This question has been addressed in 1 Texas court opinion:
COA11 — February 20, 2026
After Johnathan McKissick was convicted of injury to a child, he appealed on the grounds of a 'material variance' because the child's name in the indictment (his birth name) differed from the name proven at trial (his adopted name). The Eleventh Court of Appeals analyzed whether this discrepancy prejudiced the defendant's defense or created a risk of double jeopardy under the Gollihar framework. The court held that the variance was immaterial because the defendant was not surprised by the identity of the victim and his defense was not hindered. Additionally, the court found no violation of discovery mandates under the Michael Morton Act, as the defendant had signed a discovery waiver and could not prove the State intentionally suppressed evidence discovered after the trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“A child's legal name change resulting from an adoption or termination proceeding does not create a 'material variance' that would invalidate a parallel criminal conviction, provided the defendant has notice of the victim's identity and is not prejudiced in their defense.”