What is the litigation takeaway from May v. State?

The 'I was just trying to leave' defense is insufficient to defeat a claim of assault or family violence if the actor is aware that their departure puts another person in the 'danger zone' of a vehicle. In family law disputes, evidence that a party accelerated or maneuvered a car while a spouse or child was near the doors or path of travel establishes the 'knowing' mental state required for a Family Violence Protective Order, even if the party’s stated goal was merely to de-escalate by driving away.

What is the summary of May v. State?

In May v. State, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault after accelerating his vehicle while police officers were partially inside the car attempting an arrest, causing them to be thrown to the ground. The defendant argued he lacked the requisite intent because his primary goal was to flee, not to threaten the officers. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the 'knowing' mental state under the Texas Penal Code, characterizing assault by threat as a 'conduct-oriented' offense. The court held that because the defendant chose to maneuver the vehicle while aware of the officers' immediate physical proximity to the car’s path, a rational juror could infer he acted with the necessary intent, regardless of his ultimate desire to escape.

What are the essential elements of aggravated assault on a public servant by threat under the Texas Penal Code?

Under Texas Penal Code §§ 22.01(a)(2) and 22.02, a person commits the first-degree felony of aggravated assault on a public servant by threat if they intentionally or knowingly threaten another with imminent bodily injury while using or exhibiting a deadly weapon. The State must also prove the actor knew the victim was a public servant lawfully discharging an official duty at the time of the offense.

Is assault by threat of imminent bodily injury considered a conduct-oriented or result-oriented offense in Texas?

Assault by threat of imminent bodily injury is classified as a conduct-oriented offense. This means the required culpable mental state (mens rea) focuses on the nature of the act of making a threat, regardless of any specific result or injury the threat might actually cause. This is distinct from "bodily injury" assault, which is a result-of-conduct theory.

Can a person be convicted of assault by threat if they did not make a verbal statement?

Under Texas law, a threat does not need to be verbal to support an assault conviction. A person may communicate a threat through their actions or conduct, such as revving a vehicle's engine or maneuvering a car in a way that puts others in fear of imminent bodily injury.

How do Texas courts define the "knowing" mental state for a conduct-oriented offense under Penal Code Section 6.03?

According to Texas Penal Code § 6.03(b), a person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of their conduct when they are aware of the nature of that conduct. In a conduct-oriented offense like assault by threat, the State must prove the defendant was aware that their actions were threatening in nature.

Is conduct intended to evade arrest legally distinct from conduct intended to threaten an officer with a motor vehicle?

No, these behaviors are not mutually exclusive. A defendant can simultaneously intend to evade arrest and intentionally or knowingly threaten an officer with a vehicle. Evidence of a struggle to put a car in gear while officers are in the path of the vehicle or falling nearby can support convictions for both offenses.

What evidence is sufficient for a jury to infer a defendant "knowingly" threatened an officer while using a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon?

A jury may infer that a defendant knowingly threatened an officer if the evidence shows the defendant maneuvered a vehicle while aware that an officer was standing in an open door, under the carriage, or in close proximity to the wheels. Jurors are permitted to use common sense and apply common knowledge to infer the defendant's awareness of the danger their driving posed to the officers.

Under what circumstances is a motor vehicle considered a deadly weapon in a Texas aggravated assault case?

A motor vehicle is frequently classified as a deadly weapon in Texas assault cases if the manner of its use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. This typically occurs when a defendant revs an engine, shifts into gear, or drives toward individuals in close proximity, creating a threat of imminent bodily harm.

May v. State | Texas Family Law Powerhouse

May v. State, 01-24-00406-CR, February 24, 2026.

On appeal from the 21st District Court of Washington County

Synopsis

The First Court of Appeals affirmed a defendant's convictions for aggravated assault against a public servant, holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish an intentional or knowing mental state. The court determined that a rational juror could infer the requisite mens rea from the defendant's decision to accelerate and maneuver a vehicle while aware that victims were in immediate physical proximity to the car’s path, even if his primary objective was to flee the scene.

Relevance to Family Law

For family law practitioners, particularly those litigating Family Violence Protective Orders (FVPOs) or seeking "fault" findings in a divorce, this criminal holding is a strategic asset. Respondents frequently defend against allegations of vehicular threats by claiming they were "just trying to leave the situation" to de-escalate. May v. State clarifies that the intent to evade or depart does not negate the "knowing" nature of the threat. If a party maneuvers a vehicle while aware that a spouse or child is in close proximity—such as standing by the door, behind the bumper, or attempting to prevent the car from leaving—the act of accelerating constitutes a "knowing" threat of imminent bodily injury. This case provides the appellate hook needed to defeat the "accidental flight" defense in domestic disputes.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The case arose from a traffic stop that escalated into a physical confrontation. After Officer Armando Guerra discovered marijuana and suspected the defendant, Trayvon Tyrone May, was driving a stolen vehicle, he attempted to effectuate an arrest. May resisted, slipped out of one handcuff, and dove into the driver's seat of his Dodge Durango. A violent struggle ensued: Officer Guerra leaned his upper body into the open driver’s door to wrestle with May, while a second officer, Corporal Andrea Guerra, attempted to pull May from the vehicle. Throughout the struggle, May revved the engine and repeatedly attempted to shift the vehicle into gear.

On the third attempt, May successfully shifted the vehicle into motion. As the Durango jerked forward and backward, both officers were thrown to the ground. Officer Guerra narrowly avoided being crushed by the undercarriage, while Corporal Guerra was disoriented and believed she was about to be run over. May successfully navigated the vehicle around a bystander's truck and fled the scene. At trial, the defense argued that May lacked the intent to threaten the officers, asserting his sole focus was avoiding a civilian who had blocked his exit.

Issues Decided

The central issue was whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the defendant acted with an intentional or knowing mental state—specifically, whether he intended to threaten the officers with imminent bodily injury or was aware that his conduct was reasonably certain to do so.

Rules Applied

The court looked to Texas Penal Code § 22.01(a)(2) and § 22.02(a)(2), which define aggravated assault by threat. Crucially, the court categorized assault by threat as a "conduct-oriented" offense, meaning the mens rea focuses on the nature of the conduct itself rather than the ultimate result. Under Texas Penal Code § 6.03, a person acts "knowingly" with respect to the nature of their conduct when they are aware of the circumstances surrounding that conduct. The court also relied on the principle that a jury may infer intent or knowledge from any facts which tend to prove its existence, including the method of the act and the defendant's movements.

Application

The court’s analysis focused on the physical dynamics of the encounter to determine May's state of mind. The court rejected the notion that "evading" and "threatening" are mutually exclusive objectives. Even if May’s ultimate goal was to escape, the court reasoned that the jury could rationally infer he was aware of the nature of his conduct—specifically, that revving an engine and shifting a vehicle into gear while officers were partially inside the cabin or standing in the door frame was a threat of imminent injury.

The court emphasized that May continued to maneuver the vehicle even after the officers fell, and he had to have seen their proximity to the wheels and the open door. By choosing to accelerate under those specific conditions, May demonstrated a "knowing" mental state. The court noted that the threat does not have to be verbal; the act of moving a multi-ton vehicle in the "danger zone" where another person is standing is sufficient to communicate a threat of injury.

Holding

The First Court of Appeals held that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the convictions. The court concluded that a rational juror could find that May acted knowingly because he was aware that maneuvering the Durango in close proximity to where the officers had fallen threatened them with imminent bodily injury.

Furthermore, the court held that the jury was entitled to believe the officers' testimony regarding their fear of being run over and to reject May’s characterization of the event as a mere attempt to avoid a civilian's truck. The convictions for aggravated assault were affirmed.

Practical Application

In a high-conflict custody or divorce matter, use this case to establish "family violence" under the Family Code when a party uses a vehicle as a tool of intimidation. When a client reports that the other parent "almost hit me" or "peeled out while I was reaching for the kids," the respondent will almost certainly claim they were just trying to "get away from the yelling." Use May to argue that the respondent's awareness of the petitioner's proximity to the vehicle satisfies the "knowing" mental state required for an assault finding. This is particularly useful in Title 4 Protective Order hearings where the "intent to harm" is contested.

Checklists

Proving "Knowing" Conduct in Vehicular Disputes

Establish Proximity: Map out exactly where the petitioner was standing in relation to the vehicle’s tires, doors, and path of travel.
Identify "Awareness Triggers": Did the respondent look at the petitioner before accelerating? Was there a physical struggle or verbal exchange immediately preceding the movement?
Analyze Vehicle Dynamics: Evidence of "revving," "jerking," or "peeling out" suggests a conscious choice to apply force rather than a slow, cautious departure.
Post-Act Conduct: Did the respondent stop once they realized the petitioner had fallen or was in danger, or did they continue the maneuver? (Per May, continuing the maneuver supports a finding of knowledge).

Defeating the "De-Escalation" Defense

Argue Concurrent Intent: Acknowledge that the respondent may have wanted to leave, but argue that the method of leaving was chosen with the knowledge that it threatened the petitioner.
Conduct-Oriented Focus: Remind the court that the statute focuses on the nature of the conduct (threatening), not whether the respondent actually wanted to run the petitioner over.
Proximity as Knowledge: Argue that it is physically impossible to maneuver a car from a stationary position without being aware of individuals standing within the "arc" of the door or the path of the wheels.

Citation

May v. State, No. 01-24-00406-CR (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 24, 2026, no pet. h.).

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Family Law Crossover

This ruling is a powerful tool for weaponizing "nature of conduct" evidence in Texas Family Code § 71.004 definitions of family violence. Because family violence often involves a "threat that reasonably places the member in fear of imminent physical harm," May provides the appellate standard to bridge the gap between a respondent's "flight" and a "threat." In a temporary orders hearing or an FVPO trial, practitioners can use this case to move the court’s focus away from the respondent’s self-serving testimony about their "desire to leave" and toward the objective "awareness of the nature of their conduct." If the respondent knew the other parent was at the car door and they hit the gas anyway, they have committed an act of family violence, regardless of their purported motive to avoid an argument.

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May v. State

Litigation Takeaway