Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
In re West Fork Group, LLC
COA14
A trial court orally granted a motion for new trial and recorded the decision in a docket entry within the required timeframe, but it failed to sign a written order until after its 'plenary power' (jurisdictional authority) had expired. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b, a motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law if a written order is not signed within 75 days of the judgment, and the court’s power to act ends 30 days after that. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Supreme Court precedent and held that oral pronouncements and docket entries cannot substitute for a signed written order. Because the written order was signed after the 105-day deadline, it was void, and the court granted mandamus relief to vacate all orders entered after the deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas litigation, a judge's oral ruling 'from the bench' is not legally binding for the purpose of extending court deadlines—only a signed, written order counts. If you are seeking a new trial, you must ensure the judge signs the written order before the 75-day 'operation of law' deadline; otherwise, you hit a jurisdictional cliff that can render all subsequent wins void and reinstate the original judgment."
In the Interest of A.C. and N.C., Children
COA07
In a Texas parental-rights termination appeal, the parent’s appellate counsel moved to withdraw after briefing was complete, citing a new employment-based, “irreconcilable” conflict. Because termination appeals are accelerated and parents have a protected right to counsel, the Seventh Court of Appeals declined to proceed on an unclear record regarding counsel’s conflict and the parent’s continued representation. The court abated the appeal and remanded to the trial court to (1) rule on the withdrawal motion, (2) determine whether replacement appellate counsel must be appointed, and (3) create an appellate-ready supplemental record—including findings of fact and conclusions of law and any reporter’s record of the hearing—by a firm, expedited deadline (March 31, 2026).
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family-law appeals (especially termination), a withdrawal or conflict motion is not “paperwork”—it can stop the appeal. Get a prompt trial-court ruling, make a record (hearing + reporter), and secure written findings and a supplemental clerk’s record quickly, or the court of appeals will abate and impose strict deadlines that can compress briefing and jeopardize client rights."
Members Choice Credit Union v. Juan Menjivar
COA14
Members Choice Credit Union (MCCU) sued Juan Menjivar for a deficiency balance following a vehicle repossession. Before trial, the court excluded MCCU's business records because they were not served 14 days in advance as required for self-authentication under Rule 902(10). Despite presenting a witness at trial, MCCU failed to re-offer the documents or make an 'offer of proof' on the record. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's take-nothing judgment, holding that without a reporter’s record or a formal bill of exception showing what the excluded evidence was, the appellate court must presume the trial court’s ruling was correct.
Litigation Takeaway
"Winning on appeal requires more than just being right; it requires a complete record. If a judge excludes critical evidence like bank statements or medical records, you must immediately make an 'offer of proof' on the record or file a 'formal bill of exception.' Without these steps, the appellate court will assume the trial judge was right, even if the documents should have been admitted."
Gary P. Joseph v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this criminal appeal with frequent spillover into Texas family-law cases alleging sexual abuse, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reviewed whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence of alleged sexual assaults and sexualized conduct beyond the charged time period—including acts occurring after the complainant turned 18—and whether those evidentiary rulings required reversal of a conviction for the lesser-included offense of sexual assault of a child (age 14–17). The court applied a plain-text construction of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37 and held that the statute’s “gateway” requirement turns on the offense being prosecuted (a qualifying sexual offense committed against a child under 17), not on the complainant’s age at the time of the extraneous acts. Because the prosecution alleged a qualifying Chapter 22 offense committed when the complainant was under 17, article 38.37, §1(b) permitted evidence of other acts against the same victim to show relevant matters, including the “previous and subsequent relationship” between the defendant and the child-victim, even if some acts occurred after the complainant reached adulthood. The court further concluded the challenged admission/exclusion rulings (including embedded Rule 403 unfair-prejudice arguments) did not amount to reversible error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and the jury’s lesser-included conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"When sexual-abuse allegations involve a long-running pattern, courts may allow “relationship narrative” evidence that extends beyond the child’s minority—so an “they were over 18 then” objection, standing alone, is often weak. In family cases (SAPCR, modifications, protective orders), build or attack the case on relevance, specificity, corroboration (outcry chronology, travel/records), and prejudice/mini-trial concerns, and treat SANE/DNA-type proof as potentially decisive at early hearings unless met with competent expert analysis."
In the Interest of Z.P., a Child
COA05
In a child-support enforcement action, the mother sought confirmation of arrears and a cumulative money judgment “plus interest,” along with attorney’s fees. Before the enforcement hearing, the father paid the arrearage principal ($25,420) through the OAG, and the trial court confirmed the arrears as paid and awarded $8,766.65 in attorney’s fees/costs but omitted any interest from the cumulative money judgment. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 157.263 makes interest on confirmed child-support arrearages mandatory when a money judgment is requested; the trial court’s role is essentially mechanical once arrears are confirmed, and a pretrial payment of principal does not eliminate accrued statutory interest. The court reversed and remanded for the limited purpose of adding interest on the previously accrued $25,420 arrearage amount, while affirming the reduced attorney’s-fee award because reasonableness remains a fact issue within the trial court’s discretion even when the fee evidence is uncontroverted.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas child-support enforcement, don’t let a last-minute payment of arrears principal lull you into thinking the case is over—if you plead for a money judgment, interest under Family Code § 157.263 is mandatory and an order that omits it is reversible. Also, even strong, uncontroverted fee proof doesn’t guarantee the full amount requested; position “reasonableness” and tie the work to enforcement necessity if you want the court to award all fees."
Renove Medical Spa, PLLC & Afia Naqvi, M.D. v. Charlotte Elizondo
COA14
Charlotte Elizondo sued Renove Medical Spa and Dr. Afia Naqvi for negligence after a facial injection led to a life-threatening infection. Under the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA), Elizondo served an expert report from a nurse practitioner. The defendants waited over a year to object, arguing the nurse was unqualified to opine on a doctor's standard of care and that the report was therefore legally nonexistent (a "no report" scenario). The court analyzed whether a report by an unqualified expert is a jurisdictional nullity or a "deficient" report subject to waiver. Applying Texas Supreme Court precedent, the court held that qualification challenges are sufficiency objections that must be raised within the TMLA’s 21-day statutory window. Because the defendants missed this deadline, they waived their challenge, and the denial of their motion to dismiss was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas litigation, "unqualified" does not mean "nonexistent." If an opponent serves an expert report—whether in a medical malpractice case or a child custody dispute—any challenge to that expert's credentials must be made promptly. Failing to object within statutory or procedural deadlines (like the TMLA’s 21-day window) waives the objection, potentially allowing a "deficient" expert to remain the anchor of the case."
Butler v. Taylor
COA01
In a bench-tried divorce, the husband appealed complaining the trial court failed to file findings of fact and conclusions of law and challenging the decree’s property division (including a townhome), conservatorship/possession provisions, and child-support ruling. The First Court of Appeals held the husband waived any complaint about missing findings because, although he timely requested findings under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296, he did not timely file a Rule 297 notice of past-due findings. Without findings, the appellate court implied all facts necessary to support the judgment and reviewed the decree under the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Applying inception of title, the court concluded the record supported treating the Yorktown Meadow Lane townhome as the wife’s separate property because she acquired it before marriage; the husband’s testimony that he paid down the mortgage did not change characterization and did not establish a separate-property reimbursement/tracing claim (and the trial court could credit testimony that the payoff was intended as a gift). The court also rejected the husband’s conservatorship/possession and child-support complaints, noting broad trial-court discretion and that portions of the husband’s briefing were inadequately developed and thus waived. The divorce decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a Texas bench-tried divorce, calendar Rule 296/297 deadlines with zero slack: a late Rule 297 past-due notice waives the right to findings and forces the appeal into implied-findings territory, where the court will presume facts supporting the decree. Also, property-characterization and reimbursement claims live or die on proof—deeds for inception of title, tracing documents for the source of funds, and clear evidence on gift vs. reimbursement intent—because abuse-of-discretion review plus implied findings makes reversal unlikely."
Rhonda Williams v. Javier Alessandro Madrid Urquia and Jhonny Javier Madrid Urquia
COA14
In this case, plaintiffs sued the City of Houston and its employee, Rhonda Williams, after a motor vehicle collision. After nonsuiting that initial case, the plaintiffs filed a second suit against Williams individually. Williams moved for summary judgment, arguing that under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 101.106(a), the initial suit against the City constituted an irrevocable election of remedies that barred any future claims against her individually. The trial court denied the motion, but the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed. The appellate court analyzed the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), concluding that the act of filing suit against a governmental unit immediately and permanently bars claims against the employee regarding the same subject matter, and a subsequent nonsuit cannot 'reset' this election.
Litigation Takeaway
"Be extremely cautious when naming a governmental unit in a lawsuit; under the Texas Tort Claims Act, once you sue a city or county for an incident involving an employee, you are 'immediately and forever' barred from suing that employee individually. This election of remedies is irrevocable, meaning a nonsuit or an amendment to your pleadings cannot undo the bar and restore your ability to pursue the individual defendant."
Osbaldo Gonzales v. The State of Texas
COA07
In a single-count aggravated sexual assault of a child case alleging digital penetration, the child and outcry witness testified the act happened “twice.” The defendant argued this created a material variance from the one-count indictment and raised double-jeopardy concerns because it was unclear which incident supported the conviction. The Amarillo Court of Appeals rejected the variance framing, holding the proof matched the indictment’s elements (digital penetration) and the record did not clearly establish two distinct criminal episodes (the “twice” testimony could describe multiple penetrations within one encounter). The court explained that if the evidence could be read as multiple discrete acts, the proper doctrine is jury unanimity/state election—not variance—and that complaint must be preserved by requesting an election or a specific unanimity instruction. Because the defense requested neither, any election/unanimity complaint was waived. The court also noted that when no election is made and multiple incidents are tried under one count, double jeopardy can bar later prosecution of either incident placed in evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a child’s testimony suggests “more than once” conduct under a single-count sexual-assault indictment, don’t mislabel it as a “variance” argument. If you need the State pinned to one episode, you must timely demand an election or a tailored unanimity instruction; otherwise the issue is waived on appeal. Strategically, declining to force election may actually expand double-jeopardy protection and prevent later charges based on other incidents mentioned at trial—an important consideration in parallel family-law cases that rely on criminal-case records."
Hirut Assefa Desta v. Abraham Ayalew Wassihun
COA14
In a Fort Bend County divorce, the husband took a default final decree after the pro se wife never filed a formal answer but had sent an email to court staff (addressed to the district clerk, identifying the case and her status as respondent, requesting more time before any default, and providing contact information). About a year later the husband proceeded to a prove-up/final trial without giving her notice; the court signed a default decree with significant property consequences. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court held the wife’s email was an “appearance”/informal answer under Texas law, even though it was not file-stamped or included in the clerk’s record, because it was tendered into the court’s administrative channels and objectively showed intent to participate. Once a respondent has appeared, due process and Texas default-judgment law require notice of the dispositive setting; because the husband obtained the default decree without notice to an appearing party, the decree violated due process and the trial court abused its discretion by letting it stand. The court also held appellate deadlines were preserved via Rule 306a based on the wife’s late notice of the judgment. The default divorce decree was reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"“Default-ready” means more than “no answer on file.” Any informal written communication by a pro se spouse that identifies the case and shows intent to participate (emails to coordinators/clerks, letters, faxes) can constitute an appearance and trigger mandatory notice of the final/prove-up setting. If you take a default without provable notice after such an appearance, the decree is vulnerable to reversal for a due-process violation—often without having to satisfy the full Craddock new-trial showing."