Weekly Digest

In Re Jose Raquel Lerma

COA13

In In re Jose Raquel Lerma, the relator sought mandamus relief to compel a trial court to rule on pending motions regarding his imprisonment and speedy trial demand. The court analyzed whether the mere act of filing documents with a district clerk is sufficient to trigger a judge's ministerial duty to rule. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that a relator must establish a three-prong test: (1) the trial court had a legal duty to rule, (2) the court was asked to rule, and (3) the court failed or refused to do so within a reasonable time. Because the record only showed the filings were made with the clerk and did not show the judge was actually aware of the motions or asked to rule on them, the court denied the petition.

In re Adrian and Mary Zuniga

COA13

Adrian and Mary Zuniga filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel a trial court to set their civil case for trial after the court removed it from the docket despite multiple announcements of readiness. While the petition was pending at the Thirteenth Court of Appeals, the trial court scheduled a trial date for April 2026. The appellate court analyzed whether the trial court was still 'refusing' to act and determined that because a trial date had been set, the Relators could no longer demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion or an entitlement to extraordinary relief. Consequently, the court held that the challenge was effectively mooted by the new trial setting and denied the petition.

Lamas v. The State of Texas

COA07

In Lamas v. State, the appellant attempted to appeal his conviction for sexual assault of a child nearly four years after his 2022 sentencing. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.2(a)(1), which requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days of sentencing (or 90 days if a motion for new trial is filed). Because the appellant missed this mandatory deadline by several years, the court determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the merits of the appeal. Following the precedent in Castillo v. State, the court held that a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional necessity, and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.

Matthew Janssen v. The State of Texas

COA07

In Janssen v. State, an appellant expressed a clear desire to abandon his appeal during an on-the-record hearing but failed to submit the signed, written motion to dismiss required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). The Seventh Court of Appeals addressed whether this procedural omission prevented the dismissal of the case. The court utilized Rule 2, which allows for the suspension of specific procedural rules for 'good cause' or to expedite a decision. Analyzing the appellant's oral statements in the supplemental record, the court found that his clear intent to abandon the appeal constituted sufficient good cause to bypass the signature requirement. The court held that it possesses the authority to dismiss an appeal when the record unequivocally reflects the appellant's desire to abandon the proceedings, even in the absence of a signed motion.

Bharti Mishra v. Citibank, N.A., and Shadman Zafar

COA07

In this case, an appellant challenged a permanent injunction issued under the Texas civil stalking statute, along with a contempt order and various discovery rulings. The Court of Appeals affirmed the injunction, finding that a defendant’s history of extensive harassment (thousands of emails and videos) justified permanent relief even if the defendant claimed to have recently stopped the behavior. Crucially, the court dismissed the challenge to the contempt order for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that contempt findings cannot be reviewed via direct appeal. The court also identified a 'transfer trap,' noting that as a transferee court for docket equalization, it lacked the statutory authority to issue a writ of mandamus against a trial judge outside its geographic district.

K.C. v. T.C.-J.

COA07

In a parental termination case, an indigent mother (K.C.) appealed the termination of her rights and subsequently requested to discharge her court-appointed lawyer to represent herself (pro se). The Amarillo Court of Appeals analyzed this request under the "quasi-criminal" nature of termination proceedings, which requires that any waiver of the right to counsel be knowing, intelligent, and competent. Because the existing record contained no evidence of the mother's understanding of the "dangers and disadvantages" of self-representation, the court held that an evidentiary hearing was mandatory. The court abated the appeal and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the mother's competence and the voluntariness of her waiver.

In the Interest of C.K.S., A Child

COA06

In an appeal arising from a child custody matter, Nickolas G. Kjeldergaard sought to challenge a trial court order but failed to file a brief that complied with the mandatory requirements of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Despite the Sixth Court of Appeals providing a detailed deficiency notice and an opportunity to correct the errors, the appellant’s subsequent filing still lacked necessary legal structure, record citations, and clear arguments. The court analyzed the case under Rules 38.1, 38.8, and 42.3, emphasizing that while it allows some leeway for pro se litigants, it cannot act as an advocate or perform an independent search of the record for errors. Consequently, the court held that the appeal must be dismissed for want of prosecution due to the appellant's failure to comply with procedural rules and court notices.

In Re Jose Raquel Lerma

COA13

In this case, the relator sought a writ of mandamus after a trial court failed to rule on several pending motions. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether the mere act of e-filing a motion with the clerk's office is sufficient to trigger a judge's ministerial duty to rule. The court held that mandamus relief is unavailable unless the relator provides an evidentiary record proving the trial court was actually aware of the motion and was specifically asked to rule. Because the relator's evidence only showed that the motions were filed and not that they were brought to the judge's personal attention, the court denied the petition.

Estate of Lake Zack Hughes v. Thoyze Baker Hughes

COA05

In Estate of Lake Zack Hughes, a contestant challenged his alleged father's will, asserting he was an omitted biological son and claiming the will was a forgery. The trial court dismissed the contest and admitted the will to probate after the contestant failed to post a court-ordered security for costs and submitted a handwriting expert report that was not properly verified. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in enforcing the Texas Estates Code's security requirements and the Rules of Evidence regarding unverified expert reports. The case underscores that a party's failure to bridge the gap between allegations and admissible evidence can lead to a final judgment without a trial.

In Re Jose Raquel Lerma

COA13

In In re Jose Raquel Lerma, a Relator sought a writ of mandamus to compel a trial judge to rule on pending motions that had been filed but not acted upon. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals denied the petition, holding that a trial court’s ministerial duty to rule is not triggered by the mere act of filing a document with the clerk. The court analyzed the requirements for mandamus relief in 'failure to rule' cases, emphasizing that a relator must demonstrate the trial court had actual awareness of the motion and was specifically asked to rule. Because the Relator failed to provide a record of 'presentment'—such as correspondence with the court or a formal request for a ruling—the court found he did not establish a clear right to the relief sought.

WYLIE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT v. LACY MARIE SCHUITEMAN AND CHRISTOPER MICHAEL CONGER

COA05

Wylie Independent School District appealed a trial court judgment that granted a money judgment for delinquent taxes but failed to include a foreclosure provision or an award of costs. While the appeal was pending, a third-party purchaser bought the subject property and paid the school district the full amount of taxes, interest, penalties, and costs. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed whether a live controversy still existed and concluded that because the underlying financial obligation was satisfied in full, the school district's request for enforcement remedies was moot. The court held that the satisfaction of the debt stripped the court of jurisdiction, resulting in the vacatur of the challenged judgment and dismissal of the appeal.

Christopher Michael Green v. The State of Texas

COA05

In Green v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals examined whether a trial court erred by admitting SANE (Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner) records of an unavailable victim during a criminal punishment phase. The defendant argued that admitting graphic forensic evidence without the victim's testimony was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 because he could not cross-examine the witness. The court analyzed the records' high probative value regarding the defendant's character and pattern of behavior, especially since the forensic evidence was linked to the defendant via DNA. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, ruling that forensic medical records are admissible to show a pattern of conduct even without live testimony from the victim.

CB Sanders v. The State of Texas

COA07

In Sanders v. State, the Seventh Court of Appeals addressed whether an appeal has merit after a defendant enters a 'plea of true' to violating community supervision. The appellant, who was originally on deferred adjudication for promoting prostitution, admitted to ten violations. The court analyzed the case under the Anders framework, which requires an independent review of the record for nonfrivolous issues. The court held that because a 'plea of true' constitutes sufficient evidence standing alone to support an adjudication of guilt, the appeal was meritless. This ruling confirms that such admissions are legally conclusive, leaving no room for a defendant to challenge the evidentiary basis of the trial court's judgment.

Westyn Gregory Whetstone v. The State of Texas

COA07

In Whetstone v. State, a defendant was convicted of criminal trespass, but the written judgment erroneously labeled the offense as a Class A misdemeanor involving a 'habitation' despite the State having abandoned that specific allegation at trial. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the record under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b), which allows appellate courts to reform judgments to 'speak the truth' when they have the necessary information to do so. The court held that because the jury charge and sentencing only reflected a Class B offense, the written judgment contained a clerical error that must be reformed to reflect the actual adjudication.

IN RE THANH VAN TRAN

COA05

In In re Thanh Van Tran, the Relator sought a writ of mandamus to challenge a capias order issued by the 494th District Court of Collin County. The Dallas Court of Appeals denied the petition on procedural grounds, holding that the Relator failed to satisfy the "predicate-request requirement." Under Texas law, a party seeking the extraordinary remedy of mandamus must generally demonstrate that they first asked the trial court to correct the perceived error—such as by filing a motion to vacate the order—and that the trial court refused. Because the Relator failed to seek relief at the trial level first and did not prove that such a request would have been futile, the Court denied the petition without addressing the underlying merits of the capias order.

In the Interest of S.A., A.A., A.L.A., Children

COA13

The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of parental rights for M.R. and B.J.A. after their three children were found to have suffered severe physical abuse, neglect, and drug exposure. Despite the mother’s technical completion of some service plan requirements, the court found that her failure to secure stable housing, inconsistent visitation, and lack of accountability for the children's injuries—including a fractured tibia and positive drug tests—created a continuing endangering environment. The court held that under the Texas Family Code, the evidence of endangering conduct and environments was clear and convincing, and termination was in the best interest of the children.

IN RE CHARLES DUSTIN MYERS

COA02

In In re Charles Dustin Myers, the Relator challenged an order from the 322nd District Court of Tarrant County by filing a petition for writ of mandamus and an emergency motion to stay the proceedings. The Second Court of Appeals summarily denied both requests, concluding that the Relator failed to meet the stringent two-prong test required for extraordinary relief: demonstrating a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court and proving that no adequate remedy exists through a standard appeal.

In the Interest of K.L., A Child

COA07

In this parental termination case, a mother appealed a court order terminating her rights after she failed to appear at the final hearing, claiming she lacked actual notice of the trial setting. The Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed the termination, ruling that the mother waived her due process challenge by failing to raise the issue in the trial court through a motion for new trial. Furthermore, the court held that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a, notice provided to a party's attorney is legally imputed to the client. The court emphasized that the mother’s specific instructions to her attorney regarding the hearing—given just days prior to the trial—established that she had actual knowledge of the proceeding, thereby satisfying constitutional notice requirements.

In Re Darren L. Reagan

COA05

Darren L. Reagan filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to vacate a trial court's order granting a Rule 91a motion to dismiss. The Dallas Court of Appeals denied the petition without reaching the substantive legal merits because the relator failed to comply with the technical requirements of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, the court analyzed the petition's failure to use the verbatim certification language now required by the renumbered Rule 52.3(k) and the failure to provide a sworn or certified record under Rule 52.7(a). The court held that strict adherence to the "exact words" of the appellate rules is a mandatory prerequisite for the court to exercise its jurisdiction for extraordinary relief.

IN THE ESTATE OF LONNIE K. LEDBETTER JR., DECEASED

COA02

Following the death of Lonnie Ledbetter Jr., his children sued his surviving spouse, alleging she exerted undue influence to divert millions of dollars into a private trust. During evidentiary hearings, the spouse invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when questioned about her identity, and evidence emerged of suspicious, large-scale asset transfers. In response, the trial court took the 'sua sponte' (on its own motion) step of appointing a neutral receiver to manage the trust assets. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 64.001(a)(7) and equitable principles, determining that trial courts possess the inherent authority to protect the subject matter of litigation from dissipation. The court held that because a party’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a civil case allows for a negative inference, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a receiver to preserve the property while the lawsuit was pending.

In Re Germania Farm Mutual Insurance Association

COA13

In an insurance appraisal dispute, a trial court struck a contractually appointed neutral umpire and unilaterally appointed a replacement based on the homeowner's claim of bias. The evidence of bias was solely a prior order from an unrelated case where another judge had set aside one of the umpire's awards. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion, concluding that 'prior bad acts' in unrelated matters do not meet the high evidentiary bar for 'evident partiality.' The court emphasized that specific evidence of bias in the current proceeding is required and that trial courts cannot ignore contractually mandated selection processes when appointing replacements.

In Re Biles

COA14

Sarah Paige Biles sought a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to enter a final judgment based on a 2024 Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) and to vacate temporary orders issued over a year later. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals denied the petition, holding that Biles failed to meet the heavy burden required for mandamus relief. The court concluded she did not demonstrate that the trial court's refusal to sign the decree was a clear abuse of discretion or that she lacked an adequate remedy through the standard appellate process once a final judgment is eventually signed.

Messele Kelel v. Dallas Central Appraisal District

COA05

In Messele Kelel v. Dallas Central Appraisal District, a property owner challenged a $74,250 tax valuation, presenting evidence of lower-priced comparable sales and internal settlement offers from the appraisal district as low as $30,000. The trial court granted a 'no-evidence' summary judgment in favor of the appraisal district, effectively dismissing the owner's claims. The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed this decision, ruling that the owner's evidence—specifically the comparable data and the district's own lower offers—constituted 'more than a scintilla' of evidence. The court held that while this evidence did not prove the property's value as a matter of law, it was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that must be resolved at trial.

Keenan Deandre Black v. The State of Texas

COA02

In Black v. State, the court addressed a conflict where a trial judge orally waived a $6,000 fine during sentencing, yet the final written judgment still included the charge. Additionally, the defendant argued his probation should not be revoked because his supervision officer had allegedly modified his deadlines. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the 'Rendition vs. Entry' doctrine, affirming that a judge's oral pronouncement in open court is the legally operative event that controls over a conflicting written document. Furthermore, the court held that community supervision is a judicial order, not a private contract, meaning only a judge—not a probation officer—has the authority to modify its terms. The court modified the judgment to delete the fine but upheld the probation revocation.

Westyn Gregory Whetstone v. The State of Texas

COA07

In Whetstone v. State, a defendant was convicted of Class B misdemeanor criminal trespass, but the trial court's written judgment incorrectly recorded the offense as a more serious Class A misdemeanor involving a habitation. On appeal, the Seventh Court of Appeals performed an independent review of the record and found that the State had explicitly abandoned the higher charge before the jury was instructed. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b), the court analyzed the discrepancy as a clerical error and held that it had a mandatory duty to reform the judgment to 'make the record speak the truth.' The court modified the judgment to reflect the correct statute and offense degree, ensuring the defendant's criminal history accurately reflected the actual adjudication.

YOLANDA HERNANDEZ, Appellant v. EKISRA FRED LOUNNARATH AND AMX PCS, INC., Appellee

COA05

When a party fails to appear for trial, leading to a dismissal for want of prosecution, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a(3) requires the court to reinstate the case if the failure was due to an 'accident or mistake' rather than 'conscious indifference.' In this case, a law firm missed a trial setting because of a clerical calendaring error and a mistaken belief that a proposed scheduling order would be signed. The trial court denied reinstatement, finding the attorney's reliance on unsigned orders unreasonable. The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that even if an attorney’s mistake is negligent or 'objectively unreasonable,' it does not constitute conscious indifference. As long as the failure to appear was not intentional or a purposeful disregard of the court's authority, the trial court must reinstate the case.

EX PARTE BESSIE TEKILA MARTIN

COA02

After Bessie Tekila Martin's deferred adjudication in Tarrant County was adjudicated, she faced new charges in Parker County for the same conduct. She filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Parker County prosecution was barred by double jeopardy because those offenses had been 'taken into account' during her Tarrant County sentencing under Texas Penal Code Section 12.45. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the 'paper trail' and found significant record gaps, including missing motions and inconsistent cause numbers. Consequently, the court held that it could not determine which specific offenses were actually admitted and considered, remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual dispute.

EarnhartBuilt, LLC v. Preferred Materials, LLC, Procore Technologies, Inc., Express Lien, Inc. d/b/a Levelset, Michael Mann, and J. Earnhart, Inc.

COA05

In EarnhartBuilt, LLC v. Preferred Materials, LLC, a materials supplier filed a lien to collect $17,000 for concrete delivered to a construction project. The property owner sued, claiming the lien was "fraudulent" under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 12.002 because it was filed after the statutory deadline. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the "knowledge" and "intent" requirements of the statute, distinguishing between a lien that is merely legally invalid and one that is fraudulent. The court held that because the underlying debt for the materials was legitimate, the supplier did not have the requisite "actual knowledge" of fraudulence at the time of filing, even if the lien was procedurally defective. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the supplier.

EX PARTE BESSIE TEKILA MARTIN

COA02

In Ex parte Martin, the Second Court of Appeals addressed a double jeopardy challenge where a defendant claimed that out-of-county offenses were barred from prosecution because they had been 'taken into account' during a prior sentencing in another county under Texas Penal Code Section 12.45. While the court acknowledged that a valid Section 12.45 agreement bars subsequent prosecution for the admitted conduct, it found the record in this case insufficient to verify which specific offenses were included in the prior plea. Consequently, the court held that a defendant must provide a complete factual record—including the specific list of unadjudicated offenses—to sustain such a claim and remanded the case for further evidentiary development.

Mangawe v. The State of Texas

COA02

Bengamiah Mangawe appealed a conviction for continuous sexual abuse, arguing that vague testimony regarding dates (like 'November-ish') failed to meet the 30-day statutory duration requirement. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the evidence under a deferential standard, noting that a detective's testimony about Mangawe’s non-verbal 'nod' or confirmation of the timeline during an interview was substantive evidence. The court held that the jury is the sole arbiter of credibility and can resolve chronological conflicts in favor of the verdict, even when dates are approximate or admissions are not captured on audio.

In Re Aaron Nicholas Thomas

COA09

The Relator sought a writ of mandamus to vacate a default judgment in a suit to modify the parent-child relationship (SAPCR), claiming the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request to participate via Zoom as a disability accommodation and by entering judgment without proper service. The Ninth Court of Appeals denied the petition, finding that the Relator’s own medical evidence—which stated he could sit and work for eight hours—contradicted his claim that he could not attend court in person. Furthermore, the court determined that the Relator had made a general appearance, which waived any defects in service under Rule 124, and that a standard appeal provided an adequate legal remedy to challenge the final judgment.

IN RE ADNAN UMAIR JANJUA AND UZMA JANJUA, Relators

COA05

The Fifth Court of Appeals dismissed a petition for a writ of mandamus filed against a county clerk who allegedly refused to file specific documents. The court analyzed its jurisdiction under Texas Government Code § 22.221, noting that while it has the power to issue writs against judges, its authority over non-judicial officers like clerks is strictly limited to instances where the writ is necessary to protect the court's own appellate jurisdiction. Because the relators did not demonstrate that the clerk's refusal interfered with a pending appeal, the court held it lacked jurisdiction to intervene.

Gannon v. The State of Texas

COA02

After Dayton Joseph Gannon was convicted of aggravated robbery for brandishing a knife and aggressively posturing toward a victim through a laundromat's glass door, he appealed, arguing that the threat of injury was not 'imminent' because the victim was armed and separated from him by a physical barrier. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory meaning of 'imminent'—defined as 'near, at hand, or on the verge of happening'—and determined that a threat is judged by the aggressor's volatility and conduct rather than the victim's defensive capabilities. The court held that the display of a deadly weapon combined with combative posturing is sufficient to establish an imminent threat, regardless of whether the victim has a weapon or is behind glass.

Keenan DeAndre Black v. The State of Texas

COA02

In this case, a trial court orally waived a $6,000 statutory fine for a defendant found to be indigent, yet the subsequent written judgment erroneously included the fine. On appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed the conflict between the judge's verbal ruling and the written record. The court analyzed the 'bench controls the pen' doctrine, which dictates that an oral pronouncement made in open court is the legally binding judgment, while the written order is merely a record of that act. Finding a clear conflict, the court held that the oral waiver must prevail and modified the written judgment to delete the $6,000 fine.

Bravo v. Bravo

COA02

In Bravo v. Bravo, a Husband challenged a final divorce decree that appointed the Wife as sole managing conservator, denied him all access to his children, and ordered child support. He argued he received only four days' notice of the trial and that the evidence was insufficient to support the findings. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245 and the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that because the Husband's attorney appeared and announced 'ready' at trial, any objection to the 45-day notice requirement was waived. Furthermore, because the Husband failed to provide a reporter’s record (the transcript of the trial), the court applied an irrebuttable presumption that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the judge's rulings. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decree in its entirety.

COA10

In this juvenile delinquency proceeding, S.W. appealed an order committing her to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department. Her court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief asserting the appeal was frivolous and a motion to withdraw. The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code § 51.101(a), which requires counsel appointed at the initial detention stage to represent the child 'until the case is terminated.' Drawing a parallel to the Texas Supreme Court’s 'continuing duty' doctrine in parental rights termination cases (In re P.M.), the court interpreted 'termination' to mean the exhaustion of all appeals through the Texas Supreme Court. Consequently, while the court affirmed the commitment order, it denied the attorney's motion to withdraw.

Kist v. Kist

COA14

Kathryn Kist sought to lift a geographic residency restriction to relocate her four children from Texas to Indiana, presenting evidence of a $70,000 job offer, free housing from her parents, and access to private schooling. She argued that the father, Jonathan, was largely uninvolved and that staying in Texas was a financial hardship. Jonathan contested the move, presenting evidence of his involvement and the children's stability in their current environment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict using the Lenz factors and Texas public policy favoring 'frequent and continuing contact' with both parents. The court held that because the trial court faced conflicting testimony regarding the father’s involvement and the children's best interests, it did not abuse its discretion in maintaining the residency restriction or in characterizing Jonathan's post-petition home purchase as his separate property.

C. Q. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

COA03

The Department of Family and Protective Services sought to terminate a mother’s parental rights following allegations of drug use and child neglect. While the mother demonstrated significant recent progress, including stable housing and numerous negative urinalyses, she continued to test positive for cocaine in hair follicle tests. Additionally, her live-in fiancé refused to submit to drug testing. The Court of Appeals analyzed the conflicting forensic evidence and the mother's choice of partners under the "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard. The court held that the trial court was entitled to credit the hair follicle results over other tests and that the presence of an untested partner constituted endangering conduct. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the termination of her parental rights.

In re Steven Broomfield and Lisa Broomfield

COA06

Relators sought a writ of mandamus to compel a Panola County court to grant a mandatory transfer of a SAPCR proceeding to Smith County, where an adoption was pending, pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 155.201(a-1). The child's mother had filed a controverting affidavit, and the trial court had scheduled a hearing on the matter. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory framework, noting that while Section 155.201(a-1) is mandatory, Section 155.204(e) requires a hearing when a transfer is contested. The court held that mandamus relief was inappropriate because the Relators failed to show that the trial court had refused to rule or that an unreasonable amount of time had passed, especially since a hearing was already on the docket.

Caldwell v. Quaid

COA14

In a divorce proceeding involving complex property characterization, the Husband designated an expert for tracing and valuation but failed to provide the actual tracing reports until six days before trial. The trial court excluded the late-disclosed tracing testimony while permitting testimony on the timely-disclosed valuation. On appeal, the Husband argued the exclusion constituted an improper 'death-penalty' sanction. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, clarifying that the exclusion was a mandatory application of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6. The court held that because the ruling did not preclude the Husband's entire defense or claim, it did not rise to the level of a death-penalty sanction and was a proper exercise of discretion due to the lack of good cause or showing of non-prejudice.

In re E.L.S.

COA12

A juvenile, E.L.S., appealed a trial court order transferring him from the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to complete a thirty-year murder sentence. Appointed counsel filed an Anders brief asserting the appeal was frivolous and moved to withdraw. The Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed the transfer, citing the juvenile's extensive behavioral incidents and psychological evaluations. However, the court denied the motion to withdraw, holding that under Texas Family Code § 56.01 and the doctrine established in In re P.M., the statutory right to counsel in juvenile proceedings extends through the filing of a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court.

In re Rigolli

COA03

Jason Rigolli filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus after being confined for contempt. While the appellate court considered the petition and Rigolli was out on a personal bond, the trial court issued an amended contempt order with new purge conditions and a future deadline. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether a live controversy still existed and concluded the case was moot. The court held that because the original orders were superseded by the amended order and the relator was no longer confined under the challenged instruments, the appellate court could grant no effective relief.

In the matter of J.C., a juvenile

COA04

A juvenile, J.C., appealed his adjudication for aggravated robbery and assault, arguing that the appellate court should apply a 'factual sufficiency' standard of review to his case—a standard used in certain civil matters that allows the court to weigh evidence. The Fourth Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reaffirming that juvenile delinquency proceedings are 'quasi-criminal' and subject only to the strict 'legal sufficiency' standard used in adult criminal cases. The court held that as long as any rational jury could have found the defendant guilty based on the evidence viewed in favor of the verdict (such as the victim's identification and fingerprint evidence found in this case), the adjudication must be upheld.

IN RE Camoray ESCOBAR

COA04

In a Bexar County child protection proceeding (SAPCR), the Relator, Camoray Escobar, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to vacate an interlocutory order. The Fourth Court of Appeals denied the petition, concluding that the Relator failed to meet the rigorous two-prong burden required for extraordinary relief: demonstrating that the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion and that the Relator had no adequate remedy through a standard appeal. The court's summary denial emphasizes the high level of deference given to trial judges in family law matters.

In the Interest of M.O.S., a Child

COA04

This case centered on whether an oral statement by a trial judge at the end of a modification hearing constituted a final "rendition" of judgment. In a protracted custody battle, the trial court announced it would keep existing orders but scheduled a status conference for three months later to see if further changes were necessary. Ten months later, the mother attempted to introduce evidence of events that occurred during that delay, arguing the court's refusal to hear this "gap" evidence violated her due process. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code § 101.026 and recent Supreme Court precedent, concluding that because the trial judge's oral remarks expressed a lack of finality and contemplated future modifications, no rendition occurred until the written order was signed. Consequently, the trial court acted within its discretion in finalizing the order based on the original trial record.

Joey Hernandez v. Dulce Estrella Casas

COA04

In Hernandez v. Casas, a father attempted to use a direct appeal to challenge both a trial court's order revoking his suspended jail sentence and the accuracy of the underlying child support debt. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed the jurisdictional limits of enforcement orders, distinguishing between punitive measures (contempt) and remedial measures (money judgments). The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the contempt finding or the revocation order through a direct appeal, as those must be challenged via extraordinary writs like habeas corpus or mandamus. Additionally, the court ruled that while the money judgment for child support arrears was appealable, the deadline to file was triggered by the original 2023 enforcement order, making the father's 2025 appeal more than two years too late.

IN RE Sydney E. FENNO

COA04

In a Bexar County divorce and Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR) case, Sydney Fenno sought a writ of mandamus to overturn trial court orders. While she initially secured a temporary stay, the Fourth Court of Appeals ultimately denied her petition. The court analyzed the case under the 'heavy burden' rule for mandamus relief, which requires proving both a clear abuse of discretion and the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal. The court found that Fenno failed to provide a sufficient record or evidence to meet this high standard, and noted that her attempt to introduce new legal arguments via a supplemental petition was procedurally insufficient to save the original request.

In Re David L. Sheller and Sheller Law Firm, PLLC

COA01

In an original mandamus proceeding, defendants David L. Sheller and Sheller Law Firm sought to force the Harris County trial court to vacate interlocutory orders (1) denying their traditional motion for summary judgment seeking a take-nothing judgment and dismissal with prejudice, and (2) overruling their special exceptions. The First Court of Appeals applied the two-part mandamus standard—clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal—and emphasized the long-standing rule that denial of a traditional summary judgment motion is an interlocutory ruling ordinarily reviewable only after a final judgment. The court likewise treated the overruling of special exceptions as an incidental trial-court ruling correctable, if at all, on appeal. Because relators did not show circumstances taking the case outside the general rule (i.e., they had an adequate remedy by appeal after trial), the court denied mandamus relief and dismissed pending motions as moot.

Angela Bass v. Mercedes Benz Financial Services USA LLC

COA01

Mercedes Benz Financial Services obtained a writ of sequestration against Angela Bass, effectively seizing or “freezing” specific personal property while the underlying case remained pending. Bass attempted to take an immediate (interlocutory) appeal from the trial court’s order granting the writ. The First Court of Appeals analyzed its own jurisdiction and reiterated that Texas appellate courts generally may review only final judgments unless the Legislature has expressly authorized an interlocutory appeal. Looking to Chapter 62 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (sequestration) and the interlocutory-appeal statute, the court concluded that an order granting a writ of sequestration is an interlocutory preservation remedy and is not among the categories made appealable by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014. While the appeal was pending, the trial court voided the sequestration order; the court further held that this eliminated any live controversy and rendered the appeal moot. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

William Delawrence Lewis v. The State of Texas

COA01

In Lewis, the First Court of Appeals considered whether evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for failure to stop and render aid when the defendant claimed he never collided with the crashed vehicle. Witnesses and reconstruction evidence showed Lewis drove a high-performance car at extreme speeds while “pacing” another car in apparent competitive driving for more than a mile; the other car then lost control, crashed, and caused a death and serious injury, and Lewis did not stop. Applying Tex. Transp. Code §§ 550.021 and 550.023 and precedent holding that “involved” is broader than “collision,” the court focused on whether Lewis’s conduct contributed to the accident. The court held that even without definitive proof of physical contact, a rational jury could find Lewis was “involved” because his high-speed, side-by-side driving was a contributing factor in the sequence of events, and credibility conflicts about contact were for the jury. The conviction was affirmed.

Bustamante v. Bustamante

COA01

In Bustamante v. Bustamante, the First Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court's order granting a bill of review—which vacated a prior 2023 judgment without resolving the underlying merits—could be immediately appealed. The court analyzed Texas jurisdictional principles, noting that appellate review is generally limited to final judgments unless a statute specifically authorizes an interlocutory appeal. Because the order only 're-opened' the litigation and did not fall under the authorized list of interlocutory appeals in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

Tavarius Williams v. Walden on Lake Houston Community Services Association, Inc.

COA01

After a default judgment was signed, the appellant filed a notice of appeal outside the normal deadlines and then tried to invoke Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a to restart appellate timetables based on late notice. The First Court of Appeals analyzed TRCP 306a(4)–(5) and TRAP 4.2, emphasizing that the “late notice” timetable change is not automatic: it requires a sworn Rule 306a(5) motion filed while the trial court still has plenary power, which is measured from the movant’s date of first notice/actual knowledge. Because the appellant’s own asserted knowledge date started a new 30-day plenary window that expired before he filed his sworn 306a(5) motion, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant Rule 306a relief and the appellate deadlines remained tied to the original signing date. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Leslie Parrish v. The State of Texas

COA14

In Parrish v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether a seven-year delay in executing an arrest warrant barred the revocation of community supervision. The appellant asserted a "due diligence" defense; however, the court held that this statutory defense is strictly limited to violations for failure to report or failure to remain in a specified location. Because the State proved a separate violation—failure to provide written employment verification—the court affirmed the revocation, noting that a single proven violation is sufficient. Additionally, the court modified the judgment to remove a fine that was included in the written order but never orally pronounced by the judge, confirming that the oral pronouncement controls in the event of a conflict.

Venisha Arnold v. Google LLC, YouTube LLC, Alphabet, Inc, Reddit, Inc, Felixlightner-Reddit Thread Starter, Rechlin-Reddit Admin, Boshau-Reddit Admin, Munx1er-Reddit Admin, Swhitt-Reddit Admin, and Texlex-Reddit Admin.

COA01

In Arnold, the appellant attempted to immediately appeal an order granting one defendant’s Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) motion to dismiss. The trial court’s order dismissed only Reddit, left other defendants in the case, and expressly reserved the mandatory award of attorney’s fees/costs and potential sanctions for later determination—making the order interlocutory rather than final. The First Court of Appeals analyzed its jurisdiction under the final-judgment rule and the limited statutory authorizations for interlocutory appeals, focusing on Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(12), which allows an interlocutory appeal only from an order that denies a TCPA motion to dismiss. Because the Legislature did not authorize an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a TCPA motion, and the order was not otherwise final, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

Lalita R. Morey v. Oaks of Devonshire Homeowners Association, Inc.

COA01

After a July 14, 2025 final judgment, the appellant filed a notice of appeal on September 23, 2025—outside the 30-day deadline in TRAP 26.1 and also outside the 15-day grace period in TRAP 26.3—and filed no post-judgment motions that would have extended the timetable to 90 days. The First Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction over a standard appeal because an untimely notice of appeal does not invoke appellate jurisdiction under TRAP 25.1(c). The appellant then asked the court to treat the late notice as a restricted appeal, but the court refused because a restricted appeal has its own jurisdictional prerequisites and the notice must strictly include the statements required by TRAP 25.1(d)(7) (including non-participation in the hearing and no timely post-judgment filings). Because the notice did not contain those mandatory declarations, the court could not construe it as a restricted appeal and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Cove Funding, LP and its Subsidiary HPS Admin, LLC v. Marcy Barba and Jorge Barba

COA03

In a post-judgment enforcement proceeding, a third-party lender intervened in a receivership, asserting a priority security interest and requesting the turnover of assets. The trial court denied the turnover motion but did not issue specific findings regarding the validity of the lender's lien. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether the order met the 'discrete issue' finality standard for receiverships or qualified as a mandatory injunction. The court held that because the order was a simple denial that did not conclusively adjudicate the underlying ownership rights or substantial interests of the third party, it was an interlocutory order over which the appellate court lacked jurisdiction.

Brown v. The State of Texas

COA01

In Brown v. State, police returned to an apartment for a second search after an initial search warrant had expired. Rather than seek a new warrant, officers relied on consent from the apartment manager and the victim’s family (who were clearing out the unit) and on the defendant’s own statement during an interview that he did not live there and had not lived there for 18 months. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the suppression issue under Fourth Amendment standing principles, applying Texas’s abandonment doctrine (disclaimer of a possessory/privacy interest defeats a reasonable expectation of privacy) and the apparent-authority consent doctrine (a warrantless search is valid if officers reasonably believe the consenting third party has authority). Under the totality of circumstances—primary tenant deceased, unit being vacated by the family, manager’s consent, and Brown’s explicit disavowal of residency—the court held Brown lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore lacked standing to challenge the search; the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. The court also rejected claims of judicial bias, charge error, and ineffective assistance, and affirmed the murder conviction.

Cirilo Gomez-Lagunas v. The State of Texas

COA01

In Gomez-Lagunas v. State, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief in a murder appeal, asserting the record presented no non-frivolous issues. The First Court of Appeals performed its required independent review of the entire record under Anders and Texas Anders cases (including High and Bledsoe), found no arguable grounds for reversal and no reversible error, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the 35-year sentence. For family-law purposes, the opinion underscores that an Anders affirmance reflects both counsel’s and the appellate court’s conclusion that there is no viable appellate challenge, strengthening arguments that the conviction is final and reliable for later Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(L) and (Q) termination predicates.

Guo v. Guo

COA14

In a family law matter originating from Fort Bend County, Estella Guo appealed a trial court order but subsequently filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the request under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1, which permits dismissal upon an appellant's motion provided it does not prejudice another party's pending claim for relief. Finding no legal impediments or cross-appeals, the court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, allowing the trial court's judgment to stand as the final resolution.

Mooneyham v. Knapp

COA14

After the death of George Knapp, Terry Mooneyham sought to establish that the two had shared an informal (common-law) marriage for seventeen years. Knapp’s estate argued there was no evidence of a specific agreement to be married and successfully moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, analyzing Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2) and holding that a claimant’s own affidavit asserting a direct agreement to be married constitutes sufficient evidence to survive a pretrial dismissal. The court clarified that whether such testimony is 'self-serving' is a matter of credibility for a jury to decide at trial, rather than a reason for a judge to throw out the case early.

Bonilla v. Texas

COA14

In Bonilla v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed discrepancies between an oral sentencing and a written criminal judgment involving charges of aggravated kidnapping and sexual assault. The appellant’s written judgment included a $100 fine not pronounced in court and failed to note the submission of a victim impact statement. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b), the court analyzed the record and held that oral pronouncements control over written orders. The court modified the judgment to delete the unauthorized fine and reform the record to accurately reflect the statutory citations and the victim's participation, ensuring the record "speaks the truth."

Galvez v. Kroger Texas L.P.

COA14

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal after the appellant failed to make financial arrangements for the clerk's record. Despite the court issuing a notice of intent to dismiss and a subsequent formal order requiring proof of payment, the appellant remained unresponsive. The court analyzed the case under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 37.3(b) and 35.3(c), which place the burden of securing the record on the appellant. Because the appellant failed to fulfill this financial duty and ignored court mandates, the court held that dismissal for want of prosecution was necessary.

MAHMOUD ABDELWAHED v. NERMIN HASSANIN

COA14

In a divorce dispute between Mahmoud Abdelwahed and Nermin Hassanin, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed the enforceability of an Egyptian pre-marital agreement regarding a dowry of 147 grams of gold. While the husband argued he did not possess the gold and it effectively did not exist, the wife provided a translated copy of their Egyptian marriage contract. The court analyzed the case under Texas Family Code § 4.006, which places a heavy burden on the party challenging a pre-marital agreement to prove it was signed involuntarily or was unconscionable. Because the husband failed to provide evidence rebutting the contract's validity, the court affirmed the trial court's decree ordering the husband to return the gold, holding that Texas public policy strongly favors the enforcement of such international agreements.

Rodrigues v. Office of the Attorney General of Texas

COA14

In Rodrigues v. Office of the Attorney General, a father attempted to discharge over $500,000 in child support arrears by claiming the state failed to respond to his private correspondence. He further challenged the authority of the Assistant Attorney General to represent the state in court. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the suit, finding that the Office of the Attorney General has clear statutory authority under the Texas Family Code to participate in child support actions. The court also clarified that procedural defects, such as a lack of formal service, do not warrant a reversal if the complaining party actually attends the hearing and participates in the legal process.

Sherie A. McArthur, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF CLARENCE MAURICE LOGAN, JR., Appellant V. CONCORD HOUSTON JFK BLVD HOTEL II LLC, A TEXAS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; CONCORD HOSPITALITY ENTERPRISES COMPANY, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; AND DOES 1-20, Appellees

COA14

In McArthur v. Concord Houston JFK Blvd Hotel II LLC, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed an appellant's failure to prosecute their appeal. After the clerk's record was filed, the appellant failed to file a brief or a motion for extension for several months. The court issued a formal 10-day warning under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(b), often called a 'death notice,' requiring a response to avoid dismissal. When the appellant ignored the notice, the court analyzed the procedural failure under Rule 42.3 and held that dismissal for want of prosecution was necessary. The court concluded that ignoring mandatory briefing deadlines and subsequent show-cause orders effectively abandons the appeal, leaving the panel no choice but to dismiss without reaching the merits.

Mitchell Carter v. Administrator of the Estate of James M. Shumberg, Creg Thompson, Jon Papillon, Ryan Michael Shumberg, and InTown Builders, LLC

COA14

Mitchell Carter sought to establish ownership of four real estate lots in Harris County through claims of adverse possession and his status as a bona fide purchaser. Following a bench trial, the court entered a take-nothing judgment against Carter and quieted title in favor of the defendants. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals found that Carter waived his right to findings of fact and conclusions of law by failing to file a mandatory 'Notice of Past Due Findings' under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 297. Consequently, the court applied the 'implied findings' doctrine, assuming the trial court found all facts necessary to support the judgment. The court affirmed the take-nothing judgment, noting Carter's grantor lacked title to convey and Carter's occupancy was insufficient for adverse possession, though it modified the judgment to strike redundant declaratory relief that duplicated the quiet title action.

Tumey v. Crawford

COA14

In Tumey v. Crawford, the appellant attempted to appeal a trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). However, the appellee’s request for mandatory attorney’s fees remained unresolved in the trial court. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(12), which specifically authorizes interlocutory appeals only when a TCPA motion is denied, not when it is granted. Following the principle that judgments are not final until all claims—including attorney's fees—are resolved, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal and dismissed the case.

National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company v. Payne & Keller Company, By and Through Its Duly-Appointed Receiver, Peter D. Protopapas

COA14

In this case, a receiver attempted to domesticate a South Carolina order in Texas under Chapter 35 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code (the Texas version of the UEFJA). Third-party insurers intervened and filed motions to vacate, then attempted to appeal the filing as a final judgment. The Court of Appeals analyzed whether domesticating a non-final foreign order "upgrades" its status to a final Texas judgment. The court held that because the underlying South Carolina order was interlocutory on its face, its domestication in Texas resulted only in an interlocutory order, not a final appealable judgment. Consequently, because the trial court had not ruled on the motions to vacate and no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal for such a filing, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

In the Interest of J.C.D.Y. a/k/a J.Y., J.E.D.Y. a/k/a J.Y., M.M.D.Y. a/k/a M.Y., J.T.D.Y., a/k/a J.Y., Children

COA01

The First Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s decision to terminate a mother’s parental rights following nearly a decade of chronic neglect and substance abuse. The case centered on whether "abject squalor"—including rodent infestations, lack of utilities, and malnutrition—combined with a history of marijuana use, met the high legal standard for termination. The court analyzed the evidence under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (P), focusing on the "cumulative effect" of the mother's conduct rather than isolated incidents. The court held that the persistent pattern of endangering living conditions and the prioritization of drug use over basic needs provided clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children's best interest.

IN RE LARAB SHIZA BUTT, Relator

COA05

In a child possession dispute involving a writ of attachment, the relator sought a writ of mandamus to vacate temporary orders issued by a Dallas County associate judge. The Fifth Court of Appeals denied the petition based on procedural failures, specifically the relator's failure to provide a complete and sworn record as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.7. The court held that without a sufficient record, it is impossible to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, effectively insulating the lower court's decision from review.

In Re Krystal D. Hunter

COA14

Krystal Hunter filed a petition for writ of mandamus asking the Fourteenth Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to pause (abate) a third-party intervenor's claims in her family law case. The appellate court denied the petition, concluding that Hunter failed to meet the high burden required for extraordinary relief. The court analyzed the trial court's decision under a two-part test, determining that managing the timing of an intervention is a discretionary function of the trial court and that Hunter failed to show the court was legally required to stop the proceedings. Furthermore, the court held that any potential errors could be addressed through the standard appeal process after a final judgment, meaning Hunter did not lack an adequate remedy at law.

In Re Darrell J. Harper

COA14

After being declared a vexatious litigant, Darrell J. Harper was required to obtain permission from a local administrative judge before filing any new lawsuits. When the judge denied his request to initiate a new case, Harper sought a writ of mandamus from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals to overturn that decision. The appellate court analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 11, which designates administrative judges as "gatekeepers" to prevent meritless or harassing litigation. The court held that Harper failed to prove the judge abused their discretion, reinforcing the high barrier for vexatious litigants to bypass prefiling orders.

Chelsea Watson v. CHC Harris, LLC

COA14

In Watson v. CHC Harris, LLC, an appellant failed to file a merits brief after the appellate record was finalized. Despite the court issuing a formal notice warning of an impending dismissal and providing a ten-day grace period, the appellant failed to respond or request an extension. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 42.3(b) and 38.8(a)(1), concluding that the appellant’s failure to comply with procedural deadlines and court notices constituted a want of prosecution. Consequently, the court held that the appeal must be dismissed, emphasizing that appellate deadlines are mandatory and silence in the face of a court inquiry justifies immediate dismissal.

Bictor Guzman v. The State of Texas

COA14

In Guzman v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed the requirements for admitting jailhouse call recordings into evidence. The defendant challenged the authentication of calls linked to his 'System Person Number' (SPN), arguing the State hadn't proven he was the speaker. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Evidence 901, determining that authentication is a 'low hurdle' satisfied by a combination of voice identification from a witness familiar with the speaker and technical data from a records custodian. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recordings, as the proponent only needs to produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to find the evidence is genuine, rather than ruling out every other possibility of identity theft or PIN sharing.

Shelton v. Flores

COA14

In Shelton v. Flores, a government employee (Shelton) attempted to dismiss claims against himself by filing a Rule 91a motion under the Texas Tort Claims Act's (TTCA) election-of-remedies provision after both he and his employer, the City of Houston, were sued. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 101.106(e), which states that an employee shall be dismissed 'on the motion of the governmental unit.' The court held that because the City did not join or file the motion to dismiss Shelton, the statutory condition precedent was not met. The court concluded that individual employees lack standing to 'self-dismiss' under this provision without the employer’s active participation.

Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Susana Lopez

COA08

In Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Susana Lopez, a state employee sued for retaliation, alleging she was fired for filing internal complaints and requesting FMLA leave. The HHSC argued she was terminated for chronic training delinquency and unauthorized cell phone use. Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether Lopez's firing was a 'pretext' for retaliation. The court found that because Lopez admitted to the policy violations and failed to provide evidence of 'similarly situated' employees being treated differently, she could not overcome the agency's legitimate reasons. The court held that the agency retained its sovereign immunity and dismissed the case, emphasizing that subjective belief and timing are not enough to prove a retaliatory motive.

In Re Alejandra Suarez Jaramillo

COA13

In this mandamus proceeding, Alejandra Suarez Jaramillo challenged a trial court's scheduling order that set a discovery supplementation deadline five weeks before the order was even signed. Jaramillo argued that this retroactive and "impossible" deadline effectively barred her from presenting a defense. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the claim under established mandamus standards, which require both a clear abuse of discretion and the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal. The court held that while the retroactive deadline was procedurally unusual, the relator failed to provide a record showing that her defense was 'severely compromised.' Specifically, because she did not identify which vital witnesses or documents were excluded or how they went to the 'very heart' of the litigation, she failed to demonstrate that the error could not be corrected through a normal appeal.

E-VOLVE ENERGY HOLDINGS, LLC v. MP2 ENERGY, LLC

COA05

In a dispute sent to AAA arbitration, E‑Volve sought to vacate/modify an award confirmed by the Collin County trial court, arguing the arbitrator exceeded her authority and made erroneous offset/damages determinations. The Dallas Court of Appeals first held the confirmation order was a final, appealable judgment because it contained clear, unequivocal Lehmann finality language (“disposes of all claims and all parties and is final and appealable”), even if the order lacked detailed recovery terms. On the merits, applying the FAA/TAA’s narrow vacatur/modification standards, the court held the party challenging an award bears the burden to provide a complete, authenticated arbitration record. Because no transcript of the final arbitration hearing existed (and appellant provided only unauthenticated materials), the appellate court was required to presume the missing evidence supported the award, making review of the alleged errors impossible. The court affirmed confirmation of the arbitration award.