Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
R.F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In this case, a mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence regarding child endangerment and claiming she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her lawyer did not request a trial recess for her to testify. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the "endangerment" ground under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), noting that prenatal drug use followed by continued instability and a failure to complete court-ordered rehabilitation constitutes a voluntary course of endangering conduct. The court also reviewed the ineffective assistance claim under the Strickland standard, finding that without a developed record explaining trial counsel's motives, it must presume the lawyer's decisions were strategic. The court affirmed the trial court's order terminating the mother's parental rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Prenatal drug use combined with a failure to maintain sobriety and stability after a child's removal provides strong grounds for termination based on endangerment. Additionally, parties seeking to appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel must develop a record—often through a motion for new trial—to prove that their attorney's actions were not part of a reasonable trial strategy."
Raggio-2204 Jesse Owens, LLC v. Morgan
COA03
After a trial court's plenary jurisdiction had expired, it entered a sanctions judgment and subsequent turnover orders authorizing a receiver to seize and sell property belonging to Stacey Hammer's LLC. After the Austin Court of Appeals declared these orders void, Hammer and the LLC sued the judgment creditor, his attorney, and the receiver for damages related to the lost property. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b regarding the limits of plenary power and the doctrine of derived judicial immunity. The court held that because the underlying orders were void ab initio, the judgment creditor and the receiver could not claim immunity and were liable for restitution of the value of the property sold under the void authority.
Litigation Takeaway
"A court order signed after plenary power has expired is a legal nullity; practitioners and receivers who move property or distribute funds under a void order are not protected by judicial immunity and are subject to claims for restitution and conversion."
Musk v. Brody
COA03
In this defamation case, Benjamin Brody argued that Elon Musk's Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) motion to dismiss was a nullity—and therefore untimely—because it was signed by out-of-state counsel before their pro hac vice admission was finalized. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed Texas's overarching policy of prioritizing the merits of a dispute over technical procedural "traps" and looked to persuasive authority regarding attorney signatures. The court held that if a trial court subsequently grants a pro hac vice motion, that admission cures the signature defect on earlier filings, meaning the TCPA motion was properly before the court and filed within the 60-day statutory window.
Litigation Takeaway
"A pending pro hac vice admission does not render a timely filed motion a "nullity"; provided the admission is eventually granted, the signature defect is cured, protecting parties from losing statutory rights like a TCPA dismissal due to technical filing deadlines."
David Aston v. James Whittington and Tara Whittington
COA05
In a contract dispute that went to trial in Hunt County, the trial court entered a post‑answer default judgment after defendant David Aston and his counsel failed to appear for the reset trial setting. Aston timely moved for new trial supported by affidavit evidence that he did not know of the trial date and relied on counsel to communicate settings; plaintiffs countered with proof that Aston’s counsel received and opened the court’s electronic notice and argued counsel’s inaction should be imputed to Aston. The Dallas Court of Appeals treated the matter as a straightforward Craddock analysis for post‑answer default judgments and held the trial court abused its discretion by denying a new trial: (1) the failure to appear was shown to be the result of mistake/accident rather than intentional conduct or conscious indifference, and the court declined to import the summary‑judgment “imputation” framework into the Craddock default context; (2) Aston “set up” meritorious defenses by pleading legally cognizable defenses and offering prima facie support, which does not require proving the case at the new‑trial stage; and (3) once Aston alleged no delay or injury, plaintiffs failed to show concrete retrial prejudice beyond the inconvenience of trying the case. The court reversed the post‑answer default judgment and remanded for a merits trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Post‑answer defaults are disfavored in Texas, and a party who misses trial because of notice breakdowns or calendar‑conflict missteps can often win a new trial under Craddock—especially when the client swears they lacked actual knowledge of the setting, promptly sought relief, and sets up a real defense. On the flip side, to keep a default, the nonmovant must bring evidence of actual retrial prejudice (lost witnesses/evidence, time‑sensitive issues), not just “they opened the e‑notice” or “a new trial is inconvenient.”"
Burns Surveying LLC v. Robert H. Burns and Jacob G. Pleasant
COA06
In this professional liability dispute, the plaintiffs sued a registered land surveyor for negligence but failed to attach the mandatory Chapter 150 certificate of merit to their original petition. After the trial court dismissed the claims without prejudice, the plaintiffs attempted to cure the defect by filing an amended petition with the required certificate in the same cause number. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 150.002 and Texas Supreme Court precedent, concluding that the 'first-filed' requirement applies to the very first petition asserting the claim in a specific case. The court held that a dismissal without prejudice requires the claimant to initiate an entirely new lawsuit to satisfy the contemporaneous filing requirement, and an amended petition cannot cure the initial failure to file.
Litigation Takeaway
"When suing a licensed professional like a surveyor, the certificate of merit must be attached to the very first petition filed. If the case is dismissed without prejudice for failing to do so, you cannot fix the error by amending the existing lawsuit; you must file a brand-new suit with a new cause number to satisfy the 'first-filed' rule."
In re Quintilya Thomas
COA08
In an original proceeding arising from family-law temporary orders, the relator asked the El Paso Court of Appeals for an emergency stay of “default temporary orders” but filed only a Rule 52.10 motion and no petition for writ of mandamus. The court treated the defect as jurisdictional: under Tex. R. App. P. 52.1 an original proceeding is commenced only by filing a mandamus petition, and Rule 52.10 temporary relief is merely ancillary and is available only after a petition invokes the court’s original jurisdiction. Because no petition was on file, the court held it lacked jurisdiction to grant any temporary relief or stay and dismissed the motion for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice to refiling after a mandamus petition is filed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you need an emergency stay from a court of appeals in a family case, you cannot file a standalone “emergency stay pending mandamus” motion. File the mandamus petition first (or simultaneously) to invoke original jurisdiction; only then can Rule 52.10 temporary relief be considered—otherwise the motion will be dismissed and valuable time will be lost while temporary orders remain enforceable."
Absolute Oil + Gas, LLC v. Chord Energy Corp.
COA01
In Absolute Oil + Gas, LLC v. Chord Energy Corp., the trial court severed dismissed tort and unjust enrichment claims from an ongoing contract dispute to create a final, appealable judgment. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the severance under the three-prong Guaranty Federal test, focusing on whether the claims were 'factually interwoven.' The court found that because all claims stemmed from the same alleged collusive scheme to inflate costs and shared identical parties and evidence, severance risked inconsistent rulings—particularly regarding whether an express contract barred quasi-contractual recovery. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion, reversing the severance order because the claims were inextricably linked by shared operative facts.
Litigation Takeaway
"Prevent 'divide and conquer' tactics in complex property litigation by using the Interwoven Claims Doctrine to block the severance of tort claims (like fraud on the community) from the main property division, ensuring a single, cohesive 'just and right' adjudication."
Ex Parte Giambi Boyd
COA01
After being detained for 560 days on a $1.2 million bond for felony charges, Giambi Boyd sought a bond reduction because the State failed to announce it was ready for trial within the statutory 90-day window. The trial court denied his pretrial writ of habeas corpus despite the State admitting it was still awaiting forensic lab results. The First Court of Appeals reversed the decision, analyzing Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which mandates that a felony defendant must be released on personal bond or have their bail reduced to an affordable amount if the State is not ready for trial within 90 days. The court held that this provision is mandatory and takes precedence over general safety factors, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by maintaining an unattainable bond.
Litigation Takeaway
"In high-conflict family law cases involving parallel criminal charges, practitioners can use Article 17.151 to prevent 'strategic detention.' If the State is not ready for trial within 90 days of a client's felony arrest, counsel can force a bond reduction to an affordable amount, ensuring the client can participate in mediation, attend hearings, and defend their parental rights in the civil suit."
Patterson v. State
COA07
In Patterson v. State, the Seventh Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court must provide statutory admonishments or specific due process warnings before accepting a 'plea of true' in a revocation or adjudication proceeding. The defendant challenged his fifteen-year sentence, arguing his plea was involuntary because the trial court failed to inform him of his right to plead 'not true' and failed to state the punishment range on the record. The court analyzed Article 26.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and constitutional due process standards, concluding that statutory admonishments required for initial pleas do not apply to the revocation context. The court held that a 'plea of true' is voluntary and binding if the totality of the record—including original plea paperwork and the defendant's own testimony—demonstrates the defendant was aware of the potential consequences, even if the trial judge remained silent regarding specific rights during the hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family law enforcement and contempt proceedings, a respondent's admission or 'plea of true' is sufficient to support a revocation of suspended commitment without the trial court needing to provide formal, ritualistic warnings. If the respondent was notified of the potential consequences in the underlying motion or the original suspension order, their judicial admission will likely be upheld on appeal, making pre-hearing counseling on the finality of such admissions critical for practitioners."
Ex Parte Giambi Boyd
COA01
In Ex Parte Boyd, a defendant was held for 560 days on a $1.2 million bond for murder and aggravated assault charges. Despite the severity of the crimes, the State admitted it was not ready for trial because forensic firearms testing was still pending. The First Court of Appeals analyzed Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which mandates that a felony defendant must be released on a personal bond or have their bail reduced to an affordable amount if the State is not ready for trial within 90 days of detention. The court held that this statute is mandatory and does not permit a "safety exception" for dangerous offenses. Consequently, because the defendant proved he could only afford a $5,000 bond, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and ordered the bail reduction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not rely on the criminal justice system to keep a violent or dangerous party incarcerated during a family law case; if the State isn't ready for trial within 90 days, the party may be released on a nominal bond regardless of the charges. Family law practitioners must proactively secure civil Protective Orders and restrictive temporary orders to ensure the safety of their clients and children."