In re Phillip James Emerson, Jr.
COA06
In this original proceeding, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that once a Rule 18a motion to recuse is filed, the trial judge may not take further substantive action until the judge either recuses or refers the motion to the regional presiding judge. Here, the relator filed a habeas application and a motion to disqualify or recuse on the same day, but the county judge later denied habeas relief before entering a recusal or referral order. Relying on Rule 18a(f)(1) and prior cases holding that orders signed during that freeze period are void, the court concluded the habeas-denial order was signed without authority. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the void order, while denying all other requested relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Timing matters. In Texas, a filed Rule 18a recusal motion immediately freezes the judge’s power to sign substantive orders until the judge either recuses or refers the motion. Family-law lawyers should audit the docket before any ruling on temporary orders, enforcement, possession, support, or property issues, because an order signed during that freeze period may be void and subject to mandamus."
Tina Thuy Truong and Tina 1960 Nails Salon, Inc. v. Hoa Hiep Hoang
COA01
In Truong v. Hoang, the spouses disputed how to treat value generated during marriage by the wife’s separate-property nail salon corporation. The trial court awarded the husband $384,307 as his share of a supposed community interest in salon income and entered judgment against both the wife and the corporation. The court of appeals held that community labor devoted to a spouse’s separate-property business does not create a direct ownership interest in the business or its income; instead, the proper theory is an equitable reimbursement claim under Texas Family Code section 3.402 for inadequate compensation to the community. Because reimbursement is resolved through reconstitution and just-and-right division between the spouses, and no independent basis for corporate liability was established, the judgment against the separate-property corporation was improper. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the property division to be reconsidered under the proper reimbursement framework.
Litigation Takeaway
"If community labor enhanced one spouse’s separate business during marriage, plead and prove reimbursement—not ownership of the business profits. And if you want a judgment against the business entity itself, you need an independent theory like alter ego, fraud, or another entity-specific basis for liability."
In the Matter of C.B.
COA14
In In the Matter of C.B., the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a juvenile court retained authority under Texas Family Code section 54.11 to conduct a determinate-sentence transfer hearing and transfer C.B. to TDCJ, even though he was already confined in TDCJ on an adult robbery conviction and had never been physically admitted to TJJD. The court focused on the statutory prerequisites rather than physical placement, reasoning that C.B. remained subject to an uncompleted juvenile determinate sentence that had been committed to TJJD, and TJJD properly made the referral required for the transfer hearing. The court rejected arguments that adult custody divested the juvenile court of power, found sufficient evidence to support transfer based on the underlying offense, later adult conviction, TJJD recommendation, and inability to complete the sentence in the juvenile system before age nineteen, and held that no reversible due-process error was shown from C.B.’s Zoom appearance because no objection was preserved. The court also found no reversible error in the deadly-weapon finding in the transfer order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not confuse a party’s physical custody status with a court’s continuing statutory authority. In overlapping Family Code and criminal matters, the key questions are whether the governing statute still authorizes action and whether the required procedural triggers have occurred. Also, preserve procedural objections—especially to remote appearances—because unpreserved complaints are unlikely to succeed on appeal."
Seavey v. State
COA14
In Seavey v. State, the defendant argued his Confrontation Clause rights were violated when a substitute medical examiner testified about cause and manner of death using an autopsy file prepared by a different examiner who did not appear at trial. On remand after Smith v. Arizona, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether the State had introduced the absent examiner’s testimonial statements for their truth or instead presented an expert who independently reviewed the autopsy report, photographs, radiology, and toxicology and formed his own opinion. The court held the testimony was permissible because the substitute examiner offered an independent causation opinion rather than merely relaying the original examiner’s conclusions, so overruling the confrontation objection was not an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"When using a substitute expert, build the record that the witness personally reviewed the underlying materials, applied independent professional judgment, and is offering the witness’s own opinion—not acting as a conduit for an absent professional’s conclusions. In family-law cases, that distinction can determine whether expert testimony survives objection."
In the Matter of A.F. and I.M.A.F. v. The State of Texas
COA14
The State filed juvenile delinquency petitions against A.F. and I.M.A.F. and served their mother, but not their father, even though both parents’ identities and addresses were known. The juveniles argued that Texas Family Code § 53.04(d)(3) required service on both parents and moved to dismiss. Reviewing the statutory question de novo, the Fourteenth Court focused on the singular and disjunctive phrase “the parent, guardian, or custodian,” explaining that plural references to “names” and “residence addresses” do not create a requirement to serve every known parent. Similar language in § 53.06 and cases holding that summons to one parent is sufficient supported that interpretation. Section 53.04(d)(4) did not apply because the mother was known, located in Texas, and served. The court held that service on one parent satisfied the statutory notice requirement and affirmed the denial of the motions to dismiss and the resulting judgments.
Litigation Takeaway
"A statutory-notice challenge must rest on the precise text governing who must be served. Courts will not infer that every known parent or interested person must receive service merely from plural nouns when the operative provision identifies qualifying recipients in the singular and disjunctive. Counsel should distinguish between requirements to identify interested persons and requirements to serve them, preserve the exact alleged defect, and avoid relying on cases involving a complete failure to name or serve any parent."
Robert Anthony Rios v. The State of Texas
COA14
In *Robert Anthony Rios v. The State of Texas*, the defendant tried to elicit testimony from the complainant’s mother that the child later said, “Mommy, I’m sorry. I lied.” The State objected on hearsay grounds, and the trial court sustained the objection while expressly giving defense counsel the chance to explain any non-hearsay purpose or exception. Counsel did not identify any admissibility theory, instead rephrased the question, drew another hearsay objection, and then moved on. On appeal, Rios argued the testimony was admissible as impeachment by prior inconsistent statement, a statement against interest, under optional completeness, and under confrontation principles. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held those arguments were not preserved because none was presented to the trial court as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court also rejected the related ineffective-assistance claim on the direct-appeal record. The holding is that when a hearsay objection is sustained, the proponent must timely state the specific basis for admission or the complaint is forfeited on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the other side says “hearsay,” do not assume the judge will fill in the rule for you. In any Texas family case, you must immediately state the exact admissibility theory—non-hearsay purpose, specific exception, impeachment, completeness, or constitutional ground—or you will likely lose the issue on appeal."
In re Enriqueta Medina
COA14
In a divorce case, the trial court signed a final default divorce decree on September 30, 2024. The husband later claimed he never received notice of the decree and filed a motion for new trial months after the court’s plenary power expired. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(d), the trial court lost plenary power thirty days after signing the decree because no timely post-judgment motion extended that deadline. The court further explained that the clerk’s failure to send default-judgment notice under Rule 239a does not indefinitely extend the trial court’s power; any relief based on lack of notice must fit within the limited Rule 306a framework. Because the new-trial order was signed long after plenary power expired, it was void, and mandamus was the proper remedy to require the trial court to vacate it.
Litigation Takeaway
"Jurisdictional deadlines control, even when a party says they never got notice of a default decree. In family-law cases, lawyers must immediately analyze Rule 329b and Rule 306a deadlines after judgment; once plenary power expires, the trial court cannot grant an out-of-time new trial, and the available remedies shift to restricted appeal, bill of review, or mandamus against any void order."
In the Matter of A.F. and I.M.A.F. v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this juvenile-delinquency appeal, the juveniles argued the State’s petitions should have been dismissed because only their mother was served even though the father’s name and address were allegedly known. The Fourteenth Court treated the issue as one of statutory construction and focused on the text of Texas Family Code §§ 53.04 and 53.06. It held that the statute’s singular, disjunctive wording—“parent, guardian, or custodian”—does not require service on both parents absent express language such as “both” or “all.” The court also held that § 53.04(d)(4) was not triggered because one parent was known, located in Texas, and served. The denial of the motions to dismiss was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Service and notice fights rise or fall on the exact statutory text. If the Family Code uses singular and disjunctive language, a court may reject arguments that notice had to be given to every known parent or conservator unless the statute expressly says so. For family-law litigators, this case is a reminder to ground dismissal and due-process arguments in specific notice language, and to distinguish between complete failure of notice and partial-service complaints."
In the Interest of A.S.E. a/k/a A.E., a Child
COA01
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E). The court reviewed the father’s conduct over time—not as isolated incidents—and focused on the child’s positive drug test at birth, the father’s repeated positive drug tests, numerous missed tests treated as positive, failed treatment efforts, failure to complete services, criminal charges and convictions, incarceration, domestic violence, and repeated violations of the Department’s safety plan. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and settled law that subsection (E) is proved through a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient. The court also upheld best interest, concluding that the father’s late improvement did not outweigh the child’s need for permanence and the stability of the relative placement that wished to adopt.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are won or lost on patterns, not excuses. Repeated drug use, missed tests, failed services, criminal trouble, and violations of safety measures can add up to a compelling course-of-conduct record, and late progress may not undo years of instability. In private custody cases, the same pattern evidence can justify restrictions, supervised possession, or limits on decision-making."
In the Matter of A.F. and I.M.A.F. v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this juvenile-delinquency appeal, the juveniles argued the State’s petitions should have been dismissed because, although the mother was served, the father was not, even though his identity and address were allegedly known. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals treated the issue as one of statutory construction and focused on the text of Texas Family Code § 53.04(d)(3), which refers to “the parent, guardian, or custodian” in the singular and disjunctive. Rejecting the argument that plural words like “names” and “residence addresses” required service on both parents, the court held it would not read “both” or “all” into the statute when the Legislature did not include that language. The court also held § 53.04(d)(4) did not impose any additional service duty because that subsection applies only when the relevant adult is out of state, cannot be found in Texas, or has an unknown residence. Because service on one parent satisfied the statute, the trial court properly denied the motions to dismiss and the judgments were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Notice fights in Texas family-law-related cases turn on the exact statutory text, not broad fairness arguments. If a statute uses singular or disjunctive wording like “the parent, guardian, or custodian,” courts may treat service on one qualifying adult as enough unless the Legislature expressly requires notice to both or all interested parties."