Weekly Digest
July 25 – July 31, 2026
41 opinions this week
Glen Edward Williams v. Office of the Attorney General Child Support Division and Alycia Monet Kelley
COA03
In Williams, the Austin Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the father's bill of review challenging prior child-support-related orders because the appeal was jurisdictionally premature. Williams filed his bill of review in the same cause number as the underlying case, where a separate petition to terminate child-support withholding was still pending. Applying Lehmann and Bella Palma, the court analyzed finality by looking at the entire cause, not just the bill-of-review ruling, and held the order was not final because it neither disposed of the remaining withholding claim nor contained a clear and unequivocal statement that it disposed of all claims and all parties. Because no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal from that nonfinal order, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume an order denying a bill of review is immediately appealable in a family-law case. Before filing a notice of appeal, audit the entire cause number for any live pleadings and make sure the order either resolves every remaining claim or includes unmistakable finality language; otherwise, the appeal may be dismissed as premature.”
In re Laci Kay Johnson a/k/a Laci Kay Bode
COA05
In this original proceeding, the relator sought mandamus relief from the trial court’s January 26, 2026 oral rulings denying a motion to dismiss and a petition for writ of habeas corpus in a Dallas family-law matter. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits. Instead, it applied laches under Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, emphasizing that an unexplained delay of four months or more can justify denial of mandamus. Because the relator waited more than five months to seek relief and gave no reasonable explanation for the delay—even considering an earlier defective Rule 52 filing—the court held laches barred mandamus and denied related emergency motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is a diligence-driven remedy: if you intend to challenge an oral ruling in a family-law case, move quickly, comply with Rule 52, and explain any delay in the petition and record. Waiting four months or more without a solid explanation can forfeit extraordinary relief before the court ever considers the merits.”
Harris v. State
COA05
In Harris v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a 911 recording could be admitted through the business-records framework of Texas Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 902(10) based on a compliant records-custodian affidavit, even though neither the caller nor the dispatcher testified. The defendant challenged the recording on authentication, hearsay, and confrontation grounds. The court rejected the argument that 911 calls must be admitted, if at all, only as public records, and concluded that the affidavit sufficiently established the recording was kept in the regular course of business and that the offered copy was the original or an exact duplicate, making it self-authenticating. The court also held that the trial court properly addressed hearsay concerns by reviewing the audio, redacting objectionable portions, and admitting only the remainder, and that the caller’s statements during an ongoing emergency were non-testimonial under Davis v. Washington. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family lawyers, Harris is a practical roadmap for getting 911 audio into evidence without live testimony from the caller or dispatcher. A properly prepared Rule 902(10) affidavit can solve the authentication problem, but lawyers still must separately analyze the statements within the call for hearsay exceptions and be ready to propose targeted redactions rather than all-or-nothing admission.”
Owens v. State
COA12
In Owens v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals addressed whether a prior misdemeanor assault conviction could serve as the jurisdictional predicate for felony assault family violence when the earlier judgment did not expressly state "family violence." The State introduced not only the 1995 assault judgment, but also surrounding records from that case and a later 2009 felony assault family violence case showing the same prior conviction had been used as a qualifying predicate. The court analyzed Penal Code section 22.01(b)(2) according to its text and held the statute does not require a prior judgment to be expressly labeled as assault family violence. Instead, the required family, household, or dating relationship tied to the prior victim may be proved through extrinsic evidence. Considering the admitted evidence cumulatively, the court held a rational factfinder could find the prior conviction involved a qualifying relationship and affirmed the conviction, as modified on costs.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume an old assault judgment is useless just because it lacks an express family-violence finding. In family-law and protective-order litigation, courts may look to the full evidentiary record—plea papers, charging instruments, later related cases, and other admissible documents—to prove the victim’s qualifying relationship. Just as important, if the opposing side offers that broader record, make timely and specific evidentiary objections because appellate courts will assess all admitted evidence together.”
Allen v. State
COA12
In *Allen v. State*, the Tyler Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to admit a police detective’s expert testimony on gang membership, gang culture, and gang dynamics under Texas Rule of Evidence 702. The dispute was whether the detective had a sufficient specialized foundation to identify the defendant and others as members of the Westside Rollin’ 60s and explain the gang’s local structure and behavior. The court focused on the witness’s actual knowledge and experience—eighteen years with the department, years as a detective, a gang-focused assignment, repeated gang investigations, training, intelligence gathering, familiarity with the specific local gang, and prior gang-related testimony—rather than formal academic credentials. It held that this case-specific and experience-based foundation was enough to qualify him as an expert. The court also held that unsupported items in the bill of costs had to be removed, so it modified the judgment and affirmed as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
“Rule 702 fights are won or lost on fit and foundation, not titles. If you offer a specialized witness in a family case, build a concrete record showing training, repeated experience, local or issue-specific knowledge, methodology, and how the witness’s expertise connects to the exact dispute. If you challenge the witness, attack gaps between generalized experience and the precise opinion offered, and insist that any monetary assessment in the final order have a clear legal and evidentiary basis.”
Washington v. State
COA06
In Washington v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals considered whether a trial court had to continue trial after the State disclosed a recorded witness interview only days before trial in an assumed violation of Article 39.14. The trial court excluded the late-produced recording but allowed the previously identified witness to testify live. On appeal, the court focused on remedy and prejudice, holding that late disclosure alone does not require a continuance. Because the witness had long been known to the defense and the defendant did not explain with considerable specificity what additional investigation, impeachment, or trial preparation a continuance would have allowed, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the continuance. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that exclusion of the recording was an adequate remedy and that no concrete prejudice from proceeding to trial was shown.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want a continuance based on late-produced evidence, do more than complain about timing. Make a specific record of what work still needs to be done, why a lesser remedy like exclusion is not enough, and exactly how going to trial now will cause concrete prejudice. In family law cases, that lesson applies directly to late-produced recordings, texts, business records, CPS materials, and witness statements.”
Soma v. Winborne
COA12
In Soma v. Winborne, a husband sought restitution after he and his wife spent more than $200,000 building a home on the wife’s parents’ land, claiming they had been promised a parcel of the property. After a bench trial, the court found there was no contract, no oral promise to gift land, and no agreement to convey land. Applying Texas unjust-enrichment law, the appellate court held that a landowner’s receipt of a benefit is not enough; the plaintiff must prove the benefit was obtained by fraud, duress, or undue advantage. Because the expenditures were voluntary improvements to land the couple knew they did not own, and the factfinder rejected the alleged promise of future title, the court affirmed the take-nothing judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“If marital funds are used to improve land titled in parents, in-laws, or other third parties, do not rely on unjust enrichment as a fallback. In Texas, voluntary improvements to another’s land are not recoverable absent proof of wrongful conduct such as fraud, duress, or undue advantage, so family-law counsel should document ownership expectations and plead specific legal theories early.”
Gabriel Joshua Alonzo v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Gabriel Joshua Alonzo v. State of Texas, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that an ex-boyfriend’s prior access to a woman’s home did not defeat a burglary conviction where she had the greater present right to possession and had revoked consent for him to enter. The court focused on possession at the time of entry, relying on Penal Code section 1.07(a)(35)(A) and Morgan v. State, and found the evidence sufficient because the complainant leased and occupied the home, the relationship had ended, he was not on the lease, did not pay rent, and she testified he was no longer allowed inside. The court also held the evidence supported the assault and theft elements because he grabbed, shook, and shoved her causing pain, then took her phone during a 911 call and kept it for several days. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In breakup and separation cases, past access to a residence—keys, overnight stays, mail, or informal living arrangements—does not necessarily create a continuing right to enter. The winning record is built on present possessory facts: lease or title status, actual occupancy, payment history, clear revocation of consent, changed locks or codes, and contemporaneous objective evidence.”
In the Interest of H.H., K.H., Z.H. & Z.H.
COA12
The Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The record showed severe medical neglect of a medically fragile child, broader neglect of the other children’s developmental, dental, and daily needs, and Mother’s failure to translate services into improved parenting ability. Applying the Holley factors, the court emphasized Mother’s demonstrated inability to meet the children’s present and future needs, the ongoing danger posed by her lack of caregiving capacity, the children’s dramatic improvement in stable foster placements, and the availability of adoptive homes. The court held that this evidence allowed the factfinder to form a firm conviction that termination was in the children’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“In best-interest litigation, courts care far more about proven caregiving capacity, follow-through, stability, and measurable child outcomes than about a parent’s stated love or partial service-plan compliance. If a case involves medical, developmental, or educational neglect, build the record around concrete deficits, future risk, and the child’s progress in a stable placement.”
Treadway v. State
COA12
In Treadway v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals considered whether evidence that the defendant engaged in similar sexual misconduct with another child could be admitted after the defense argued the complainant fabricated her allegations. The court held the evidence was admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) because it was offered for a non-character purpose—to rebut the fabrication defense—rather than to show propensity. The court also held the trial court acted within its discretion under Rule 403 because, in a credibility-driven child-abuse case, the evidence was highly probative and its value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you make fabrication, coaching, mistake, or accident a central theory, you may open the door to otherwise excluded other-acts evidence. In family cases involving child allegations, courts may admit similar prior-act evidence for a non-propensity purpose if it directly rebuts that theory and survives Rule 403 balancing.”
In the Estate of Allie Marie Brock Fugler, Deceased
COA12
The Tyler Court of Appeals reversed a take-nothing summary judgment in an estate dispute arising from an allegedly invalid premarital agreement. The decedent’s child and grandchild sued the executor for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence, alleging he wrongly relied on and enforced a forged or invalid premarital agreement and mishandled estate assets. Another party filed a no-evidence motion asserting broadly that the claims depended on the agreement’s validity, but the motion did not identify which specific elements of the pleaded claims lacked evidence. The court held Rule 166a(i) requires a no-evidence motion to target actual claim elements, not just attack the opponent’s overall theory of the case. The court also held the trial court could not grant summary judgment for the executor because he never filed or joined the motion. Even if the motion were construed generously, the plaintiffs produced more than a scintilla of evidence through a handwriting expert affidavit raising a fact issue on the agreement’s authenticity. The court reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“A no-evidence summary judgment motion must identify the exact elements that allegedly lack evidentiary support; attacking only the other side’s “central theory” is not enough. Also, a trial court cannot grant summary judgment to a party who did not move for it or join the motion.”
Robert Link v. The State of Texas
COA12
The Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed Robert Link’s conviction for repeated violation of a protective order. The key dispute was identity: Link argued the State failed to prove he sent the June 29 and July 11, 2023 texts and calls because the communications came from spoofed or changing phone numbers and no carrier records directly tied those numbers to him. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and Texas circumstantial-evidence precedent, the court held the jury could rely on the cumulative force of the evidence, including the content of the messages, references to the parties’ DNA and protective-order disputes, Link’s prior pattern of unwanted contact, expert testimony explaining spoofing, and similar-transaction testimony from another former partner. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, that evidence allowed a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Link was the sender and that he repeatedly violated the protective order under Penal Code sections 25.072 and 25.07.
Litigation Takeaway
“Direct phone-company proof is helpful but not always necessary in protective-order enforcement cases. If anonymized texts, calls, or app messages contain details uniquely tied to the respondent and fit an established pattern of harassment, courts may find circumstantial evidence sufficient. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a narrative with preserved messages, context, timelines, corroborating witnesses, and pattern evidence rather than relying solely on digital subscriber records.”
Grant v. State
COA12
In Grant v. State, the defendant challenged the trial court’s designation of a forensic interviewer as the Article 38.072 outcry witness and argued the court improperly shifted to the defense the burden to prove someone else was the proper outcry witness. The appellate court held that complaint was not preserved because counsel did not specifically object when the trial court announced that burden allocation. On the merits, the court concluded the interviewer was a proper outcry witness because the child’s earlier statement to her grandmother was only a vague allegation, while the interviewer was the first adult to receive a discernible description of the sexual abuse. The court also indicated that complaints about testimony vouching for the child’s credibility and criticizing defense cross-examination were largely unreviewable due to preservation failures.
Litigation Takeaway
“Preserve the procedure, not just the substance. If a court allocates a burden, adopts a gatekeeping framework, or permits testimony that edges into credibility vouching, counsel must make a timely, specific objection on that exact ground. In abuse-related family cases, vague early disclosures do not necessarily control outcry-style admissibility issues; the key question is who first heard a discernible description of the alleged abuse.”
The State of Texas for the Protection of M.D.J.
COA12
The Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed a protective order against Nicholas McKay, holding that the appeal was not moot despite the order’s expiration because the family-violence finding carries collateral consequences in later family-law cases. On the merits, the court applied deferential legal- and factual-sufficiency review and concluded that the applicant’s testimony about repeated physical abuse, threats to kill her, a firearm threat, and a threat involving the child—corroborated by injury photographs and audio recordings—was more than sufficient to support findings that family violence occurred and was likely to occur in the future. The respondent’s contrary evidence, including the applicant’s prior assault arrest and ordinary text exchanges, created credibility conflicts for the trial court but did not render the findings unsupported or unjust. The court also rejected other appellate complaints as moot, inadequately briefed, or unpreserved.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas protective-order cases, credible testimony plus basic corroboration like photos and recordings can be enough to sustain a family-violence finding on appeal, even when the respondent offers competing narratives or impeachment evidence. Treat every protective-order hearing as a high-stakes record-building event because the resulting family-violence finding can continue to affect custody, possession, and divorce litigation long after the order expires.”
Juan Fidel Lopez Antonio v. PNC Bank National Association
COA12
On restricted appeal from a default judgment, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that a private process server’s return was not defective under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 107(e) merely because the unsworn declaration cited 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and stated it was made under penalty of perjury under federal law. The court analyzed Rule 107(e)’s requirement that the return be verified or signed under penalty of perjury in substantially the prescribed form, and concluded strict compliance does not require a talismanic reference to Texas law. Because the return included the server’s identifying information, execution details, signature, and a perjury-backed attestation, there was no error apparent on the face of the record, and the default judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you are defending a default judgment, a return of service is not automatically void just because the private server used federal unsworn-declaration language instead of expressly invoking Texas law. The key is whether the return still contains Rule 107’s essential service details and a signed attestation under penalty of perjury; attacks should focus on real omissions, not stylistic wording differences.”
Stapleton v. Prather
COA03
In Stapleton v. Prather, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a 2005 divorce decree requiring the parents to fund their children’s 529 plans as “additional child support” did not actually divide ownership of those accounts. The court analyzed the decree under ordinary decree-construction principles and Texas Family Code §§ 9.201 and 9.203, emphasizing the difference between imposing support obligations and expressly awarding or divesting property interests. Because the decree referenced the children’s 529 accounts and their educational purpose but never stated who owned the accounts or who was awarded the spouses’ interests, the court concluded the accounts were omitted property subject to a later just-and-right division. The court also rejected res judicata and judicial-admission defenses at the summary-judgment stage, reversed the associated fee award, and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a divorce decree is supposed to transfer, confirm, or extinguish a spouse’s interest in a financial account, it must say so expressly. Support language about funding an account does not substitute for property-division language, and vague references to a child’s account can leave the asset open to later omitted-property litigation under Family Code § 9.203.”
Gregory Jack v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Jack v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed adjudication and revocation of deferred-adjudication community supervision because the State proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Gregory Jack failed to report as directed. Although Jack argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to prove a separate alleged new-law violation involving discharge of a firearm, the court applied settled revocation law holding that one proven supervision violation is enough to sustain revocation. The court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling, noted the supervision officer’s testimony that Jack had notice and failed to appear, and emphasized that Jack neither challenged that finding on appeal nor developed any due-diligence defense. Because the unchallenged reporting violation independently supported the judgment, the court affirmed without needing to resolve the attacked new-offense ground.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a trial court’s order rests on multiple independent grounds, an appeal can fail unless every ground is challenged. For family-law litigators, even a so-called “technical” violation—like failing to report, attend, exchange, notify, or complete services—can independently carry the ruling if it is pleaded, proved, and left unanswered.”
Chelby Thrasher v. Jessica Thrasher
COA11
In this divorce appeal, Chelby Thrasher challenged the denial of reimbursement, the characterization of certain assets as Jessica Thrasher’s separate property, the overall just-and-right property division, and an attorney’s-fees award. The court held that reimbursement was waived because Chelby did not plead it as an affirmative claim and, without the reporter’s record, the court could not determine whether the issue was tried by consent or otherwise preserved. As to property characterization, property division, and attorney’s fees, the court explained that each complaint depended on the evidence presented at the final hearing. Because Chelby failed to provide the reporter’s record required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6, the appellate court was required to presume the omitted evidence supported the divorce decree and therefore affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to challenge a divorce decree on appeal, you must bring a complete reporter’s record for any issue that depends on trial evidence. Also, reimbursement must be affirmatively pleaded or clearly tried by consent; otherwise the claim is likely waived.”
Driver v. State
COA14
In Driver v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Evidence 608(b) barred the defense from cross-examining a child complainant about a prior childhood false statement to a counselor, even after the complainant’s aunt testified that the child had a truthful reputation. The court analyzed the proposed impeachment as classic specific-instance evidence offered only to show the complainant had lied before and therefore might be lying again, which Rule 608(b) prohibits. The court further concluded that exclusion of the evidence did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights or right to present a defense because the prior falsehood was not tied to bias, motive, interest, coercion, or correction of a materially false impression. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family cases, you generally cannot impeach a witness with an unrelated prior lie just to argue they are a dishonest person. If you want the evidence admitted, you need a non-character theory—such as bias, motive, interest, coercion, or a misleading impression—and you must clearly build and preserve that theory on the record.”
In the Interest of H.F., a Child
COA02
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals independently reviewed the entire record, counsel’s brief, and Mother’s pro se response, which raised fairness concerns, recent sobriety efforts, and explanations for missed services and drug tests. The court held those arguments did not reveal an arguable appellate issue, especially where they relied on matters outside the trial record or were contradicted by evidence showing repeated positive drug tests, missed tests, homelessness, unemployment, and noncompliance with services. The court affirmed the termination order under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (b)(2), and denied counsel’s motion to withdraw because under In re P.M., a belief that the appeal is frivolous is not by itself good cause to withdraw.
Litigation Takeaway
“Appeals are won on preserved error and the trial record, not on post-judgment explanations or extra-record documents. In termination and other family-law cases, lawyers must build the evidentiary record before judgment and, for appointed appellate counsel, remember that Anders affirmance does not automatically end representation.”
In the Interest of B.L.H., M.L.H.-C., P.M.S.S., D.R.D.S., Children
COA10
In In re B.L.H., the Waco Court of Appeals held that a mother whose parental rights were terminated could not appeal only the order appointing DFPS as managing conservator while leaving the termination judgment unchallenged. Mother argued DFPS failed to overcome the parental presumption under Texas Family Code section 153.131(a), but the court explained that once termination stands, section 161.206(b) divests the parent of all legal rights and duties, including the ability to invoke rights available only to a legal parent. Relying on In re J.D.G., the court treated DFPS’s conservatorship appointment as a consequence of the unchallenged termination rather than a separate issue Mother had standing to contest. The court therefore rejected her appeal on standing grounds without reaching the sufficiency of the conservatorship evidence. The court also affirmed Father’s termination under Anders review and denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a parent wants to challenge DFPS conservatorship on appeal, counsel usually must also challenge the termination ruling that extinguishes parental status. Once termination is left intact, the parent generally loses standing to rely on the parental presumption or attack conservatorship as if still a legal parent.”
Eric Hines v. Tiffany Shavonne Stevenson Hines
COA09
In Hines v. Hines, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed a divorce case’s dismissal for want of prosecution after neither party nor counsel appeared at a required pretrial conference, even though the parties had previously signed a mediated settlement agreement. The court held the trial judge acted within its discretion because the case was no longer truly uncontested once the wife filed a motion to set aside the MSA, and the appellate record did not include key materials—such as the scheduling order, alleged emails excusing attendance, a proposed decree, or a reporter’s record from the dismissal setting—needed to show the dismissal was improper. The court also upheld denial of reinstatement, finding the record did not negate conscious indifference where counsel knew about the setting, the risk of dismissal, and the pending MSA challenge. Finally, the court rejected the husband’s argument that Family Code section 6.602 required entry of judgment on the MSA, explaining that without a complete record he could not show the statute compelled rendition instead of dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
“A signed MSA does not end the court’s power to manage its docket or protect a case from dismissal. If there is any dispute about the MSA or decree language, treat the case as contested, appear at required settings unless formally excused, and build a full record showing the court was asked to render judgment on the MSA. Section 6.602 is powerful, but it will not save a case on appeal if counsel misses settings or fails to preserve the documents and hearing record needed to prove error.”
In the Interest of S.M.T. and S.J.T., Children
COA14
In this post-divorce SAPCR modification case, the father tried to undo an in-court Rule 11 settlement after the trial court accepted the agreement and stated the orders were effective that day. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused on the key procedural question: whether consent still existed at rendition. Applying Texas Rule 11 principles and S&A Restaurant Corp. v. Leal, the court held that consent may be withdrawn only before rendition, not after. Because the settlement terms were recited in open court, father personally agreed to them, and the trial court rendered judgment before father attempted to back away, his later refusal to sign and later objections did not prevent entry of a conforming written order. The appellate court also rejected father's complaint that the written order improperly changed the children's primary residence, concluding the record supported the trial court's view that the rendered agreement imposed a Clear Creek ISD-based framework rather than designating father's address as the primary residence.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you settle a family-law case on the record, the moment that matters is rendition, not the later signature. Once the court accepts the Rule 11 agreement and renders it effective, buyer's remorse usually cannot undo the deal; from then on, the real fight is whether the written order truly conforms to what was recited in court.”
Graeme v. Graeme
COA03
In Graeme v. Graeme, the Third Court of Appeals treated a dispute over a Mediator’s Proposal as a straightforward contract-construction case. The agreement required Brian to repay $625,000 to the trust, required Paul to repay $75,000, and provided that upon those payments and reimbursement of expenses, the remaining trust assets would be divided equally among the three siblings. Brian argued that a later clause allowing the parties to “account for and net out” the repayment amounts let him simply reduce his distribution instead of paying first. Reading the agreement as a whole, the court held that the payment language in Paragraphs 1 and 6 created an express payment-first sequence and condition precedent to final distribution. Paragraph 7 was only a permissive administrative mechanism and did not give Brian a unilateral right to offset his debt against his share. The court therefore affirmed enforcement of the agreement requiring repayment before distribution.
Litigation Takeaway
“If an MSA or property-settlement agreement says a party must pay, reimburse, or contribute funds before distribution, a later general “net out” or accounting clause usually will not override that sequencing unless the agreement says so clearly. Draft offsets and equalization provisions with precision, especially whether offset is optional, unilateral, and a substitute for payment or merely an accounting tool.”
Suarez v. State
COA13
In Suarez v. State, the defendant challenged whether a prior deferred-adjudication disposition for continuous violence against the family could satisfy the prior-conviction element needed to elevate a new family-violence assault to a felony under Texas Penal Code § 22.01(b)(2)(A). The court applied the legal-sufficiency standard and focused on the statute’s text, especially § 22.01(f)(1), which expressly defines “previously convicted” to include a guilty or nolo contendere plea that resulted in deferred adjudication, whether or not sentence was ever later imposed. Because the State introduced certified records showing Suarez’s guilty plea and deferred adjudication for a qualifying family-violence offense, the court held the evidence was legally sufficient and that no later adjudication of guilt was required during guilt-innocence. The court also modified the judgment to reflect the jury’s repeat-offender enhancement finding that had been omitted from the written judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not make blanket arguments that deferred adjudication is “not a conviction.” In Texas family-law and family-violence litigation, the controlling statute may give a deferred-adjudication plea real legal effect. Read the exact statutory definition, and use certified plea papers and orders—not summaries—to prove or challenge the prior proceeding.”
Richard Pasillas v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Pasillas v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether admitting muted body-camera footage showing a non-testifying complainant crying, gesturing, and displaying injuries violated the Confrontation Clause. Rather than deciding that constitutional question, the court assumed error and analyzed harm under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a) and the Langham factors. The court held any assumed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the video was cumulative of other evidence admitted without objection, including officer observations, photographs of injuries, EMT testimony recounting the complainant’s description of the assault, and Pasillas’s separate admission establishing the second predicate assault. The conviction for continuous violence against the family was therefore affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“A good evidentiary objection may not win on appeal if the same fact came in elsewhere without objection. In family-violence-related litigation, lawyers must preserve error across every parallel evidence source, while proponents should build redundancy so the judgment can survive harmless-error review even if one item is later excluded.”
In re Office of the Attorney General of Texas
COA03
In this mandamus proceeding, the Texas Office of the Attorney General challenged a trial court order transferring an entire SAPCR from Texas to Arizona, including the child-support portion of the case. The court held that even if custody-related issues could be transferred under UCCJEA-type principles, child support is governed separately by UIFSA. Because Texas issued the support order and Father still lived in Texas, Texas retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over support under Family Code section 159.205(a). The court also concluded that Family Code section 155.301 authorizes only intrastate transfers, not interstate transfer of support jurisdiction. Because the transfer order was interlocutory and not immediately appealable, mandamus was the proper remedy. The court further rejected the argument that the support-transfer language was merely a clerical error correctable by nunc pro tunc, holding the mistake was judicial. Mandamus was conditionally granted to vacate the order insofar as it transferred child support to Arizona.
Litigation Takeaway
“Custody jurisdiction and support jurisdiction do not automatically travel together. Even when another state may become the proper forum for conservatorship or possession issues, Texas keeps child-support jurisdiction under UIFSA so long as the obligor, obligee, or child still resides here, absent a statutory exception. Family lawyers should draft transfer motions and orders with precision, carve out support expressly, and treat an improper interstate support transfer as a mandamus issue.”
In the Interest of M.R.L.
COA04
In a contested SAPCR, the trial court entered a default final order after the mother failed to appear, even though no reporter’s record was made and the order recited that the parties waived the record. The court of appeals held that Family Code § 105.003(c) imposes an affirmative duty on the trial court to ensure a record is made in any contested SAPCR final hearing unless all parties validly waive it with the court’s consent. Because the pleadings showed an active dispute over conservatorship and residence restrictions, the case remained contested despite the mother’s absence. And because the mother was absent and unrepresented at trial, she could not waive the reporter’s record. The absence of a record was error apparent on the face of the record and harmful because it prevented meaningful appellate review, so the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not treat a default prove-up on parent-child issues like an ordinary civil default. If the pleadings make the SAPCR contested, get a court reporter and make a record; an absent, unrepresented party cannot waive it, and skipping the record can make the default order easy to reverse on appeal.”
David Cortez v. Alicia Cortez
COA04
In a default-divorce appeal, the parties settled during the appeal and asked the court of appeals to render an agreed judgment adopting their mediated parenting plan and child-support terms. The court held it could not do so because Texas Family Code § 153.007 requires the trial court to approve any agreed parenting plan involving conservatorship, possession, or support based on a best-interest finding, and appellate courts cannot make that factual determination in the first instance. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(2)(B), the court set aside the judgment and remanded the case so the trial court could consider the agreement and, if appropriate, render judgment consistent with it after making the required best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a family-law appeal settles on child-related issues, do not ask the court of appeals to simply render the agreement. Structure the disposition as vacatur and remand, because only the trial court can approve a parenting plan under § 153.007 after finding it is in the child’s best interest.”
In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile
COA01
The State sought to waive juvenile jurisdiction and transfer A.M. to criminal district court on three aggravated-assault allegations and a murder allegation arising from multiple shootings. Applying Texas Family Code §§ 54.02(a) and (f), the First Court of Appeals concluded that surveillance footage, witness testimony, and officer identifications supplied probable cause and supported the finding that the seriousness of the person-directed offenses and the need to protect the community required criminal proceedings. For the murder allegation, the State did not have to identify whose bullet killed the victim at the transfer stage; evidence that A.M. fired repeatedly into the occupied vehicle during the fatal shooting supported probable cause under felony-murder or party-liability principles. Although A.M. presented evidence of cognitive limitations, low intellectual functioning, impulsivity, and mental-health concerns, the juvenile court could reasonably give greater weight to the repeated firearm violence, post-release conduct, and public-safety risks. The appellate court therefore held that the transfer findings were supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence and affirmed the waiver orders as within the juvenile court’s discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
“At a juvenile-transfer hearing, probable cause is a preliminary screening standard, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence of coordinated violent conduct may support transfer under felony-murder or party-liability theories even when the State cannot identify who fired the fatal shot. Cognitive or mental-health mitigation will not necessarily overcome repeated, person-directed violence; counsel seeking rehabilitation-focused relief should present a concrete, credible plan for treatment, supervision, placement, and public safety rather than relying on diagnoses alone.”
In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile
COA01
In In the Matter of A.M., the First Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring A.M. to criminal district court under Texas Family Code section 54.02. The State presented surveillance footage, witness testimony, and officer identification tying A.M. to three aggravated assaults and to a shooting in which Faridah Davis was killed. A.M. argued that his low IQ, cognitive limitations, mental-health history, and prior fitness concerns weighed against transfer, but the court held that the juvenile court could reasonably give greater weight to the seriousness and repeated nature of the violent offenses, the recency of the conduct after release from detention, and community-safety concerns. The court also held probable cause existed on the murder allegation even though the State could not yet prove which shooter fired the fatal bullet, because evidence showed A.M. fired multiple rounds into the occupied vehicle and acted in concert with another shooter. The transfer order was therefore supported by sufficient evidence and was not an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a record shows serious, repeated violence supported by objective evidence like video, witnesses, and law-enforcement testimony, Texas courts may prioritize safety over mitigating evidence of mental-health or cognitive impairment. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to connect impairment evidence to actual risk, parenting capacity, and workable safeguards—or expect the court to focus on dangerous conduct and public protection.”
In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile
COA01
In In the Matter of A.M., the First Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s decision to waive juvenile jurisdiction and transfer A.M. to criminal court under Texas Family Code section 54.02. The State alleged three aggravated assaults and one murder, and presented surveillance footage, officer testimony, and psychological and probation evidence showing A.M.’s involvement in multiple violent shootings, including a fatal shooting into an occupied vehicle. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support probable cause and the finding that the welfare of the community required criminal proceedings, despite evidence of A.M.’s intellectual and mental-health limitations. It also held probable cause existed for felony murder under the law of parties even though the fatal bullet was not tied to A.M. specifically, and affirmed the denial of a fitness-to-proceed hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
“Courts do not treat diagnoses, low IQ, or mental-health history as automatic barriers to transfer or other protective rulings; they focus on functional evidence, prior interventions, public safety, and whether existing services can realistically prevent further harm. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a concrete record linking behavior, supervision history, treatment response, and objective evidence to the governing best-interest or safety standard.”
In re U. L.
COA14
In re U. L. involved a party who sought emergency mandamus relief after a regional presiding judge denied her motion to recuse in a pending Harris County case. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(j) controls and makes a denial of recusal reviewable only for abuse of discretion on appeal from a final judgment, which forecloses interlocutory mandamus review of the denial itself. The court also analyzed its mandamus jurisdiction under Texas Government Code section 22.221 and concluded it lacked authority to order the regional presiding judge to vacate the recusal denial or conduct further proceedings absent a specific statutory grant. The court therefore denied the mandamus petitions.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a recusal motion is denied in a family-law case, do not count on emergency mandamus to fix it. Build a complete Rule 18a record, preserve objections and harm, and prepare to challenge the denial only after final judgment.”
In the Matter of A.M.
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order waiving jurisdiction and transferring A.M. to criminal district court under Texas Family Code section 54.02(a). The State alleged three aggravated assaults with a deadly weapon and one murder arising from multiple shootings, including one incident in which A.M. allegedly fired nine rounds into an occupied vehicle and a passenger was killed. On appeal, A.M. argued the evidence was insufficient on probable cause and the welfare-of-the-community finding, and emphasized his extremely low intellectual functioning and mental-health history. The court applied the section 54.02(a) transfer requirements and the nonexclusive section 54.02(f) factors, held the violent, repeated offenses against persons and the failure of prior interventions supported transfer, and concluded the juvenile court was entitled to weigh public-safety concerns more heavily than the evidence favoring treatment in juvenile court. The court also held probable cause existed on the murder allegation even though the investigator could not identify which shooter fired the fatal bullet, and it affirmed the denial of a fitness-to-proceed evidentiary hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a case involves youth violence, courts tend to focus on structured statutory factors and will defer heavily to the trial judge’s weighing of conflicting evidence. In family-law litigation, repeated violent conduct, firearm use, surveillance evidence, and failed prior interventions can strongly support emergency relief, possession restrictions, and conservatorship limits; mental-health or cognitive-deficit evidence is most persuasive when tied to a concrete treatment, supervision, and safety plan.”
In the Interest of J.J.C., a Child
COA05
In In re J.J.C., the Dallas Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from an order denying post-judgment motions filed more than twelve years after a 2013 child-support order. The appellant argued the earlier order was void for jurisdictional reasons, but the court focused on procedure rather than the underlying voidness claim. It held that motions filed in the original family-law case under the same cause number were not a true collateral attack; under Texas law, a collateral attack on an allegedly void judgment must be brought as a new proceeding under a different cause number. Because the 2025 motions were merely untimely post-judgment motions in the old case, the denial order was neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, and any effort to challenge the 2013 order directly was untimely. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Calling an old family-law order “void” does not make a later denial order appealable. If deadlines for a direct attack have expired, a party seeking to challenge a judgment as void must use the correct procedural vehicle—typically a new collateral proceeding under a new cause number—or risk having the case dismissed before any court reaches the merits.”
Jose Agosto v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Jose Agosto v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether testimony from a forensic interviewer and a police sergeant improperly vouched for a child complainant’s credibility in a child-sex-offense trial. The interviewer testified she had no concerns during the interview that required referral to a detective, and the sergeant testified the child’s forensic interview was consistent with the earlier outcry. The court analyzed the objections as turning not on the label 'bolstering' alone, but on whether the testimony actually expressed an opinion that the complainant was truthful. Relying on Texas cases distinguishing factual consistency and process-based observations from direct credibility endorsements, the court held that testimony about an absence of concerns and consistency across disclosures was admissible because neither witness expressly stated the child was truthful, credible, or believable. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by overruling the objections.
Litigation Takeaway
“In abuse-allegation cases, professionals can usually testify that a child’s statements were consistent or that they observed no concerns requiring further action, so long as they do not cross the line into saying they believed the child or that the child was truthful. For family-law litigators, the key is careful question framing: descriptive and process-based testimony is more likely admissible, while explicit credibility-vouching remains vulnerable to objection.”
Wilson v. State
COA05
In Wilson v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed an aggravated-assault-by-threat conviction arising from a domestic-violence fire set inside an occupied apartment. Wilson poured gasoline on his girlfriend, ignited it, and fled while her teenage son, NF, was asleep in the home. On appeal, Wilson argued there was no evidence he intentionally or knowingly threatened NF because he made no express threat to the child and the child was not his primary target. The court rejected that argument, holding that circumstantial evidence was enough: Wilson knew NF was home, intentionally started a fire in the residence, fled through NF’s window, and created an immediate life-threatening condition that caused NF to believe he would die and to jump from a second-story window to escape. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the court held a rational jury could find an intentional or knowing threat of imminent bodily injury and could also find use of a deadly weapon, because fire and the means used to ignite it were inherently dangerous. The court affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“A child does not have to be the direct target of household violence for the conduct to support serious safety findings. In family-law cases, circumstantial evidence that a parent knowingly created an immediately dangerous condition in an occupied home can strongly support family-violence allegations, endangerment findings, protective orders, and restrictions on conservatorship or possession.”
Wilson v. State
COA05
In Wilson v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support aggravated assault by threat against a child who was inside an apartment when the defendant intentionally set it on fire. The court analyzed the case under the legal-sufficiency standard and emphasized that a threat of imminent bodily injury can be proven through circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s conduct, knowledge that the child was home, the spread of the fire, and the child’s reaction in escaping through a second-story window. The court held that even without an express verbal threat aimed at the child, a rational factfinder could infer that intentionally starting a fire in an occupied home knowingly threatened the child with imminent bodily injury and involved a deadly weapon.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases, you do not need an express verbal threat to prove danger to a child or household member. If a parent or partner knowingly creates an immediately dangerous condition in the home, the court can infer a threat from the conduct, the living arrangement, the child’s presence, and the surrounding circumstances—making this case especially useful in custody, protective-order, and family-violence disputes.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Lenore Hernandez Mowafy and Mohamed Rizk Mowafy and in the Interest of R.M.M., a Child
COA07
In this Texas divorce appeal, the husband had answered and counterpetitioned, but later failed to appear for the final hearing. The trial court proceeded by post-answer default and signed a divorce decree after a hearing set only 42 days after the setting order was filed. The Seventh Court of Appeals held that because this was a post-answer default, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245 required at least 45 days’ notice of the first trial setting. Relying on Highsmith, the court concluded that the record affirmatively showed inadequate notice, which amounted to a Rule 245 and due-process violation. The default divorce decree was therefore ineffectual, so the court reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“If the other side has filed any answer, you cannot safely take a default final order on short notice. In an answered family-law case, Rule 245’s 45-day notice requirement is a hard appellate trap, and a decree entered on less notice is vulnerable to reversal even if the absent party does not appear at trial.”
Shaikh v. Rodriguez
COA01
In Shaikh v. Rodriguez, a diabetic patient sued her rheumatologist, alleging negligent prednisone treatment because the doctor failed to ensure glucose monitoring, warn about steroid-related risks, and coordinate diabetic care, which allegedly contributed to serious vision complications. On interlocutory appeal from the denial of dismissal under Chapter 74, the defendant argued the plaintiff’s experts were unqualified because they were not rheumatologists. The First Court of Appeals rejected that specialty-matching argument and held the qualification inquiry is issue-specific: whether the expert has knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the precise medical questions at issue. Because the ophthalmologist and the internal-medicine/critical-care physician tied their experience to prednisone use in diabetic patients, glucose monitoring, risk disclosure, and coordinated care, the trial court acted within its discretion in finding the reports sufficient and denying dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
“When defending or attacking an expert, focus on the exact issue in dispute—not job titles or subspecialty labels. An expert need not share the opposing party’s specialty if the expert can show real, issue-specific experience with the standard of care, risk, monitoring duty, or methodology actually at issue.”
Willie Silliman v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Silliman v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a trial court could exclude late-produced April 2024 police and recording materials as a discovery sanction under article 39.14 yet still admit testimony about that same prior family-violence incident under article 38.371. The complainant recanted at trial, and the court treated the discovery-sanction issue and the admissibility of relationship evidence as separate questions, concluding that independently admissible testimony was not automatically tainted by exclusion of related exhibits. The court also held that using the excluded materials outside the jury’s presence to refresh recollection did not make the testimony inadmissible because the excluded items themselves were never shown to the jury, and that a timely disclosed May body-camera video referencing the April incident was admissible because its probative value in evaluating recantation and relationship context was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403.
Litigation Takeaway
“Excluding a late-produced exhibit does not automatically exclude live testimony about the underlying conduct. In family-law cases involving violence, recantation, or coercive control, lawyers should separate excluded documents from admissible personal-knowledge testimony and focus objections or responses on relevance, Rule 403, and whether the other side is using testimony as a backdoor way to publish excluded material.”