Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
In the Interest of D.R.S., a Child
COA07
In a parental-rights termination appeal, the parent’s appointed appellate counsel sought to withdraw after briefing due to a newly arising, irreconcilable conflict of interest caused by new employment. Recognizing that termination appeals are accelerated and implicate the parent’s right to effective representation, the Seventh Court of Appeals held it could not proceed on the merits without a trial-court ruling and an adequate record regarding the conflict and any need for substitute counsel. The court therefore abated the appeal, suspended appellate deadlines, and remanded to the trial court to rule on withdrawal, decide whether substitute appellate counsel must be appointed, and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, with a supplemental clerk’s and reporter’s record due by a set expedited deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family-law appeals—especially parental-termination cases—an attorney conflict is a threshold issue that can halt the appeal. Raise conflicts immediately and build a clear trial-court record (order, findings, and hearing record) on withdrawal and substitution, or the appellate court may abate the case and suspend deadlines until representation issues are resolved."
In re M.S.
COA02
In a modification of a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR) between a mother and a nonparent former partner, the trial court initially maintained the nonparent's joint managing conservatorship and possession rights over the mother’s objection. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals, applying the "fit-parent presumption" established in In re C.J.C., held that a trial court cannot grant or continue a nonparent's possession or conservatorship rights over a fit parent's objection without evidence of extraordinary circumstances or parental unfitness. Finding that the record consisted primarily of interpersonal conflict rather than evidence of significant harm to the child, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court to vacate its orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"Temporary orders are a critical constitutional battleground in parent-vs-nonparent disputes. Litigators must treat the "fit-parent presumption" as the controlling standard from the outset; a nonparent cannot rely on the "status quo" or "best interest" alone to maintain rights, but must instead prove extraordinary circumstances to overcome a fit parent's objection."
In the Interest of J.D., R.D.-G., K.G., and L.G., Children
COA02
In this case, the Department of Family and Protective Services sought to terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father following reports of drug use, child abandonment, and instability. The Father, who was incarcerated for deadly conduct throughout the case, challenged the trial court's finding that termination was in the children's best interest. Mother’s court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief, signaling that her appeal lacked nonfrivolous legal issues. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the record under the clear-and-convincing evidence standard, focusing on Father's history of incarceration, his minimization of Mother’s drug issues, and the children’s successful bonding within their foster placements. The court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the best-interest finding and affirmed the termination of both parents' rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest determinations often hinge on a parent's credibility and insight. Minimizing risks—such as ignoring a partner's drug use or failing to provide a concrete timeline for stability—can be fatal to a parent's case. For parents facing litigation, demonstrating accountability and providing a realistic, child-centered plan for the present is far more persuasive than making aspirational promises for the future."
In re Nicholas David Kiselov
COA05
In a Dallas County post-judgment family case, the relator sought mandamus to compel the trial court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law after a hearing on a motion for jurisdictional production and a motion to disqualify. The Fifth Court of Appeals denied relief at the threshold because the petition omitted the mandatory Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(k) certification that every factual statement is supported by competent evidence in the appendix or record—an omission the court treated as an independently sufficient reason to deny mandamus. The court also held, in the alternative, that even with a compliant petition the relator failed to meet the two mandamus prerequisites under In re Prudential—showing neither a clear abuse of discretion nor that appeal was an inadequate remedy—so extraordinary relief compelling findings was not warranted on the record presented.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus in Texas is strict-compliance and strict-proof: include the TRAP 52.3(k) certification (and back every fact with record evidence) or your petition can be denied outright, and even then you must build a record that concretely shows both a clear abuse of discretion and why an appeal cannot fix the problem—especially for post-judgment “findings after a hearing” complaints."
In the Interest of A.Z., a Child
COA02
In a private SAPCR termination case, an incarcerated father failed to appear for the final hearing. The trial court had mailed him notice of the setting with instructions and a phone number to call the bailiff to appear telephonically. Father did not call in, and his mailed request asking the court to coordinate with his prison unit was file-stamped after the hearing. The trial court proceeded, found predicate grounds under Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(F) (failure to support) and (L) (conviction for a listed offense, here sexual assault under Penal Code § 22.011), found termination in the child’s best interest, and terminated Father’s rights. On appeal, Father argued the court lacked personal jurisdiction (based on alleged noncitizenship), that proceeding without him violated his right of access to courts, and that the court should have granted a new trial. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held Father’s personal-jurisdiction complaint was waivable and was forfeited by his participation after answering; the trial court provided a workable means of remote participation and was not required to halt the hearing based on a late-received request; and under the post-answer default/new-trial framework (Craddock/Dolgencorp), Father failed to show his nonappearance was not due to conscious indifference and otherwise did not meet the requirements for a new trial. The termination judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When an incarcerated parent receives clear notice and a workable telephonic-appearance procedure, failure to timely follow it (or to secure prison-side coordination well in advance) is unlikely to overturn a termination on “access to courts” grounds. Preserve jurisdiction defenses early (special appearance before answering) and, after a post-answer default, support any motion for new trial with evidence meeting Craddock/Dolgencorp—conclusory complaints and late-filed requests usually won’t suffice."
Crystal Flack v. Michael Mendoza, Sr.
COA08
In this transferred appeal from a Travis County bench-tried divorce, the wife challenged a property division she claimed was impermissibly disproportionate—particularly a provision awarding the husband the first $30,000 of proceeds from the sale of the marital home. The El Paso Court of Appeals applied the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard under Texas Family Code § 7.001 (“just and right” division) and emphasized that neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, requiring the court to imply all findings necessary to support the decree. On the record presented, the implied findings could support unequal allocations based on equity considerations such as the wife’s unilateral withdrawals and trading losses that depleted community assets, removal of funds from a joint account shortly before filing, the husband’s post-separation payment of home carrying costs, and the decree’s stated rationale tying the $30,000 offset to the wife’s lack of good-faith participation in the litigation. The court also rejected the notion that a no-fault (insupportability) divorce bars a disproportionate division; fault is only one of many permissible factors. Holding that the wife failed to show the division was arbitrary, unsupported by evidence, or manifestly unfair—especially given the lack of concrete valuation proof and the presence of implied findings—the court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Property-division appeals are won or lost at trial: build a valuation record and request findings of fact. Without numbers and without findings, appellate courts will imply facts supporting a “just and right” division and rarely reverse—even if the decree looks unequal (like awarding one spouse the first $30,000 of sale proceeds). Litigation conduct and dissipation/waste evidence can justify disproportionate offsets in a no-fault divorce if tied to the record."
In the Interest of J.B.S. and R.G.S., Children
COA13
In a Chapter 157 SAPCR enforcement proceeding, Mother sought contempt-style relief against Father for alleged violations of multiple prior orders. The trial court dismissed/denied the enforcement motion on threshold legal grounds (treating many alleged violations as pre-final-order and effectively barred) and signed an order denying enforcement. Mother attempted a direct appeal, arguing the denial was a final, appealable order under Texas Family Code § 109.002. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the substance of the proceeding and reiterated that contempt/enforcement determinations under Chapter 157 are not reviewable by direct appeal; any review lies, if at all, in mandamus (and habeas if confinement is ordered). Because the order was an unappealable enforcement/contempt ruling, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Don’t assume a signed order that ends a Chapter 157 enforcement hearing is appealable. If the relief sought/ruling made is contempt-type enforcement, the correct review vehicle is usually mandamus (or habeas if confinement is involved); filing a direct appeal can waste time and jeopardize your client’s only effective remedy."
Lonis v. Kinzie
COA02
In a Denton County family-law enforcement case, the trial court signed an order revoking a previously suspended commitment and enforcing support obligations, including contempt/commitment provisions and an arrearage money judgment. The pro se appellant attempted to appeal the December 8, 2025 enforcement order but filed the notice of appeal on February 2, 2026—after the 30-day jurisdictional deadline—and did not file any postjudgment motion extending the timetable or any timely motion for extension under the appellate rules. Applying Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b), 26.1, and 26.3 and the Supreme Court’s guidance in Verburgt, the Fort Worth court held it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the notice was untimely and no extension was sought; the appellant’s pro se status did not excuse noncompliance. The court also reiterated that contempt rulings are not reviewable by direct appeal, so the contempt/commitment portions were independently nonappealable, and any attack on the arrearage judgment likewise failed due to the untimely notice. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law enforcement, deadlines and remedies are everything: calendar the notice-of-appeal deadline immediately for any arrearage money judgment, and don’t try to “appeal the contempt” (contempt is typically reviewable only by habeas if confined or, in limited cases, mandamus). A late notice of appeal without a timely extension request is jurisdictional and will get the entire appeal dismissed—even for pro se litigants."
Robinson v. Kelley
COA01
In an appeal from a Brazoria County SAPCR modification order, the parties entered a later agreed modification order while the appeal was pending. Appellant’s counsel notified the First Court of Appeals by letter that the agreed order eliminated the need to continue the appeal, and appellee did not oppose. The court construed the letter as a motion to dismiss and, because appellant no longer sought appellate relief and there was no live controversy to resolve, dismissed the appeal under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a) and 43.2(f), also dismissing all pending motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you settle a parenting-plan modification dispute during the appeal and the trial court signs an agreed modification order that replaces the challenged order, the court of appeals will typically end the case quickly—sometimes even treating an informal “no longer necessary” communication as a dismissal request. Be intentional: decide whether you want immediate dismissal, an abatement while performance occurs, or continued appellate leverage, and communicate that clearly in a formal motion whenever possible."
Estate of Samantha Skaggs; Robbin Skaggs, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Samantha Skaggs; and Walter Skaggs Sr. v. Peternett, Inc. d/b/a Showdown
COA02
In this Tarrant County case, the plaintiffs sued a bar under the Texas Dram Shop Act but failed to conduct any discovery during the applicable period. Although their pleadings stated they intended to conduct discovery under Level 3, they never obtained a signed Level 3 discovery-control plan. The trial court applied default Level 2 deadlines, quashed the plaintiffs' late discovery requests, denied a continuance, and granted a no-evidence summary judgment after striking the plaintiffs' unauthenticated evidence. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that Level 2 rules govern by default unless a signed Level 3 order is entered, and the plaintiffs waived their right to contest the summary judgment by failing to challenge the exclusion of their evidence on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pleading for 'Level 3' discovery is not enough to extend your deadlines; you must obtain a signed Level 3 discovery-control plan from the court. Without that signed order, default Level 1 or Level 2 deadlines apply, and a failure to conduct discovery within those windows can lead to the quashing of late discovery and an indefensible no-evidence summary judgment. Furthermore, always ensure your summary judgment evidence is authenticated and specifically cited, as 'document dumps' are easily excluded."