What are the requirements to modify a custody order or get a protective order in Texas?
This question has been addressed in 4 Texas court opinions:
Tatum v. Noble
COA14 — February 24, 2026
In Tatum v. Noble, a respondent failed to appear for a protective order hearing in the 280th District Court. Following the presiding judge's sua sponte recusal, the case was immediately transferred to the 245th District Court within the same county, where the judge issued a default protective order. The respondent challenged the order, claiming the court lacked jurisdiction due to missing administrative forms and that her due process rights were violated because she was not served with new notice for the second courtroom. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the order, holding that administrative "Registry" forms are not jurisdictional requirements. Furthermore, under Texas 'exchange of benches' statutes, a respondent who has already defaulted by failing to appear at the originally noticed time and place is not entitled to new formal notice when the matter is moved to another district court in the same county.
Litigation Takeaway
“Failing to show up for a scheduled hearing is a major risk; a judge recusing themselves or a case being moved to a different courtroom in the same building does not require the other party to re-serve you with notice before a default order is signed.”
In the Interest of B.R.H., A Child
COA06 — February 11, 2026
In this modification case, the Sixth Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's order restricting a mother's visitation to supervised, therapeutic-only access after she unilaterally and unnecessarily admitted her child to a psychiatric facility. The appellate court analyzed the child's best interests under the Texas Family Code, weighing expert testimony from a counselor and an in-chambers interview where the child expressed fear of the mother's medical decision-making. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the mother’s access, awarding the father exclusive educational rights, and calculating child support based on the mother’s earning capacity instead of her reported income.
Litigation Takeaway
“A parent's unilateral and unwarranted medical or psychiatric decisions can be legally characterized as harmful acts, providing sufficient grounds for a court to restrict that parent to supervised visitation and transfer exclusive decision-making rights to the other parent.”
In the Interest of A.N.G. and A.G.G., Children
COA07 — January 28, 2026
The Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's order transferring the exclusive right to designate the children's primary residence from the Mother to the Father. On appeal, the Mother admitted that a material and substantial change in circumstances had occurred but argued that the move was not in the children's best interest. The appellate court analyzed the case using the 'Holley' factors, which assess parental abilities, home stability, and the children's needs. The court ultimately held that because the trial court is in the best position to judge witness credibility and the nuances of the case, and because there was sufficient evidence that the Father could provide a stable environment, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the custody arrangement.
Litigation Takeaway
“In custody modifications, conceding that a "material and substantial change" has occurred focuses the entire legal battle on the child's "best interest." Because appellate courts give massive deference to trial judges on these issues, litigants must prioritize building a comprehensive record of stability and parental involvement at the trial level, as overcoming an "abuse of discretion" standard on appeal is a high hurdle.”
Anum Kamran Sattar v. Ryan Zedrick Hazlitt
COA05 — February 11, 2026
In Sattar v. Hazlitt, the Dallas Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's denial of Anum Sattar's application for a protective order against Ryan Hazlitt. The case arose from "dueling" protective order filings, with Sattar claiming a history of emotional abuse and a specific instance involving a firearm. The trial court excluded testimony regarding Hazlitt's emotional slights and manipulative behavior, focusing strictly on whether the conduct met the definition of "family violence" under Texas Family Code § 71.004. The appellate court affirmed the denial, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Sattar's testimony about physical threats lacked credibility and that general interpersonal misconduct is insufficient to warrant a Title 4 protective order.
Litigation Takeaway
“To secure a protective order, an applicant must provide credible evidence of physical harm or imminent threats; general "bad behavior," infidelity, or emotional manipulation does not meet the statutory definition of family violence in Texas.”